During this battle, my father was part of Bombing 16 from the USS Lexington flying an SBD in Ralph Weymouth's squadron. Carrying 1000 pound bombs, on their leg out, he said that they plotted their course staying low gradually climbing to arrive at 15,000 feet over the target area. As he started down, he noticed a group of TBFs being jumped by Zeros. One TBF was shot down and fortunately they saw 3 chutes and all of the crew were later rescued by a PBY. My father said his dive went well and he released his bomb at 1500 feet. At his release point his said his canopy and windshield had fogged badly because his SBD had a malfunctioning heater. As he pulled out of his dive, his gunner confirmed that they had gotten a hit. He didn't say or may not have known at the time which carrier he dove on but we now think it was either the Hiyo or the Junyo.. Because of the fogged canopy and wondering where he was, he jammed open the cockpit and found they were directly over a Japanese DD at about 500 feet which was firing at them. Fortunately they were not very good and his plane didn't take a hit. He worked his way around the entire Japanese fleet to get to their rendezvous point for the long trip back. During the return, he also turned off his radio because he couldn't stand the what he was hearing. When he got back to the Lexington, low on fuel, he found the the flight deck had been fouled by an SB2C. (Thank you Harold Buell.) Later, Buell tried to justify his actions of ignoring the wave off in his book "Dauntless Helldivers". His actions killed two, while endangering the lives of others trying to land, including the life of my father. When my father was finally was able to land, only 14 of the 34 Lexington planes found their way back to their home carrier. Despite what they had just gone through, I think Seth, Bill and Jon are right on about some of the aviators and their determination to finish off the Japanese fleet. My father said that his squadron had talked about and considered a followup attack the next morning. Weymouth put together a group of 10-12 volunteers dive bombers who would attack. It would be a one-way mission with the proviso that after the attack they would ditch in mass and be picked up by a destroyer. He said that the plan was rejected by the admiral's staff because their primary mission was to protect the landings on Saipan and Guam. For his actions during the battle my father was awarded the Navy Cross.
I am very moved when we hear confirmation from people who were participants. Through a son is close enough. Thanks for the post. My dad was not able to join the fighting forces because the draft board prevented his desire to be an aviator because he was an electrical engineer with G.E. who provided turbines and communications, and other "high tech" equipment for Liberty ships. He was responsible for the checkout of the production from the Kaiser shipyards located on the Columbia River which empties directly into the Pacific. The mouth of the Columbia provides its own gate and security. The currents at the mouth are very dangerous to small vessels. They capsize, or run smaller craft onto reefs and rocks, and sand bars whose locations are constantly changing in the rip currents and tides. On one checkout cruise, the ship being checked out was just into the ocean maybe a mile offshore, when a Japanese submarine surfaced nearby. After determining that this ship was empty, the sub moved off and sub merged. Not worth a torpedo empty. No shots were fired although several crew manned the AA weapons. The civilian contractors, my Dad and others, told the crew of new sailors that they shouldn't start something they could not finish. The crew weren't trained or shaving yet. These ships got the men and all their stuff to the Pacific War. Dad was disappointed for awhile at the decision of the draft board, but my mother sure was not. She had brothers and other relatives and Coast Guard Academy classmates in harms way... Two died in early in the war presaging Kamikaze attacks by crashing their plane onto a surfaced U-boat off New Jersy. An order stopped those kinds of attacks by our people, but we were getting badly mauled by the U-Boats and were frustrated at our primitive anti submarine effort. It wasn't long before radar was on patrol planes, but to hear Mom tell it, it was forever. She was genuinely scared. She didn't know what we now do.
I don't think Harold Buell should be blamed as much some, we don't know all the circumstances for sure and we weren't there, everyone's nerves are on edge for a night landing. Very proud of your father's actions here!
I already said my piece but thanks again for your post. If you have anything to donate to the WW2 or Nimitz museum, I'm sure your first person account about the second day of this Battle would find its way onto an exhibit.
Love this channel, coming from sunny England coverage of the Japanese war is basically Pearl Harbour, Mid way, a few islands then victory. This channel has shown how bloody hard victory was for Americans and allies, I never know how many low's had to be overcome before the tide started to turn. Keep it up. Also, John is a great guest speaking
I thought the War in Pacific became relevant in the case after Midway, when the BPF (British Pacific Fleet) starting to join the Fast Carrier Task Force starting from Iwo Jima onwards. Since it was worth reporting rather than battles like Philippines Sea, Leyte Gulf etc.
hypohystericalhistory has a great, comprehensive, respectful take on the south pacific campaign that really opened my eyes to the contributions of the Australians and Kiwis. i highly recommend them.
American here, it's about the same here. We focus a lot more on the European theater. I knew the major naval and air battles in the Pacific (the exciting part with battleships, carriers and cool looking planes) but not really the fighting on the islands except Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima. I'm loving this podcast!
Hi, in 1964, as a 12 year old I walked about the neighborhood around St. Paul's cathedral in London. Both my mother and father were US Navy, dad in the thick of it in the Pacific. The damage from the German Blitz was still very obvious in London 19 years after VE Day in 1945. ( I have 8mm color film taken that day in September )Few Americans then, and a dismally few now, know the sacrifice every British civilian and Military endured from 1940 to 1945, and the rationing afterwards. I would like to see an equivalent presentation about Britain's huge contribution to the destruction of Fascist Germany. Cheers!
So let me make sure I understand something here. Jon Parshall, co-author of one of my favorite historical volumes and frequent guest on one of my favorite RU-vid channels, also built plastic models of ships, plays Overwatch, and is a bassist? My doe-eyed fanhood of this man is growing by the day.
Best WWII Pacific Campaign podcast. For total WW2 coverage it is hard to beat Second World War - Day by Day. And for Navel history in general Drachinifel has been the pioneer here on RU-vid. If you aren't following him two of best are: "The Mark 14 Torpedo, Failure is like Onions" and "French Pre-Dreadnoughts - When Hotels go to War." Military history enthusiast are truly living in a blessed time.
One of the attributes of these fine gentlemen is their courtesy to one another and guests. Nobody talks over another. They are quick to cut off a conversation conflict. Everyone is a good listener as well as precise in their speech. There are a couple whose hosts blab on, ruining otherwise good content.
Great show as always!! Yes the, to a question posed by Cmdr Totey, yes the Hellcat fighters had hard points under the wings for bombs, and later in the war rockets, as well as hard points underneath the fuselage for an external drop tank. Great show as always. On a side note, my sister gave me John Parshall and Anthony Tullys book “Shattered Sword” for Christmas. We are well and truly blessed today.
I was like 401. You guys are 5 min into this episode and it’s already up to 1600. You guys are doing great work and people are watching. Couldn’t happen to a better group of guys.
Re the relationship between Marc Mitscher and Ray Spruance: an analogious situation existed in the IDF re Ariel Sharon. Sharon tended to lie often in reports and his superiors knew it. But they respected his abilities. He wasn't promoted for some 7 years after the 1956 Sinai War because of his disregard for orders and his attempt to lie his way out of the situation. But he later made up for it in the 1967 and 1973 wars when as an armored commander he charged across the Sinai and later crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt and surrounded the Egyptian 2nd Army. Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan's bet on Sharon eventually delivering had paid off. Dayan refused to kick him out of the army and Yitzhak Rabin promoted him in 1964. In 1943-44 the U.S. was not between wars and eventually needed all the talented officers that it could find. So the situation was even more dire and urgent than in the IDF during Sharon's mid-career.
And I thought I knew a lot about the WW2 Pacific campaign. Watched Victory at Sea as a preteen. The Fighting Lady, Tora Tora Tora everything I could find. I couldn't tell you how many documentaries I watched, but if it was in black and white and had warships or warplanes then I was there. Moving past the fiction, I starting reading memoirs. Guadalcanal Diary, With the Old Breed and lots more. Semi-memoirs like Goodbye Darkness (which is an incredibly moving retelling of WW2 marine memoirs. Then I heard about the Shattered Sword (Drachinifel introduced Jon to me) and it was like an awakening, battles retold in greater depth without the "inevitable march to victory" refrain, not ignoring the mistakes we made (mitscher's gun decking his report after Midway), academic rigor! Thanks very much to you three, plus Drachinifel and HypoHystericalHistory it is like WW2 is an entirely new war to me. Everything I "thought" I knew is open to at least re-examination. I am having a ball with this.
You might find interesting Gerhard Weinberg's "A World At Arms". Very high-level overview; zero tactical- or operational-level focus. But I can't remember any other WW2 work which so readily reflected the strategic/political-level complexity, uncertainty, and interconnectedness among all the major theaters like Weinberg did here. Insights almost every page (lol, over 1000 of 'em) that had never occurred to me or I'd not seen before (and I've been reading about WW2 more or less continuously for 40+ years).
@@cragnamorra Thank you for the reference. I am retiring next year and will have more time. I plan on doing more reading and a big chunk will be historical in subject matter.
There IS an access hatch on the underside of the Grumman TBF/TBM Avenger. In fact, the only way for the turret gunner to get out while airborne was to climb down into the radioman’s compartment, put on a parachute, and then jump out that hatch. I believe the turret confines were too restrictive to accommodate a parachute in flight.
You are welcome. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and Bill. Please enjoy an adult beverage on me for the both of you. Cheers! Love your work men!
I loved the talking heads. Tina was my favorite. I play drums. Jon plays bass, right on. Now I know Tinas Dad was there. I'm happy he made it. Your show is one of a kind. Maps, more maps. Thanks Seth and CPT Bill. Your the best.
@@william_toti Which is why I *immediately* made my way into the highly remunerative field of naval history! Running a hedge fund? Pffft! I'm goin' where the *big bucks* are, m'dude...
@@jonparshall Hello. Love the things You put out. You once told Drac how japanese planes that manage to return from Santa Cruz. You said the pilots were shell shocked. 20, 40, and 5 inch. We let em have it. Keep at it. Built many models over 58 years. Love the F4U, the Big E. Wished she was saved. Sara to.
Gents, with due respect, I think that you have skirted around the real issue that Mitscher's decision to launch an attack late in the afternoon was just a bad decision. Target fixation led to recklessness. The two non-variables in the equation - range and darkness - should have been the primary factors in the decision to launch (and the results proved it). June 19 excellent, June 20 bad. Love these podcasts and the obvious research that goes into them. Thank you so much for forcing me to think.
My thoughts exactly. Bill said in the wrap-up of this episode, looking forward to Leyte, "I don't think Mitscher learned very much from this experience." June 20 added a Phyrric flavor that wasn't there on the 19th.
Toti is right. Mitscher knew that the Japanese had suffered horrendous carrier based air casualties the day before and may have thought this gave him a distinct advantage. But the Japanese air casualties also made the turning on of the carrier and fleet lights a much safer option than it would otherwise normally be. Personally, I would have held the strike back to dawn the next day and I would have trusted radar to tell me if the Japanese had doubled back during the night. Also, the Enterprise and one or two other carriers had equipment specifially aimed at night operation and scouting. This would have protected the U.S. fleet from ambush during the night.
Adding onto that, I read that Mitscher had planned for Enterprise's VT-10 to launch a midnight attack on Ozawa's fleet. With 2 Avengers sent out to find them. This was followed up by VT-10's CO LTCDR Bill Martin leading the rest of the squadron in attacking them. But the plan was called off due to the after dark recovery.
@@leoamery not so much crackpot as extremely risky. The Royal Navy have done similar stuff before with Taranto and Bismarck. Plus there was a plan for a night attack on the Kido Butai during the Indian Ocean Raid. At this point, VT-10 had only attacked Truk in a night raid as part of Operations Hailstone in February 1944. Plus, The big issue was that this would be the first night torpedo attack by US Navy carrier aircraft. So lot of things capable of going wrong.
Wrong, Mr. Troll. Japanese submarines were never very effective in the whole of WWII AND by this time the U.S. had many escorts with advanced sonar and advanced weaponry like the Hedgehog. Suggest you go to the library once in a while and stick your nose in a book.@@leoamery
Peanuts compared to the total war effort. So, you are saying that a handfull of Japanese submarines are going to stop or annilhilate this U.S. fleet? Get real. Wasp and Yorktown were early in the war. Japanese subs could not even get close to a U.S. fleet by mid-1944. Indianapolis was more a case of dereliction by it's captain than anything the Japanese did. You, sir, are dreaming, drifting off into space with your nonsense.@@leoamery
To me this Battle Showed the aggressiveness of the U.S. Navy. The American priority was to take out the Carriers of the Japanese Navy. This would take away a large part of Japan's offensive capability. It also showed the Japanese how far we would go to sink their carrier force. What a great thing for Japan to understand. they had the best bait in the ocean. They knew the Americans would take the bait. The only Question now was, can Japan set the hook? Thank you, guys' great show.
Thanks gentlemen, I appreciate your presentation. Shout out to Jon I loved Shattered Sword and his work here is excellent. Shout out to John McManus (who I picked up on here) I am a chapter into the third book of his trilogy and recommend his books highly, page turners. Seth, Captain Toti great work. Thanks you're appreciated
Just because, you fellas are doing the world a great service, the fact you're a fun bunch to watch, & interact with, sort of, makes it even better. No, Thank You
Regarding Mitscher’s “Wish I was with you!” message. I can only guess what he was thinking but he was an early pioneer of naval aviation. The planes he was flying as a young officer were not much more than powered kites. He knew how far US naval aviation had come and like you guys said he really loved his flyers. I really think he wished he was with them on that mission even though he knew how dangerous it was going to be.
With regards to Mitscher's farewell address:"I wish I was going with you." I suppose I should read the book "The Magnificent Mitscher. At this point in our story, however,I wish he had gone on the "Mission Beyond Darkness." Regardless of whether he survived or not, he would have had information he didn't have this day and night. Sometimes, it's wiser to quit when you're ahead. That is certainly what the Admirals had decided when members of Weymouth's squadron were gathering volunteers for yet another shot at the beaten Japanese. I don't know if Mitscher was one of the Admirals who said "no" to that, but this decision has Spruance's prints on it. Saipan is the real mission.
@@william_toti Hey Bill, I thought as much. I am always glad to see him, we are Facebook friends and he is perpetually nice and kind and intelligent. But I will add that from we see of you on the channel, so are you.
I'm posting here to add my number to the deserved avalanche of praise. Launched on THE holiday of the year. Well done. Makes the day after significant ❤😊 I couldn't stand your suspense building pace, so I drug out HORNFISCHER's Fleet at Flood Tide and read ahead. Free of suspense I could relax and listen closely. His death was/is a real loss to the voices of the Historians. But we do have Jon who provides plenty of content & color.
Thank you all as usual for the pleasure of education on a topic I sadly had little knowledge. Big picture point #4 - this is a great podcast/channel. Well done Seth, Bill and Jon.
I do not look at it as weird. I look at it as the Enterprise being the most important and efficient fighting ship ever produced by any Navy in the history of Navies. She got it done, with scars. Watch her own episode by these gentlemen.
Also I think there are generally recognized as being 5 major carrier actions during the war. Midway, Philippine sea, coral sea, Santa Cruz and eastern Solomons. Not in that order lol
@@matthewnewton8812 Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Philippine Sea and Cape Engano. The last one tends not to be recognised as a carrier battle as the Northern Force barely fought Task Force 38.
This is the most comprehensive analysis of the battle on video and by far the most balanced and fair in any medium. I would argue that this was an extreme 'Macho' event by US naval admirals , that using cold reason, was not worth the cost. Two Oilers at that time was crippling to the JIN, but they were over; the battle was won the previous day with the destruction of Japanese aviation and the sub attacks which were brilliant. Bravo again gentlemen -
The idea about not using torpedoes is a complicated one you would have to just know what they were thinking. I immediately thought they wouldn’t since it was max range. Torpedoes weigh 1800-1900lbs. You could carry two or three 500 lbs for less.
Wonderful knowledgeable, descriptive discussions of the Pacific theater of operations 1942-45. You guys are the greatest. I can't wait fot the next installment.
The argument is made that the US Pilots at Philippine Sea I were inexperienced at attacking warships, may planes should be many kills. Well, what experience against warships did the US flyers at Midway? Some of Yorktown's pilots had Coral Sea. What else? --The battle of Leyte involving enemy carriers would have been much more interesting if Spruance were in charge there. He would have fulfilled Nimitz's order for Aircraft Carriers, but he would have left San Bernadno Strait protected at the same time (my opinion).
Thanks yet again guys. A superb discussion as always. This podcast formula with the three of you has matured to the point where it's now bang on the money!
You suggest the carrier strikes were disappointing. In the cold calculus of war, the strikes were an abject failure considering the assets employed. The subs outperformed the air strikes if taking into account a cost/benefit analysis and considering the change into kamikaze doctrine because of the air battles. What if task force 58 detached one task group, two fleet, one light or any combination of carriers to attack earlier, while still maintains main objective of protecting the landings? Question: Since the US subs were tracking the IJN task force, and sinking two of them, why couldn’t they have maintained contact over this period to relay coordinates to task force 58. How many subs were in the vicinity? Absolute top notch coverage and content from this channel!
The subs that got hits were in the right place at the right time. After that a sub doing maybe 2-4 knots during an attack and then really opening the submerged throttle to go maybe, maybe 8 knots can’t keep up with a task force doing at least 20 knots. So that’s why they couldn’t keep track of the task force e after an initial attack.
Thank you for this podcast. It helped me understand how and why my uncle died. Robert Varmette was a radioman/gunner on an SB2C Helldiver in this battle. My father always said he was MIA in the Mariana Turkey Shoot. I remember seeing the telegram the Navy sent our family. It said his plane was seen being attacked by a Japanese fighter. His plane was last seen losing altitude and smoking. He and his pilot were never seen again. My dad had a nice photograph of uncle Robert and his pilot in front of of their Helldiver which was taken just a few weeks before they were shot down. Thank you for remembering men like my uncle who gave their all for their shipmates and country.
I hope all your holidays are full of happiness. Thank you for all your hard work. Will there be a video on what the submarines were doing during Guadalcanal time frame ? CPT Bill more sub stories please. HAPPY NEW YEAR. SGT DOUG, RECON, 101ST, RVN 68-69, LZ SALLY
A salute to Lt. George Brown. Talk about great intrepidity, plane hit and on fire at least for a bit. Crew has left, drops his fish and it runs true, gets acknowledged and is lost to the sea. Thank you gentleman for letting his story be known.
I was thrilled to see a new episode having dropped the day after Christmas. I love this series, ever since I discovered it last summer. I went back and watched all the old episodes, so now I'm current. I consider myself a WWII historian, but from you I've learned more about the Pacific war than I ever knew. I also like the casual give and take between Seth and Bill, and the very best episodes have John Parshall as the guest. So many history presentations are about trying to impress people with pedantic scholarship, but you guys know your material without all that. Count me as a Navy vet and an appreciative viewer.
You guys rock! Love the cast! Hey could you possibly do a show or two on the operational aspects of the PTO? Idk, like maps and an explanation of how they moved that massive amount of stuff to the front? Also, where did it all come from? The planes came from Long Island, the oil came from Texas… Anyway, love your show!
Note to Capt. Bill: Flying the YE-ZB or "Hayrake" homing system was much more complicated than an NDB approach (it had to be, or it would lead the enemy to your Carriers). The pilot not only had to know what frequency the ship was transmitting on, but also the "Code for the day" which assigned a morse code letter to every thirty degree arc of the compass rose. In Essence, the pilot had to listen in his headphones and determine if the signal was getting stronger or weaker, or changing into another letter... through static and interference, all while flying an airplane. If done perfectly, you didn't waste a ton of fuel flying the wrong heading to get back to the boat. At least the bomber pilots had a radio gunner to assist them with the process (if he wasn't unconscious from loss of blood), but the fighter jocks were on their own. Thanks to all three of you gentlemen. Outstanding presentation!
i just remembered my dad telling me how much they all loved admiral Mitchner when he turned all the lights on..i was born in 1958 and i probably never wouldve been born if he didnt..
Can’t get why Mischer would launch a strike at that range and with his planes having to return at night. Ozawa’s squadrons had already been decimated and his carriers were heading north; weren’t a threat. Anyway, throughly enjoyed the show. Thank you and greetings from Malaysia.
Appropriately, much is said about the lack of experience of American flyers in attacking moving targets, but it seems to me that the lack of sufficient fuel not only impacted their eventual return home, but what about the psychological affect on the pilots at the time of attack. This seems likely to have affected their focus, their decision making their approach altitude, etc. Their low fuel and darkness were serious potential distractions. This aspect as well as the affect on pilot return to ship should have been a part of the learning experience in future operations where stretching the limits of range may have a very negative affect on results in multiple ways.
Do you know how many battles were fought in Europe between 1000 A.D. and 1700 A.D. where Generals and Admirals felt that they had to attack because otherwise they would lose their army or fleet? They are too many to account for. Most of those conflicts involved alliances and mercenaries, but the need to man up and show a pair has always been important for a commander in making battle decisions.
I was in a vintage shop last weekend looking at vinyl records and came upon a soundtrack album for Victory at Sea by Richard Rodgers. Of course I got it, a Christmas gift for me. It has a beautiful painted cover of an explosion on a Carrier flight deck. I remember the show from reruns on PBS during pledge weeks (waaay too young to have seen it in 1952). Great music too. Merry Christmas Team!
Victory At Sea was my gateway drug to the war in the Pacific (and in the Atlantic as well). I was all of eleven years old. All of the episodes are accessible online. Some of the episode titles were great. And Leonard Graves, the narrator, was superb.
I think that closing point, that Nimitz's regret on not getting more carriers in Phil Sea pushing Halsey to fall for Ozawa's decoy force, is something that CANNOT be forgotten. Far too often, leaders are criticized in what they do in a battle, but there is no recognition on past events that shaped the battle.
Bill made an awesome point. The bugler and the "Chaaarrrge!" just like Leyte would be, that urgent need to attack... even in a dicey situation. It had to figure into future IJN planning didn't it?
Retired SKC(SS), USN here, so hand salute to the Admiral. This battle is personal with me- my grandfather was on the Princeton during this incredible victory. He was the Chief of the Machinery Repair Shop.
As for the 0-range Japanese CAP doctrine - that stationed the defensive fighters right over the fleet - the Japanese carriers had radar, but IIRC they didn't have anything like a CIC setup.
Chester Nimitz and Ernest King: "We're backing Ray Spruance 100% because he stuck to his mission, and the mission was accomplished." Chester Nimitz and Ernest King, on further reflection: "Maybe we need to rethink the mission a little the next time around."
