I was very privileged to spend 2 days on the hill looking down over Isandlwana with David Rattray. Hearing on the first day the story from the Zulu perspective and the next day from the British perspective. An amazing experience.
I also was fortunate to hear Rattray describe the story while sitting at the base of Isandlwana. You could hear a pin drop. A marvellous story teller and sadly murdered.
Our Zulu guide at Rorke's Drift said that the Zulu's short stabbing spear was called after the sound it made stabbing into a body and the sound it made when withdrawing it - eech-schuk! The same guide told us at Isandlwana that his great-grandfather was an eyewitness that fought in the battle who described that when the redcoats ran out of bullets, and facing certain death, they all shook hands with each other and met their fate with great equanimity and calmness, fighting on with bayonet and rifle butt until they fell; bravery which deeply impressed the Zulus.
Such brave men invading a vulnerable people and killing them for their land... It was ALL about cutting off the Ottoman empire's monopoly on opium trade with China so we could take it over for ourselves. The Zulus occupied land the Ottomans had financed and militarised to protect a critical trade route. The only reason we hear about the Zulu's is because they were the only ones with the resources to try and compete with our superior firepower, the rest of the trade route was swallowed without a fight... Those men were fools and cowards who died believing they fought for a flag when it was all about resources and opium for corporations profit.
@@omnipotentpumpkin9755 Calling those men cowards is stupid and disrespectful. The average foot soldier has no say in what wars are fought or where. I'm pretty sure the flag is the least of their motivations - more likely feeding their families back home is the main reason they join the army, not fame or glory.
@@omnipotentpumpkin9755 yes because they always do a fine job of running they're countries, I know let's return south Africa to them, it will go from strength to strength and they'll all work hard and everyone will live in a land of milk and honey... O wait 🤔 give it a rest leftard.
One side armed with rifles with a lethal range of 1-200m and the other with a stabbing weapon with required the wielder to be within arms length. Lets face it the isiZulu were the brave ones. The Brits got taken by surprise at Isandlwana.
I was incredibly fortunate to be a part of an Earthwatch sponsored archaeology dig at the Mission station at Eshowe in 2000 with Tony Pollard's team; we also had a chance to visit the sites of the battles at Rorke's Drift and Isandlwana....very moving.
I thoroughly enjoyed this interview. I've been fascinated by the Zulu War ever since I saw the film Zulu when I was about 7 years old. Leaving aside all factual considerations, it is still a very rousing film. Especially the sing-off between the Rorke's Drift defenders and the Zulus.
One of my favourite scenes of all time. Even as a child I was thrilled by it and glued to the screen. Such beautiful, stirring, terrifying, magnificent music!
I bought the book all those years ago and used it for an A level course. I’ve always been interested in the Zulu war, something shared with my father who first peaked my interest when I watch ‘Zulu’ with him and he pointed out all the historical inaccuracies which I now do to anyone who will listen 😂 great interview of a great author.
Ironically, he just came out with his own inaccuracies in this talk. He said Isandlwana was a morning attack and the Zulus used captured Martini Henry rifles at Rorkes Drift. Neither of those claims are true.
The absolute arrogance and over confidence of some of the officers at this time is unbelievable. Especially as this had happened after the retreat of Kabul. Saul David explains this so brilliantly within this interview. Excellent as always
The retreat from kabul, and the ensuing massacre was not down to arrogance. Elphinstone agreement with the afghans was that he would withdraw and be given safe passage Assured by the afghans, It was just an empty promise by another savage, and Elphinstone column was massacred. No arrogance do I see there at all In fact just the opposite, a British commander willing to take the word of honour of a Muslim chief, That faith which became treachery cost all their lives.
@@caractacusbrittania7442 take the word of an enemy that you have invaded to give you safe passage is arrogance no? Considering we didn’t really understand how the country was run and the importance of the tribes, to think we would be aloud to retreat unopposed by a word given from someone who had no real control over the tribes along the pass, seems rather cocksure? Who dare would undermine the authority of the British empire after all?
I watched this as a young Para recruit in form up in '67. The atmosphere in the SKC cinema was electric, I'll never forget how our trg staff were cheering and shouting out advice. Wonderful times.
@@anandmorris I don't think anyone in the British Army has formed a square since Wellington's time Anand, that was a defence against mounted Cavalry, and they haven't been around for a long, long time,
Living in Brecon and having links with the regiment I spend time at the SWB museum , it was interesting to meet the Great Granddaughter of Robert Jones who is reported to have shot himself whilst depressed from the constant dreams about the battle, she was insistent that he tripped over a fence and the shooting was an accident, also discussed his VC medal which she told us was'stolen' and sold by a member of the family. Interesting hour sitting in the backroom of the museum and in truth a high lite in my life. I was informed that in fact the Zulu had more fire arms than the British but of course not as accurate but at hundred yards that made little difference, like Custer on the Little Bighorn, distance was the key, unfortunately for both they could not keep it. Excellent posting very interesting to listen too, thank you.
Yes. Around 1 in 5 Zulus were armed with a gun. As you said, not modern guns (at least not at Isandlwana and Rorkes Drift) but they still killed and injured. A considerable number of British casualties at Isandlwana were from Zulu gunfire (the actual totally will never be known), while at Rorkes Drift 18 of the 32 British casualties there were due to Zulu gunfire. Source, Like Wolves On The Fold by Col Mike Snook.
@@lyndoncmp5751 a government report of August 1878 claimed there were 20000 firearms in Zululand of which 500 were breech loading rifles (Schneider, standard British infantry firearm 1866-74 until replaced by the Martini Henry but still used by some Colonial forces), 2500 percussion cap muskets (Enfield), 5000 older percussion cap muskets and the rest flintlock muskets The Zulus had a lot of guns
Growing up in Africa, the Zulu war, Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift were of immense interest. Donald R Morris' (an American perspective maybe) The Washing of the Spears, was my bible on this. Magnificent book filled with magnificent detail that tells the story of the Zulu nation better than any other account I have read, and not heard anybody tell it better since.
An amazing book. It is showing its age, and sometimes says things that have been shown to be false. But still the single best book on the Anglo-Zulu war. Touches on the founding of the Zulu nation, the British involvement in Natal, the Boer Great Trek, the war and aftermath. Anyone wanting a copy can find one easily.
I have read & watched videos for information on Islandlwana & Rorks Drift for many years and this is by far the best most informative presentation I have seen. Well done.
Its actually quite inaccurate in places. Please, try listening to Mike Snook, Ian Knight and others. They are considerably more knowledgeable than Saul David and have written superior books.
Good interview. I would have liked to hear a little more about the actual battles of Rorke's Drift and Ulundi which were rather skated over, but otherwise, very interesting.
Amazingly, he came up with inaccuracies here. He said Isandlwana was an early morning attack and the Zulus used captured Martini Henry rifles at Rorkes Drift. Both of these are not true. The Zulus attacked Isandlwana in the afternoon and the Zulus at Rorkes Drift were not at Isandlwana, so they couldn't have used captured Martini Henry rifles. What's more, none of the 18 British troops shot by Zulus at Rorkes Drift were shot by Martini Henry Boxer bullets. Just saying.
My brother has one as well he bought about ten years ago. He restored it and was able to secure a few boxes of ammo for it too. It's loud, kicks hard, and fouls the crap out if the barrel after just a few rounds.
@@adambrowne01 absolutely worth the time I think. If you're not in the military side of things you can easily skip those. Both books are of such wide breath that I found myself learning about european institutional history, economics, technology while reading a seemingly simple couple of paragraphs on telegraph and dispatches between London and Capetown. Can't recommend highly enough. Of the English speaking history books I've read only Hobsbawm with his 'Ages,' and beevor 'the Spanish civil war' packed more information per page.
One of the VC recipients from Rorke’s Drift, Surgeon Reynolds was from my home town Dun Laoghaire, Co Dublin. Not sure where his pet dog was born though. 😀
One of the VCs is buried in a church in Llantarnam near Newport my hometown. After my kids first watched Zulu, I took them to the church to pay our respects.
@@Andrew-yb1uv Funnily enough, one of the few survivors (Horace Smith Dorrien) from Isandlwana went on to command 2 Corps at the battle of Le Cateau August 1914 in which my great grand uncle Lt Vincent Fox was killed in action. Vincent was the first veterinarian surgeon to be killed in WW1 and he was inside a Church tending to wounded humans (not animals) when the Germans shelled the village.
He gets basic things completely wrong here though. 1. Isandlwana wasn't a very early morning attack. It was an afternoon attack. 2. There wasn't poor scouting. There were scouts and sentries posted miles out. One of these outpost sentry positions saw large numbers of Zulus manoeuvring in the direction of the main impi at first light on the day of the battle. Bit hard to see them before this when the Zulus only arrived there just before dusk the evening before. 3. Chelmsford didn't go out on a wild goose chase. His recon patrol encountered a couple of thousand Zulus and requested assistance. It was actually a logical decision at the time. 4. At Rorkes Drift, the Zulus didn't use Martini Henry rifles captured at Isandlwana. For a supposedly renowned historian to make such glaring errors, particularly points 1 and 4, is astonishing.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I mean unless you have a PHD in history , I’d really probably have a word with yourself 😂 he’s written about this in extensive ways and likely seen material you don’t have access to - sure his referencing isn’t Wikipedia 👍🏼
Its a FACT that he got points 1 and 4 completely wrong. Saul David is a generalised history author. He's not a specialist on Isandlwana specifically. There are superior authors than him on the subject of Isandlwana such as Ian Knight, Mike Snook etc. These are my sources, not Wikipedia. Judging by his basic errors Id say that I know more about Isandlwana than Saul David does. You need to inform yourself more widely than Saul David. 👍
And let me get this straight. Dan Snow asks Saul David: "is it a night attack they make on the British camp?" Saul David categorically replies at 9:40: "Its very early in the morning". Are you seriously claiming Saul David is correct there? Really?
Saul David made a very interesting point about the similar military tactics of the Romans and the Zulus (closing with and annihilating the enemy). While I suppose it's possible that someone taught Shaka about Roman tactics, I suspect the guy simply realized that if he wanted a different military outcome, he needed different military tactics. Going from the 'relatively benign tactics' previously used by Zulu tribes to the outright destruction of opposition meant just that; destroy the opposition. I'm sure Shaka also realized that this tactic had an amazing ability to get other tribes to 'see things his way'.
If we are looking at Classical battles, the Athenian led Greeks also reinforced their flanks and thinned their centre before annhiliating the Persian beachhead at Marathon.
the best account was written by Lt Col. Mike Snook in his two books about the battles, 'How Can Man Die Better' and 'Like Wolves On The Fold, The Defence of Rorke's Drift'. Very well written and detailed, highly recommended reads.
Absolutely. Snook and Knight are the supreme authorities on this subject. Regarding Isandlwana, too many other authors spend too much time on the before and after and relatively little on the actual battle itself. Snook reaches his conclusions based on evidence, eye witness testimony and the standard practices of the time, to piece together what happened. Saul David, in contrast, makes basic schoolboy errors in this interview. He claims Isandlwana was a morning attack, that there was poor reconnaissance, and that the Zulus at Rorkes Drift used captured Martini Henry rifles. All three claims are absolutely false. Yes stick with Snook, or Knight, and ignore the likes of David.
I should add as well to take Quantrill and Lock with a grain of salt. They too have a bias. Thankfully their The Missing Five Hours revisionism, where they claim the Zulus deliberately decoyed Chelmsford out, and were moving on the camp to attack it in the morning (must be THE slowest attack in history because they were still en mass at their bivouac spot 8 hours after Chelmsford left) did not gain any widespread support except for some Durnford supporters on a forum.
@@jimzimmer2048 True, but for some reason the British always find a way to go beyond and above for their epic failures of leadership wiping out whole armies.
What a fascinating interview. I had no idea about most of the subject matter. It's an area of history I've never delved into much, but I'm going to have to now. Off to amazon for a new book.
Jason might I suggest you buy Lt. Col Mike Snook's two wonderful books on the Zulu War, How can man die better and Like wolves in the fold. The former perhaps the most definitive account of the disaster at Isandlhwana and the latter a first class account of the defence of Rorke's Drift. Nobody and I mean nobody describes these engagements better. You have some great reading ahead of you, good luck.
@@paulkelly8456 Off topic but How can man die better is itself part of a brilliant poem by Thomas Babington Macaulay. And how can man die better Than facing fearful odds, For the ashes of his fathers, And the temples of his gods
In the 1930s, Colour-Sergeant Bourne gave an interview to the BBC. In that interview, he states that all of the British casualties at Rourke's Drift, were the result of rifle fire.
Just over half of the 32 British casualties at Rorkes Drift were via Zulu gunfire. 18 of them, including 6 fatalities. Source Mike Snook Like Wolves On The Fold.
RC Fokker, In his book Like Wolves On the Fold, Mike Snook actually names every single soldier who was shot or stabbed. Its finely detailed and sourced by the army records. Bourne was clearly misremembering and exaggerating.
Saul David is incorrect when he claims the firearms used by the Zulus at Rorke's Drift were Martini-Henry rifles captured at Isandlwana. This myth is perpetuated in Cy Enfield's film, "Zulu". The warriors who fought at Rorke's Drift weren't present at the earlier battle. The firearms they used were old trade guns, typically flintlock, smoothbore muzzle-loaders.
It’s been a long established fact according to historians that it was the Zulu reserves that attacked Rorkes drift and were not armed with martini Henry’s. I was enjoying this interview until I heard him giving the version that was in the film! Anyway I’ll watch the rest and see how many other alternative facts he comes up with!
rockster He also said Isandlwana was a morning attack and the British had poor reconnaissance. The Zulus never got within miles of the camp before being spotted. Their movements in the hills to the north were seen at first light then their impi was discovered. Of course, reconnaissance and encountering a sizeable number of Zulus to the south east was the reason Chelmsford went out there. Because reconnaissance saw Zulus there.
Their is a famous photograph taken in 1929, on the 50th anniversary of isandlwhana. The photograph showns many Zulu now in their 70s Who fought there. There was no animosity between Zulu and British, in fact quite the opposite, many recounted the battle Tales were told, stories swapped, The photograph taken on the base of the mountain, among the white cairns marking the places were soldiers died in heaps. A Zulu, "each man fell in his place" Testiment to the line "a man came down, with his sword above his head, he charged and cut down the Zulu, before the Zulu killed him", he, and another in a cave, we're the last. The escape across the nek, toward the river, young husbands stand, Hamilton browns description of the attack on the camp, the Zulu children who went to see the dead white men the following day, And their description of things they found hard to understand, Even down to Durnford epic stand on the british right, and the discovery of his mummified body some months later, and cetswayos horror that the dead Zulu are so many they can not be counted. Cestswayo knew, being a very intelligent man, that this day spelled the end of his nation.
I was fortunate to spend some time in the area staying at the Rorkes Drift Hotel (recommrnded) including a whole day with a local expert who took us around in his Landrover and gave us a detailed insight into both this battle and Rorkes Drift. It was interesting to compare the films Zulu Dawn and Zulu with the real truth. He said Zulu Dawn was closer. The film Zulu was, well, almost totally inaccurate!
Overexaggeration in the film that was. The Zulus certainly didn't run 50 miles to Isandlwana. They took a number of days to get there and were not in any rush. They also preferred a rest day in between.
Halfway through this book and its a great read. Since watching the movie Zulu (on repeat ha) when I was young I've always had an interest in the period. Glad I chose this book as my first to learning more about what happened.
Hopefully you can move on to more knowledgeable and renowned Anglo Zulu War authors such as Knight and Snook. In this one video alone, he repeats basic mistakes and myths.
Really insightful. What stands out was the hubris that lay behind the events. That the Zulus had not choice and that Rockes Drift battle later that same day, was deliberately used to save face./cover up the reality. 11 VC medals awarded (all and most likely more besides deserved) but it feels like some higher up wrapped themselves in the flag, to save their careers and reputations.
Bit of a myth that, otherwise those at Inyezane that same day would have had VCs dished out willy nilly to them too. They didnt. The VCs at Rorkes Drift were fully deserved. Extremely brave men who put up tough and stubborn resistance in the face of overwhelming odds.
@Iguazu65: Chelmsford was a particular favourite of Victoria. His clusterfuck at Isandlwana was covered up by glorifying Rorke's Drift. The British public swallowed the whole thing without question.
I understand that the Director of the Russel Crowe movie Gladiator was fascinated by the Zulu War Chants. Check out the opening battle in Gladiator and the Germanic Barbarians are actually yelling Zulu
Read this book years ago, well written and researched and truly gives you an insight of what happened in this campaign and at Rorke's Drift. Great interview.
Really interesting question whether Shaka had any knowledge of the Roman army. It certainly isn't a requirement to produce a similar military machine. The combination of a throwing weapon, large shield and short hand weapon optimised for a one-stab kill was reiscovered / re-implemented on several occasions. The Romans learned the Pilum from other Italian states, the large shield form the Gauls and the short sword form the Spanish. It wasn't long before kingdoms all over Greece, North Africa and Asia Minor were fielding their own "imitation legions". The mercenary Catalan Company adopted similar aggressive tactics during the late days of the Byzantine empire. The Spanish conquistodor "rodolero" relied on sword, shield, breastplate and aggressive tactics in their conquest of Mexico. Maurits of Nassau suggested Roman style armaments when designing a Dutch army to repel the Spanish. He ended copying the Roman small-unit command/control, but using modern weapons of pike and musket. It's an effective system, so no reason why it should not be re-invented independently.
@Simon Appleton: That would appear to be correct. The Zulus at Rorke's Drift were held in reserve at Isandlwana. They were essentially made up of older men. Having been denied any glory at Isandlwana, they saw Rorke's Drift as an opportunity to be part of the action. Their withdrawal was not as a result of British resistance. They were satisfied that honour had been served and they buggered off home.
Much like Custer at the Little Big Horn, the conventional wisdom was that the difficult part was managing to find them and engage them in battle. Hancock and others had chased the Sioux/Cheyenne all over creation and never caught up with them. When presented with a battle that weren't sure they could win, the villages would break up into family units and melt away into the wilderness...until the Little Big Horn, when Custer found the largest concentration of Natives ever seen before or since.
Having a Left Right and Center to your army formation and throwing spears before closing with the enemy and having a good stabbing sword are all Very Sound military precepts.....and THAT is the connection between Zulu and Roman....very good military sense
Could you argue that the British did want to annex Zululand in the end? Doing this through breaking the land into chieftanships, hoping that they would get into fighting each other, and then they could come in claiming that they are there to keep the peace?
The Martini-Henry rifles taken from Isandlwana WERE NOT used in the Battle of Rorke's Drift. The Zulus at the battle for Rorke's Drift were Impi reserve warriors who had not participated in the battle of Isandlwana. These reserve Impi warriors were lead by the brother of Zulu King Cetshwayo, Dabulamanzi kaMpande, and they were upset that they had been denied (i) glory in the battle of Isandlawana and (ii) denied the opportunity to enrich themselves via looted items from the British at Isandlwana (such as the Martini-Henries.) The Impi warriors at Rorke's Drift were predominantly older (35-40 years of age and above) while the few firearms at their disposal were likewise old -- principally a hodgepodge of muskets and older rifles the Zulu had purchased or bartered for from the Boers and other European traders. In fact, very much like their muskets, the rifles at their disposal primarily fired black powder cartridges. Ultimately, Dabulamanzi kaMpande and his reserve warriors chose to attack the British at Rorke's Drift despite the express order from King Cetshwayo that they not do so. Again, no Martini-Henry rifles from Isandlwana were used at Rorke's Drift. Zero. Nada. Zilch. None.
And what meagre fortifications they were, too. Biscuit boxes, mealie bags, and two small buildings never designed to be defended. Plenty of ammunition, though, and some pragmatic leadership.
4:38 This topic is presented in the book _Washing of the Spears_ by Donald Morris. The author discusses the developing influence of the Zulu nation and the British colonials in southeastern Africa, neither of them being native to the area. The phrase, as I remember it, was that the British out paced the Zulus "in the twinkling of a century".
Underestimating the enemy’s abilities and willingness to fight for their homeland coupled with an overestimation of your own forces has often proved costly for armies and governments in historical terms. Britain has experienced this several times, and the United States fell victim to it in Vietnam. I was an infantry officer in RVN in 1967 and, having studied the French Indochina war as a young man, was surprised at the arrogance of senior command towards the failure of the French military and the spirit of the VC and NVA to fight for the reunification of their homeland. Johnson, McNamara and Westmoreland believed our technology and American courage and skill would kill so many of “them” as opposed to our losses their political will to fight on would fail. Even a casual study of the Vietnamese history of taking on bigger, supposedly tougher invaders, including the Chinese, when their sovereignty was threatened should have produced healthy caution in our leaders, not exaggeration of our capabilities. A lesson not learned but repeated in Afghanistan not long after Vietnam.
The British learned from this defeat but the Zulus showed the same overconfidence again and again at Khambula and Gingindlovu, despite their heavy defeats at Nyezane and Rorkes Drift.
In actual fact the Zulus didn't use weapons taken from the bodies at Isandlwana. They were still using the outdated weapons that they had prior to the attacks. That said, I thoroughly enjoyed this video.
1800 well armed troops vs 10 to 20 thousand warriors is not equivalent to 20 to 1 lol...I read a lot of these comments and there are so many excuses, admit you faces a fearless enemy lol
A bit of technical trivia: Part of the legend of the massacre at Isandlwana revolves around the ammunition transport boxes for the rifle ammunition. Something about needing a screwdriver to open them and nobody having a screwdriver handy. I have actually had my sticky paws on one of these original type of ammo box. Yes, the lids (plural) were, indeed, held on with screws. HOWEVER, the centre lid panel was essentially "tapered", i.e., trapezoidal and designed to slide sideways for removal. On a nice, polite English rifle range, the properly-equipped ammunition party would have the correct screwdrivers for the job..However, the wooden ammunition box was designed to be opened more roughly in an emergency.. A solid butt-stroke in the "narrow" end of the trapezoid with a Martini Henry would shear off or tear out the retaining screws and the centre lid section would depart rapidly, allowing access to the ammunition.. Like many good military procedures; crude but effective.. Now, if the troops in that column had never been taught that drill, that would be a big part of the problem. The second alleged part of the problem was that the Quartermasters in charge of the stores, including ammunition, may not have been in a serious combat frame of mind when they apparently refused to issue ammunition to troops from other units / sub-units. The old Q-Store mantra being: "You can't have it, somebody else might need it" / "Show me your signed authorization and sign here, sunshine", and all that. The approaching roar of thousands of asegais drumming on greenhide shields, overwhelming the rapidly diminishing rattle of rifle fire, notwithstanding
The problem with those old myths though is that its bern shown that the British infantry still had plenty of ammo when they fell back to camp. The other myth is based solely on one anecdotal remark and there was no follow up to that remark. The British didn't run out of ammo until the Zulus entered the camp, cutting off the ammo wagons. Only Durnfords men ran out of ammo on the firing line, but that was because he didn't make sure he knew where his own ammunition wagon would be in the camp. He rode out before it arrived and overlooked this crucial aspect.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The other thing that one might learn from British and other infantry doctrine and training, is that the PRIMARY weapon of the infantry soldier was the BAYONET. The rifle to which it was attached was merely an expensive noisy stick; an extension of the bayonet. "Proper" soldiers got up-close and personal to ply their trade an a "civilized fashion". The "spirit of the pike" died very slowly; much slower than millions of young men in the coming years. There were two other problems with all this antique weaponry. The .577-450 cartridge is large and powerful as black-powder military cartridges go. The standard issue cartridges were literally hand-made, composite cases with a steel base rim and a rolled brass foil body; not particularly robust. Note also that the single-shot Martini Henry went into service about the same time several other European countries were starting to field-trial black-powder-fueled magazine rifles that fired deep-drawn, solid brass cartridge cases.. One of the other designs competing with the Martini was the Alexander Henry, which initially used a cartridge of similar performance, but which was too long to work in the short, tilting block Martini action. That is why the .577-450 became one of the first "bottle-necked" military cartridges in use. As the name suggests, both rifles used the complex but effective Henry form of rifling. Another interesting bit of trivia is that the British Army was toying with early "machine-guns". There of course HAD to use proper, deep-drawn brass cartridge cases as the mechanical feed mechanism would tear the "rolled" MH cases to pieces in operation. These "machine" guns were not the sleek kit that was to develop in the next couple of decades, but massive, multi-barreled affairs mounted on horse-drawn wheel and trail arrangements. They were also regarded as artillery, and deployed and maneuvered as such. Man-portable, mostly-reliable, smokeless powder fueled, standard cartridge machine guns were, in conjunction with parallel rapid developments in actual artillery, the means by which industrialized warfare came about. (See also: "railways").And, as usual, the infantry doctrines were about the last to be amended to deal with this new state of affairs.
While researching the battles of Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift, I came upon the traditional purging rites that the Zulus were obliged to perform before going into battle. To say that these rites were nauseous would be a massive understatement. (I would recommend that those readers with a weak stomach refrain from reading on. What follows is not very nice at all, so you are warned). I will spare readers the most vile details, but a brief description is necessary to understand the point I am trying to make. Each Zulu warrior was made to drink a vile concoction brewed up especially for the rites by the "izinyanga", the nation's "witch doctors" as the British called them - which forced the warrior to vomit his entire stomach contents into a pit especially dug into the ground for the ritual. Now, try to imagine what this pit would have been like when the entire army of about 25,000 men had finished this horrid ordeal ! It even gets worse, for at the end of the whole process (which I refrain from describing in detail) the warriors spread some of the disgusting contents of the pit over their heads, their hair, their faces and their whole bodies !!! My main point comes now - just imagine if you can, how the whole Zulu army of circa 25,000 warriors must have stank when they attacked the camp of the 3rd Column at Isandhlwana and later, in part, the mission at Rorke's Drift ! To tell the truth, I am surprised that the British soldiers were not bowled over by the horrendous stench, let alone by the weapons of the Zulus. Sorry if I have spoiled anybody's day, but I thought that these seldom told details are worth telling, and I did warn you, remember.
Couple of errors here which surprised me - there weren't 1000 British soldiers at islandlwana, but about 580 infantry and another 100 or so from the royal artillery and rocket troops. Second, guns were not used from isalndwana at rorkes drift because the zulus who fought there didn't fight at isandwlana
To be fair to Chelmsford, splitting into self-sufficient columns wasn’t a bad idea. The columns struggled logistically on their own (one big column would have been impossible as well as being less flexible) and the Zulus aren’t stupid; even they wouldn’t be drawn into battle if the British went in with one big army. I also don’t think Isandlwana was his fault as it was only meant to be a quick supply camp with wagons coming in and out (making a wagon laager defunct). The ground was also too rocky to dig in. Colonel Pulleine should have formed a square while using Isandlwana as a defensive position but that’s only with the power of hindsight. He didn’t know that the Zulu force was so big and was probably influenced by previous engagements (such as the battle of Nyumaga, only a year before, where thin British skirmish lines battered a larger Xhosa force).
Have you not heard of the maxim, "don't divided your forces in the face of an unknown enemy"? Of course it was Chelmsford's fault he was the commander. Did you not listen, the pickets were too close to camp and the defence was mounted too far out. They assumed they weren't going to be attacked and so were unprepared. The soldiers ran out of ammunition and so a bayonet against an assagai = no contest .
Chelmsford was trying to take the initiative and fight the Zulus on his terms (a difficult thing to do with a large baggage train in tow). Otherwise, the Zulus could have used the tough terrain in that area to ambush his column when it was strung out on the road. This is what forced him to split his forces, although he did leave half of his force in the camp to protect it against attack. I agree that more should have been done in terms of scouting but their pickets were well placed enough to notice any enemy force approaching from the northern Nqutu Plateau. They were also hamstrung by the fact that a large part of the cavalry was scouting to the east. When Pulleine did have a sufficient number of cavalry from Durnford they did use them for scouting; that’s how the battle happened in the first place.
Zetectic, Saul David actually gets things wrong here. Chelmsford only divided his force at Isandlwana because the recon patrol got into a pickle and had to spend a terrifying night in the hills. They just tangled with around 2,000 Zulus late in the afternoon before and could not get back to camp. They sent word in the middle of the night requesting help from Chelmsford. They were certain they would be attacked by the main impi in the morning. Chelmsford chose the right military response. He took a strong force out and he left a strong force back to act on the defensive and protect the camp. He also ordered Durnford with his 250 armed mounted men up to the camp as well. Unfortunately Durnford ignored this order to get to the camp to reinforce and instead Durnford rode out chasing after retreating Zulus and brought the battle of Isandlwana on.
Zetectic, The defence was too far out because of Durnford. When Durnford rode off he told Pulleine he expected to be supported in case he got into difficulties. This absolutely obliged Pulleine to have to keep his infantry companies far out, supporting Durnfords left flank. Durnford decided to make a stand in a donga (dried river bed) a mile in front of camp. During the morning false alarm, when a group of around 4,000 Zulus were sighted by outlying sentries, Pulleine actually had the 24th Foot infantry companies 'stood to' in readiness for a Zulu attack just in front of the tents, in a very close tight defensive position. This he did from 8.00 to 10.30 am until Durnford arrived and stood the men down. If Pulleine was left to his own devises he would have defended much closer to the camp. His orders were to act on the defensive and that is what he did. Then Durnford turned up and upset the apple cart with his determination to take the fight to the Zulus and then his decision to make a stand a mile out in front of camp. The tactical mistakes at Isandlwana were primarily by Durnford.
Paul Newton I wouldn't even say Durnford was under pressure. He just went a bit maverick, desperately looking for action. His excitable decisions lead to the battle and subsequently the defeat. The Zulus did not even plan to attack that day, but Durnfords men rode into their bivouac spot, thus bringing the battle forward a day.
The Zulu regiments at rorkes drift did not take part in the battle of isandlwhana, they bypassed the battle and headed directly for rorkes drift, or kwa Jim, as the Zulu called it The regiments at rorkes drift were If memory serves, the udloko, the uve, and one other which escapes me. At isandlwhana regiments were the umbonambi, the ngobamakhosi And several others
Exactly. This is a basic mistake by Saul David. None of the bullet wounds on the 18 of the 32 British casualties by Zulu gunfire at Rorkes Drift were via Martini Henry. They were from older guns. Around 1 in 5 Zulus were armed with a gun before the invasion began. The Zulus outnumbered the British in guns at Isandlwana and Rorkes Drift.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Zululand was awash with firearms before the war with Great Britain began. There had been a Civil War between Cetswayo and his brother, and European traders had been happy to sell arms to both sides.
@@caractacusbrittania7442 Great info in relation to identifying the Zulu regiments at Isandlawana. As you know some of these regiments that were devasting at Isandlawana would take horrific heavy casualties at the Battle of Khambula on 29th March 1879. The Battle of Nyezane River was fought on the same day as both Isandlawana and Rorkes Dtift but is obviously overshadowed by the aforementioned more famous battles. Zulu KIA at the Battle of Nyezane River is estimated at 400-600 warriors.
So often the British lose because of arrogant and ignorant leadership, as well as underestimating the enemy. Chelmsford should have been court martialed.
Can someone please clear something up for me? Saul David repeatedly refers to Isandlwana as "Islandwana" (At least that's how it sounds, maybe my hearing isn't great). Have I been mispronouncing it all these years?
Well add 2 and 2 together. If the British had the largest empire in human history and they vastly underestimated natives of various lands. That assumption is one that has been made with experience. Meaning, that they had learned to underestimate them because from past experience resistance was very underwhelming
@@Michael-yl4ch also I don’t know how truthful his statement is. The British have many examples of not underestimating natives. They didn’t underestimate Indians and Chinese and used grand strategies to defeat them both. The other natives weren’t usually able to fend them off. I can only think of the afghans and the zulus which were both defeated completely in round two.
Yes but there was no internet or books about said natives back then so? Why SHOULDN'T the British have underestimated the Zulus? Their only significant battle against Europeans was a disaster for them, and no notable Zulu force had opposed the crossing into Zululand or attacked them in the two weeks prior to the battle. You don't overly fear what you haven't experienced yet.
No mention that Chelmsford ordered Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in and act only on the defensive, and for Durnford to get there at once with all his available forces. If only Durnford followed his orders and those given to Pulleine instead of riding off on the attack pressuring Pulleine to support his rash and brazen adventure.
1878 was also the year Manchester United was created, abeit called Newton Heath Lancashire Yorkshire Railway Cricket and Football Club. No idea why i had to point that out.
ITS INTERESESTING THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THIS battle and the bighorn 3 years before...multiple armies converging, a hidden enemy, splitting of forces, overwhelming numbers converging on smaller forces and of course massive arrogance. It could be argued repeating rifles were the decisive factor for native Americans at bighorn and yet we see here how the assegai and surprise could still be used to gain victory
The Zulus also had far more guns than the British. Older guns yes but they could and did kill. As many as 1 in 5 Zulus were armed with a gun, so thats at least 4,000 Zulu guns at Isandlwana, compared to around 1,000 British guns. All engagements with Zulus during the war are full of accountants of Zulu gunfire as commonplace. At Rorkes Drift, over half the British casualties were via Zulu gunfire. Zulu gunfire was very likely a high proportion of the British casualties at Isandlwana as well.
15:48 What he says here is an important rebuttal to an argument I have often heard that, if the Confederacy had won the American Civil War, the British Empire would have annexed both North and South shortly afterwards. That was a century out of date. By the time of the American Civil War, the British understood that it is more efficient to apply other forms of pressure, particularly economic pressure. The British might well have imposed some sort of limitations on the American navy -- which would probably have been unnecessary anyhow -- and they would certainly have imposed some trade agreements that would be very lopsided in favor of Britain. That would certainly be enough. For crying out loud, Canada was given independence in 1867 in much the same way. They probably would not have insisted on either North or South having the British monarch as head of state because it would be unnecessary and generate too much resentment; they would just lean a bit more heavily into the "special relationship" with both North and South and treat them as client states.
The counter factual game of history is always interesting to conjecture on. The Britush would not militarily be in a position to annex both the South & North. Crikey if the British were hostile it would galvanise both North & South against a common enemy. Remember the Americans fought the British twice in the American War of 8ndependence and War of 1812.
In all likelihood it would have reunited the North and South to take on a common for from 85 yrs. before and if any army went up against a battle hardened United American army that would have been all she wrote for them. No sir, not some European army messing with our Yankee brethren, no sir.
I enjoyed this thanks. Chelmsford knowing the Queen saved him from his incompetence. I did read that the ammo boxes were sealed up and the tools to open them were not available? Is there any truth to this?
Yes. This was highlighted in the film Zulu Dawn. The ammo boxes were metal banded and the lids screwed down. Only 1 screwdriver per company I believe and many sealed boxes were found after the battle.
They were screwed down to stop the widespread pilfering of ammo by the natives who sold them on to the settlers. It made no difference to the outcome of the battle, as many boxes were found smashed open with, presumably, the soldiers rifle butts. No-one in the six companies survived to tell exactly what happened.
I thought that the battlefield forensics team at Isandlwana concluded that they had a bad batch of ammunition which jammed the rifles and they had no time to clear them. The British Army were indeed complacent and with good reason. Before and after this battle the British Army were able to mow down equally large armies of African troops. They didn't seem to have too much of a problem at Rourke's Drift (with good ammunition). Addendum: I have since revisited this documentary. I have a faulty memory of it. I find it hard to give credence to their findings. They found that the rifle didn't like hot weather. It seems to me that it must have been as hot or hotter at the lower altitude of Rouke's Drift. The rifle was never found unsuitable for hot climates. They did a laboratory test so it is empirical laboratory testing vs practical experience that this issue was to my knowledge never reported. Make of that what you will.
I read somewhere there was an eclipse of the sun, which allowed the Zulu to get in close, plus the Martini-Henrys on rapid fire could jam the cartridge in the breech.
@@zen4men Not sure about an eclipse, it seems extremely note worthy yet I have never heard of it. I am sure that they would have loved to have put that into the film, Zulu Dawn, if they knew about it. I am not sure how you could jam a single shot breach loader by trying to go as fast as you can. I suspect that they were working those rifles as fast as they could at Rourke's Drift. There might be an issue with overheating the barrel and cook off but I have never herd of this in anything other than belt fed machine guns. I admit I only have one source for the bad ammunition theory. It was a TV program with a Battlefield Forensics Team. They looked at the QMs "Where's your chities" thing in Zulu Dawn and dismissed that as utter nonsense. They showed that the average Tom would have no difficulty opening the cartridge box without the correct tool. Box meet rifle butt. My memory is a bit vague as it was some time ago on if they found lot's of damaged rounds or something but I firmly recall that after scratching their heads at why there wasn't a similar outcome here to countless other engagements, they concluded bad ammunition jammed the guns which were difficult to clear, impossibly so in the time constraint of fast moving Zulu's closed with them. The soldiers were effectively left with less than ideal spears instead of death spitting rifles.
The MH cartridge at the time was very thin walled & filled with black powder, which would foul the barrel after lengthy firing, at least that's what I read. Soon after the cartridge cases where thickened & later filled with cordite instead.
@@2bingtim That is correct, which was why they were paper wrapped to help clear fouling. Again, entirely similar engagements prior and post Isandlwana resulted in a busy day at the office for British Troops. The round did suffer from hang fires, which isn't much of a problem if you are used to it. The Mk I Martini-Henry was a superb rifle, if extended firing resulted in a significant issue, they would have stayed with/returned to the Mk III Snider which was only a marginally less effective weapon. To see this comparison I recommend: ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-s-8DaM6BtrA.html
@@williamvorkosigan5151 Later MHs had a longer breech lever to enable better extraction of fouled cases. The reason the cartridge of the MH .577in Boxer round was lined with paper was to stop the black powder reacting with the brass cartridge case.
A few things ... First off - Shaka _may_ have served at one point in time in his youth - as a body guard for a traveling merchant - and this Merchant _MAY_ have been the one who passed on to Shaka the tales of Roman Legions and their short, stabbing swords. Next - there is to little consideration given to the locals who were scared shit less of the Zulu's. There were previous occasions in which the Zulu's - usually in pursuit of a fleeing Royal Family Member his relatives wanted dead - briefly invaded Natal. There were 30,000 Zulu Warriors in total. A significant Army by anyone's standards and with them being Justly refereed to as Black Spartans - anyone who wasn't scared shit less of them - was a fool. The Zulu's had begun a process by which, like a series of falling dominoes a series of African tribes displaced each other with large bands of them roaming about and in fact resorting to cannibalism as much of the future territory occupied by the Boers was depopulated. For anyone wishing to see an end to the constant tribal warfare that was normal, removing a power like the Zulu's was a requirement. People who condemn the invasion of Zululand - didn't have to live with the Zulu's as neighbors. There is entirely to much foisting of current, popular Western morals on people of a different age. One of the things that is common for people to do - is to take their past experience and use it in future endeavors. As with Custer - Chelmsford's previous experience was difficulty in catching the natives he was trying to fight. In all these cases - the Technologically Advanced People had good reason to believe in their power - but - when faced with drastically greater numbers of natives - they couldn't make any mistakes ... The person to blame for Isandlwana - was Pulliene. Regardless of any orders Chelmsford had left - HE was the one in command and HE should have adjusted his tactics to the threat at hand. Here - a problem may have been to much Staff Work in his history and to little Command in the Field. As to the Zulu's being mercilous - that would depend. They had been told to kill all the RED Coats - and they did - but some British Officers were not wearing Red - and there were more of them that survived. Yes - the Governments of many of these colonial powers didn't actually want empires - that they would have to come up with the money to defend. It was usually mercantile interests who got a nation involved - got in trouble - and then had to have the Army come bail them out. India in fact was conquered for the British Empire by the British East India Company - using Native troops with British Officers. The influence of Merchants should not be discounted. Merchants like things to be nice and quiet so they can make money without worries bout their inventory being set ablaze. Merchants are seldom shy about voicing their concerns to the local political people so it's not like local politicians were just doing things on their own. .
It was a clash of empires basically. From what I’ve researched, the Zulu were not actually native to that part of South Africa. The Zulu massacred every tribe in their way. They literally caused the Mfecane.
Incoherent ramblings here. What is a mercilous Zulu? Shaka could have been captured by British slavers when he was very young. He would then have been sent up to Oxford to get an education. He would have studied Roman History and learned about military formations. He would also have learned about English grammar and context. The reason why more British Officers survived was not down to the fact that they were not wearing Red uniforms. It was because they placed themselves at the rear where they were in no danger. Chelmsford gave the orders. His orders were carried out. The blame lay with him. Arrogance on his part. To suggest that the invasion of Zululand was an altruistic gesture is totally misleading.
I am curious about the pronunciation of the name of the battle. Phonetically, it should be pronounced iss and l 'wanna Yet David Saul is aknowledged as an expert on the Zulu wars and he appears to call it iss land wanna. Curious to know what the correct version is.
This is f-ing cool. Just a couple of dudes talking history. Maybe in the next piece with the same guest or another one, we could start in the kitchen getting a brew ready and the camera walking you to the parlor with all the tidbits of getting nicely comfortable in your seats, positioning the mug just, taking your first sip and so on. Just milking the footage and the audience.
