The Second Battle of El Alamein | Monty's Masterpiece 

Of course he does. He was the only general to resist Churchill's clamouring for an offensive. He refused until his troops and support were ready. Previous commanders caved in to Churchill's demands and were defeated every time.

yes of course

@Essinse Yes, Monty was a practical man. Deep Maneuver didn't always guarantee success, and you could easily risk outrunning your supply lines, as had happened a few times on both sides during the desert war. By forcing a gap in enemy lines with a powerful "mailed fist" and then driving the fist home by exploiting the gap with massive reserves of manpower, he was almost guaranteeing his ability to progress forward, even if it did take a little longer, as he was able to consolidate his gains and not risk losing them shortly after via counterattack.

Almost any general could have won with the resources Montgomery had, unprecedented in previous battles. Auchinleck certainly would have won, and without making such hard work of it.

@Essinse The point is his predecessors never had any of this, Churchill sacked them, and Montgomery trashed them to tge press (as ge does). Monty deserves credit for ensuring his subordinates didn't stuff everything up. Auchinleck did not micro manage his subordinates and they were almost all inept.

womp womp

Same here, my great-grandfather fought in this battle too, as part of the British Indian Army's 4th Indian Infantry Division, the red eagles. Held 2nd New Zealanders in high esteem.

@@JitendraKumar-tt3ht My Father was with the 4th Indians in a RAMC unit, he too held the Kiwis in high esteem.

You wouldn't say that about a land mine

womp womp

Might I take this opportunity to apologise to your late father on behalf of my late father, whose guns (4.5 inch mediums, of 69th Medium Regiment) helped to make some of the noise.

@@dovetonsturdee7033 No apologies necessary! He was mightily impressed by the barrage and could never forget it as it was a couple of days before my mother's birthday. He spent a lot of time out in the western saharan desert with just 2 other guys on a GMC truck with a radio transmitter reporting on enemy aircraft movements to get our guys onto them. They were often out alone with the danger of getting captured by the enemy as there were rapid movements on the ground. Dad started the war in the Royal Artilliery and was asked to transfer to the RAF after he'd been temporarily attached to the Observer Corps and had a good eye for aircraft spotting. He went on to be involved in both the Sicily and Italy landings and was invalided out to Tunisia to hospital after suffering an injury sustained somewhere north of Naples. He came back to the UK in time to be involved in plotting air movements during the DDay landings. He never spoke a lot about the war, but Alamein was always big in his memory.

@@rodsmith3911 Mine was at Alamein, Mareth, and later Saleno, before being transferred to the military police and, oddly, ending the war outside Dunkirk. As he was a Manchester lad, I never quite worked out how he ended up in a Welsh artillery regiment ( 69th was the Carnarvonshire and Denbighshire Yeomanry).

@@dovetonsturdee7033 My Dad was from Leicester and on call up in 1939 was ordered to report to Park Hall Camp at Whittington near Oswestry a Royal Artillery camp. He did some practice firing from the range at Towyn in West Wales. It was there that he first saw the Talyllyn Narrow Gauge Railway and as he had been to Wales and travelled on the Ffestiniog line he took an interest. When I was young he was involved with the preservation of the little trains and I have been a Ffestiniog supporter all my life having begun volunteering as a teenager. It led me to eventually work on the North York Moors Railway and I still live in Grosmont but have not lost touch with the Ffestiniog as I still do volunteer work there at 75! It's funny how life turns out and the effects of the war still affect us in our lives all these years later. I've travelled to a few places my Dad was at in the war but haven't been able to get to Egypt yet. I would like to see Alamein, Sidi Barani, and Mersa Matruh, and I'd like to see the Qattara Depression. All places he remembered from the war in the Sahara Desert. Have you been to any of the places that your father went to? I've visited Israel and Jordan where Dad did assault course training for the Sicily landings, and parts of Italy. It's such a shame that folk still make war when some of those places are so lovely to visit and enjoy.

I loved your story. I wish your dad had written a book.

As you will probably know the dummy tanks and trucks were only a small part of the deception. That is a story in itself.

@@simonmorris4226 Thanks for the reminder. An interesting character but you have to take many of his claims with a rather large grain of salt.

Yes, British were quick to use the talents of theater set designers. The Royal Army Ordinace Corps couldn't get enough of them and they were highly skilled. This came about from experience in WW1.

@@louisavondart9178 and the deception they did by rerouting genuine radio traffic and broadcasting it from the Kent area was genius!

Then the Germans fell for it AGAIN during Overlord.

I think he just have small head

He needed one to put all his bling on.

“Incomparable in haberdashery, indomitable in retreat.”

@@j24130 The problem is that he had a big head and a small military mind. (I’ll say that I did not watch this as I can’t stand the man) The war would have ended earlier if someone hadn’t pried him off the cross. Even Churchill couldn’t stand the man. We might have been saved if Gott hadn’t been killed. A hero was needed by the British and there he was. From Sicily to Caen and on and on, he got a lot of guys killed that otherwise might have lived. When he should have been taking the Scheldt Estuary (as a result of this poor move a great many Canadian troops, once again, paid the price as they did in Dieppe) and securing Antwerp, as directed, he instead used the cover of Operation Comet to launch Market Garden, almost last minute if you will, and Eisenhower had no choice but to go along at that point due to politics and momentum. An ingenious way of stopping Patton and the 3rd Army’s reinforced deep penetration across Europe, aiming at the heart of Germany. We all would have been a lot better off if he had been shot down in 1942 instead of Gott.

@@analystanalyst7652 Nonsense and half truths ! Montgomery had cancelled Operation Comet but Eisenhower insisted it was resurrected and expanded into Market Garden. Nevertheless, Montys part of the plan was still successful, however the American Brereton (no relation) messed up his part and hollywood blamed Monty. Just as they made the loud mouthed, racist no body Patton into a hero, no mean feat in itself .

you speak my Dad's words. He was in the Royal Canadian Air Force - a kid plucked off a farm tractor and sent unquestioning into events he didn't fully comprehend, based solely on his devotion to country and trust in its leaders. Those he flew against would have told identical stories. Politicians weren't in tanks or airplanes - decent, heroic young people on all sides were, based on love of country. I echo my Dad's highest respect for those in every force of every nation who were prepared to give their all. Bless the All.

@@coldlakealta4043 My father was taken as a prisoner by Montgomery’s forces whilst fighting under Rommel’s command and shipped to America as a prisoner of war before being eventually transferred to the UK as a prisoner of war. He was one of those that stayed in the UK where I was born in 1956. Also respect to all those professional soldiers who fought in duty to their country.

My father to, Royal co SIGNALS Then on to Monty Cassino

It cannot be summed up in one simple sentence like that. It wasn’t just one single person either. It was an army of half a million men AND women

Nope, Monty had to reorganise, teach and train the Army he inherited.

He deserves some recognition for making that good decision. He denied Rommel an open flank.

@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 and Auk set the conditions that made that possible.

@@Conn30Mtenor Montgomery's careful handling of the battle of Alam el Halfa made sure that Alamein would be fought on allied terms.

Where did they manage to get all the guns from?

@@Kalaswalia many of them were still in service from WW2. Also the UK still had national service back then so getting the man power was not a problem

It could be heard in Alexandria some distance away. F A CT

My dad was in Alexandria on that night and they could hear the rumble of that barrage all those miles away

When I saw the question posed, I was about to write about Alam El Halfa but you had beaten me to it, why is this battle forgotten ? The Americans love to claim that Monty couldn't lose at El Alemein because he had more troops and equipment than Rommel, but they can't say that at Alam El Halfa as Rommel had been resupplied, whereas Monty had not. Rommel had 6 divisions to Montys 4, yet he still soundly beat him, just as he did in their headlong retreat all across North Africa to Tunis where they were trapped between Montys 8th Army and Anderson's 1st Army and over 362,000 casualties and 300,000 surrendered, thats more than at Stalingrad !

I agree with your insightful analysis. I'd like to add that, other then continued defence of British homeland and home waters, and with it the preservation of the British Crown and King, keeping Britain's Atlantic lifeline to the USA free of the German U-boat menace, Churchill had prioritized limited empire resources (over other British theatres of war, especially the Far East) to defeating Rommel and Afrika Korps in the Middle East. This was to keep sea access between Mediterranean and Asia free of Fascist (Nazi and Italian) control via the Suez Canal. The was also concern over Nazi German access to Middle East oil. Another consideration was Churchill's plan to attack Europe's "soft" underbelly via Italy. In short, Montgomery had full backing from his Prime and Defence Minister in Churchill in the desert war, as part of Churchill's global strategic priorities.

@@lychan2366 Yes, Montgomery did have Churchills full backing. However, Churchill kept interfering in North Africa, and after the Italians attacked British Egypt in 1940 the British retaliated by driving them right across North Africa in a series of spectacular battles. At this point in 1940 the British had almost completely conquered North Africa, but before it was completed, Churchill ordered their best troops and equipment to Greece, leaving the British weak and vulnerable. The Italian and German reinforcements then attacked and drove them all the way back to Egypt and the war dragged on untill 1943.

@@johnbrereton5229 I wouldn't argue with your comments about Churchill. Yes, the reason why Churchill "interfered in North Africa" was because he had staked so much of British imperial and personal pride and prestige in the desert sands of North Africa, according to his global strategic priorities. Yes, he made a number of military blunders. As Stalin & FDR soon realised, Churchill's description of Hitler's underbelly (in Southern Europe) was anything but "soft". Having tolerated and finally lost patience with Churchill (especially Stalin), they prevailed over Churchill to open up a new front in the form of Operation Overload in Western Europe in 1944. Compounding this, Churchill's subordinates who came into direct contact with him got a feeling of a powerful character, immense drive and force. Churchill’s method of dominating meetings was browbeating, badgering and cajoling. These factors made Churchill privately unpopular with his senior military commanders; the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) and Chiefs of Imperial General Staff (CIGS), especially Sir John Dill and Sir Alan Brooke. Despite Churchill's blunders and faulty thinking, his relative priority to the Middle East meant that Monty enjoyed material advantage over Rommel. Of course, Monty's leadership skills at El Alamein, did help. When WWII victory came to Europe, a grateful public of Churchill's generation remember him more for his positive role than for his mistakes.

@@johnbrereton5229 Good points. Montgomery didn't have Churchill's backing until after he won at El Alamein. What Montgomery had before that was Churchill's reluctant silence after his first attempts to press Montgomery into premature action were rebuffed. Unfortunately for Auchinleck, whose plan at El Alamein Montgomery used (and publicly disparaged, to his great shame), his arguments for a respite to rebuild, train and reinforce the damaged 8th Army were over-ruled by Churchill, forcing him into premature attacks with disastrous consequences. Montgomery, like Auchinleck, could see what was needed and upon taking over the command pushed back exactly as Auchinleck had done. Having faced the same arguments for a second time, this time from the new commander he had just appointed after rejecting the arguments from the previous commander as 'defeatist', Churchill had to shut up. Really, Churchill's role in buggering up the British war effort is over-ripe for detailed debunking. You are quite right about his role in snatching defeat from victory in 1940/1 with the Greek adventure and his role in over-riding long standing Imperial Defence Policy in starving Singapore of modern forces over the lower priority Western Desert (where a purely defensive posture would have been more than enough, even ignoring the 1940 early 1941 successes), led to the worst military defeat in Britain's history. No wonder Churchill rushed to get his (version of) history out before any other author!

I don’t think Rommel was drawn into anything !! Couldn’t he read a map ? Well of course he could but he was an opportunist only this time he did not succeed. Much of his success was based on excellent intelligence via Bonner-Fellers , and that was stopped.

Because Bir Hakiem was during the abysmal Gazala campaign and had ZERO to do with the 2nd (actually 3rd) battle of Alamein being discussed here. The retreat from GAZALA was a shambles and in no ways organised or controlled. Auk made the right decision to pick Alamein as it was hard to flank - That became the first battle of Alamein where Rommel tried to breakthrough to Cairo. The second was Alam Halfa which is not given the recognition it deserves. Auk/Dorman Smith anticipated that Rommel may try to flank through that channel but the Dorman Smith plan relied on Mobile forces to plug it which would have been playing into Rommels hand as he would have picked them off Piecemeal. Many claim Montgomery just used this plan but the force dispositions and the etrenched nature of the defence plus the Artillery assembled and Deep strike of the DAK supply lines used in conjunction are all Montgomeries doing and these are what won him that battle where Rommels forces were the larger and well supplied with superior tanks (Pz IV F2) in some numbers. Instead of fighting a mobile battle with Jock columns and fd Batteries Montgomery fought a static one with Minefields , AT, Dug in tanks and Infantry backed by Medium and Heavy Artillery at the same time send ng 4 AB and the Armoured cars to attcxk his logistics tail. Of course the forgotten part is that Montgomery was already thinking ahed and left the battlefield as he wanted it with the Germans in command of the High Feature (Hienemat) and the great show of false forces to the south indicating that would be his Main axis of attack. That setup the battlefield for the coastal attacks

Respect to Italian

@@ShubhamMishrabro No respect for fascists

I heard about this too and thanks for posting the full story.

I'd be interested to see the sources for this. I can't imagine Montgomery allowing any enemy troops, however brave, to parade in front of British troops weapons in hand. It would be a humiliation to the British & French that fought them. Also the source for the destruction of 200 tanks? My source has it at 31 damaged or destroyed. There's no doubt that they fought well and held their line but I'd like to see sources for such claims.

Bravo well said. It was a combined effort.

Or the folly of attacking until exhausted with little supplies and weaker numbers by the Axis...

At the Battle of Gazala (& Tobruk), Rommel did not need 2.5:1 superiority, or for that matter, 3:1 to win a resounding victory in attack. Actually, he had inferiority in all departments: men, tanks, (over 2:1, excluding British reserves), artillery and also in the air, (all including Italian forces). Yet, while doing most of the attacking against the entrenched British positions on the Gazala Line, (Brigade Boxes) and the fortress of Tobruk, he gave the 8th. Army a bashing, killing, wounding or capturing half the men, (50,000) while destroying or damaging virtually ALL the tank force, (1,200), loosing in return just over 5,000 casualties and 400 tanks, a significant number of which were recovered and repaired.

@@joegatt2306 except Rommel wasn’t fighting montgomery, who was a far more professional and solid leader than auk and co. You can’t discount leadership’s impact on an army’s willingness to fight.

@@shanewilson199 Good or bad leadership, the Battle of Gazala stands out as a crushing defeat inflicted by Rommel on a defending British army when nearly all the odds were against him. On the other hand, Montgomery did not need to be practically adept to win the Battle of El Alamein. He had everything stacked in his favor, from men (nearly 2:1), to tanks (2.25:1 and not counting reserves), armored cars (2.25:1), artillery (1.6:1), anti-tank guns (2:1), serviceable aircraft (2:1) with an inexhaustible supply of ammunition (over half a million artillery shells expended in just the initial bombardment of 23rd Oct.), and fuel. On the other hand, due to his acute fuel situation, Rommel could only move once to concentrate his Panzerarmee, after which, it would not be able to re-position again, and from then on, with barely enough fuel for 3 days to fight. In spite of everything, it still took two weeks for Montgomery to force Rommel to admit defeat, (4th Nov.).

As the Yanks once said, If you find yourself in a fair fight your battle plan was wrong.

AS YOU KEEP TELLING US AD NAUSEAM! Give it a rest.

Yes the battles in the Western Desert had been going backwards and forwards for several years, first with the Italians trying to gain land in Egypt, then later German assistance.

Monty got the credit because The Auk set the trap and Rommel's rear was under threat. Monty must be the most overrated general of WW 2

@@johnbeavin9170 Yes, I tend to agree... I think that the British Govt, News, media, etc., all wanted to applaud the efforts of a Brit. General, and tended to minimise the work done by ANYONE else, of any nationality... If we look at the whole of the North African coastline, from Tripoli to Alexandria, it is a fact that the ONLY superb defensible position is the 50 mile gap from the Sea to the Qattara Depression...The fact that it is the last realistic place, where a retreating army could put up an effective block, means that, in my opinion, ANY General would have been able to stop Rommel there... It is generally accepted that Rommels' superior tactical brain, achieved successes, where there was vast open desert to work in.... But the area between El Alamein railway station and the 1,000 foot drop to the salt marsh, meant that Rommel was , for the first time, unable to swing far out into the desert, and do his skill... So I think that The Auk did a great job at the so-called " first battle of Alamein " but Churchill was eager to have a Brit. get the plaudits....

Hi think u will find Upham was awarded his bar in the first battle of el alamein

Allies had overwhelming numbers, 2x, 4x the tanks, aeroplanes etc.

@@Ofelas1 Not really.

Ah well with your common and garden "the fash should have have won" commenter the allies only win fairly when they do it with a soldier with one leg, a small brass spoon and a paper bag, otherwise its unfair. 😂😂

Where it it on record that Montgomery promised an earlier offensive?

@@thevillaaston7811 Churchill dismissed General Auchinleck in August 1942 after the commander refused to launch an immediate counterattack after El Alamein. He was unable to re-organise and resupply after the battle, as quickly as demanded by Churchill. (NY Times Obituary) This, along with his poor relationship with many senior British and Dominion officers in Eighth Army, led to him being relieved of command. His main failing in North Africa was appointing a number of senior commanders who proved to be unsuitable for their positions, or who had personality clashes with other colleagues in Eighth Army. (National Army Museum). Montgomery said Aukinlech had plans to withdraw from El Alamein, which was false. Can't now find the source of Montgomery's promise to attack sooner, which was to Brooke not Churchill directly.

@@carrickrichards2457 31.07.1942 Auchinleck signalled to Churchill that it was unlikely that Eighth Army could resume its advance until the middle of September. Just over six weeks later. 19.08.1942 Montgomery, in his 5th day in command of Eighth Army, indicated to Churchill that needed six weeks to get ready for battle. Six weeks later was 30th September. 30.08.1942 - 05.09. 1942 The Battle of Alam-el-Halfa. In the period after the conclusion of the battle, Montgomery reviewed the Eighth Army situation and concluded that Alamein would not commence until the 23rd October, the first full moon in October. 23.10.1942 - 11/11/1942 The Second Battle of Alamein. Montgomery went on to deliver a resounding victory that ended the war in North Africa as a contest, for less than 8% casualties.

See the other comment below. I can't remember the exact figures but a very large amount of German/Italian supplies were attacked and sunk by the RAF and Royal Navy as they sailed across from Italy to north Africa. Hence why Malta was such an important base - with RAF aircraft and RN submarines based there.

Forming SAS and LRDG units was a massive undertaking requiring loads of training as well as experience to pull off correctly. The early SAS joined LRDG patrols and used them like a taxi service to drop them off on a mission and pick them up again. Members of the SAS even said the experience of the LRDG was invaluable in those operations and it took a while for the SAS to catch up to the LRDG's long-distance driving and survival skills. This is mostly from the book Eastern Approaches; in the second part of the book, he covers his time in the SAS during the North African campaign, it's a little before Alamein but gives a good idea of the difficulties of raising such a force.

@@conan5300 .. The LRDG were New Zealanders. All volunteers and they needed no training in living rough in the desert while wrecking German and Italian supply lines. It came naturally to them. The British SAS lost half their force on their first failed mission, were at risk of being disbanded and in desperation asked for help from the LRDG. After that, they stole all the glory, along with the LRDG's best navigator. I won't knock the SAS today but in those early days they were shite. Their parachute training took the form of jumping off the back of moving trucks... FFS. Most of their initial kit was stolen from a NZ base. The Kiwis probably felt sorry for the SAS as they floundered to the job the Kiwis had done for 2 years already.

@@louisavondart9178 'LRDG were New Zealanders' And also British.

The LRDG and the later SAS had been operating for over 2years. They were useful in intelligence gathering and disruption activities, they were high risk with high casualty rates requiring the most highly trained and motivated troops but Campaigns could only be won with Main Force actions. There was a fear that without main action the Western Allies could do little except "Commando" attacks carried out by near "private" armies.

"There was also too much chatter on the British radio nets-gossiping really-and no real radio discipline. Another bad British habit was too much "cc’ing" of messages instead of simply leaving these addresses off of messages that did not directly concern them. From just one message, Seebohm could learn all the out stations (subordinate units) to the control station (commanding unit). He could combine that with a captured codebook and/or good traffic analysis, and a British order of battle could be built up over time." Rommel’s 621st Radio Intercept Company

They were famous for beating the Germans and The Japanese. No other Army unit could say that

@@Rusty_Gold85 yes indeed they paid a heavy price specially againest Rommels afkrian Korp through they didn't break the German line the certainly put tremendous pressure on Rommel held Just !! He consider the Aussie 9th division an elite fighting solders because of thier stature they. We're big strapping men from few prisonors captured and there tenacity in fighting they were the only division that could have done what they did every body from Winston churchill down to the lower ranks in montgomery Eight army knew what the aussies 9th division contribution in the Elamien battles and without thier sacrifice the outcome as it did wouldn't have happen

Yes agree the 740 souls of the 2/27th WA can vouch for that

I served with a Warrant Officer in Vietnam in 1966 who had been a corporal at El Alamein

Nick what Cape ? No US planes on Malta the US never manufactured our Artillery or Ammunition or A/T guns or 3.7 inch A/A guns and our Blitzs were Canadian Nick Where did the US sink enemy shipping in the Med Nick Oh you mean after El Alamein ?

@@jacktattis Cape of Good Hope numb nutz. 4,242 57mm, M1, on carriage M2 Lend leased to Britain. page 7 Hyperwar Lend Lease shipments Ordnance--General Supplies May 1942 USS Wasp launched Spits to Malta for the second time in two months when the USN lost one fleet carrier, one fleet destroyer and one fleet oiler with another fleet carrier damaged at Coral Sea preventing the IJN form landing on New Guinea.

He didn’t choose the ground as such, but he knew it from service here in the years before the war. His knees weren’t as white as suggested.

And he had a shorter supply line .

It was actually Gen Claude Auchinleck who chose the Battleground at the Qatarra depression at the First Battle of El Alamein. Auchinleck had fewer soldiers and equipment and still did good considering that fact. Montgomery who was arrogant and overrated in my opinion waited until a few hundred American Tanks and more Troops arrived before he commenced the Second Battle of Alamein. The Long German supply lines and the short British Supply lines was also a strong mitigating factor of the outcome.

Up until June 1942 Rommel had been receiving detailed information about the strength and movement of British forces from reports sent to Washington by Colonel Bonner Frank Fellers, the U.S. military attaché in Cairo. The American code had been stolen following a covert operation by Italian military intelligence at the American Embassy in Rome the previous year. Montgomery benefited because the Americans finally stopped using the code, so Rommel no longer had the intelligence advantage.

Montgomery didn't choose this position. The Allies had already stopped the Axis in 1st Alamein and following attack. This was a counterattack...that was hugely outnumbering the Axis.

Rommel knew how dangerous the Australian and New Zealand soldiers were, so he had to counter them whenever they attacked. Monty knew this of course, and counted on them drawing in German resources every time the ANZACs showed up, allowing the rest of the army to attack elsewhere.

Where did you pick that up from? Aust 9th Division was ambivalent at best, with many officers considering Montgomery to be a prima dona. Auchinleck's issue with the Australians was that Morshead was quite prepared to appeal to the Australian government if necessary, and actually held the authority of the Australian government to countermand Auchinleck's directives and orders when he considered it necessary to protect the cohesion and integrity of 9th Division. Montgomery hadn't faced that, and didn't have time to develop ill will...on the other hand, he knew he would lose 9th Div after the battle, so he was quite prepared to burn the Division out in the fighting, as even totally losing it would not impact on his post battle troop strength. As the Australians knew that, do you really think they 'loved' Montgomery?

@@Gungho1a Results speak for themselves, el Alamein was a victory. The Australian military had lost faith in the judgement of Churchill and British commanders in general by around April 1942, the fact that they were prepared to tolerate Montgomery says it all. The Australians were quite prepared to appeal to the Australian government due to experience in 1941 when the British had disregarded the agreement reached by Churchill and Menzies in 1940; the AIF would fight as a single contiguous force under an Australian commander. Blamey ensured the relief of the 9th from Tobruk and forming up of the Australian Corps much to the displeasure of the British who treated Australian commanders with disdain. Blamey decsribed himself as the most hated man in Cairo before his return to Australia. Montgomery had no intention of splitting the Australians up, he was too smart. He also didn't "burn" them out as expendable, he gave them a tough job that he was confident they could do; lead the attack and then withstand Rommel's counterattack which was German doctrine at the time. He was confident because the 9th under Morshead had withstood Rommel at Tobruk the year before. Churchill tried to keep the 9th division until the end. As the British controlled shipping the only reason why they released the 9th was that Australia made it clear no further reinforcements would be sent. Hundreds of thousands of Australians flocked to the streets of Australian cities to welcome Montgomery after WWII (there is a RU-vid video) and he also had a happy reunion with members of the 9th division, as he did for the rest of his life.

@@guyh9992 ...Blamey went on to become the most hated man In Australia. Aussie troops refused to do the " Eyes Right " for him on parade. He'd called them cowards in New Guinea and they never forget an insult.

@@louisavondart9178 'Aussie troops refused to do the " Eyes Right " for him on parade.' Where is this on record? 'He'd called them cowards in New Guinea and they never forget an insult.' Where is this on record?

Which was of course the intention. Grand strategy. But of course they should’ve had a man in man tank duel with equal numbers of aircraft and tanks.

Precisely and well said. It wasn’t all good old Diggers with rifle and bayonet.

Two directions? Op Torch was 3000 miles away and only started very late in the Ala. It had zero effect on the battle and by the time US forces faced Rommel at Kasserine Montgomery had gone 1900 miles and was taking the on the German defences to Tunisia having defeated him in four battles at this stage

Rommel made the big mistake of advancing into Egypt instead of defending in Libya like he was originally supposed to.

Patton was a blowhard show-off and not a very good general. Monty had to come to his rescue at The Battle of the Bulge. The Germans can't have thought much of Romell either or they would have put him on the Eastern Front instead of a sideshow like North Africa.

I suggest you research Wellingtons tactics in the peninsular war. I suspect Monty Had!

@UK Media Warrior Despite claims that "Monty only attacked with overwhelming force", he had just a 4/3 advantage in infantry (60,000 to 45,000), Yet he inflicted 30,000 to 50,000 casualties on the Germans, and by the time Panzer Army Africa retreated to Tunisia 80- 90% of the army were killed, missing or captured.

You've got good points, despite those who support Monty in the replies. For me the deciding point is Operation Market Garden, a plan destined to FAIL from the start. Putting an Army down a single avenue of approach while overextending the Airborne forces positions that were ABSOLUTELY RELIANT on that single avenue of advance (with WILDLY EXPOSED FLANKS) was something that a green Platoon Leader "Might" try, only to have their ears pinned back by the more experienced Battalion Commander. For that Monty will be a FAMOUS FAILURE in my book. Conversely, the only strategic failure the Rommel made was not insisting on more explosives being used blow up Hitler. In every case on the field of battle, Rommel made the most of what he had, and as you said wasn't timid about attacking when it was to his advantage. In fact, Field Marshall Rommel is widely considered the "Father of Maneuver Warfare" for good reason. A doctrine fully embraced by most modern militaries including the United States. Rommel's genius is very apparent in Gen. Schwarzkopf's great "Hail Mary" flanking maneuver of the Gulf War. SSG. U.S. Army (Medically Retired) Infantry / Sniper / SOF Intel (SOT-A), multiple tours

What about air power at Al Amein. Never mentioned but it was decisive.

By the time of El Alamein, the 8th Army had more Shermans than any other type.

@@jerryware5749 No. Lee/Grants :- 170 Stuarts :- 117 Shermans :- 252 Crusaders :- 294 Valentine :- 194 Churchills :- 8

@@dovetonsturdee7033 According to Great Campaigns of WWII, 1980 Phoebus Publishing, London, the number is 170 Grants, 252 Shermans, 216 Crusader 2 pounder, 78 Crusader 6 pounder, 119 Stuarts, 194 Valentine. Evidently this data lists the 2 pounder and 6 pounder Crusader as two separate tanks. Against this the Germans only had 489 tanks total with 278 of them being the obsolete and outgunned Italian M13/40.

The anti-tank gun was the key weapon in the desert war.

This somewhat underplays the Naval war in med……

@@robertpatrick3350 Sorry Patrick-I was thinking also about the Naval war in the med. The mostly British naval forces with some help from the RAF did a fantastic job of defeating the German and Italian naval and air forces operating in the Med.

What did the us navy do in the med? Didn’t think they contributed much.

@@spidos1000 In May 42 USS Wasp launched Spits to Malta for the second time in two months while the Pacific Fleet lost one fleet carrier, one destroyer and one oiler preventing the Australians on New Guinea from being outflanked at Coral Sea.

@@nickdanger3802 Don't give us that crap. Britain defeated the the German Navy, the French Navy, the Italian Navy, and also had to deal with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. WASP helped the Royal Navy in 1942, VICTORIOUS helped the US Navy in 1943 Britain was 21 miles from its nearest enemy, the USA was 3,500 miles from its nearest enemy.

RU-vid Tik Stalingrad...sortrd

yes please more eastern front stuff

Keep your eyes peeled over the next few months, you may be in luck 😉

There's a channel called Tikhistory that has a long running series on Stalingrad.

The Australians NEVER have a complimentary word to say about the British Army.

@@anthonyeaton5153 I'm British and I believe we have the best army in the world.

​@anthonyeaton5153 still can't get that big chip of your shoulder can u mate lol😂

No the first defeat inflicted on ‘the Jerries’ was The Battle of Britain.

That applied to every US engagement with the Germans. WShich one do you want?

So far as I understand it, breaking the Enigma in time to act on the information, was never a foregone conclusion (each day brought a new combination to be broken). Nor was absolutely everything sent by that method. So while it's seriously important, it's not a guarantee.

Whilst Rommel's successes came as a result of the compromised reports from the US embassy in Cairo. He stopped winning when that dried up. What's your point?

I'd suggest you do a little research on that subject, It helped but there is clear evidence of how it hindered as well. It was not real time as many claim and particularly in the pursuit phase rarely accurate or timely. I'd start with the Stewart book "Victory in the Desert from Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942-43 - How the tide was turned". He devotes a very well researched chapter to that specific issue. Also conventiently forgotten is that up until Alamein Rommel had daily updates as to the intent, strengths and disposition and plans of the 8th Army thanks to the US Defence Attache sending detailed reports to the US Chief of Staff via a compromised code that initially the US failed to change when British Intelligence proved it was their reports he was getting. Once he lost this and Sieboms SIGINT unit seized by the Australians he really struggled in everything he did even when freshly supplied and equipped.

“Strafer” Gott was favored because he had been in the N. African theatre for a while and they thought he would organize an offensive sooner. Alan Brooke personally recommended Monty to theater commander Alexander who agreed with the very competent Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Rubbish. Both Italians and Germans fought really well when heavily outnumbered. Typical of this was the German and Italian Paratroopers who held the centre of all the defences. Neither had any transport yet fought like tigers and retreated as best as possible... including capturing Allied trucks. :)

No. Montgomery was made a Field Marshal on September 1st 1944, when the Allies had reached the Sigfried Line and 21st Army Group was just about to begin operations to liberate Antwerp.

@@11nytram11 Right. Not a Field Marshal at the time of El Alemein, as the video suggests

Didn’t help at the Bulge did it !!

@@californiadreamin8423 It would have if the Americans had taken any notice of them.

@@Poliss95 Really !! Good ahead, supply the information.

How so? Rommel and Patton never met in battle.

Patton didn't fight Rommel, Rommel was in Germany when his victory at El Guettar took place.

I am sure this is tongue in cheek but the numpties that believe that crap here is how Patton fared in NA from "An Army at Dawn" : "Monty took a quarter of million Axis prisoners in Tunisia. More than taken at Stalingrad. Here was American help.... "the fact remains that Eighth Army had fought its way almost two thousand miles across North Africa, often with a single supply road, in the time it had taken the 88,000 troops of 2 US Corps to establish its presence in the virtually undefended southern sector of the Eastern Dorsale and then be driven back to the Western Dorsale. With Eight Army drawing upon itself all three Panzer Divisions at the battle of Medenine, and then forcing Messe to keep two of them behind the front at Mareth, Monty felt that a true fighting Corps could, by an energetic offensive, recapture Gaga’s and threaten at least the supply routes to Mareth from Tunisia. ...Although Alexander later signalled that ‘2 Corps was very slow seizing MAKNASSY defile’, he went to see Patton on 25 March and worked out a plan whereby Patton was to use the full strength of his three divisions as Monty wished, and by 27 March he hoped to ‘pass 1 US Armd Div through for a strong thrust to Djebel TBEGA’, in the rear of Gabes gap, or Chort, position. This Patton failed to do, ‘making only negligible progress’ in the attack beginning on 28 March, as his biographer Ladislas Farago chronicled, leading to ‘irritation and confusion’ week of fighting that resulted only in ‘stalemate’. ...Although Patton’s failure to break out of the Eastern Dorsale mountains had delayed the meeting between British and American forces, it could now only be a matter of days before the two Armies joined hands. ...Here indeed were the seeds of future discord and misunderstanding, although Eisenhower was too shrewd to leave Marshal with the impression of sour grapes, after the American disaster at Kasserine Pass and Patton’s failure, despite overwhelming superiority, in the Eastern Dorsale at Maknassy and El Guettar… ..But not all Alexander’s and Montgomery’s urging could shift Patton’s paralysed divisions - and the Americans never did break through the Eastern Dorsale. ..and like Patton before him, Alexander would completely fail to break through the Eastern Dorsale to sever Messe’s vulnerable line of communication. Eighth Army, still being supplied along a single road from Tripoli, was thus left to fight its own way forward without material help from Alexander’s forces on the enemy’s rear flank. ’Contribution of 2 US Corps has been very poor so far,’ Monty signaled on 1 April 1943 to Alexander. ‘If that corps could come forward even a few miles it would make my task very simple.’ But Patton was stuck…. ..Alexander tried, and in fact Patton was ordered to take the all important Hill 369 ‘regardless of losses’ but it was to no avail. Patton’s troops had taken considerable casualties - over a thousand men in each infantry division - and only when the Germans retreated after Eighth Army’s tremendous victory at Wadi Akarit did Patton reach the plain. ...Patton humiliated by the initial role of tying down enemy reserves, then humbled by his own failure to break through into the enemy’s rear, had no idea what to make of the situation. Thus when con Arnim switched away the Afika Korps divisions from Patton’s front to try and contain Eighth Army’s successful break-in at Wadi Akarit, Patton was in no mood or position to exploit the sudden weakening on his front. Alexander urged again and again, but despite the 88,000 troops under his command, Patton would not take the risk of further infantry casualties. ‘Had this Corps been able to get on, the whole of the AKARIT posn would have been taken in the rear,’ Lt-Colonel Oswald noted with feeling in his diary. Nevertheless a great British victory was won that day…. ...Large numbers of prisoners were taken with their boots off,’ General Leese, commanding 30 Corps, later recalled. The best natural defensive position in North Africa was thus surrendered by the German-Italian Panzer Army in a matter of hours. Within three days Eighth Army was in Sfax - though Patton’s 2 US Corps failed to cut into the Axis retreat, to Roosevelt’s chagrin.”

Oh I didn’t know that. Prove it.

Where did you get that from?

The unnecessary Italian Campaign was a disaster for the Allies, like the Dodecanese Campaign.

Montgomery also had O Connor, Dempsey and Pip Roberts in Europe, were they buffoons?

Aukinleck's shortcoming seems to have been the selection of his on the ground commanders. Ritchie was inexperienced but would serve well later in the war, as a Corps coommander under Montgomery.

You are absolutely right. Montgomery was overrated and had a bigger advantage with more manpower and American supplied Grant and Sherman Tanks. Aukinleck did what he could considering.

@@davidpowelson4817 Sadly the video did spin it like building up a massive superiority was a genius Montgomery strategy.

@@iancarr8682 This is a frequent allegation, but who else was on offer? The British Army of 1939 was wall-to-wall incompetence. In general, micro management of subordinates is seen as bad, but it had to be done in Br Army. Auk was theatre commander (in a very active theatre), he could not be in a radio truck behind the front line. Montgomery's genius was allowing his dubious corps and div commanders zero initiative, having 500 modern US tanks, and having no distractions. Auk had an infinitely tougher job but history presents them as equals.