Unveiling the Coromandel Express Accident Point Machine Analysis Revealed 

As a maritime consultant, i have been involved with Major Incident investigations within the marine industry and have been following media reports on this unfortunate incident and have also been sharing my comments after filtering out media clutter. As events have unfolded, the story developing seems all too familiar as i suspect that this incident is deeply routed and there would be a chain of relatively minor incidents and near misses that would lead up for this particular major incident to occur. An audit of the Quality Management System of the Indian Railways would most likely highlight major non conformities including non compliance of Standard Operating Procedures. The fact that there was a Disconnection Memo & Reconnection Memo issued by the Station Master, we are assuming that the railways team had become aware that there was some problem with the facing point machine on up-loop line x-over and basis the high risk status, a Disconnection Memo was issued by declaring the point Failed, requiring immediate repair & maintenance. The was a serious breach in the implementation of standard operating procedures after issuing the Disconnection Memo until issuance of the Re-connection Memo because if procedures as laid down by the Indian Railways was followed with due diligence this unfortunate incident would never have taken place. In context, the standard operating procedures require that maintenance repair or replacement of the point is carried out by a joint team comprising of experienced personnel from the engineering & signalling dept under the station masters command. Standard practice after boxing up the point and reconnecting the terminal wiring, testing and commissioning requires the point to be function tested from Normal locked position to Reverse locked position and vice versa, ensuring point gets locked at each end position, i.e. tongue rail makes full contact with the stock rail which requires total travel distance of tongue rail to be measured for a pre-determined value and if required the throw slide of the machine is adjusted after confirming self-locking of lock slides at its end positions. During these tests, the point is operated locally by hand cranking the manual lever and thereafter the remote operation is checked from control room. AS PER IR RULES, IT IS MANDATORY FOR STATION MASTER TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT LOCAL SITE TO WITNESS TESTING OF THE POINT, AND ONCE SATISFIED WITH FUNCTION TESTING OF POINT AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM, the station manager is then able to issue a re-connection memo. We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issual of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine. The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point.

Nobody, we don't know the exact reason, but we have tried to clear the doubt if you are thinking this kind of reason for the accident.

There has been information overflow on root cause and unfortunately by providing incorrect or incomplete information, digital media has created a lot of confusion. The very fact that CBI investigation is still ongoing does indicate foul play. Please note that for any accident investigation to be successful, data verification and data accuracy, clarity of thought process, logical data evaluation for root cause is mandatory. In context, assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate towards “some kind of unauthorised interference “ with the facing point machine for x-over from main line to loop line . An event summary on the sequence of events ( to be verified by the data logger) as follows: (a) There was a slow-moving goods train running ahead of UP Howrah Chennai Coromandel Express. (b) In order to clear main line for the fast-approaching passenger train, standard procedure was followed by shunting the goods train on to loop line. (c) The facing point machine for loop line x-over should have been remotely set and locked at reverse position, triggering the point signal to turn Yellow. (d) Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the signal would automatically changed over from Yellow to Red. (e) For the automatic signal interlock system to clear main line for fast approaching Up Coromandel Express at speed of nearly 130 kmph, the facing point machine would have to be remotely re-set and locked at normal position triggering point signal to automatically change over from Red to Green. (f) The time in between signal change over from Yellow to Red and thereafter from Red to Green, is the time range within which the automatic signal interlock system would have indicated an abnormal point signal which in turn should have triggered an emergency response by the station master where the point machine should have been locally checked for any external obstruction, apply key to lock supply and test the point by manual crank handle and if the point movemen still defective, the point should be considered declared failed and follow up emergency procedures should be folowed. d(g) If emergency situation described under (f) never occurred, it would insinuate railway team were aware of the point malfunctioning and not taken corrective action or the point malfunctioned after maintenence work due to incorrect adjustment of the control rods or unauthorized tampering with the electrical wiring at either local site or the signal room whereby standard company emergency procedures were completely ignored . Refer link for video on Station Masters responsibility when a point fails. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-bbI6MKYWmwQ.html .In context, please note although the system may be rated as failsafe, by no means can the system be considered as tamper proof. (h) It may be possible to fool the automatic signal interlock system by simple alteration of the feedback circuit, i.e. either by interchanging wiring to feedback signal relays located inside the point machine motor housing or by swapping the signal relays located in the relay room. (i) Irrespective, whether case (f) or ( g), under both counts emergency operating procedures issued by the Indian Railways was not followed. Normally under these circumstances, standard procedures would entail incident reporting to senior management seeking for disconnection memo, padlock and clamp point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary electrical bypass of the point , employ 24 hours sentry duty at local site to monitor status, carry out permanent repairs, check insulation, measure / adjust distance of travel bars, test for local and remote operation of point machine to the satisfaction of attending Station Master, etc. Serious doubts on due diligence by the railway staff. (j) Please note that before any serious incident, there are tell tale indicators including related minor incidents and near misses and we suspect CBI is taking their sweet time with the investigation as suspect on going through historical data they may have come across serious breach of safety management system , negligence and non-compliance of standard operating procedures . The Railway Board have reported repeated occurrences of similar nature which should have been taken into consideration during the CBI investigation .

It is now CRS report is submitted, @Let'us grow up should make a video explaining the incident with all technical details.This clears all the doubts.

is that any camera in station master room ...or any internal coverage system so that panel image at the time of accident will give precise info. on accident,..... is am thinking 🤔 out off!

Correct Video Correct Data

Let's grow up ✌️ never stop ✋️ learning ✌️ ✋️ 🥳 👍 ✨️ ❤

At 2:35 of video Pl explain how the signal is generated by the point machine to communicate to control panel about presence of stones between the rails

Plz make a video on track reading

❤

In these scenarios Kawach system can't save

Human mind lust born corruption may be the the another second reason for intention act ...

What if there is an electrical maintenance issue? I mean some internal circuit kind of shorting to give false signals?

🥺🥺

Point machine mein stone nahin hota hai stone dur rahata hai

Cos Rubbish interlocking ( Electrical interlocking very difficult lot of relays used in circuit sum circuit control by voltages refence & sum microprocessor card with plc Control where is safety)

Poor explanation, animation is only good

Your illustration is totally wrong.

Vai tera English 😂😂😂😂😂😂 nice try nice try😂