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Axis logic: step 1: observe victory after victory where rommel smashes dispersed british forces step 2: order rommel to attack with dispersed forces step 3: fail objective
Also, to stop using their tank divisions as an exploitation force after their infantry broke through, but use them as a blunt breakthrough force at Kursk and then as fire brigade forces to fight enemy breakthroughs and especially tanks. Which goes totally against all the rules of how Germany conducted mobile warfare in the 1st half of the war.
Not to mention that German mobile warfare assumes command of the air. The Germans had that against their overmatched opponents earlier in the war, but now they're facing Anglo-American air forces that are building new air bases and moving more aircraft closer to the front by the week. Those German Stukas which proved so effective as "flying artillery" to support German ground forces in the early going have poor survivability when the opponent has actual fighter aircraft. Ultimately the problem for the Axis is that by this point in the timeline they've all but lost the naval battle of the Mediterranean. So even though their supplies need only a short hop from Sicily to Tunisia, that's becoming a very dangerous hop for them. The Allies are steadily building up their air forces on Malta and in their North African airfields. This is forcing the Axis to rely increasingly on air transport to supply their ground forces in North Africa and we've already seen at Stalingrad how that ends.
@@danielmocsny5066 Thing is about the Eastern Front, the Red Air Force never was able to create the same king of air superiority that the RAF and USAAF managed to obtain. Which meant that even up to 1945 the Luftwaffe could still be seen over the Eastern Front. There was just too much ground to cover to create a full air defense and forward air control network that the Western Allies managed to achieve. Local air superiority seemed to be the thing the Soviets aimed for.
@@chaptermasterpedrokantor1623 - Yes, the Eastern Front was different because the Red Army had huge ground troop numbers and short supply lines. Anglo-American forces had to fight across oceans making it impossible to field ground armies of similar size. Thus the Anglo-American Allies invested proportionately more in air and naval forces. They couldn't as readily beat the Germans with numbers on the ground and so had to defeat the German technological force multipliers first, including air power and the U-boats. The diversion of the Luftwaffe westward to fight the Anglo-American Allies also took pressure off the Red Air Force. Soviet forces did not need to defeat the Luftwaffe outright, given that the Anglo-Americans were doing that job. This will come to a head a year from now in the timeline, when the Western air war will see the Luftwaffe losing ace after ace in fighter battles over Germany. Those decorated Luftwaffe pilots had been racking up stupendous victory totals on the Eastern Front but will find the flying much tougher against Western pilots who have at least comparable skills and vastly superior production and supply advantages.
The battle of Kasserine Pass was hugely important to the Americans, while a defeat, the lessons learned were astutely applied. The army was re-organized, bad leadership was replaced, combined arms coordination improved. The impact of the changes to the American Army, especially to the officer corps, was to pay dividends later. Looking forwards to next week's installment.
Good observation, and true. Likewise, the debacle at Savo island taught the American Navy a harsh, but needed, lesson also. Bleed, suffer, learn, and move on. However, the arrogance of some Axis powers precluded these lessons, as they refused to accept any defeat or reverse as a lesson. This was especially true of Japan, and horribly true at Stalingrad. Did we learn from Iraq and Afghanistan? Seems not, to me, and I'm a Vietnam combat vet.
You are correct. It was something that Rommel noticed almost immediately. He saw that the Americans were a lot quicker than the Brits when it came to learning from their mistakes.
Watching the Battle of Kasserine Pass unfold over these episodes is so weird for me, because of every town or mountain or pass or river mentioned I go "Hey I've been there, and there, and there too" Another thing I remembered as well is around the time of this battle my Grandparents are getting married in Tebessa as well.
An interesting trivia this week on February 20 1943 is that the *Mexican volcano Parícutin* will arise through the cracks from a cornfield and begin to erupt ashes and lava. This will happen continuously for nine years until 1952, where it has remained dormant since. Despite the ongoing war, it attracted a lot of attention from volcanologists and magazines such as Life, as this was the first time they were able to study and document the entire life cycle of a volcano. It was even used as a backdrop in the 1947 Hollywood movie, Captain from Castile, and the volcano is now a tourist attraction today.
Another interesting volcano tidbit is that the Japanese base at Rabaul is built in and around a giant volcanic caldera. The flooded caldera makes for the nice harbor that the Japanese used. In 1994 the volcano erupted again and destroyed 80% of the town, forcing the relocation of the provincial capital away from Rabaul. If a similar eruption had occurred in 1942 it might have shortened the Pacific War, depending on how much damage the Japanese forces would have taken. Putting the Rabaul base out of action might have crippled the Japanese ability to fight on Guadalcanal.
1943 and now in 2022, they fight in the same area of Ukraine. Crazy to think about - even harder to watch unfold in front of you on TV. Really sad to see what extreme power-lust and fear can lead to. Thoughts/prayers to all of Ukraine.
Reminds me of a memorable quote from the 2007 video game World in Conflict: "War can be fascinating to watch on TV, but up close personally it's a whole other story. Imagine your office blown to pieces, your car thrown about like a discarded glove, and your friend lying on the street, his body torn to bloody shreds."
@@pbmccain I believe that the Americans would be more welcome than Germans, though (memories fade slowly, atrocities maybe never). That said, all support is surely welcome.
That initial phone call ("That's not how command structure works, is it?") reminds me of the Japanese concept of "leading from below" (IIRC). This refers to the way junior officers might force their senior officer's hand on an issue (like an offensive) by taking action on their own that, effectively, forces the senior officer to act to support the junior.
Given that the junior officers are closer to the action they should have better situational awareness. It's better to give tactical flexibility to the officers who are best positioned to exploit it. I'm reminded of the classic example of Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr. on June 6, 1944, who upon landing with troops on Utah Beach away from their assigned position, said "We'll start the war from right here!" He recognized that they had landed, by accident, on a less-heavily defended beach, and that it was better to change the plan and redirect the following waves of invaders to this new position, given the better information he now had than what the planners had worked with.
@@danielmocsny5066 yes, but with geokokoju the Japanese had junior officers assassinating senior officers and government officials or starting wars (Marco Polo Bridge incident, IIRC). Or starting an offensive in a particular location despite being specifically ordered to stand on the defensive, thereby daring their commanding officer to let them be destroyed versus coming in to save them (and support the offensive they were specifically ordered not to start).
@@kemarisite Exactly. The Japanese Manchurian army took over control of the country's China policy from the Tokyo government and plunged Japan into a major commitment, one that ultimately proved disastrous.
I really enjoy the day-to-day coverage. You guys should consider releasing them in a book form after the war. Every book can be a year. And since 1939 and 1945 aren't a full year of war those years they can have some information about the start and end of the war. Just an idea.
I would buy that book from Time Ghost / WW2. I'd pay $200-300, more if they donate a portion to Veteran Charities. Very possibly the best & now MOST IMPORTANT RU-vid Channel. Never has it been more relevant. I stand with Ukraine, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Sweden & Finland. It looks like they will be the Frontline 2022. Gods speed & safe return, Gentlemen. May Artemis & Athena bless them all. (🇺🇸 here)
Aide: Sir, we just lost Kasserine…. Eisenhower: What do you mean we lost Kasserine, it had good defensive features! Fredendal has ample men. What did he do during the attack, hide behind an anti tank ditch? This is embarrassing the US contingent here! Bring me Fredendal! Fredendal! Fredendal!
Kharkiv here, third day under siege. Now i not need to imagine how it was 70 years ago. I already learned sounds of different types of weapons. Parts of russian missiles all over the city, roads, yards, craziest is a shelling of main children hospital at 17:00 yesterday, luckily only glass was broken and medical staff injured, not the children, but they were forced to run into hispital basement. Hospital is on the nothern edge of the city, russians are pushing from there. But they could saw it on any map, who could shell such a target. First day they were hitting our military, from yesterday it is just f... random. Lots of burned down russian vehicles on another northern area, Pyatihatki, for some reason, invaders mark their vehicles with letter "Z". Just now enemy was pushed back from the east too. I'm good, but my mom looks like mentally injured so much, i don't now will she ever recover. We are still standing, 3 days in a row. It looks like a size of an army alonr doesn't matter, moral also important. And here we are winning. Wish us luck, gentlemen, the long night is ahead.
Good luck. The entire world is behind you right now. If Ukraine manages to hold on long enough, Russia’s oligarchs might force peace or even depose Putin... Slava Ukraini
Great job, as always, love the series (starting with 1914, to be honest). Just my usual tiny contribution: Remnants of Hungarian 2nd army were being gathered in the region between Kiev and Belgorod. Between late Jan and early March, about 65,000 men arrived, many of them with wounds or frostbites. The entire army had 6 guns left, but most of the small arms were also lost, along with all the armor, airplanes, and most of the trucks. In the following weeks, these remnants were transported back to Hungary by train. The exact losses could not be determined, but more than 60% of the army was gone, including dead, lost, and prisoners. On my channel, I'm uploading more videos on Hungary's participation, soon, I'll discuss 2nd army's campaign and its fate. Keep up the good work!
You have many videos, looks like a great channel! What's the title of the video that dicusses 2nd army? "WW2 - Rebooting the Hungarian Army in 1943 - The Szabolcs Plan" ?
At 15:00 there is a little details that only french care 😅, the CFA Corps Franc dAfrique, is not under the Free France (wich is named Fighting France since 1942 btw) but Giraud's command. However.. this double battalion is a volonteer formation with a trouble but interesting origins with various political groups inside and of refugees from spain and other countries. At the time of this attack they are undersupply with no heavy equipment and submachingun.... not good to defend themselves BUT one compagny make a daring move against italians who were bypassing them, they made a bayonet charge while singing La Marseillaise ! And it works, the plans of the operations are stolen, the italiens are defeated and the commander is killed in action. 380 prisoners are taken as well as supply, weapon and ammunition.
@@danielmocsny5066 Hate to be this guy... but je m'en fous litterally means "I don't give a f***k/care". So you might have wanted to say "je ne m'en fous pas". Anyway thanks for the sentiment and trying another language.
14:00 still get a chuckle when I hear Smilin' Al....... My high school self, circa early 80s, would have loved this. We had the highly dramatic and somewhat viewpointed World at War. The level of detail all around is grand. Thanks
I'm sure everyone watching this series is aware of what's going on in Eastern Europe right now. I watch this series not because I like war. I watch it to understand what happened during this time. This series and The Great War is a good lesson for humanity as a whole. I just wish more people would study and learn from the mistakes.
I'm one of your patrons and I just want to say thank you for making these, this is the exact kind of RU-vid content that I really don't mind giving a couple of bucks a month. I wish there were more things on RU-vid that were half this intelligent and informative.
With regards to the Americans fighting at Kasserine Pass, there is a quote attributed to Rommel, rightly or wrongly, that he had "never seen troops who fought so badly in their first battle fight so well in their second".
American forces in 1943 have the advantage of Allies who have already made and learned from many mistakes. But there are many mistakes left to go. Even by late 1944 when the Allies hold overwhelming logistical advantages, Monty will still believe he can send XXX Corps up a single two-lane road to relieve paratroopers tenuously holding three key bridges. He'll reach the first two but that third bridge will prove just a bit too far. And then after that the Americans will be caught by surprise when the Germans counterattack in the Battle of the Bulge. And Rommel's quote could be inverted to "We've never seen a dictator who failed so badly to supply 300,000 men at Stalingrad by air try the same trick again in Tunisia."
@@danielmocsny5066 With regards to Market Garden, almost all the Allied officers figured the Germans were still off-balance and on the run. They figured (Eisenhower included) that if they kept the pressure up they could "bounce" the Germans out of their defenses. And after blazing across France from Normandy to the German border, could you blame them for thinking that? It was a miscalculation as to the ability of the Germans to throw together forces "on the fly" and improvise defensive operations. The ability to create ad hoc units on the fly is something that both the Allies and the Red Army had to contend with on multiple occasions, and something they were seldom able to overcome.
@@blockmasterscott At least the Americans learned quickly and applied those lessons rapidly, unlike the British who took 2 years to figure it out (although it is more like relearn how to do it), and the Russians who took just as long if not longer to figure out how to beat the Germans. Their learning curve in the Pacific, however, is not as good with regards to naval actions. They will still make similar mistakes during the first part of the Solomon Islands campaign.
@@merdiolu Then you have done poor research. Have your critics of Guderian not minding his flanks, or Manstein not being able to keep promises and Rommel too going for daring attacks, like at Tobruk with no reconnaissance at his first try. But saying that he has no plan of logistics or how to lead his soldiers is just utter rubbish. Especially considering that his supplies were much more limited than those of Wavell, Auchinleck, Cunningham, Montgomery, etc. at pretty much any time of the conflict. He basically created the North African theatre in the first place after smashing and destroying the British forces shortly after arriving there, even capturing O'Connor and even though he was just sent there to defend the Italian positions. I could go on about his role in France and so on, but pretty much until El Alamein, the British were powerless against him. Not a wehraboo, just stating facts.
@@hopfinatorischerkuchenkrieger Only thing Rommel smashed and destroyed eventually was Panzer Army Africa and entire North African strategy for Axis by over extending all the way to Alamein with dreams of being next Pharoh of Egypt due to Fall of Tobruk with bad British command of Battle of Gazala Tobruk and then entrenching at the end of a supply line that was impossible to sustain for his extended dreams during 1942 summer and autumn. Once he let his army destroyed, leaving two Italian corps to be captured then letting entire Libyan fall to Eighth Army (when they were extending their rear lines all the way to Alamein ) which had been his main duty to defend from OKW, he and his post war acolytes with over inflated propaganda disguised the fact that only strategic outcome of Rommel's antics in desert , had been giving a free live ammunition crash course about German operational and tactical and organizational methods to Allies between 1941 - 1943 which they utilised later for landing on Italy and France and liberating Europe. Do not concerned about my "poor" research by the way. I have at least 25 titles about North African campaign in my library. I really recommend Romnels Desert War by Martin Kitchen and Rommel End of A Myth by Hans Reuth. You might learn how inflated Rommel's War Godness image by both sides during the war.
At Kasserine Pass my dad and his brother and many of their friends were taken prisoner of war. Red Oak Iowa suffered more losses per capita than any other American community. In the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943, forty-five soldiers from Red Oak alone were captured or killed; more than 100 telegrams arrived in Red Oak saying that its soldiers were missing in action. Some months later my grandparents learn through the Red Cross their two sons were not dead but were prisoner of war. Love your channel and let us never forget the cost of freedom.
Damn, just imagine how much your grandma must have cried... Thinking for months that her sons were dead, and then learning that they were alive - but knowing that one stray bomb, lack of food, or a particularly mean prison guard could still kill them Never again
Germans: we can't afford a second Stalingrad! also Germans: let's sent 1000 troops a day to Tunisia, which is encircled by allies form all sides on land, and in danger of being cut off at sea!
The irony is that the heavy Axis losses soon to come in Tunisia will make the invasion of Sicily relatively easy for the Allies shortly after. It would have been smarter for the Axis to fortify Sicily instead of sending so many men to Tunisia where they cannot be adequately supplied. Of course this all is playing out now due to the Axis failure to take Gibraltar and Malta in 1940 after France fell when the British were on the ropes. The Germans also failed, bafflingly, to force France to surrender its naval forces as part of the terms. (Japan had a similar failure of strategic thinking, by failing to take the most strategic location in the whole Pacific Ocean - Hawaii - back in late 1941 when it held all the advantages. And also by failing to send its submarines to rampage through American West coast shipping like the German U-boats were rampaging through East coast shipping in the first half of 1942.) Tunisia is already nearly cut off at sea due to the Anglo-American Allies essentially winning the battle for the Mediterranean and breaking the siege of Malta. Allied aircraft production is gearing up like mad just now and a lot of those airplanes are pouring into the Mediterranean - North African theater. We've seen by this point in the war that cargo ships are all but defenseless against attacking aircraft, not to mention the Allied submarines and surface ships. Thus Hitler is increasingly down to supplying his North African forces by air, the same (non)genius method that just failed at Stalingrad, and once again trying to supply a ground force of ca. 300,000 men. They're trying to use a method that even on its best day can't land one day's worth of supplies. The Anglo-American Allies will soon prove even more adept than the Russians at shooting down German cargo aircraft. At least the Germans are at less risk of freezing to death this time.
@@danielmocsny5066 I know the Japanese submarines had a long range, but could they reasonably reached all the way across the pacific? Similarly, supplying an invasion of Hawaii would have also been very difficult. They didn't have the merchant marine capable of sustaining that sort of effort while still supplying the home islands, and such an effort would have been at risk of US submarines.
Like the movie trope of the veteran police detective who is just days from qualifying for his pension, and he's caught one final case that shouldn't prove too hazardous.
Rommel: "It's over Fredenhall, I have the high ground!" General Fredenhall: "Jokes on you, I'm not anywhere close to the front. Come dig me out of my cave if you can find me!"
It will be like the earlier Axis mistake at Pearl Harbor. Merely damaging the Allies makes no difference if you don't take and hold a strategic position.
It's amazing to me that German units running out of fuel and having such supply issues. No one would have thought that in the 21st Century Putin's Russia would face the same incompetence and supply issues.
Why, it's almost as if Putin believed his own propaganda that the Ukrainians would throw down their arms and welcome Russian forces as liberators. We do see the historical pattern: wars are generally started by dictators who "sell" their wars to their hapless subjects by promising quick victories with little sacrifice.
@@Ahnenerbe1944 morale? huh noone in the right mind wants this war in Russia only putin and his gov. puppets, and mb true victims of propaganda and fcking bots
@@TheRifild I’m saying Russian morale. Clearly the war is not popular in Russia judging by the several protests. Russian military progress is not nearly what it was chalked up to be. They only brought enough equipment for a short excursion because they though Ukraine would capitulate quickly, clearly that’s not the case
@@Ahnenerbe1944 i mean even among the soldier i'm expecting the mood "why should i shoot fellow slav?" actually theres a video where's ukrainian man having a small talk with russian tank crew who ran out fuel and i think this little talk prove my expectation
You know: one thing that musst be kept in mind is that all these troops send to Africa are needed in the east. The one thing that Hitler absolutly did not want was a two front war, but Germany was in a two front war since June 1941, were all their supplies that were also send to Africa, since the beginning of the campaign there, were also desperatly needed on the eastern front. Not to mention that the Luftwaffe also found it self in a three front war: against Britain, the Mediteranien and the eastern front. And also the Battle of the Atlantic also ate up a lot of valuable ressources.
Not to mention that a lot of those valuable resources ended up at the bottom of the Mediterranean and _not_ in the hands of German or Italian soldiers.
No, not three fronts. He had more. The Partisans led by Tito controlled actual territory in Yugoslavia. They tied down huge numbers of resources and killed many Axis soldiers. Partisans all over Europe would do the same although wouldn't hold defined territory, like in Belarus, Ukraine, Norway, the Netherlands, Greece, France of course, and more, where they would assassinate Axis leadership and important personnel, disrupt their operations and communications, kill or capture Axis informants, collaborators, and spies, disrupt Axis intelligence and terror, steal information, send it forward to the United Nations to bolster their intelligence, and would undermine the economy and confidence in Axis capabilities.
The Axis nations created that problem for themselves. I have absolutely no clue what they were thinking trying to run a campaign to take Egypt without first securing Malta and the Mediterranean sea lanes. Ignoring Gibraltar was understandable due to Franco's unwillingness to help and wind up in the war, but not securing their lines of communication better where they could was inexcusable.
By WWII the smaller mortar bombs were sort of like rockets in that they contained a propellant charge that fired expanding gases out of the back. There wasn't a separate powder bag or cartridge that propelled a shell or bullet forward as in "conventional" artillery or firearms. Spigot mortars such as the Hedgehog anti-submarine weapon were even more like rockets whose motors burned out in one quick pulse. Technically the main characteristic of a mortar is that it fires a relatively short-range projectile on a high arc trajectory. This enables nearby targets to be hit even if they are behind walls or hills, on higher ground, or in trenches or holes. If the enemy can see the sky he can be hit by a mortar. Conventional artillery can also blur the lines with rocketry as in the cases of rocket-assisted projectiles and base-bleed projectiles.
@@Raskolnikov70 There are specific documents on the use of rocket artillery by the Wehrmacht. Drawbacks and advantages vs. regular artillery, doctrine on use.
I wanted to share a story mostly unrelated to this episode in particular, something that happened now in 1943, in Concepción, Chile, a corner of the world otherwise unaffected by the War. For several decades now, there has been a German school for the significant German-Chilean community's children. But now, in 1943, with France occupied by the Germans, as an act of resistance, the local community of French-descended Chileans create their own French school. They couldn't, evidently, bring french teachers for this endeavor, despite existing systems for french education abroad in France, what with the occupation and all, so they had to bring them from the Martinique. I attended this school despite being of mostly German heritage. It was placed one block away from the German school and one block away from the French WW1 memorial, a site that marks the names of all WW1 dead for France from the city of Concepción, Chile, a type of memorial that is common in France, and where the French and often German communities of the city gather for Armistice day. The city also has a Bismarck monument, which are common in Germany.
I've always enjoyed the historical flags upstage. Glad to see you've now got the accurate UK flag (same then as it is now) and not the pre-1801 version (which I'd been wondering where you found).
@@Rocketsong Yeah, I had noticed that too, and the oh-so-careful display to make the star pattern seem rectangular, but I figured over in Sweden such artifacts may be hard to come by. The pre-Irish-union UK flag made no sense, though--just go buy a modern one. And so they did. Rejoice! :-)
Wow at 2:33 we are seeing 12 German Panzer divisions all at once in a single frame picture of the zoomed in map. I'm not sure we have seen that many German Panzer divisions in a single fame of a zoomed in map yet during the war. I'm sure we have seen that many USSR armored divisions in a single frame of a zoomed in map but we just didn't notice it. Something done very well on your maps is how easy it is to see the German Panzer divisions since they stick out so much because of their different color to the German infantry divisions. I think it would be great to make a change on your maps to make other nations armored divisions stick out as well. The armored divisions really show where a nation is focusing their power at.
Maybe it stands out because it's the first time in a while we've seen a decent-sized panzer concentration? Barbarossa failed because their disposition in June 1941 didn't look like that.
@@Raskolnikov70 barbarossa failed for a variety of reasons, one of which, you cannot invade a country the size of the soviet union, with only 3300 tanks.
To be fair to the comparison, German panzer divisions might be at lower strength now in the timeline than they were at the start of Barbarossa. Twelve divisions on the map today might have been equivalent to six divisions a while back. This non-standardization of "division" and other military element sizes, both between nations and within the same nation's forces over time, is annoying. The battle maps could use a third dimension where we see units as rectangular blocks with the volumes reflecting their true strengths.
@@stanbrekston That's what I was getting at. Although I was mainly referring to how the Wehrmacht was essentially forced to ignore its own doctrine about concentration of forces because of the lack of armor units to successfully carry out their plan for a broad advance. They knew they didn't have enough armor to encircle the entire Red Army and should have focused instead on concentrating what they did have and going after something that would have crippled the USSR like the Caucusus and the lend lease routes in the north and south. They're only able to concentrate this way now because they've been forced to shorten their massively overextended lines in the south and get some mobility back. They should have been thinking about mobility since June 1941, not as an afterthought.
@@danielmocsny5066 TIK History does something like this where he makes the Red Army unit boxes smaller in order to contrast their strength with Wehrmacht units with the same names. A Red Army division box is smaller than a Wehrmacht division box because its authorized size (MTOE strength, or whatever term they use for it) is similar to a Wehrmacht brigade and so forth. I realize that doesn't address what you're saying, which would be to find a way to visually indicate the actual size/strength of the units on the map, but it's a start. It is kind of ridiculous to use a division box for something like a 'panzer' unit with 7 tanks left.
Also, very good episode as always. Something not mentioned on the battle of Kasserine pass in this weeks episode that I was replying to in a comment of someone posting on the battle last week is British General Kenneth Anderson's (leader of the British 1st Army and commander of Fredendall's 2nd American Corp) role in the defeat at Kasserine that he was not fired for like Lloyd Fredendall will be. But Kenneth Anderson's role in the defeat will be seen in the next few months so it will be decided to not let Kenneth Anderson have a Army command fighting the enemies from that point forward. Anderson was greatly disliked by both American and British officers. What Anderson did that greatly helped cause the defeat at Kasserine is he split up the American 1st Armored division into 3 units spread out across the Allied defensive lines (just like the Allies did when the German's beat them in France). To Fredendall's credit that people found post war was he did repeatedly complain to Anderson about the splitting up of his best division in official communications. So when the German's attacked at Kasserine pass they were hitting only a 3rd of the US 1st Armored division and doing so with all of the 10th Panzer division and large portions of the 21st Panzer division. Anderson was also criticized for refusing Fredendall's request to move back to a defensible line after the initial assault by the Germans on the French Corp (which was not mentioned in this weeks episode, which happened prior to the German attack on the Allies at Kasserine pass but singled out the attack was coming). This refusal is what allowed the German panzer forces to overrun many of the American positions to go along with the splitting of the 1st Armored division. Something that many allied commanders including Eisenhower and Montgomery wrote about post war was how quick the Allies were to fire commanders during WW2 after a single defeat. They determined post war that this was a bad course to take as it never gave Allied commanders the ability to learn through mistakes. Lloyd Fredendall was cited by both as a example of a Allied officer fired to quickly just to satisfy the public's opinion that if a officer in charge of a lost a battle (if it was their fault or not) they had to be replaced.
Fredendall also failed during January in Faid Pass and Sened Station operations too though and during culmination point of Sidi Bou Zid / Kasserine Pass offensive , he showed no initiative (General Ernest Harmon wrote things about Fredendall that were not complimentary when he found Fredendall drunk in his bunker during German advance) , displayed constant pessimism and let enemy slip away after repulsed in Thala and Tebessa too. Fredendall is not blameless , half of the culpability should go to him despite holding an easily defended mountain terrain in Eastern Dorsal and Grand Dorsal , he was pushed back almost 70 km or so despite having all time to prepare defensive positions since December and despite on being defensive on advantegous terrain , 2nd Corps under his command , suffered four times more casaulties than attacking enemy on the open. I complately agree about Anderson though. General Harold Alexander dismissed him as a "mere plain cook" and reduced to him to a figurehead (rightfully) after taking command of both 1st and 8th Army on 19th February after activating his 18th Army Group HQ and after Tunisian Campaign was over he sent Anderson (who never took any active command afterwards) back to UK. Eisenhower holds some responsibility too , allowing himself to being distracted with French politics and administration he should have appointed a deputy land forces commander like Alexander long ago.
@Vinny Siracusa Thank you for the added info. Not to detract at all from your comment, but I'm continually astonished by the consistency of in-depth comments like yours on our channel. The TimeGhost Army really impresses me week after week, so thank you for sharing your insight & please continue bringing great analysis to our videos!
@@WorldWarTwo Oh cool, thanks. Yeah I try to work like a few weeks ahead of you guys doing my own research looking into topics on the war to see what is going to happen. A lot of it I guess I already know but I find new random things most weeks as I am looking things up.
Fredenhall being relieved of command was justified, IMO. If his only sin was that he failed there could maybe be some debate on whether he should have remained in command, but positioning himself 70 miles behind the front line in a ridiculously fortified bunker paints a picture a man without either the spine or good sense to remain in the position he had been given. There were also other, deeper problems with Fredenhall's leadership that can't be chalked up to inexperience, as he often got along poorly with both superiors and subordinates and gave orders that were confusing in the extreme. A better example of an American officer that was unfairly relieved of command was Admiral Kimmel, in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attacks. He was in effect a military scapegoat for a failure that rested on the shoulders of the US government.
Anderson was indeed partially responsible, but the onus is mainly on Fredendall. Fredendall didn't take his responsibilities seriously enough to use correct military terminology. He often confused those around him with his own jargon ("Pop guns" etc). Placing himself 70 miles from the front in a bunker, that took most of a month to construct, was also asking for trouble.
The thing happening between Rommel and Von Arnim is quite the product of an army valorizing too much initiative AND Fuhrerprinzip. A german officer can get away with almost anything as long as he please Hitler and achieve victory, preferably an offensive one. This was the driving princip of the career of Feldmarshal Walter Model, who was brillant, hated by his pairs, overstepped himself often, but also sold most of his battle as counter-offensive one to Hitler.
Last post for me for this week (this is my 3rd but I normally limit myself to 1 post per week). I just wanted to say I'm glad you guys did a special on the Mosquito today which is what I was sort of asking for last week in terms of specials. My exact request would be specials on each nation in WW2's aircraft and small arms. The small arms would sort of be like was done in the Great War channel but the covering of aircraft and small arms in WW2 would be even better because of the great degree of differences each nation in WW2 came up with when they were designing their aircraft and small arms. Which is the same case for tanks as well but the team already has Chieftain doing great work making specials on the armored vehicles of WW2.
The situation on the eastern front is pretty busy this week as it was since the beginning and I'm worrying that one thing is the city of Kharkov is somewhat the same then and now.
Who is the person in your mind when you talk on the telephone at the start of each episode? They have fabulous insider knowledge that is always so incomplete. Oh, and its a great device. Gets me sucked in every time.
David M. Glantz called the II SS Panzer Korps counterattack in this show a strategic counter offensive because the ultimate outcome was to stabilize the Axis southern front for the first time since the Soviet's launched Operation Uranus.
I'm impressed by Indy and crew's restraint. I'm sure it was mighty tempting to slip in a reference to the ironic timing of events in Ukraine in 1943, and what's happening today.
Excellent post as always. 👌 very high levels of research and presentation. As an aside, I'd like to comment on the thumbnail for this instalment, which is also excellent, a great welcomer to this instalment and once again, setting the bar very high, right from the get-go. Kudos to your art department. 👏
It was pretty ambitious to hold Tunisia so far just to avoid the prospect of an Allied invasion into Europe from there, but time is obviously not on Axis side.
This week on February 22 1943, the fifth mission of the 2005 video game *Call of Duty 2: Big Red One* , *Counterattack* starts at Kasserine in Tunisia, North Africa. In this level as *Private Roland Roger* , you will be tasked to secure and hold the town from the Germans until the wounded and medics are able to leave. You will take control of a M1919A6 machine gun and fend off an enemy half-track before going to another part of town to eliminate a sniper and dress Sergeant Hawkins’s wounds. After more fighting, you will have to eventually fall back when a German tank will chase you and your squad in the town, forcing you to reach a M3 half-track to leave the town safely.
5:20 The top right map square is different to the others, like it came from a separate map. Not a problem or anything but once I saw it, I couldn't unsee it lol
A good WW2 movie to watch around this week is "L'armée des ombres (Army of Shadows)" (1969) by Jean-Pierre Melville. Army of Shadows follows a small group of French Resistance fighters as they move between safe houses, work with the Allied militaries, kill informers and attempt to evade the capture and execution that they know is their most likely fate. Period covered: 20 October 1942-23 February 1943 Historical accuracy: 3/5 - An adaptation of Joseph Kessel's 1943 book of the same name, which mixes Kessel's experiences as a member of the French Resistance with fictional versions of other Resistance members. IMDB grade: 8.2/10
@@WorldWarTwo Thanks! It's an interesting film in that shows all the difficulties involved and the little results sonetimes obtained despite all the dangerous work. It's also very well filmed
@@stanbrekston "Fun" fact. As many Russians died in the siege of Berlin as brits during the whole war. Just that Stalin can get the german capitol a week earlier before the allies arrives and have better position during the post-war negotians...
All previous episodes I watched like a stories from the distant past but now it looks so real and alive War in the Ukraine is something that is hard to comprehend
Hi, I saw my name on the list of 'New Officers' :) Don't seem to be able to log in to your site though? Also - Do you think the stuff about US - UK rivalry is a little overplayed. In the lead up to - spoiler here - the invasion of Sicily , both Eisenhower and Alexander seemed to be strongly opposed to any inter-allied disputes. I read somewhere that Alexander set up battle schools in Algeria to teach new and in-theatre US units the lessons of the Tunisian campaign.
@john Quick Have you only had log-in issues recently? If it's still persisting I'll try and put you in touch with someone who can help. A US - UK rivalry was something that I'm sure commanders wanted to avoid but rivalries between militaries, and different branches/units of the same military, is something that can never be entirely avoided, we'll have to see how the British and Americans do cooperating going forward.
It's so surreal watching the map around the current fighting area of the Ukrainian-Russian War and hearing familiar names being read out as part of the Great Patriotic War. How sad.
@6:31 There is an artifact in the film that looked like something scooting across the screen at high speed! Had to slow it down and freeze frame to catch it!!😄
I would appreciate if you provided a non-instagram access to your day-by-day documentaries --- thereby allowing those of us who shun that arm of social media access to the content.
Trying to watch 3pm Saturday... No matter what I do the video will not play. All other videos play just fine. Curious. I am in Michigan. Playing now at 3:30 pm.
Sometimes it feels as if history keeps finding ways to repeat itself each time. I just hope we don't have to fight another four battles for Kharkiv again like during 1941 to 1943...
The Kasserine Pass was reoccupied on 24 February, the Allies feeling their way back up along the mine-infested roads and tracks and battling over destroyed bridges. The Allies had suffered a humiliating defeat but, in terms of casualties, the Axis losses had been as bad, and were felt more keenly. Even so, over six thousand Americans had been killed and wounded in the fighting, and a further three thousand and six hundred taken prisoner. The biggest casualty had been 1st US Armored Division, which had lost around half its number. Back home in the USA, the news of the defeat was received with stunned shock. ‘You folks at home must be disappointed at what happened to our American troops in Tunisia,’ wrote Ernie Pyle. ‘So are we over here. Our predicament is damned humiliating … we’ve lost a great deal of equipment, many American lives, and valuable time and territory - to say nothing of face.’ Yet, he assured them, there was still not the slightest doubt that they would fling the Axis out of Tunisia. It was, he added, also important to put things in perspective. ‘One thing you folks at home must realize is that this Tunisian business is mainly a British show. Our part in it is small. Consequently our defeat is not as disastrous to the whole picture as it would have been if we had been bearing the major portion of the task.’ This was true enough, but it didn’t stop the soul-searching, or the recriminations, which had begun even before the offensive was over. ‘The defeat has made all hands realize the toughness of the enemy and the need of battle experience,’ noted Harry Butcher on 20 February. Certainly it was true that the biggest casualties had been among the least experienced troops, and there is no doubt that combat experience was the best teacher. Nonetheless, the inadequate nature of American training prior to reaching North Africa had been ruthlessly exposed by the Germans. But the ‘greenness’ of American troops was only a part of it. Not even seasoned troops would have fared much better at Sidi Bou Zid, when the American armour was pitched against the prepared defensive positions of a force considerably larger than itself. ‘One good man simply can’t whip two good men,’ noted Ernie Pyle. The real problem lay not so much with the troops, but with the commanders.Throughout the battle, Lloyd Fredendall , 2nd Corps commander had continued to make a complete hash of his command, issuing orders without any real appreciation of what was happening. He had been quick to move out of the still incomplete bunkers at Speedy Valley and further back, into a mansion owned by a Vichy businessman, and there had continued to act in an increasingly erratic and bizarre way. On one occasion, an artillery officer had been ordered to see him and had arrived as quickly as he could, straight from the front and covered in mud. But Fredendall had kept him waiting until he’d finished his dinner of beef and ice cream. The 2nd US Corps commander had also continued to completely ignore Ward. On 20 February, for example, he bypassed the divisional commander and ordered Robinett to counter-attack with CCB towards the Kasserine Pass, an order that would have seen an armoured column head once more into the waiting jaws of a larger enemy force; even after Sidi Bou Zid, Fredendall hadn’t learned. After an impromptu meeting with Robinett, he appeared to have a change of heart, but by that time had already to succumbed to defeatism, telling Robinett, ‘There is no use, Robbie, they have broken through and you can’t stop them.’ At this point, the Allied command structure had begun to disintegrate rapidly. Anderson had become convinced that Fredendall was incapable of sorting things out, and so had ordered another British commander, Brigadier Nicholson, to the front to help take control, even though his Chief of Staff, Brigadier McNabb, was already forward with the troops and liaising with Robinett. Then Major-General Ernest Harmon, commander of 2nd US Armored Division in Morocco, also arrived to lend a hand. Fredendall had tried to have Ward sacked, and Ike initially agreed, ordering Harmon up to the front to take over. But while Harmon had been flying east, Ike changed his mind, having heard from Truscott that Ward had done well at Sbeitla. Instead, Eisenhower told Fredendall that Harmon should be regarded as his deputy and ‘a useful senior assistant’. On arriving at Fredendall’s new mansion, Harmon had been told to take over tactical command of 2nd US Corps and to use Ward’s staff. An already confused command structure was now an appalling tangle. In the meantime, Robinett quietly circumnavigated most of these senior commanders and, after consulting with Brigadier Dunphie of the 26th British Armoured Brigade and Brigadier McNabb, drew up plans for a coordinated defensive stance - plans that would soon pay off. That they were able to cut through this jumbled chain of command and stream of orders and counter-orders and actually successfully hold the Axis onslaught at bay was a credit to men like Robinett and Dunphie, and the troops under their command.‘There are two things we must learn,’ wrote Ernie Pyle. ‘We must spread ourselves thicker on the front lines, and we must streamline our commands for quick and positive action in emergencies.’ He may not have been a fighting man, but there was certainly much to be said for his prognosis. What the Allies needed was firm and vigorous leadership. Fortunately, they were about to get it. Together We Stand - James Holland
It's almost hard to believe the German habit of counterattacking will keep coming as a surprise right through to 1945. You'd think the lesson learned would be "Yay we won! Now prepare for the inevitable German counterattack." If only "counterattack" had been given a German name, perhaps remembering might have been simpler. Could the Red Army suffer from a bit of its own "Victory disease" after Stalingrad?
@Cooking With Chef Luc Thank you! We're only able to do it with the support of you in the TimeGhost Army. Thanks for watching and stay tuned for much more
@@greenkoopa yes i have been wondering when we get cool/interesting stories here and yarnhub and such. The memes are hilarious but I want some cool stories to munch popcorn too in my big comfy come chair to balance the humor 😂
The Allies had been checked in northern Tunisia and again in central Tunisia. Luckily there was one further avenue of advance open to them. On 23 January, Tripoli fell to the Eighth Army. 7th Armoured Division which had now been rejoined by 4th Light Armoured Brigade, was given little time to enjoy this triumph, being ordered by Montgomery to keep Rommel ‘on the run’ as far as the Tunisian frontier. Following the retreating enemy along the coast road, 7th Armoured took Zavia on 25 January. It was then hampered by bad going and bad weather but on the 31st, it reached Zuara and by 4 February, had crossed the border into Tunisia. There would be a delay before the main body of Eighth Army could move up to its support, however. The weather continued to be dreadful and, as Montgomery reports in El Alamein to the River Sangro, ‘for several days the desert became a quagmire and made operations impossible’. Furthermore, as Kesselring rather admiringly points out, ‘the British Eighth Army had marched halfway across North Africa - over fifteen hundred miles - had spent the bad winter months on the move and in the desert, and had had to surmount difficulties of every kind’. Nor did those difficulties cease once Tripoli was reached, for the enemy, as Captain Roskill states in his Official History of The War at Sea, had ‘managed to destroy the port facilities very thoroughly, and to block the entrance completely with six merchantmen’ that had been scuttled as well as with other debris including ‘many barges filled with concrete’. Air raids and a violent storm did nothing to improve the situation, the first supply ship could only enter the harbour on 2 February, and it was not until the 14th that large quantities of stores began to arrive. Yet when weather conditions improved at last on 15 February, Eighth Army had managed to overcome all difficulties and was ready to resume its victorious advance forthwith. The natural defences guarding the southern edge of the Tunisian plain were of a type already familiar to Eighth Army in Tripolitania: salt marshes - but those in Tripolitania were as nothing to the vast, trackless wastes of Tunisia’s Chott el Fedjadj which blocked any attempt at an outflanking manoeuvre as effectively as did the Qattara Depression at El Alamein. A long tongue of the marsh reached out particularly close to the sea just north of the little town of Gabes, to provide a tight bottleneck called the Gabes Gap, across which was a series of high ridges running from west to east. To the south-west of the salt lake lay an almost equally impassable sea of sand known as the Grand Erg, while to the south-east the Djebel Tebaga and the Matmata Hills ran parallel to the line of the coast. There was thus a further narrow passage to be negotiated east of the hills at Mareth, and this had been barred by what Ronald Lewin calls the ‘French-built, solid defences’ of the Mareth Line. Finally, any movement through the difficult country west of the Matmata Hills would be blocked by the marshes and would have to turn back towards the coast through the tightest bottleneck of them all, the Tebaga Gap. Eighth Army’s first operation in Tunisia was an attack on the Axis stronghold of Ben Gardane on the coast, which was duly taken on 16 February by 7th Armoured Division reinforced by 22nd Armoured Brigade. 51st Highland Division was also moving up to the front line and on the 17th it combined with 7th Armoured to capture the important road centre at Medenine, south-east of the Mareth Line, as well as its four landing grounds. Next day, Foum Tatahouine (Luke Skywalker’s home planet in Star Wars) , to the south of Medenine and on the eastern fringe of the Matmata Hills, also fell. It is again interesting, in view of all the criticisms about Eighth Army’s deliberation and slowness, to discover that Rommel records that these conquests were achieved ‘rather earlier than we had bargained for’. Eighth Army’s next task was to build up its supply bases in the area of Ben Gardane, ready for an assault on the Mareth Line. 30th Corps was to be responsible for this, while 10th Corps would be kept in reserve to follow up success and perhaps break through the Gabes Gap on the heels of a retreating enemy. It was anticipated that this operation would take place by mid-March, but on 22 February, all plans were disrupted. A signal was received from General Alexander, who had arrived at Algiers a week earlier to establish Eighteenth Army Group Headquarters, from which he would exercise tactical control over the entire land battle in Tunisia. In this, Alexander urgently requested that Eighth Army should put increased pressure on the enemy immediately so as to assist the Allies to rectify a grave situation that had arisen elsewhere. While Eighth Army was waiting at Tripoli in order to build up its strength, Panzer Army Afrika was falling back onto its supply bases in Tunisia. Encouraged by this fact, by his junction with his comrades, and by the prospect of assaulting inexperienced troops instead of his usual formidable Eighth Army opponents, its leader now reverted briefly to the old, aggressive Rommel of the days before El Alamein. Rommel’s first aim was to strike at Gafsa, west of Maknassy, which was the nearest position held by II US Corps and which threatened the rear of his right flank. For this attack he wished to use not only his own armoured units, 15th Panzer and the Italian Centauro, but also his former 21st Panzer Division, now re-equipped and led by Major General Hildebrandt, and 10th Panzer Division under Major General von Broich. Von Arnim opposed this suggestion as he wanted 10th and 21st Panzer to attack westward from Faid towards the American positions at Sidi Bou Zid. Kesselring, attempting to keep the peace between his two difficult subordinates, therefore declared by way of compromise that von Arnim’s attack should proceed but thereafter he should release 21st Panzer to Rommel to help the latter’s advance. Von Arnim placed his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Heinz Ziegler, in command of the preliminary offensive and on 14 February, that officer struck at Sidi Bou Zid, well supported by Kesselring’s dive-bombers. The Americans knew an attack was planned but ‘Ultra’ interceptions had indicated that it would come in the Fondouk area. Consequently the defenders were taken completely by surprise and ‘in three days’ says General Jackson, ‘Ziegler had destroyed two tank, two artillery and two infantry battalions of Fredendall’s II US Corps’. Rommel’s spirits were raised dramatically by Ziegler’s success, particularly since it had forced the Americans to evacuate Gafsa, which was occupied without resistance on the 15th. He now proposed that he be given command of all the German armour, with which to strike north-westward beyond the Western Dorsale to the main American bases with their vast supply dumps, the capture of which he felt certain would wreck all chance of an American offensive for the foreseeable future. Kesselring, despite von Arnim’s objections, gave his support, and on 19 February, Rommel, disdaining once more to concentrate his armour, advanced down both the two main roads leading through the Western Dorsale, attacking the Sbiba Pass with 21st Panzer and the Kasserine Pass with 15th Panzer and Centauro. Contrary to later exaggerated accounts, these assaults achieved comparatively limited results. All attempts to seize the passes on the 19th failed and Rommel was forced to abandon his planned breakthrough at Sbiba entirely. Reinforced by units from 10th Panzer, reluctantly and belatedly released by von Arnim, he did manage to capture the Kasserine Pass on the afternoon of the 20th, but he was able to make little further progress next day, and on the day following he was compelled to turn his attention to a new source of anxiety.
For on the 22nd, Alexander’s signal for assistance reached Eighth Army. General Richardson records that, knowing Montgomery’s insistence on making proper preparations and remaining ‘balanced’ at all times, ‘I would not have been surprised if he had answered that there was nothing he could do. Not a bit of it! His reaction was: “Alex is in trouble; we must do everything we can to help him”.’ ‘It is at such moments,’ remarks de Guingand, ‘that Montgomery is at his best. He always responds wholeheartedly to an appeal.’ ‘It was Monty in his most generous mood,’ agrees Richardson. 7th Armoured and the Highlanders were ordered up to the Mareth Line at once; the Desert Air Force’s Kittybombers stepped up their attacks; and Montgomery sent a cheerful signal to Alexander - which did not reflect his true feelings - that they might be able to get Rommel ‘running about’ between them ‘like a wet hen’. Alexander replied that he was ‘greatly relieved’, as well he might have been. Rommel would later remark only that success at Kasserine was no longer possible and would make no mention of any concern over Eighth Army’s activities - but then Rommel rarely gives more credit to his conqueror than is absolutely essential, and what he may have said afterwards is unimportant compared with what he felt at the time his decision was made. On the evening of 22 February, he reported his reasons for abandoning further attacks in the Western Dorsale to Hitler. His signal was intercepted by ‘Ultra’, and we know therefore that a major motive was ‘the situation at Mareth’ which ‘made it necessary to collect my mobile forces for a swift blow against Eighth Army before it had completed its preparations’. Certainly Rommel also gave other reasons for his decision, chiefly the arrival of Allied reinforcements, bad weather and difficult terrain. Yet even ignoring the points that his troops had been outnumbered throughout the offensive and that on 22 February the weather and the terrain over which they were fighting were both better than they had been in the immediate past, these arguments were irrelevant. If Rommel wished to collect his mobile forces for a swift blow against Eighth Army, then he could not have continued his operations against the Americans even had no reinforcements reached them, had the weather been perfect and had the terrain been entirely suitable for his purposes. The simple fact was that his mobile forces could not be in two places at once. Field Marshal Kesselring emphatically confirms that Rommel’s main anxiety was with Eighth Army and other factors were little more than excuses. ‘On 22nd February 1943,’ Kesselring reports, ‘I had a long talk with Rommel at his battle HQ near Kasserine and found him in a very dispirited mood. His heart was not in his task and he approached it with little confidence. I was particularly struck by his ill-concealed impatience to get back as quickly and with as much unimpaired strength as possible to the southern defence line.’ Nor did Kesselring think that Rommel’s anxiety was ill-founded for he approved the decision to break off the Kasserine battle, and indeed promoted Rommel to the command of Army Group Afrika which had been set up to control the activities of both German-Italian Panzer Army Afrika and von Arnim’s Fifth Panzer Army. Eighth Army's Greatest Victories - Adrian Stewart
@@Raskolnikov70 They weren't really combat engineers, though. They were rear area engineers tasked with repairing infrastructure. They had dump trucks instead of 6x6 trucks with mines and barbed wire.
13:07 the only conclusion I can make regarding the Americans learning in 3 months what the British learned over 3 years being considered disappointing to the British would be the simple fact the Americans should not have had to learn it. They had the British there to tell them. For example I learned in 18:25 what Indy and the team had to spend weeks learning. You did the hard work I got to learn, I got handed the knowledge for free.
Question for anyone that might have an answer for me: why didn’t the Axis forces withdraw from the Kuban to the Crimean peninsula? It seems that would be an easier position to hold given the more narrow front and the water crossing. Did the axis lack boats? We’re they refused to withdraw by Hitler? Maybe if they had done this they may have avoided certain troubles later on
There's a story, perhaps apocryphal, about a method for trapping a monkey. You tether a jug to a stake and put a piece of fruit in the jug. A monkey can reach into the jug and grab the fruit, but cannot withdraw its hand through the narrow neck of the jug while holding the fruit. The monkey being supposedly unwilling to release its prize will stay there, frustrated, until the trapper arrives and takes the monkey.
This week on February 20 1943, the first and second levels of the 2003 video game *Medal of Honor: Breakthrough* ( *Kasserine Pass 1* and *Kasserine Pass 2* ) , starts at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. These two levels are part of the first mission, *Battle of Kasserine Pass & Operation Torch* . As *Sergeant John Baker* in the *Kasserine Pass 1 level* , you will be dropped off at the heart of the front line at Kasserine by jeep and will first have to fight through the enemy lines cautiously amidst a sandstorm. Eventually you will take control of a German Panzer tank and move along the desert, occasionally getting off to take out Flak 88 guns and clear out enemy bunkers and trenches. Soon a closed fortified gate will stop your advance until you clear out the enemy bunker and open the gate, allowing you to rendezvous with the 1st Armored Division. Next in the *Kasserine Pass 2 level* , you will first need to check the route ahead for mines using a minesweeper device to destroy the mounted artillery guns to allow friendly Sherman minesweeper tanks to advance. Your next task is to escort these tanks by eliminating Panzerschreck teams along the way. Eventually the tank will hit a mine and you will be diverted to destroy an enemy munitions depot instead. Once that is done, you will rendezvous back with the tank convoy.
Indy in a few years: I'm Indy Neidell and this is World War 3. "Last week we saw how Russia invaded Ukraine, which many consider to be the beginning of the conflict."
if we are to learn something from the battles going on in 1943, it's that even if you think what going on right now is final, you are probably wrong and that wars could be turned around and who is winning today might be losing tomorrow, stay strong Ukraine🇺🇦🇺🇦
