198 - Eisenhower Lays Out His Plans for Sicily - WW2 - June 11, 1943 

Join the TimeGhost Army: bit.ly/WW2_198_PI Operation Husky, a bit of a weird name. How do you guys think commanders came up with operational names?

I really love these "Planning" episodes. The anticipation is palpable.

Guderian and Model: "Let's play defense for the time." Hitler and von Manstein: "LEEEEEROY JENKINS!!!"

I don't know if that's blood or... ? It's definitely an eye-catching tie, which is impressive giving the muted colour scheme. Nice. 3/5

The once vast Axis armies in Europe are looking far closer to a square than anything else now. They once controlled land from Tunisia to the gates of Moscow, but they now control neither It's crazy how much changed in 43.

Model's awareness and strategic thinking here is just beautiful.

It is interesting to hear how disjointed the planning for Kursk was in the lead to the operation. I’m sure it will go really well....

While these plans were still in preparation, study indicated the desirability of first seizing the island of Pantelleria, lying roughly between Sicily and the northeastern coast of Tunisia. This island was popularly known as the “Gibraltar of the central Mediterranean” and was assumed by many to be unassailable. It possessed an airfield from which Axis planes were able to operate against us but, more than this, we badly needed the airfield ourselves in order to supply additional air support for the Sicilian attacks. Except for small numbers of P-38s, we were still using the short-range British Spitfires and American P-40s, and to bring their bases closer to their intended target would be of tremendous advantage. Topographically Pantelleria presented almost dismaying obstacles to an assault. Its terrain was entirely unsuited to the use of airborne troops, while its coast line was so rocky that only through the mouth of the island’s one tiny harbor was it possible to land troops from assault boats. We would obviously have to use an attack of a blasting nature; that is, the volume of fire on the point of attack would have to be so great that, in spite of the lack of surprise, our assaulting troops could get ashore and make good their position. Many of our experienced commanders and staff officers strongly advised against attempting this operation, since any failure would have a disheartening effect on the troops to be committed against the Sicilian shore. However, Admiral Cunningham, in particular, agreed with me that the place could be taken at slight cost. We based our conviction upon the assumption that most Italians had had a stomachful of fighting and were looking for any good excuse to quit. We believed that if the island were subjected for several days and nights to an intensive air bombardment, denying the garrison any chance for sleep or rest, the assault, if supported heavily by naval gunfire, would be relatively easy. The garrison might even surrender beforehand. We proceeded on this assumption, since our air force had now grown to the point where a bombardment of the kind contemplated could be readily carried out. Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Spaatz, and the air forces became enthusiastic supporters of the project. In a period of six days and nights approximately 5,000 tons of high explosives were dropped on the eastern portion of the island and in such a limited area that the concentrations achieved were greater than any we had previously attempted. In the actual outcome the capture of Pantelleria was so easy-the garrison surrendered on June 11, just as our troops were getting into their assault boats from the larger ships-that few people had any inkling of the doubts and fears that had to be overcome in launching the operation. Indeed, objection had been so pronounced that I resolved to make a personal reconnaissance immediately prior to the assault date in order to determine for myself that the defenses were sufficiently softened to assure success. This reconnaissance took the form of a naval and air bombardment of the island two days prior to the attack, conducted so as to appear to the defenders to be a real assault and to simulate as nearly as possible the actual operation contemplated for D-day and H-hour. Royal Navy Mediterranean Fleet commander Admiral Andrew Cunningham and I boarded a British cruiser at Bône one evening, and during that night steamed eastward at full speed to join the squadron assembly near Pantelleria. Cunningham told me that the whole area was mined except for a narrow channel we were following, which had been swept. This prompted me to ask, “Are there no floating mines about?” His answer was, “Oh yes, but at this speed the bow wave will throw them away from the ship. It would be just bad luck if we should strike one.” The squadron of some half-dozen Royal Navy cruisers and ten destroyers began the bombardment about eleven in the morning, while the planes came over in wave after wave to drop their bombs on selected targets. Reaction was weak and sporadic. Although all our ships pressed in close to shore, and small, speedy craft ran up almost to the edge of the mole, the ships suffered no damage. Cunningham and I were confirmed in our belief that little opposition would be offered to the attack and that we could have taken the island then if we had been accompanied by troops. The Prime Minister, who was then visiting with me in Africa, was very anxious to go along on this operation. I evaded direct reply but would never have agreed to his going, on the grounds that it involved needless risk for a man of his importance. But I had a difficult time indeed explaining to him afterward that Admiral Cunningham and I had always intended to participate. Two years later he reminded me that I had been very unfair to him on that occasion, especially as he had a personal financial stake in the enterprise. A small wager between us had grown out of his estimate that there were no more than 3,000 Italians on the island. He offered to pay me five centimes each for all we captured in excess of that number. We took 11,000 prisoners, and though I had naturally forgotten the joking wager, he paid up promptly, figuring out the exchange himself and remarking that at that rate (a twentieth of a cent each) he’d buy all the prisoners we could get. With Pantelleria captured we immediately moved strong air elements onto its airfield. In the meantime we further improved our air position by building a new field on the island of Gozo, just off Malta. On Malta itself was stationed every aircraft that its fields could possibly absorb. Crusade in Europe - Dwight Eisenhower

Fun fact, the word “Shipai” is very close to the Japanese word for failure, shippai. I wonder if any of the Japanese soldiers made that joke

4:52 Actually, the Regia Marina still has 7 operational battleships: 2 modernized dreadnoughts of the Conte Di Cavour class, 2 modernized dreadnoughts of the Andrea Doria class, and 3 fast battleships of the Littorio class.

Indy and everyone involved in this channel deserve an award for their incredible work. If RU-vid ever had their version of Oscars, it would be a clean sweep for this channel. I love everything you do. 😊

During the night of June 10/11, a British radio listening post on Malta intercepted communications between the military governor of Pantelleria, Admiral Pavesi, and Supermarina, the headquarters of the Regia Marina. Pavesi explained that the garrison was running short of water and munitions and had been told to surrender. Supermarina’s reply was short and to the point: “We are convinced that you will inflict the greatest possible damage upon the enemy. Long Live Italy!” The next morning, despite the heavy bombardment of the town and port of Pantelleria, Pavesi held his normal morning staff meeting. Polling his staff officers, he found the overwhelming majority were in favor of capitulation. Pavesi decided to bypass the chain of command and at 9:50 am sent a message directly to Mussolini advising him of his plan to surrender. At the same time Pavesi’s message was being sent to Mussolini, the dictator had been briefed by Supermarina that Pavesi was going to hold the island. Il Duce dispatched a message to Pantelleria praising the heroic resistance of the garrison and announced the award of the Cross of Savoia for Admiral Pavesi. However, by 11 am Mussolini had received Pavesi’s message that he was planning to surrender due to water shortages. No doubt chagrined, Mussolini replied to Pavesi, concurring with his surrender plans and telling the admiral, “Only Stalin or the Mikado [the Japanese Emperor] can order a commander to fight to the last man,” and directing him to inform the British on Malta that he was surrendering due to the lack of water for the civilian population. Mussolini’s permission did not reach Pavesi until he had already surrendered. At 10:30 am, June 11, the first wave of British landing craft left the invasion fleet en route to the Red, White, and Green landing beaches at the port of Pantelleria, their approach hidden by fog from lookouts on the island. The landing areas were being swept by gunfire from four Royal Navy cruisers and three destroyers while the town was simultaneously being bombed by hundreds of B-17s. This last fusillade of firepower directed against the defenders stopped, according to schedule, at 11:45 as British landing craft approached their landing zones. Admiral Pavesi’s signal to Malta that he was surrendering was sent at 11 am, simultaneously with his order to raise a white flag in the town and display a white cross on the airfield. Delays in communicating the orders to all the defenders caused some isolated machine-gun fire against the landing craft as they beached, but they were quickly silenced and no Allied casualties were suffered. Fighters making low-level strafing runs on the island reported seeing the white cross on the airfield, and the order was given to the Royal Navy ships off shore to cease fire. Due to a breakdown in communications, the Mediterranean air forces did not receive the cease-fire order and continued sporadic bombing of targets until late afternoon, an act for which Lt. Gen. Spaatz later apologized. At noon, 20 soldiers of the 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington Regiment set foot on European soil for the first time since the Dunkirk evacuation three years and one week earlier. They were greeted by the few Italian soldiers in the vicinity waving white flags. There was no more resistance offered by the beleaguered defenders, and the seizure of the island went off without a hitch, with one exception. Winston Churchill, in his memoirs, said the only casualty was a British soldier “bitten by a mule.” The unfortunate soldier was Corporal Sanderson of the 2nd Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, who had actually suffered a fatal kick in the head by a jackass. The Comando Supremo of the Italian Armed Forces released war bulletin 1113 the next day, stating: “Pantelleria, subjected to massive air and naval actions with a frequency and intensity unprecedented in history, deprived of water resources for the civilian population, was yesterday forced to cease resistance.” A British postwar commission investigated the effects of bombing on Pantelleria and discovered that only 36 military and three civilians died during the attacks. Of the 118 guns on the island, only 16 had been destroyed and 43 damaged. The food and water supplies were adequate for prolonged resistance although the distribution system for the water relied on motor transport that was interrupted by the destruction of roads and trails on the island. Admiral Pavesi stated that the water supplies had been contaminated by the bombing, but the inquiry could find no proof of that. Was Pantelleria’s surrender due solely to the application of airpower? Certainly the unrelenting aerial bombardment weakened the defenders’ will to resist; Hap Arnold’s observation to that effect was accurate. Italy’s German allies certainly expected a stiffer resistance from Italians that were defending their home territory for the first time. They expected Pantelleria to represent a line that could not be crossed, like the Rhine River was for the Germans in 1945. They were disappointed. For the Italians, Pantelleria was another domino of defeat that began in North Africa. The Italians were faced with the prospect of either losing their independence to the Anglo-Americans or greater subservience to their German allies. In light of these two choices, defeatism spread first through military leadership, then through the ranks, and finally through the Italian population. For the Germans, it confirmed suspicions that the Italians were unreliable allies and that in the upcoming battle for Italy the Wehrmacht would have to take increasing responsibility for her defense. The fall of Pantelleria had other wide-ranging effects. Besides removing a threat to the Allied invasion of Sicily and furthering the collapse of Italian morale, Hitler was forced to postpone his upcoming Kursk offensive in Russia-Operation Citadel-due to his fears of an imminent Allied invasion in the south of France. For the Allies, Operation Corkscrew was an unqualified success. Pantelleria had been seized from the enemy at little cost. Admiral Pavesi surrendered the garrison and all the supporting equipment and infrastructure intact. Within a week, the airfield runway was open, and a P-40 fighter group based on the island flew top cover for the invasion of Sicily the next month. For the first time, air power had been able to fulfill the dreams of Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Alexander de Seversky and compel an enemy to surrender without the need to seize territory by land forces. By concentrating overwhelming power on a narrow front, aerial bombardment had reduced a seemingly impregnable fortress on its own. Unfortunately, the other consequence of the bombing of Pantelleria reinforced the mistaken belief that dropping large numbers of bombs on enemy positions would make land movements easy. Warfare History Network

12:06 no transmissions? Dear god that’s like the worst part of the Tiger! The Tiger is the perfect show of how reliable weaponry that won’t break down before it gets to the battle is very important

Thanks Indy and the TimeGhost team! I started watching you all 2 weeks ago and am all caught up in no time because of the really engaging content. Thanks for putting so much time and effort into these videos so we can learn from the past in this interesting week-by-week format. Cheers!

Mutsu's sudden destruction is fascinating in its mystery. We will likely never know what *really* happened with her, just speculation. She also represents one of Japan's most powerful battleships and its loss is much worse than if Japan had lost something older like Fuso. The plans for Husky are also interesting, we'll get to see how D-Day 'lite' plays out.

German engineers: 'We can handle any defenses the Soviets make.' Soviets make a 25 mile deep set of defenses in the Kursk salient....

Operation Zitadelle was hopelessly compromised by Soviet intelligence, who knew what the Germans were planning. However, I am just seeing now that Model was modifying the attack plan from the north, as he correctly knew about the Soviets multi tiered defense in depth.

Started watching about 2 weeks ago, marathoned week by week, pearl, and some others here and there. I finally caught up, and am now slapped with the wait. My hubris blitzed through when I should have taken my time

At 5:18 in the video there is the Stars and Stripes shown for Force H. I was under the impression Force H was all Royal Navy.

1:36 It should be noted that the aerial bombardment of the Italian island of Pantelleria by the Allies also marked the first time in history where an unconditional surrender was the result of solely air attacks with no ground actions involved. Whether this may happen again in future actions elsewhere remains an open question to be seen though.

The invasion of Pantellaria by the British 1st Division resulted in just one casualty: a British soldier that was bitten by an Italian donkey😂.

i still insist, Rokosovsky deserves a special episode, he is the trully best general in soviet union

the plan for kurks alone give me goosebumps already.

I find it interesting how Model could have simply followed the orders, but at the same time he really looked the best for his man and future and considered already to leave as much as possible for the upcoming Soviet offensive "just in case". While a pessimistic view, at that point it was probably the most realistic one.

Battle of Atlantic shifts to South Atlantic ( 5 - 11 June 1943) Although the waters in the Gibraltar-Azores area had become quite perilous because of increased numbers of British and American B-24s and Catalina flying boats based at Gibraltar and Port Lyautey, Morocco, political considerations in Berlin apparently demanded that Dönitz do all he could to redress the Axis setback in North Africa and to help prevent or at least interfere with an expected Allied invasion of Sardinia, Sicily, or Italy. Therefore on the same day that Dönitz ordered the U-boats to withdraw from the North Atlantic run, May 24, he directed Control to form a new group by May 31 to attack UG and GU convoys. More specifically, Control logged, the group was to attack convoy UGS 9, apparently put onto this target by B-dienst or other intelligence sources. At that specific time, Allied codebreakers could not read naval Enigma effectively, but DFs of the U-boat radio chatter gave Captain Giles Short commander in US Navy escort carrier USS Bogue from Support Group 6 a good idea of the Trutz wolfpack assembly area gathered by U-Boat command to attack convoy SC-131. U-Boats could bot intercept the convoy but Captain Short maneuvered USS Bogue and her screen to that general area in such manner as to provide cover not only for UGS 9 but also for two other convoys passing east and west close by, UGS 7A and Flight 10, a special formation of nineteen eastbound British Landing Craft Infantry (LCI). On June 4, USS Bogue’s aircraft saw and attacked three Trutz wolfpack VII type U-Boats on the surface, all formerly of group Mosel on second patrols: Erwin Christophersen, age twenty-eight, in U-228; Rudolf Baltz in U-603; and Horst Rendtel, age twenty-six, in U-64L Baltz and Rendtel fought back with flak guns, fouling the aim of the bombardiers, and all three boats escaped with only slight damage. On the day following, June 5, two USS Bogue aircraft on patrol found another Trutz boat on the surface. She was the clumsy VIID minelayer U-217, commanded by Kurt Reichenbach-Klinke, age twenty-six. Pilot Richard S. Rogers, flying a Wildcat, dived and strafed the boat, knocking six Germans into the sea. After Rogers had made two more strafing runs, pilot Alexander C. McAuslan in an Avenger dropped four depth charges on U-217 from an altitude of one hundred feet. The U-boat disappeared with the loss of all hands. Including U-636, which made her maiden patrol in the Atlantic but was transferred to the Arctic at its conclusion, and two boats that sailed for the Mediterranean, U-409 and U-594. The U-409 got into the Mediterranean, but a Hudson aircraft of RAF Coastal Command Squadron 48, piloted by H. C. Bailey, sank with rockets the U-594, commanded by Friedrich Mumm off Gibraltar, on June 4. The seven new U-boats from Germany and the one from the Arctic force joining the Atlantic force incurred catastrophic losses. Six were sunk, one was so badly damaged that she had to abort to France, and the other, an IXC40, had to be diverted to a refueling mission. One of them was the new Type VII U-417, commanded by Wolfgang Schreiner, age twenty-six. She was sunk on June 11 in the Iceland-Faeroes gap, merely nine days out from Kiel by a B-17 of RAF Coastal Command Squadron 206. Piloted by R. B. Thompson, the plane dropped four shallow-set depth charges. Before she sank, the U-417 hit the B-17 with flak guns, inflicting such serious damage that the plane was forced to ditch. Sighting the British airmen in a dinghy, an American Catalina of the Iceland-based Squadron VP 84 attempted to rescue them but crashed, forcing the Americans to scramble into their life raft. On June 14, a Catalina of the Faeroes-based British Squadron 190, piloted by J. A. Holmes, rescued the British aircrew but the American raft was not found until June 16, by which time only one airman was still alive. After rescue, the surviving British B-17 aircrew reported seeing “twenty to thirty” Germans in the water where U-417 went down, “some covered in oil, some shaking their fists at the aircraft, but the majority prone.” There were no survivors of U-417. Hitler's U-Boat War - Clay Blair Jr

Awesome job Indy and team 👍

Hi my name's chrissy I just wanted to thank you for your serial. During covid conditions your have provided me with a consistency. Having lost my job and house you gave something honest and informative to look forward to every week. Thank you again Chrissy Hoskins

That is really fascinating information on Model and his plans at Kursk. First time ever hearing that. Thank you

I had to delay my viewing this week, as my coffee brewing was late. Watching the WWII video while drinking coffee has become a Saturday morning ritual for me, and a very pleasant one. A special and well-deserved thanks to the folks that draw and animate the various maps displayed on the episodes. They do a really wonderful job. I believe those maps are improving week by week. Thanks. At risk of foreshadowing, I know you will cover the tragic friendly fire incident during the Sicily invasion. I was on the receiving end of friendly in Vietnam - we had two wounded, but no KIA's. This series has become a very enjoyable addiction for me. Massive kudos for all involved!

I hope you guys continue this and cover the Korean War next

Kinda cool to know your still chugging along. Last watched like 2 years ago. It's enjoyable checking back in and seeing where your at.

I’m Roger Drew! This is one of my proudest moments. I am officially cool. Thanks Indy.

My father ran a warehouse when I was in high school (in the 1980s) He had an older pair of employees (husband and wife). The husband had served in the Aleutians. He was very excited when he discovered I knew about the campaign as it is rather obscure in the US.

Allies planning an attack: Okay, so we put a note on a corpse and send it ashore in Spain, then we send a massive naval force near the supposed objective, then we reroute our convoys to meet near Greece... Axis planning an attack: They know we're coming and they're building up their defences, so we launch a frontal assault.

As always, brilliant narration 😀

Thank you.

Another great episode. Fascinating piece about the IJN Mutsu. I hope you've checked out the game 'Darkest Hour(HOI2)'. It's really the most accurate and realistic of the HOI series -especially with historic mods(don't let the fact that it's the cheapest fool you). I have all the HOI series games, but can't stop playing this one.

Excellent, as always 🙂👍

Danke!

model being put on offensive work - it's a bold strategy okw, let's see how it plays out

Amazing Military coverage of this Historical Episode about WW2

Ike's planning: 7th Army will cover Monty's flank and NOT take Palermo Patton: 😈😏

This whole group of shows some of the best on youtube.

I can't explain how happy I am to see Polish flag displayed alongside other major players of the war behind Indy. Somehow people think that we disappeared during WW II but our underground was being prepared for asymmetrical fight through almost whole 1939. Thank you Indy and the Crew! Not only for that, but perhaps even more for making sure your work if of such quality! You made me read about "Stalingrad of the East" myself after you mentioned last time that the sources about it are conflicting and therefore you can't tell us about them ;)

11.000 Italian troops on an island at the gates of southern shores of their homeland surrender without a fight Japanese garrisons in distant Pacific "What the hell ?"

dam, i didn´t know how complex the planning for sicily was. but so to say it is the first majoy invasion of the allies of the mainland axis possessions. and which such a logistical risk they do not try to capture a port but be supplied by the beachheads. i realy wonder how this will work out.

I think it's very interesting seeing Model and Mainstein come up with such different plans. I remember reading that towards the end of the war, Model no longer believed in victory. And seeing his planning, he seems to be thinking quite realistically. Pheraps realistic thinking and fighting against people with many times the surface, industry and population than you don't give much hope together.

Patton changed the Sicily objectives once the landings took place, grabbing Palermo quickly.

strategic bombing has been an abject disaster for the allies and it's a bad sign how inflexible they've been in changing their tactics.

Thanks!

Great episode!

I was so confused by the doggo in a helmet until Operation Husky was mentioned.

Without the Chair of Wisdom to make sense of everything, the Phone of Confusion can really run amok.

Deception and surprise are key elements in warfare. The allies are thus having the enemies believe that they are preparing to invade Greece. All this is taking place while the Germans are preparing for Kursk.

how come the year 4 playlist has this video directly after 194? I missed out on the ones in between and was wondering about some of the comments...

Love your sense of humor Indy. Appreciate your hard work into these awesome videos

Ah yes the invasion of Sicily, Eisenhower's famous beach landing!

Development of the Sicilian plan, assigned the code name Husky, began in February. The major points to be decided were the strength of the attack, its timing, and its exact location. Manifestly we could not depend entirely upon the employment of troops that were then engaged in the Tunisian battle. To do this would force us to defer decisions respecting timing until after the final battle in Africa, and since this date could not be accurately predetermined, all other planning would have been indecisive and commanders and staffs could not have proceeded with confidence. Considering the strength of the enemy garrison, we felt that some five or six divisions should be deployed in the initial landing. An invasion on this scale required the concentration of a very considerable number of landing craft and additional fighting vessels of the Navy. During the spring months of 1943 we kept in constant communication with the Combined Chiefs of Staff to determine the amount of the resources upon which we could count and the time at which they could be made available. The United States staff found that it could send us a splendidly trained division, the 45th, properly loaded on convoys for the assault. In addition we had the 3d, which we did not plan to use in the Tunisian battle. Moreover, our plans called for the release of the U.S. 1st Division from the Tunisian battle area as quickly as success was sure. These three divisions, reinforced by the 2d Armored Division, still in Morocco, paratroop elements of the 82d Airborne Division, and Rangers were to make up the American portion of the assaulting forces. On the British side it was determined to bring into the assault a Canadian division from England, while the Eighth Army was able, some time before the end of the Tunisian campaign, to detach part of its strength to prepare for the Sicilian assault. These forces were to attack Sicily in early July, and all preparation was based upon the keeping of that target date. Because of the location of our troops and embarkation points, the convoys would converge upon the island from the east, the west, and the south. Selection of the assaulting areas was a complicated problem. From the standpoint of ease of approach from our scattered ports, protection of our communications, and the nature of the coast line, the southeastern portions of the island looked favorable, yet the supply staffs were convinced that a force of the size contemplated could not be maintained over available beaches. Even assuming the early capture of Syracuse on the eastern coast of the island, the technical experts flatly stated that without additional ports the operation would be defeated by lack of reinforcements, ammunition, and other supplies. The alternative was to arrange the attack so as to gain quickly more points and ports of entry, but since strength in landing craft was limited, each of these attacks would be relatively weak. Experience up to that time led us largely to discount the quality of the defense to be put up by the Italian formations; however, in the coming operation they would be defending their own territory, which could easily make a great difference. Our Intelligence staffs were vitally concerned with the strength of the German garrison. We felt-and later experience proved that our estimate was reasonable-that if the German garrison at the time of attack should be substantially greater than two fully manned and equipped divisions, then the assault as we were planning it was too weak and we would be wise to defer the operation until we could effect a greater concentration of our own forces. Because of the estimated inability to supply several assault divisions and their reinforcements over the southern and eastern beaches, we studied and tentatively adopted a plan that contemplated assault by echelon, beginning in the southeast, followed by a second one in the south, and a third in the vicinity of Palermo on the north coast. The idea was that each would provide air cover for the following one and the result would be to give us a number of beaches and ports at the earliest possible date, thus facilitating supply. The danger in such an operation was that failure in any particular assault would cancel out the following ones, and even if initial landings were successful, later concentration would be difficult, and we ran the risk of defeat in detail. This last possibility we did not consider serious unless before the attack could begin the German strength defending the garrison should reach the danger point, namely, substantially over two divisions. But the plan was complicated and that is always a disadvantage. At first, however, it appeared to be the only possible solution to the problem. As time went on it was evident that the German was moving to stiffen up the garrison in Sicily, but our information led us to believe that he had not yet attained, or at least passed, what we considered to be the critical level. No one really liked the plan for echelon attack. Its complications, dispersion, and successive rather than simultaneous assaults were cited as risks outweighing the chance of defeat through lack of port facilities. Montgomery, especially, always a believer in the power concept, desired to throw heavy forces into the southeastern portion of the island. The supply staffs were again required to study the problem, and now they came to a more optimistic estimate than they had some weeks previously. This change resulted from the unforeseen availability of a considerable number of LSTs and the quantity production of the “duck,” an amphibious vehicle that proved to be one of the most valuable pieces of equipment produced by the United States during the war. Incidentally, four other pieces of equipment that most senior officers came to regard as among the most vital to our success in Africa and Europe were the bulldozer, the jeep, the 21/2-ton truck, and the C-47 airplane. Curiously enough, none of these is designed for combat. With considerable quantities of improved equipment in sight, the supply staffs agreed that their estimates could be markedly revised upward, and plans were crystallized on the basis of the British forces moving against the eastern coast and the American against the eastern part of the southern coast. Before leaving this point, a word upon the “might-have-been” of the alternate plan. Some professionals and others have since vigorously asserted to me that if we had correctly evaluated the low combat value of the huge Italian garrison we would have stuck to the “encircling” plan and so overrun the island in ten to fifteen days rather than in the thirty-eight eventually required. Moreover, it is alleged, we would have captured the German core of the defending forces instead of merely driving it back into Italy. It is possible that with Syracuse, Gela, and Palermo quickly in our hands we might have been able to capture Messina, the key point, before the Germans could have concentrated sufficiently to defeat any of our attacks. But not even by hindsight can it be said with certainty that the whole Italian garrison would quit-I still believe that we were wise to concentrate as much as possible, and to proceed methodically to the conquest of an island in which the defending strength was approximately 350,000. In any event the simple, simultaneous attack became the adopted plan. To conduct the British portion of the attack General Alexander designated the Eighth Army under General Montgomery, while on the American side General Patton, who had been brought out of the Tunisian battle in the middle of April, was placed in command. General Alexander was to be in immediate charge of the ground assault; his headquarters was designated Fifteenth Army Group. Crusade in Europe - Dwight Eisenhower

The Model part of this episode was so interesting, class episode

The Mutsu explosion was nothing more than an accident. It was not rare for battleships of the era to explode while in harbor probably due to poor ventilation, older steel warships were much better ventilated when under way. Quite a few warships of all nations had magazine explosions under similar circumstance although Mutsu I think was the last. The USS Maine was a notable example, but there were more. Mutsu was launched 1920, still a warship of the Super Drednought era. In 1917, the British Battleship Vanguard exploded in harbor Both Japanese and British ships used cordite and some variants were more unstable than others.

Be extra thorough about the soviet advance following kursk. Not covered enough in general. People say it's a turning point but don't mention the frontline change after the German failure

Sorry for nitpicking, but since Italy is going to be a theatre of action in the future and your pronounciation (yours - Indy, that is- and Spartacus) sounds quite on point for German and French, and I assume you strived to being accurate on this matter, I suggest you check on your italian pronounciation. For instance - and I assume you recorded this episode a while ago, so I know the next episodes won't have accurate pronounciations, even if you read this comment - the "g" in Gela is soft, while the "c" in Pachino is hard. Just my two cents. Thank you for your work anyway!

Somehow I don’t believe the results of the investigation of the Mutsu’s demise. Thought the IJN is most truthful about losses at Midway…oh wait. And then there was the USN’s investigation of the turret explosion on the USS Iowa in 1989 blaming it on a suicidal sailor. Totally different.

Just a minor debate, if you are bombing fortifications for a future invasion is it strategic bombardment or tactical bombardment? in my eyes, strategic bombardment is about reducing opponent's strengh in the long run and tactical more about support of yours operations. Am i wrong and why? thank you all for the answers.

Oh boy getting closer to Kursk. The anticipation is building

Next week, I hope he mentions the King of Lampedusa

A lot of wishful thinking was going on in the lead-up to the Battle of Kursk.

I wonder what will happen if Husky and Zitadelle occur at roughly same time... Will Germans focus on Kursk or move some forces West to deal with new land front in Italy?

1:07 I really wonder how he could imagine it really flying.

Another incredible video. Wow!

What planning are the Italian forces doing during June? There hasn't been any mention of any military planning by Italy.

Best opening phone call in quite awhile! 😃

"The German army is a machine, & machines can be broken!" K. K. Rokossovsky.​💯​✨​

Just an Italian side note gela is not pronounced jela, the G is harder… Same as cage -> ca-gela -> gela ;)

Not targeting Messina early on was a major blunder; it let all the Germans escape.

It's a relatively quiet month in this June 1943, next month is when it all kick's off.

Wooooo! NEW EPISODE!!! LOVE THE SERIES!!

General James Longstreet in the American Civil War was noted as saying, "You need 3 to 1 advantage to take a well built defensive line." But I guess the German General Staff didn't read American Civil War history.

I always click on thumbs up routinely before I start as I know it'll always be great. I'm not disappointed today.

During this time (June 1943) in Norway Generalmajor Adolf von Schell is building the 25th panzer division for a possible invasion of Sweden.

It is fun to hear about plans being hashed out for upcoming operations. Who thinks what and agrees or disagrees with who. It sounds almost like a high school soap opera, what with the crazy plans that may or may not work.

One angry soldier took out an entire battleship? Legendary

7:00 - "The restoration of the Stars and Stripes over Attu brought a renewed call in the United States for more resources to be concentrated on the Pacific War." It seems these callers haven't been keeping up with America's remarkable shipbuilding program. Already at this point in the timeline, five of the new Essex class aircraft carriers have been launched and are working up to operational status, with many more under construction. New airplanes are being built to operate from them, including the Grumman F6F Hellcat fighter, specifically designed to out-fly and out-shoot the dreaded Japanese Zero. We'll see how it does in a few months. There isn't as much call for additional fleet aircraft carriers in the European theater, where most of the fighting from this point forward will be within range of land-based air power, so these Essexes and their supporting ships are effectively earmarked for the Pacific. In the Pacific theater, only a limited number of islands are suitable for hosting airfields, and many of them are too far apart to be within easy range of neighboring Allied-held islands with airfields. That means aircraft carriers will play a critical role in siezing islands in the Pacific from the Japanese. Enough carriers must be available to establish air superiority over and around a Japanese-held island until invading forces can capture or build an airfield on the island - the factor that proved critical in the battle for Guadalcanal. Ergo, the very existence of so many new fleet aircraft carriers and the ships for their supporting task groups means that vast resources are in fact being concentrated on the Pacific War. But it takes time to build the ships and aircraft and train the sailors and pilots for them. The construction and training are taking place feverishly just now in the timeline, even if the effects are mostly not apparent yet, as the Pacific theater is somewhat quiet for the Americans and Japanese. Both have been racing to rebuild their depleted carrier forces after each side took heavy losses in the early battles up to and through Guadalcanal. And though it may not be immediately apparent from the news reports from the front lines, back home the Americans are winning that construction race - by a wide margin. It's going to be a whole new kind of war in the Pacific come 1944, with no more "operation shoestrings" for the Allies. The Americans will be arriving with the entire shoe store.

we're getting closer to Kursk

15:40 Literally me, making drinking plans with my friends

I noticed your soundtrack usage is different with this one.

When will the big D-Day special coming out??

Also this week, 13 B-24 Liberators of the "Halverson project" (HALPRO) take off from Egypt on the 12th to bomb the romanian city of Ploiesti and its oil fields. Sadly for the americans, the bombs fell only on civilian buildings, doing minimal damage. Both sides will keep quiet about the air raid, the americans to cover up their failed mission and the romanian and german authorities so as to not panic the local population. The germans, suddenly reminded of the fact that their romanian ally supplies them with about a third of their oil, will send in Luftwaffe General Alfred Gerstenberg to organize and beef up the city's air defenses. I wonder if the americans are aware of this development and will plan accordingly in the future...

About a month to go before Operation Husky and Citadel are scheduled to begin. The passage of time feels really fast, just a few months ago, we were just going through the Battle of Stalingrad! I wonder what will be next after all this? Hmmm....

I get that attacking Kursk is a bad idea, but by admitting this aren't they also admitting that they have no chance of winning the war? By not attacking they're accepting defeat and to trying to postpone it

One of the three British officers present with Tito at Sutjeska wrote a book called The Embattled Mountain. If you can find it, it makes a stunning reading. Alongside Davidson's Partisan Picture it is the best book on Yugoslav resistance I know to exist in English.

It's always a wise idea to have a plan B.👍

My late father saw Gen. MacArthur while in the Philippines during WWII. MacArthur was a first rate putz.

Technically italian fleet was still quite stronger tha just 2 battleships and 6 cruisers, as next week italian battleship roma will be officially commissioned, and by the armistice the battle fleet will have 6 battleships (3 in the adriatic and ionian and 3 in the thyrrenian), 10 light cruisers ( the heavy cruisers had been completely deleted,the few survivors at this point will be sunk in july ) and a pletora of dds and other crafts, plus merchants and what remained on the bottom of the barrel. The 3 modern battleships and the rest of the thyrrenian battlefleet would have been deleted by the allied air support but were still considered a major source of possible danger. Also it eould be interesting to know if the allies were waiting something from the italians, as truly devastating raids on italian ports were really launched to sink whatever remained after the armistice, well aside from the bombing of the maddalena harbour which caused catastrophic damage to 1 of the 2 last heavy cruisers, and sunk the other. Now thay i think of it this happened in april 1943, i think it didn't appear on the channel.

Meanwhile in France Jean Moulin participates, with the Franc-Tireur resistance movement, in the creation of the Vercors maquis. However, the reasons for concern accumulate: Captain Claudius Billon, regional head of the AS (the Secret Army, a combat structure resulting from the fusion of the paramilitary formations of the three most important “Gaullist” resistance movements in the southern zone of France: Combat, Liberation-Sud and Franc-Tireur), was arrested on February 1 1943 in Lyon, Commander Henri Manhès was arrested in Paris in March, two months before the arrest of General Delestraint, head of the AS, on June 9 in Paris. The Secret Army was decapitated and Jean Moulin himself knew he was being hunted, as he wrote to General de Gaulle: "I am now wanted both by Vichy and the Gestapo, who know all about my identity or my activities. My task is therefore becoming more and more delicate, while the difficulties are constantly increasing. If I were to disappear, I would not have had the material time to inform my successors”.

Hi Indy Awesome episode. Planning for next offensive looks great. Thanks for the video.

The new lighting makes your hair look greener than ever. Have you considered smiling more?

Great episode as always crew! Ive come to notice that just about every british general has a very defined moustache aswell in this era lol

What baffles me the most to this day is the fact, that they did not change their angles of Attack at the last minute to confuse the red army. Striking right behind the Frontlines and encircling the entire bulge while just bombing all the enemies inside of it. But then again, we have more overall Information than the Generals on both sides.

I guess we witnessed a vital difference between WW1 & WW2 Germany this week. Ludendorff knew when & how to play defense when it was necessary, Hitler didn’t. Luckily so, probably shortened the war and spared millions of lives.