The Battle of Gettysburg offers timeless lessons to Soldiers, military leaders, corporate CEOs and others. Listen to Professor Len Fullenkamp, Army War College historian, discusses when to change the battle plan and when to persist.
One of the most important decisions Meade made was his written reply to General John Buford on day 1 of the battle telling him to hold and wait for reinforcements. That Buford was an unusual Cavalry officer for the time who saw his horses as transport and his troops as mounted infantry was key to the Union's success. His time at West Point was put to good use as well, Buford assessed the ground like an Infantry officer and correctly noted that he had good ground and the Army of Northern Virginia would try and take it in force. The Sharps Carbines also gave a critical firepower advantage to Bufords troops.
I would love to sit in his class! It all comes down to what you know or do not know at that moment in time. Its a simple truth, Gaius Julius Cesar would have understood Lee's and Mead's dilemma on those bloody three days. I been there, Its not a very big place. You can walk it in an hour or less if you don't stop and look at things. But If you look you can spend the whole day and then some.
I think Lee understood the long run situation. That over time the Union with its vast resources would overwhelm the South, he needed a knock out blow while the wind was at his back. Grant was already about to take Vicksburg...time was not on his side.
mark merzweiler Lee was following Jefferson Davis's misconception that Britain would offer informal support or formal recognition if there was a big victory. Not only was that not even remotely possible, the loss of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863 would have completely cancelled out a victory at Gettysburg. As it happened, the double loss should have been sufficient to cause the confederacy to surrender altogether. They couldn't abolish slavery, they couldn't win, and they couldn't get an ally to help them. It was over.
I agree. But i am less familiar with Sun Tzu. Which rules in particular? I know there is one like, "be far, but let the enemy think you are close." and another about giving chase.
@@jonny5ive167 Maybe a couple. One was "Some battles should not be fought". Even more relevant to Gettysburg, "The commander must be absolutely clear in his orders". One of Lee's weaknesses was that he preferred to word his orders more like "suggestions", leaving his officers a lot of discretion. This worked with Jackson, but not so much with Ewell, Hill, and even Longstreet who was not fully on board from the beginning.
this was a heartening video. I see many videos from historians slagging off generals from yesteryear; including antiquity and through to the US civil war and beyond, yet they have never been in the position or had the responsibility of a military commander not been faced with the same decisions and information they had at the time. i think legitimate questions can be asked about Lee's generalship at Gettysburg but the likelihood is that the vast majority of those second guessing aren't quite as good a19th century commander as he was.
I think this video gives too easy of a time to Lee. It is not a question of being a better commander, fact is, most of their job was in areas far too few people have a decent understanding off... But there are a few fact, that needs to be asked when we talk about "saint" Lee. First of, why is Grant seen as a butcher, when Lee lost more troops in most of his battles? Why did he commit to an attack on the third day, when he himself had been at Frederiksberg, and had seen the power of the defense? Why commit to a major battle at all, if he didn't feel ready for it (on the first day). However the most glaring critique of Lee at Gettysburg, is that he didn't command it, but sort of just watched on the side... I agree on the overall message that we know what happened, and they at the time, had to live through it, to find out... But trying to pass of critique of a man that really didn't preform in those days, by claiming that he couldn't know any better, despite having people that was seen as his close advisers offering alternatives, that is a bit too forgiving.
deze man heeft het door , zo werkte het verzet in Holland ook , de mogelijkheden deden zich voor en ons KP acteerde daar op met kleine en of grote eenheden of ad-hoc ,, bravo grtz uit het thuis land van Longstreet , Holland , europ ..
So what is the generally accepted argument against Lee trying to get past Meade's left, get between Meade and Washington, and fight a defensive position at Fredericksburg (?)
I totally agree with this as it applies to all life events. Kudos to antares4s as well because we are all guilty of 20/20 hindsight. Very true!! Hats off to both of you
Lee's problem with devising a sound strategy for this battle was that it was too fluid. Large groups of men were coming up and joining, shifting positions - witness Sickles moving his corps forward from Cemetery Ridge - an order given at one point in time may no longer be feasible in less than hour. Meanwhile this order has to be distributed by horseback to subordinate generals, brigade commanders, right down to the regimental and company levels.
Name me one battle where Caesar "persisted". Just one. Seems theres a direct inverse relationship to persistence and victory. Caesar was a man who wasnt afraid to throw in the towel and walk away.
Never really questioned that Lee had a good chance of winning but from my "arm chair" I always wondered what would have happened had he chose a different direction on the last day of battle? Why would he have Pickett's men cross such a huge open field? Did he think the Federal Lines were actually broken and only needed a push? Without being able to see the battle fully from his point of view at the time it will always be a mystery.
When I think of a pouting Longstreet insisting upon Lee's plan to attack up the Emmitsburg Road in echelon; that is, from south to north across the Union front I get slightly ill. The conditions had so changed since Longstreet was ordered to move, eight hours previously, that they were obsolete. It was his duty to adjust the tactics to meet the changed conditions on the field or to check with Lee. He did neither. Then something unusual happened. Generals Hood and McClaws had one of those "are you seeing what I'm seeing" meetings. A colonel reached Hood a paper. It was a document indicating that any orders to send men against what was before them would be followed but under protest. Hood not only signed the petition, he and McLaws violated orders. They would make a frontal assault. Futile and senseless though it was, the alternative was the echelon attack Longstreet ordered, and that was insane. This way their men - or, perhaps more accurately, "boys" - will not fall having been shot in the back; they will die with the dignity they deserve, facing the enemy. Longstreet was visibly upset because Lee had hurt his feelings by not attempting to steal past Meade's left, get between Meade and Washington, and refight Fredericksburg under completely novel conditions. But that is neither here nor there. The point is this: Despite being all but begged by McLaws and JOHN BELL HOOD, of all people, THREE TIMES not to order them to witness their soldiers being murdered, Longstreet would not relent. Knowing that Lee's plan was obsolete when time came to launch his attack, Longstreet stood firm. Knowing that Sickles' salient was not contemplated in Lee's plan or orders and that adjustments were essential, Longstreet was immovable. "We will follow Lee's orders," said Longstreet, knowing that two divisions would be butchered for no gain but to assuage his bitterness and soothe his pride. Longstreet ordered them to attack and they at last went forward. Outnumbered, outgunned, but most of all, outmaneuvered, not by Meade but by Longstreet, they went, Hood's Texans, who had the worst of it, with their usual elan, their spirit, their ferociousness, their fearlessness - FORWARD, they went, too many brave, young men.
Leonardo's Truth One could argue, however, that Longstreet risked no more than exactly what happened: a bloody repulse. Nevertheless, this is equally difficult to accept.
Leonardo's Truth I realize and very much appreciate the fact that you did not reply in order to merely start an argument, so it is with some hesitation that I say more. Nevertheless, many Union generals, friends of Longstreet, were perplexed as to why he did not turn the Union left from the round tops on July 2, because it was apparent to all that it could have been accomplished. Longstreet replied, untruthfully, that Lee had prohibited him from striking that flank. Longstreet would have been well within his discretion in that movement; what Lee declined was Longstreet's suggestion to move the entire army around the Union left and take up a position between Meade and Washington. So as it turned out and given the disposition of Union troops, Longstreet's assault that day was a frontal assault in echelon. Despite this, Hood's men saw the Union vulnerability and would have turned the Union left had not Gen Warren rushed Vincent's brigade to the spot and still it was very close run, as Joshua Chamberlain would attest were he alive today. Hood reflected that had he not been wounded early in the battle and carried off the field he would have, in the face of and despite Longstreet's orders, have turned the Union left, which Meade always worried about as a vulnerable spot, and knowing what I do about Hood this is entirely possible. All this is to say that I fully understand the implications and seriousness of my criticisms of Longstreet, who was when in his element as good a field commander as either side fielded, and I do not make these lightly. My initial post is admittedly harsh and possibly too much so, but the essence of it is accurate as best as I am able to determine and I as much as anyone wish it were not so. Much in the same way I wish it were not so that Grant and Sheridan railroaded Gouverneur Warren by so unfairly and unjustly relieving him of command and having him court martialed after Five Forks. But they did. These men were after all mortal and human. With the possible exception of Lee :)
Stonewall would not only have determined the better course, but, he would have enacted it on his own initiative and been later approved by Lee for having done so. Longstreet was no Stonewall. Lee called Longstreet his 'War Horse'. This was mere stroking and probably had a reverse effect from Lee's intention in that Longstreet never sat comfortably under Lee's command and likely considered it a condescension. He permitted insubordination amongst his subordinates and felt no compunction at following orders in a dilatory manner. Lee was ill served by Longstreet and likely lamented the loss of Jackson in every battle after Chancellorsville. The battle was decided at Culp's Hill and Little Roundtop. Success on either would have thrown the battle against the Union and there would have been no need for a Pickett's Charge. Not Meade, but Lee's generals decided the outcome at Gettysburg.
The overarching stratagem decided between Jefferson Davis and General Lee was not to destroy the Union armies (as they knew that they didn’t have the resources to maintain a war of attrition with the North), but to win enough decisive campaigns in the northern states and therefore break the resolve of northern populace, forcing Lincoln to a negotiated a peace settlement. If you stick with that clear stratagem, you can make the argument that General Lee should have pulled his army back after the decisive battles over the Union forces on July 1 and proceeded toward Washington for further engagements of their choosing. The press would have reported that Lee pushed back the Army of the Potomac out of Gettysburg, thereby further eroding the waning northern populace support for the war.
Meade became the least important man on the field? Meade was stripping parts of the line and plugging holes and rescuing subordinates from their misjudgments, often with no time to spare, for two days. You cannot hold the battle in your head, all thirty square miles of it, and come away with any reasonable conclusion other than 1) Despite what revisionists say, Lee was terribly Ill-served by Ewell and Longstreet, particularly Ewell on the first day and Longstreet on the second; his plan was sound and he almost won in spite of them; and 2) Meade did an absolutely splendid job as an army commander.
Leonardo's Truth We know this now. Longstreet had a long history of reminding Lee of the impossibility of actions that the Army of Northern Virginia promptly and successfully accomplished. It's hard to put ourselves on the spot at a definite place and time in the past but in fairness this we must attempt as best we can. I don't have room here for details but Longstreet failed Lee on the second day as surely and as badly as Ewell did on the first. Read John Bell Hood's after-action report.
Leonardo's Truth I think as do most military historians that Lee had two options on day three: Retreat (that most difficult of maneuvers) over fifty miles of wasted ground or attack. He could not feed his army and horses by simply staying put. So what of the proposed flank march of myth, legend, novels and movies? Look at a map. No roads lead in the proposed direction, which would expose Lee's flank and all roads lead to Lee's flank regardless of his direction. Remember, just Ewell's baggage train alone was 14 miles long. I have yet to see an argument from a serious historian or even a serious student that this was any more than nonsense. As for Ewell taking Cemetary Hill, then what? Meade had already accounted for this eventuality whereby his forces would fall back on Pipe Creek, leaving Lee in all probability to cut loose from his already stretched and tenuous supply and communications line (which would also be required in the flank march mentioned above) and attack a highly entrenched and fortified position across a river. Not the sort of maneuvers victories are made of. And we can all be incredibly perceptive and knowledgeable in hindsight.
+Leonardo's Truth This is actually not the case probably, if Lee had few brigades of professional soldiers trained for long range shooting(British system) they could on second day break the Union army. Even on third advancing in open order and earlier in the day they could maybe win. Alma is a good example of trained infantry with a rifles attacking across a river up a STEEP hill against entrenched enemy supported by a ton of artillery and succeeding. But this is fantasy neither side in the ACW possessed troops of that sort of quality. When I watch videos of the Gettysburg terrain, I still wonder how they could possibly expect to break the Union line on day 3, it seems just nuts
dmytroy Longstreet's assault on the third day was not a fool's errand. Both armies, yes, even in the Eastern Theatre, broke a fortified line over a cleared space and into artillery. If you are a student of the American Civil War, then you are aware of these. If you are unaware of these, read up on them - no time or room to explain them here. Which leads me to my point: One reason you haven't heard of these, if indeed you haven't, is because nothing particularly consequential resulted. So, what if the Confederates had split the Union line? Lee was already off kilter due to Meade upsetting his initial plan on day three by launching a morning assault on the Confederate left. Lee's cavalry. which would have been indispensable after a Confederate breakthrough was checked and taken out of action. Meade had under his command the best Army of the Potomac by far to that point. Meade had a full corps unbloodied and held in reserve, and an entrenched and fortified position in his rear that was in easy marching range and was agreed by all Union corps commanders to be impregnable. So for me the relevant inquiry is: So, Lee's army breaks through. What then? Again, in answering this it is instructive to research those occasions when this indeed happened by both Union and Confederate assaults - one that in fact split a hole in Lee's line over 200 yards long and resulted in the almost immediate capture of thousands of Confederate soldiers and dozens of cannon. You may know about this, but those who speak of how impossible it is to break such a line are stuck with the fact that this did indeed happen but when it happened no army was crushed and it wasn't the war-winning event may assume it would have been if the Confederate assault had succeeded on the third day.
Leonardo's Truth To answer your question, these come immediately to mind: John Bell Hood's brigade with an unrecognized by history assist by DH Hill at Gaines' Mill. Meade''s division at Fredericksburg. Emory Upton's breakthrough at Spottsylvania. Hancock's 2nd corps along with Burnside's 9th also at Spottsylvania. I know I am leaving things out but these are a few examples that should suffice to demonstrate that this was not unheard of or a forlorn hope. By the way, Upton, who was one of only two men Grant promoted on the field to brigadier, demonstrated that in order to break a heavily entrenched position the first two ranks MUST BE DEPRIVED OF PERCUSSION CAPS SO THEY CANNOT FIRE. Stopping to fire or do anything else was the end of such an assault and the party that fired first saddled themselves with a distinct disadvantage. Rifled muskets are accurate at 300 yards and deadly at over a half mile. So much for this "British style" nonsense someone mentioned. Fortified positions are not overrun by men standing in the open or standing anywhere else taking pointless shots at a concealed foe.
General Cavazos is playing rhetorical tricks. First he says "Making decisions is easy" with the proviso the circumstances are easy but then continues an antanagoge "Making decisions is hard" under other circumstances.
I find myself more often in disagreement with Professor Len Fullenkamp than not as he tends to speak more in terms of the strategic than the tactical which is where I see the problems. But in this case his comments are right on point and I am in full agreement with this analysis. We often are guilty of seeing things with 20/20 hindsight instead of seeing things as commanders did at the time and this is the great fault of many modern day arm chair commanders. We must rid our selves of hindsight and try to see things as they saw them at the time to understand the actions that follow and why.
When you think about it, Gen. Lee made the mistake of all mistakes by going to Gettysburg. What was he thinking? Not to be rude to the dead, but I'm just wondering if he didn't have some sort of physical, or even mental condition, that clouded his thinking capabilities.
You can argue, "If not now when?" But you can also argue that Lee,i in this instance, ignored what he should have learned at other battles about attacking prepared positions. I would argue that Lee without Jackson was like Napoleon without Berthier.
Sometimes you're absolutely correct to go after something right now because the future will only make it too difficult, but you're too late. The Gettysburg Campaign was one of those instances. Strategically correct, but still ultimately futile.
You have to wonder about a leader, Lee, who goes against the judgment and understanding of his fellow generals, in the face of so little data. Was this stubbornness, or merely determination?
lee was sick and he was also sick and tired of war.. he won most battles by hit and run.. his sons had been captured a few days earlier leading other battles.. he had decided to to stake it all at gettysburg.. we either win or we quit here... if he had run he would have won.. the elections were coming up and the north was ready to allow the south to leave.. if he could just hang on 6 more months.. the south would be free... but thousands more dead.. he made a mistake but he made a decision.. that ended the war
There is another video mentioning why Lee wants commit in a bigger picture and some interesting why Stuart's cavalry was missing and Lee's didn't have his eyes and ears on Union troops. ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-lrXxz4iniRs.html
I think Lee really came off the rails in the summer of '63. There may have been good strategy behind invading the North if it had been done with clear objectives. But to be way up there trying to break the back of the biggest army on the continent on their own ground didn't make sense. In a battle of that scale even victory would cost too much for an insurgent army in hostile territory. He knew as well as anyone how a people responded to being invaded.
he was running out of time and resources, and needed a quick policy win in congress. Lee's men where starving and shoeless, plundering dead men in the field as early as 1862
I don't think Lee was very optimistic about the outcome of the war unless he could demoralize the north, he knew he could never win strategically his goal was to cause as much destruction as he could in hopes the enemy would give up, he couldn't really flank and move toward Washington he would have been trapped, his army was not well supplied and he couldn't go back to Virginia because then his invasion would be fruitless, he was forced to give battle and we know now what the result was but it could have turned out in his favour. Mead did a good job considering he didn't even want the command and was only 4 days into it.
The only real mistake Lee made, in my view, was not surrendering after learning of the end of the siege of Vicksburg. He had to know that the war was over and that all after that was useless carnage.
@@nora22000 You definitely have an excellent point! After Gettysburg (or maybe even beforehand...who knows), Gen. Lee must've felt that the whole war wasn't going to end well for not himself, but his troops, and, indeed, the entire southern states. Recently, I heard that, even as they were traveling to Gettysburg, Gen. Lee had actually suffered a slight heart attack. If that's the case, then you can only imagine the physical condition he was in, even after the Confederates had arrived near Gettysburg. Poor guy...I can only imagine how he must've felt. Another thing:I wonder if he had truly recovered from the loss of Gen. Stonewall Jackson. So much went wrong at the Gettysburg campaign...and yet, they nearly won the battle for the first two days! Just a little more effort would've gotten them the victory. We all know what happened, though...well, that's history for you!
Lee was brilliant throughout the civil war, but not at Gettysburg. It was always better to take a blow while on good defensive ground than to give a blow on bad offensive ground. Lee knew this, yet he persisted. Longstreet was right, they should have disengaged after day 1 and headed south to place themselves between Washington and the AOTP in a solid defensive position and forced Meade to attack them there.
I'm no lover of the South, but I believe Lee should have listen to second in command and not attack the Union center on the 3rd day, but move off to get the Union to follow him on the ground of his choosing or attack the center with Pickett's men at night and feed men into it to distort the Union center, then renew the plan of attack.
By that time it was too late. Lee had fought two days in northern territory. He did not have the luxury, nor the supplies to be hanging around as the North consolidated a position against them..
Good points all. Yet ... there is a danger that this excuses all bad decisions. Longstreet was against fighting on on day 3. Why? Because unlike Lee, he looked at the facts more coldly. The Federals held the high ground, a good position, and had fought well on day two. So the odds seemed too small. Lee chose to believe in something less factual - that the better morale of the Confederates would overcome the facts, and that Meade would be as bad a commander as Hooker. So the argument that Lee considered there to be a good enough chance to win rests on accepting these heroic assumptions. Longstreet made fewer assumptions and hence calculated different odds - so with the fog of war, and the strategic objective in mind, one can give in to wishful thinking...
Everyone has an opinion and a idea how Lee or Meade figured battle plans or strategies! Look here's how it went down plain and simple! Two armies collided at a unexpected time and place. Now what? You plan and adjust as to how the offensive or defensive position is materializing at any given time on the field. Roll with it and keep adjusting troop movement as to how the battle is unfolding! Whoever takes the high ground and outflanks generally gains the objective. In conclusion I blv that Lee should of bailed out the morning of July 2nd. But nope high glory kept him there in a position that he knew he couldn't win. And then to throw your army out across a mile of open field against artillery! Come on! Stop over thinking it people! It's simple law of reasoning that Lee wanted it over and done with then and there.😀
I would not have wanted to be in Robert E. Lee's shoes either on 3 July 1863, or even at the outset of the Gettysburg campaign. He never had any really good options open to him at any time, and he didn't even have the luxury of standing pat on the defensive. As much as I've always thought that the 3 July assault was a bad idea, there was little else that Lee could do. Random factors ruined his original plan of campaign (which was a long shot at best), and he was truly stuck on the horns of a dilemma.
Experts put the spin on about the choice Lee made with the available facts and they just aren't that convincing. I am not a soldier but Gen Meade was. He wanted Lee to attack. Gen Longstreet was a soldier and he saw failure coming. Gen Meade's war council all thought the Union position excellent. And from a layman's point of view...if anyone of us were asked to walk that hill to the stone wall infested with people shooting at us, I feel we would have had an opinion.
The view from the bottom forces one to wonder what kind of men were they. It's a dauntingly long way up a clear slope and the enemy has a stone wall for cover. Somebody should have got fragged.
"Is it because they are lucky that great men become great? No- but, being great, they have been able to master luck. What is luck? The ability to exploit accidents".
I seldom agree for Len Fullenkamp. He tends to wander in his thoughts never ties things together. He does this consistently time after time never completing a thought. His rambling style as an instructor is not IMHO a good one.
lee should have left.. you win guerrilla wars by running away.. you either break their WILL,, or you break them.. the north had 10x times the men and guns and money.. the only choice was break the will of the north.. you cant break them physically.. 6 more months and the future would be totally different
it wasnt the BEST judgement,, it was a YUGE gamble..something he had never done before.. the south was out numbered 2 to 1 at gettysburg.. bad decision
I think your statement applies well to 1864, but not 1863. So if Lee had won that battle, it's still 16 months to the next election so that morale bust could have been overcome in that period. But in July 1864 the eastern campaign was a stalemate and had Atlanta held out just 2 more months (had Johnston remained in command and Hood not wasted the AoT attacking) THEN possibly Lincoln would've lost the election and the Confederacy would've gotten the truce it wanted.
The moral of the story is : 1. don't lose Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville 2. don't let Jefferson Davis keep Beauregard from joining the march 3. don't let Stuart disobey a written order to " feel the right" of the army after crossing the Potomac at the " Point of Rocks" 4. don't let E.Porter Alexander and Pendleton fail to hit their targets with their artillery and fail to provide artillery support for Pickett's Charge 5. don't let a reluctant commander who guarded peanuts in Suffolk while Marse Robert won his greatest victory lead half the army in severely delayed attacks ........Or, "Antifa" thugs will pull down your statue !
Stuart was issued contradictory orders which coincided in time. He tried to carry them out and failed. The mistake was Lee's, who should have issued primary and secondary objectives.
I agree with #1. I've always thought that Lee's big mistake was thinking that any one of his remaining subordinates at Gettysburg could do what Jackson could do when given an order.
Jackson was no cure-all. One need only look at how Jackson completely failed Lee during the Seven Days Battles- and primarily for religious reasons. He was an outstanding tactician- who clashed repeatedly with his subordinates, and said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak.
I have to laugh, because everyone thinks their an expert on the Battle of Gettysburg: everyone has their own opinion about "this" and about "that." And, yet, when it comes right down to it, and when you look at the morons that the USAWC are turning out, it isn't surprising that these "mental giants" still aren't capable of bring the "War on Terror" to an end, let alone defend this nation from enemies, foreign or domestic. The Battle of Gettysburg in an event that most 14 year old teenagers can analyze, evaluate and validate without all the bullshit of the USAWC. Perhaps the USAWC, instead of pontificating about this battle, should concentrate on more modern and relevant topics. Now, wouldn't that be refreshing!!!
Roman de CaesarThe video is not about the battle of Gettysburg. The battle itself is only the backdrop of the real subject matter of the video, which is leadership. Specifically, the subject matter is a leader's decision making process, and the need to balance resolution (or persistence), and adaptability to changing circumstances. This is critical today just as it always has been, because the human factor is- and always will be- the single most important factor in war.
now then all that said..lets say the north gave up and gave in.. the north freed their slaves over a course of 50 years.. the south would have freed their slaves over 50-75 years.. the slavery issue was one of timing. .. how do you free 4 million and not utterly destroy the economy.. it was being done all over the world.. the last slave freed in the north was 1901 in the NORTH.. anyway,, the south and north would have eventually solved their differences and reunited by the 1920 1930s...
those blue belly tyrants could only win if lee lost by the actions of his own command, the blue scum bellies werent worth a shit and could only win a half assed victory if the south had a bad day
The North did everything they could possible do wrong for the first two years of the war and still crushed the South. You wimps hold to ignorance like it was your mother's milk. The South was doomed from the start, and if they HAD won...the CSA would be a third world country today. I hate you limp wristed wimps who can't deal with the truth.
