Longstreet's Counter-march 

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I just suggested that to someone above

5 STAR RANGER

Absolutely!

I'm a native Alabaman who's always rooted for the Union. Guess that's what happens when you're raised near racists who fly the rebel flag. Grateful for my family. Peace, y'all.

​@mortalclown3812 I am a fan of the Stars and Bars, and also a Southerner. NOT a racist particle in my body. Perhaps you could enlarge your research before you speak.

@@cindy-followerofjesuschris6572 you failed to understand his comment didn't you

As a time traveler from the 500th century, I can tell you we still enjoy Matt Atkinson's lectures on Gettysburg. We don't get all the jokes, though.

Lee was violating the fundamental principles of wisdom; that is, “hear counsel and receive instruction”(Proverbs). Lee was like Hitler when he was @ Gettysburg; that is, he wasn’t willing to listen to the minds of wise men around him.

He’s awesome

@@jaywinters2483 c m

Longstreet was slow day 2. Sorry.

Sorry about typos

Ill-advised is exactly the right term. Lee sent Longstreet off to fight with almost zero intelligence about the Union position. An example of sloppy staff work that rivals the Lost Order.

This is the crux of it - the real issue is not whether Longstreet should have attacked earlier, but the ultimate futility of attacking Meade’s position at all.

Longstreet was slow.

Lost Cause nonsense! Read Longstreet at Gettysburg, by Cory Pfarr.

Probably only Ambrose Wright (Hill’s Corps) and William Barksdale (Longstreet’s Corps) who’s Brigades both broke the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge unsupported.

12rwoody I met him at the park recently myself. He was a lovely man, and was very kind and brilliant in his delivery. Took a tour as well.

Longstreet should have been working on a plan to follow out the orders to attack the next day! A strategic move to the right, is at best absurd.

I’m not sure that the day three order is enough proof. Maybe lee had even less confidence in Hill. Maybe Lee didn’t place the blame on Longstreet, but just blamed fortune.

They were both recommended for promotion same time. Longstreet was senior to jackson so was going to be senior subordinate either way. Two of the three instances you state for longstreet being a “defensive strategist” really shows him at his best which was fighting on the tactical offensive

...bring yer musket and a bucket of minie balls !!! Y'all gonna need em when you run into them thar " Antifa" varmints who will be trying to topple Lee from his horse on Seminary Ridge !!

He basically just sent reinforcements where they were requested. Not difficult.

Ted Logan Lordie, I would have HATED to be in Longstreet’s boots that day. He KNEW Lee had just about lost his mind in his desire to “ “just get things over,” so to speak. Or maybe just knew he had lost his mind, but did not know why.

logical assessment, I would add that Lee's failing health do to heart trouble may have also caused him to act so recklessly. he may have thought his time was short and he wanted to end the war quickly so that everybody could enjoy the fruits of victory. I think it was clear from the moment Heth went up against Buford that things were out of his control and the loss of half of his planning team (Jackson) left him severely at the Union's mercy despite it's ineptitude. Lee should have order Johnson's division from Ewell's Corps to the right flank with Anderson from Hill's Corps forming the first part of the hammer to hit Cemetery Ridge while Sickles is moving his Corps forward. Hood and Mclaws then come in afternoon and provide the crushing blow while rolling up the Union left flank and possibly capturing the II and III Union Corps and forcing the remaining Union forces off the hills back to the Pipe Creek line. There you would only have the V, VI, and XII Corps with the remains of the I and XI from the first day. The Union would probably have lost a lot of artillery and unless Burnside and some of the other Union Corps can come up from the Peninsula in time then Lee has a strong chance to roll up the rest of Meade's command and force Lincoln to either surrender or march into Washington and arrest him. Now of course that is if everything goes perfectly despite the losses of the first day. The Union left flank was the key to the whole battle and failing to take it, very little success could have happened after that. Sedgewick's VI was barely even engaged in the battle so if he was plugged in with his fresh Corps as Pickett's men might have cracked the center, they still would have been thrown back by Sedgewick. My thoughts of course, who knows what if any of it would have happened. I think the only thing we all can agree on is if Jackson would have been there the South wins the war.

What I don't understand is if there were so many delays and things going wrong and no coordination of attacks why didn't Lee call everything off and go back to the drawing board? Also, the fault should go back to Lee since as Harry Truman use to say the buck stops here.

Robert I think it is due to the fact that he was seen as someone who went against the grain of former CSA Generals during the post war period (i.e. he became a Republican and friendly to the Grant Administration). This for many made him a model post war ex Confederate. While I think though he should be commended for his post war behavior, this doesn’t mean or translate that he was some perfect general during the actual war.

If Longstreet had attacked when he was supposed to...Sickles would have been where the Third Corps was supposed to be: with its flanks anchored on Little Round Top and on Cemetery Ridge right next to the Second Corps. Pickett's Charge would have been a day early, and without Pickett. And if Longstreet had tried to swing around, he would have ended up with the Fifth Corps on his ass.

Abby Grant I have to agree. It's just my opinion, that Gen. Longstreet wanted to stay on defense. Gen. Lee wanted to strike. Lee supposedly agreed to a 'defensive' campaign at the beginning, or so we have read. The anxiousness of Lee is understandable, as is reluctance of Longstreet. The plan was full of faults and friction. Col. Alexander was probably the best performer on the march, having found his way around the hill quickly to avoid detection. Unfortunately, we cannot know what was really going through each mind... all we have are the notes.

You people seem to be a little forgetful when it comes to Longstreet as a General. General Longstreet was with the Army of Virginia before, General Lee was given command of said army. General Lee knew exactly who Longstreet was, and how Longstreet would fight when told to do so. And General Longstreet knew how stubborn and hard-headed General Lee could be, he had seen it before at Malvern Hill. When General Lee pulled McLaw aside, pulled out a map and said, I want you to do this. That is a direct order, and it is (in my opinion) proof that General Lee knew Longstreet well enough, to override the normal chain of command. If, that indeed happened. What everybody forgets, is that nobody sent out scouts in the 6+ hrs between the first scouting mission, and the time of Longstreet's start of march. General Lee's plan was flawed from the start, because the intel was bogus, and it only snowballed as the day wore on. Any half-wit military man, should have been expecting Union reinforcements to continually show up at Gettysburg, all through the second day of battle. General Longstreet supposedly waited for the stragglers from his command before moving out. Someone in the Confederate leadership, should have taken a looky-see to find out if things had changed, on the Union side of that battlefield. All it would have taken is a short little ride to the seminary, and a pair of field glasses, from there they could have seen all of Cemetary Ridge.

zettle 234: I agree with you on your major points. I'll make some statements. Firstly, we cannot know what was in the minds and hearts of each individual in question. Having said that, I'll address your points and give you my viewpoint respectfully. The flanking plan, originally, was a good one, in my opinion, given Ewell's actions on July 1 with Culp's hill now occupied by Yankees. Okay, so we're going to flank them and hit their left. Good plan, but inadequate recon, as you say. The main problems, as I see them... 1: Early morning recon of the Union left, which was not followed up before attack time. 2: Lee agreeing to allow Longstreet to wait for Gen. Law, causing a delay. There were other options, (IMO), such as attaching one of Anderson's brigades to Longstreet to make up for Law. 3: No scouting of a good route to get to the Union left, prior to Longstreet's march. 4: Encountering Bream's Hill, which probably frustrated Longstreet, who may not have been on-board with the attack in the first place. 5: Longstreet's decision to counter-march instead of an "about face" of 1st Corps, causing further delays. 6: No pre-attack reconnaissance of the Union left. There are other more subtle points and details. What we're dealing with is history, and we have a lot of conflicting information, and twelve different sides of the story. Overall, I agree with you on what I believe to be your best point: Riding to the Seminary, or to Bream's Hill, to observe any changes on the Union left before the attack. Thanks for listening to my perspective, remembering we still cannot know all the actual words and facts. We must also consider what Lee expected vs. what Longstreet felt was practical. And also evidence that Lee was ill. Military hindsight is always 20/20, and there is no shortage of armchair generals. Thank you for your thoughts, Sir. :-)

I'm sorry Montgomery, I did not mean it to sound like a point by point thing. I just get tired of people trying to assign blame. Flanking your enemy was a good tactic before these guys fought, and it will be a good tactic after we are gone. Agreed. The leader comes up with a plan and if it is successful, the leader takes the credit. If it fails, it is still the leaders plan. Ike wrote a letter before D-Day, and General Lee rode out on to the field on day 3. No blame is needed. And yes, Lee could have told Longstreet to go ahead and move, and Lee could have sent the stragglers when they arrived. There was no reason to wait. The trail the Artillery left, when they went around the hill, had to be like a modern day tank track with all the horses, cannons, ammo train and men on foot. Never have figured that one out. The counter march? I don't know how far they got. If the supply train is started already, you have to put the cart before the horse to just turn it in place. Like you said 20/20. Oh, and no I am not saying you blamed anybody lol Thank you Montgomery, for adding your perspective to the questions I find hard to answer. To look at pieces of a battle, and not keep in mind the entire battle, takes away from the battle (IMO). If we stop the clock at Chancelorsville when Hooker had flanked Lee, Hooker looks like a brilliant General for dividing his Army.

zettle 234 Thanks for your comment. I think you're right with your comment about dissecting a battle too much... I agree, it takes away from the whole. Battles and wars are like tornadoes: Mass destruction and confusion. And the best laid plans in war mostly go awry about a minute after a battle starts. There weren't any body-cams back then, (too bad), or none of us would have to discuss intentions, orders or results LOL. I agree about the counter-march, in that if their supply trains were following the same route, it would have been even more difficult to just about-face the whole column. I play a lot of strategy games, including Sid Meyer's Gettysburg. People who play and win as the South often boast about it. Well, in a game, we have the advantage of seeing the entire field and basically knowing who is going to arrive and when. In real-life, plans and results are usually quite different. Thanks for reading my perspective, and thank you for yours! Cheers.

Buggs Bunny sign: “Throw the bumb out!”

Matthew Miller - Good take and viewpoint on this matter. The loss of Gen. Jackson, I believe, is a hidden factor here. Plus Gen. Hill is new to Corps command, and Gen. Lee knows Gen. Longstreet favors defense. So much to discuss, and unfortunately we weren't there to hear it all.

What upset everyone just below the surface was J.E.B. Stuart. Going into a major conflict without knowing the numbers and placement would upset any commander.

How did he not give 100%?

After just watching this again with additional perspective about the presentation of the speaker. Very well done in preparation and execution. GB was a simple example of time to chew gum or kick butt. While they were all out of gum. The initiative dictates the plan becoming all too painfully obvious. Lee committed to have his battle the night of the 1st and Longstreet understood this completely. Longstreet saved his corps to fight another day while giving Lee his battle as instructed. You have to determine when it is time to fish or cut bait. This is exactly what they did. The VI corps of Sedgwick in reserve, confirmed Longstreet called an end to the attack at the definitive time to the very predictable result.

I've considered this myself. The wrong move might have still been a longterm benefit?

Sickles moved out & isolated his corp. ( didn't tell the commander). Without support on his flanks his command was wrecked & left a huge hole in the union line. He never got another command.

@@Noland55 perfect response to the op.

@@Noland55 he .loved his corps to a better position, after he realized that Meade had no intention of heeding the warnings that Sickles was sending. Sickles's corps acted as a breakwater to slow, disrupt, and break up the momentum of the Confederate attack. In this, it worked perfectly. Meade was lucky to have a scapegoat in Sickles after he completely ignored his left flank and the imminent danger.

General god Lee was in command. His fault. But the southern baptist bastards couldn’t allow this. Add to this that Longstreet converted to Catholicism and joined a republican administration. .

They did attack the Round Tops. About 6 hours too late. Longstreet wasn’t arguing for seizing the heights but of bypassing them. Which would have failed due to Sikes corps coming up from the Federal rear.

I have read the book about Col. Oates. Can't recall the title, but he had already been Gov. of Alabama. It also tells of his grief of leaving his brother on Little Round Top. I am from Texas, and kinfolk went up that dang hill being in the 4th Texas, Co.K. The book was a great read! DEO VINDICE

Longstreet's case of the slows......has become something of a red herring in the Gettysburg debate. Longstreet's real sin wasn't that he was slow it was that his Corp dispositions and attacks were fundamentally tactically unsound. McClaws and Hood asked for delays and changes to their orders because they saw that the situation on the ground was manifestly unsound as planned. Hood felt so strongly that he protested his orders at least 3 times and then ignored them anyway when he executed his attack. A good commander does not blindly follow orders, a good commander reports changes on the battlefield to his commander and requests new orders to account for those changes. Longstreet flatly refused to do this, claiming that he had already tried to do so before the flank attack was arranged. Longstreet tried to equate a request for changes in the tactical disposition of his corp with a request he had made for the movement of the entire army to an alternate location where they might await an attack from Meade. This is errant nonsense and should be ignored by anybody with the most rudimentary understanding of troop movements, tactics and strategy. McClaws and Hood's request was tactical, Longstreet's was more in the nature of a strategic request and it was a fundamentally unsound one at that. Longstreet was extremely unhappy that his advice was being ignored by Lee and that he was not to be considered an equal as he imagined Jackson had been (Jackson had been no such thing of course). Nursing his wounded ego and pride he became like a passive aggressive child that follows the letter of every command but refuses to honor the spirit of those orders. He put his entire corp and army at risk and ended up taking needless casualties in a tactically unsound assault.

@@ashleighelizabeth5916 Bah, you've chose to believe the post war hype. Lee himself asked Longstreet later, "Why didn't you stop me that day?"

@@ashleighelizabeth5916 an interesting theory, but what adjustment should have been made? How long would it have taken? How much more marching in the July heat? And how would you predict the Union would respond to the adjustment?

@@mjfleming319 well the original attack plan called for a flanking attack on the left flank of the AotP by Longstreet's two divisions that were then on the field up the Emmitsburg Rd. In the absence of Stuart the actual position of that flank was left to the determination of Captain Samuel Johnston who was sent on a reconnaissance mission to discover the Union disposition on that part of the battlefield. The trouble is that while the job he did was well enough in it's own way for a lone scouting staff officer it did not account for the shifting troop dispositions of the AotP on that day. When Longstreet's troops were nearing their positions for the start of the attack Major General Daniel Sickles III Corp had moved forward into the Wheat Field and the Peach Orchard which straddled the Emmitsburg Rd and was in a position to pour enfilade fire into the flanks of Longstreet's attack. Meanwhile Little Round Top was left uncovered by Sickle's movement as well as the shifting of other units of the AotP on the Left Flank. Hood and McLaws were able to see that the conditions on the field were manifestly different then what they were told to expect and that executing the attack as outline would be extremely costly. Hood could also see that capturing Little Round Top would be the key to flanking the entire AotP position and he requested 2 or 3 times ( I forget the exact number here) of Longstreet to shift his attack to Little Round Top. The last of these requests was made in person and all were refused with the reasoning that General Lee had refused to allow a flank attack. Now this is complete hogwash as the whole point of the attack was to catch the AotP in flank and role it up. Longstreet was trying to equate his request to Lee that the AofNVa disengage from the battlefield move across the face of the AotP and take up a defensive position between Washington and the AotP and there await it's attack as being the same as allowing Hood and McLaws to move from an attack up the Emmitsburg Rd to an attack up Little Round Top as equivalent military moves. The first move is a strategic move of the entire army in the face of an alert and active enemy that would take one or more days to execute where as Hood's was a tactical request to shift the attack of his division and that of McLaws from the area of the Emmitsburg Rd to the area of Little Round Top which would take at most an hour or two of additional marching for some of the troops (but not all of them mind) involved. In the event Hood ignored Longstreet's orders and attacked Little Round Top on his own initiative with what he had at hand. As he very nearly succeeded with his attack one can presume that the additional weight of McLaws division had a reasonable chance of taking and holding the hill. Had they done so it would have been the AotP that would have been forced to make a strategic withdraw in the face of an active and alert enemy army or risk destruction where they were. Meade had already made plans for a withdraw if necessary towards Harrisburg but to have to do so in the face of an alert and active enemy army would have been a very difficult and potentially costly maneuver and what's more it would have provided Lee and the AofNVa with yet another victory and another demoralizing retreat of the AotP. I want to make one thing above all others clear here. Much of what Longstreet said and wrote about Gettysburg didn't happen until after Lee was dead and gone. With Lee not alive to contradict him he could say whatever he wanted about any conversation they had. And while Longstreet was a very solid and reliable corp commander (one of the best in the war in fact) he was not what would call a smooth off the cuff speaker. So to believe that he gave these long monologues to Lee about tactics and strategy while Lee silently sat there and ignored his opinions and advice stretches credibility a great deal. A lot of the deification of Lee during the Lost Cause Period gets wrapped up into the controversy of Gettysburg, but if one can be objective and separate the myth from the facts, and the hearsay from the truth one can't help but be struck by how badly Longstreet exercised control of the troops under his command on July 2nd and July 3rd. One must also recognize that the only witness to most of what Longstreet and Lee spoke of on those two days was Longstreet. And it would presume to much of human nature to assume that Longstreet would not try to exonerate himself from any responsibility for the disaster that day 2 and day 3 of Gettysburg was for the Lee, the AofNVa and the Confederacy.

@@ashleighelizabeth5916 the original plan was based on faulty intelligence. I think Allen Guelzo has demonstrated convincingly that whatever Cpt. Johnston said, he was nowhere near the round tops. Lee’s plan called for an attack along the Emmitsburg road, not knowing that Sickles’ corps had already extended the Union line far to the left, and if Longstreet had blindly obeyed the original plan at, say, nine o’clock in the morning, sickles would have enfiladed him. So yes, the problems start with lousy staff work, going all the way back to Lee’s convoluted orders to Stuart at the very beginning of the campaign. But Longstreet is finally in contact with Sickles at 4:00 pm., and Hood requests that they move even further to the right. Let’s be generous and say that Hood’s proposed maneuver would only take an hour. What would the Union have done in that time? For one thing, an extra hour would have given Meade enough time to reposition Sickles back where he belonged. Then Longstreet’s force would be stretched thin over a wide front, and Sickles would be in a compact line, well supported, and anchored on Little Round Top...just as it should have been and would have been if Longstreet attacked at ten o’clock in the morning. As it happened, Longstreet and the ANV caught a lucky break when Sickles moved forward. The closest thing they got to a breakthrough occurred not on the rugged terrain of the round tops, it occurred on the flattest part of the whole Union line. It occurred there because 1. Big gaps opened when Sickles’ salient collapsed and 2. It was a lot easier to march there. Ultimately the charge of the First Minnesota saved the day, but we might wonder, “what if Hood hadn’t wasted so much time trying to sneak through unscouted woods to get to the union flank and had just obeyed Longstreet?” In that case, the attack on the lowest part of cemetery ridge might have had a little more weight, and there might have been a breakthrough. But in the end, it all comes down to “active and alert”, as you rightly note. The Union army was active and alert at Gettysburg, and we have to assume that if the ANV took an extra hour to do something, the AOP would have countered that move.

Jackson would have performed better. He would have captured Cemetery and Culp's Hills. Different battle!

I agree. Jedediah Hotchkiss may have been the best cartographer of the war. On the other hand, that flank march was detected. Howard just ignored Hooker’s order to prepare for it. A modest breastwork and a couple of prepared batteries by the XI corps and that battle would have been very, very different.

Johnston was part of a reconnaissance party of five or six men, including Longstreet's engineer and it was far from the only group detailed over the 1st and the 2nd to scout the Union lines.

.@Jonathan Parks: With all due respect, Ewell's troops & misc. cavalry had marched back & forth thru G'burg for 2 days b/f Longstreet had arrived in Cashtown. The actual recon sent by Longstreet three (3) days later is moot - That had been the cavalry's job - days earlier. Given the CSA troop distribution on days 1&2, Lee had Meade right where he wanted for a Napoleonic battle. (surrounded on over 200 degrees) with one corps (Hill) in front, one corps (Ewell) on the Union right & rear, & 1 corps (Longstreet) arriving on the Union left. - while Meade arrived piecemeal by 2 parallel roads from the only direction possible. So many 'what if's' - but they all depend on cavalry duties unmet - but "Lee was blind, using infantry to scout his flanks." (above).

I think there was a mannequin challenge built into the program..

I think a few people were responding to Atkinson's joke about seeing the audience's reaction to the picture by hamming it up when the camera panned over the audience

Definitely a mannequin challenge. Ranger Matt's sense of humor I would guess. :)

Coughing is from a Confederate vet still choking from the dust of the turn@?

So what you're really saying is that THEY, whoever THEY is in your world point of view, does not say what you believe real history or the "entire truth" is according to your opinion.

Fer sure. Makes me chuckle every time. I've become so fond of it that it has creeped into my utterances upon occasion.

@@howardclegg6497 Me too!

You’re assuming that Sickles’ men would have sat on their thumbs all morning, lazily watching Longstreet’s corps take the high ground unopposed. As it happened, various Union officers besides Sickles were alert and active all day. We have no reason to think Longstreet would have been able to surprise them. We also know that Sickles’ men fought with skill and determination. We should assume they would have done the same if they had been deployed where Meade wanted them instead of the unsupported salient where Sickles foolishly deployed them, except that in addition to their ferocious fighting, it would have been much easier to support them. By far the most probable result to an earlier attack would have been an earlier defeat.

Longstreet's troops were not on the field yet. Law was furthest behind. Early in the day, with no Sickles there, Longstreet would have hit nothing , and his right flank would have been enfiladed from the Federal troops there, back of where Lee thought they were. But above all, at dawn, there would be zero knowledge of the ground.

Ewell was to "demonstrate," basically act as a decoy via skirmishing and feigned attack formations, in order to keep the union's right flank occupied and distracted on Culp's and Cemetery Hills while Longstreet's divisions prepared to attack the left flank. He had orders to launch a proper attack anytime if a good enough opportunity presented itself.

Ewell didn’t attack until at least 7pm and this was after Longstreet’s assault had finished. Ewell only did so with one division (Johnson’s) who managed to take some trenches at the base of Culps Hill. Ewell was never good enough to command a Corps and his shocking performance at Gettysburg (along with his demotion after Spotsylvania) reflect this.

😂😂😂 I see you’ve watched the movie Gettysburg a few times!

Yeah, that was rough. I would have excused myself from the room, but that's just me.

Yep. Lousy staff work. Probably even worse than the infamous Lost Order.

Longstreet's corps did not fight on day 1. By the time he got there Hancock had already occupied the high ground and Sykes was quickly approaching Little Round Top. Lee's army could not stand and wait to be attacked while it was still forming up and establishing its communications.

Longstreet's men didn't fight on day 1

Really, where did Longstreets men fight on Day 1? Please let us know. 😂

Their doom? You speak as if it was a suicidal attack. It was not.

Nah, Sickles's original position was very poor and would have been completely overrun. Meade completely ignored his left flank until Sickles took matters into his own hands and moved to a stronger position to preempt the Confederate attack.

Thank you for saying that! Of all people, shouldn’t Lee have known about Washington’s generalship? It’s like the whole Confederacy knew nothing about the Revolution.

By today's standards, Lee would be interpreted as giving vague orders. But for the times, Rank and Respect were paramount. Maybe Lee should not have expected Longstreet to replace his attacker "Jackson", in the field. As mentioned, Longstreet's skills played more to a defensive preparation for battle. For the 1980's this may be a correct approach. Looking back in time, charging a well fortified position was suicidal. This is not my opinion but what I have read, maybe Lee seriously may have thought that this was the best chance for the Confederacy to destroy the Army of the Potomac. A completely different approach to war fought by General Washington and the Revolution.

Wrong. He had a duty to carry out his orders with vigor, and he did not. He sulked instead.

You must have never been in the military if you say that!

You are another redditor midwit who knows just enough to be dangerously stupid.

Wrong. There were not 30k there. They were not dug in. And you could hardly call it high ground.

Huh? So the overall commander needs to abort plans when his subordinates sulk and sabotage? Longstreet has blood on his hands because his ego couldn't handle it

You fail to appreciate one of the most respectable park rangers of the day. He laid out a very comprensive review of the actions taken on the second and leaves the audience to draw their own conclussions. Your derogatory comment reveils much about your character and in no way can reflect what Shelby Foote would or would not think of this presentation.

Roman, you are obviously a passionate patriot. Opinions like noses come in varying degrees.

😂😂😂 you hold up Shelby Foote as a paragon of history😂 he’s was a novelist, a good one, but not a historian. His Gettysburg works don’t even have footnotes…please!😂