This is great stuff and timely for our current world context. Thanks for uploading this and thanks to the professor Ha-Joon for dropping the knowledge on us. It's very appreciated.
An excellent lecture on why carbon markets don’t and won’t work and even legitimize the idea that companies have a right to destroy the planet as long as they have a permit and pay the (current) price. Carbon taxes are better, but need to be high as the goal is to drive down high carbon emission activities through big price increases. As the video suggests this also might not be enough and regulation will also be needed. Another fantastic video, thanks.
By default logic, the assumption of the politics of defence that "pre-emptive attack is the best form of defence" could mean either removing the need to defend by negotiation or adopting the MAD Mentality of Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, and that means not spending the money on Diplomacy that has been reserved for Arms Manufacturing, because it's pre-emption of the perceived need for negotiation. "One and Done" policy it takes time to see the error.., which is attaching the opposite perceived monetary value of weaponry in a Reserve, to peaceful coexistence in an operational Economy.
In A Citizens' Guide to Climate Success, environmental economist Marc Jaccard makes the case for 'flex regs'. One problem with any carbon tax is that it is politically more difficult to introduce and sustain over time to achieve the same emissions reductions (or weaker reductions) than those we can get through regulation. Jaccard argues instead for 'flex regs'. "“We economists should also explain that while carbon pricing gets all the media attention, flex-regs quietly do the heavy lifting,” Jaccard adds. In British Columbia, a single flexible regulation was three times more effective than the province’s groundbreaking carbon tax, and produced no opposition. Carbon pricing accounts for only 15% of the emission reductions achieved in California, and only 5% in Alberta." theenergymix.com/2018/12/19/jaccard-carbon-taxes-are-good-policy-bad-politics-when-regulations-do-most-of-the-work/
20 years ago, in New Delhi, the state introduced CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) and thousands of hired experts claimed that the pollution will go down and we will have a cleaner environment, a healthier future. Now what happened is the opposite. New Delhi became the most polluted city, a gas-chamber by all means. Where 25 million people suffer and continue... Not to blame the CNG, or the vicious consumer greed, but the "Right to Pollute" is more like "Right to Live" for millions and millions of poor , uneducated and power-less people. Ironic part is that an average Indian emits 3.1 tons of CO2 every year while an american emits 19.5 tons.
piketty, yes piketty, has a graph a nice graph, of CO vs total amount by contry, its the ellets all countries, that cause the bulk of the co pollution. The polution as the total in an old champagne glass. 90% on top, 10% in the stem. A carbon tax, taxes everyone, therefore a carbon tax shifts the burden onto the non polluters.
Flex-regs are better than carbon taxes. That said, even though the 1%ers are absolutely responsible for more of the pollution, and even though the corporations are responsible for more of the pollution, we'll all have to make certain sacrifices. No way around that I'm afraid
He correctly goes after the carbon market approaches as we have in California, but with a straw man approach and not mentioning the politics of giving carbon credits to politically connected people and institutions. Giving carbon credits for "tree growing or not cutting" where the carbon stays out of the atmosphere for the years before the tree burns or rots is just silly and meaningless. He doesn't mention that the political class can pass out credits and exemptions which transfer wealth to the insiders from the citizens. However, he is very weak in specifying policies that can work without all these problems. He doesn't directly mention a revenue-neutral carbon tax on fossil fuels at the source (well, or mine) that has very accurate measurement and trivial compliance cost (none of the transaction cost factors of emission taxes). Only a very small fraction of the gas, oil, and coal taxed at the sources doesn't end up a CO2 in the atmosphere and these small non-combustion uses like asphalt for roads or plastic production can get tradeable credits for the carbon tax amount. Adjustments for carbon equivalents on imports like cement could be made. A pure carbon tax would make coal more expensive but wouldn't increase natural gas nearly as much for applications like electricity production where gas can be much more efficient (combined cycle generators). He did suggest direct regulation like forbidding incandescent lights without mentioning that this requires a huge number of exemptions to work at all and then results in non-optimal economic outcomes for the society. Regulations on forcing LEDs just gave the political class unnecessary power as LEDs so outperform incandescent in most applications, only the economically stupid wouldn't switch. However, the political result of the bans means you must have exceptions for things like oven lights where temperatures are high, but you can't feasibly make an exemption for that light in the attic that is only used 10 minutes/yr - if that. That could be a cheap or used incandescent bulb which is fewer resources that use an insignificant amount of energy, making the whole economy closer to optimal. Instead of paying for CO2 reduction with a carbon tax making my solar system more cost-effective in California, we have a complex buried carbon trading system combined with subsidies for my solar system. This means that my economic analysis became very complex. The system is now so tied in bureaucratic knots that our effective cost of carbon decrease is outrageous and getting political control over the process is more important than the CO2 emissions and the political class is getting rich. A solar system is effectively buying a 25-year supply of electricity upfront in one lump sum but now the government wants to change the long-term contract I used for my cost analysis. Governments can't be trusted. I do get a kick out of how he is quick to point out individual flaws in the analysis of their true financial self-interest, which is true but fails to note that when these individuals are in regulatory institutions with no self-interest at stake (no skin in the game) he is assuming they will make rational decisions. This assumption about the individuals making decisions in institutions is obviously false, but he is blinded by his beliefs.
