I'm glad that you know of these things. Yes, I did try and rescue certain notions that the Cartesians had put in the right track, but did not complete the proof (esp. in the case of innate ideas, the ontological proof of God, and even on how the cogito plays in our knowledge). I believe that Locke's arguments against innateness and his supposed "empiricism" can be disregarded due to what he says about reflection.
(2) Truths about numbers are in us, but we still learn them, whether by drawing them from their source or testing them by examples. In the latter case, we do not know the underlying principles, Demonstration spares us from having to make these tests, which one might continue endlessly without ever being perfectly certain. And it is just that-namely the imperfection of inductions-that can be verified through the trying out of particular cases.
(3) Mr. Locke has asked whether it might be the case that not only the terms or words that we use but also our ideas come from outside us? To this I respond that if they did, we too would have to be outside ourselves! For intellectual ideas, or ideas of reflection, are drawn from our mind. I would like to know how we could have the idea of being if we did not, as beings ourselves, find being within us.
The problem with 'I think, therefore I exist' is that it can be taken as being empirically based. That is, if thinking is supposed to be something the mind observes about itself (of course, not directly through any of the five senses, but instead through what empiricists would call 'reflection'), then it appears that the stated premise is empirical in this way. Moreover, as some opponents of Descartes have argued, the premise, as stated, already asserts the conclusion of the 'I', so it cannot be used to support the conclusion, at least not without begging the question. It does not help much to remove the 'l' and instead say 'there is only thinking' either, because then the hidden premise that thinking requires a thinker can plausibly be challenged, as can the other hidden premise that the thinker is identical to the observer in such a case. However, the more simple statement of Rene Descartes' argument is that the proposition, 'I am', cannot be denied by the person making the assertion without self-contradiction. It logically appears to be something that is necessarily true for that person. So, you might question might real existence, and I might question your real existence, but nobody can logically deny their own existence.
so would you say that our senses are innate rather than our ideas? Do you think that our senses are the ones allowing us to access the ideas? This online learning is kinda hard because I'm not the smartest and like to ask questions so if I sound stupid I'm apologize lol
When they talk about senses, I believe their referring to sense-experience (not innate), that is experience gained through the senses. But innate ideas, are ideas that are supposed to exist in the mind from birth.
(1) Dear sir, your point here is the same one that Mr. Locke has raised against innate ideas, namely that when people learn math or the rules of logic, they are not learning anything new at all. Mr. Locke said that it is clear that they are learning something, therefore what they "learn" is not innate. I shall respond to this. First, I agree that we learn innate truths/ideas, so I do not say that we learn nothing new. I don't agree that 'whatever is learned is not innate'.
(...continued) For example, you may have learned of Modus Tollens from someone, just as you may have learned that fire will burn you, but where do these ideas ultimately come from? Are you suggesting that Modus Tollens was ultimately arrived at through the senses same way as "fire burns"?
If you take Plato's theory of knowledge literally (instead of metaphorically) as remembering, then this only throws the question of the origin of knowledge back to the time of the soul's previous existence. In other words, how was knowledge first derived in this previous existence ? You cannot just say that knowledge is remembering literally without getting involved in an infinite regress in which the question of the origin of knowledge is continuously thrown back to an ever earlier existence. If Plato had not tried to use his theory of knowledge to prove the immortality of the soul, I would argue that he only meant it metaphorically -- so that 'remembering' in Plato's theory of knowledge is just having innate knowledge. Does merely having innate knowledge (supposing we actually have it) prove that we have immortal souls or minds ? Plato seems to think so, but I believe it is plausible that innate knowledge can come into existence along with the mind -- without supposing it to have existed for all eternity. After all, the instincts of animals are neither supposed to be eternal characteristics nor acquired behaviors, but instead are supposed to be 'programmed' or 'hard-wired' into these animals at their birth -- at least to some extent. Of course, animals (including ourselves) can obviously learn and improve through knowledge that we acquire through sense experience, so I would not argue that all knowledge is innate. But the possibility that some knowledge is innate appears to be plausible, without necessarily implying (nor presupposing) our immortal existence.
I think you're equivocating on the word "learn." The notion that math, language, logic are innate doesn't suggest that any one individual doesn't have to "learn" them. Rather, it's that these ideas are ultimately found not from without - through the senses - but from within. In this context to "learn" means to find with the help of others who have found it from within. (continued...)
Plato seems to go so far as to argue that empirical knowledge doesn't exist -- that it really only belief, and at best, it simply serves as a reminder of the innate ideas (or Forms) which are the objects for real knowledge. Descartes, I think, does not go that far, allowing for the existence of empirical knowledge alongside innate knowledge. However, since his entire program seems to be to discover a certain foundation for knowledge, and since he thinks that certainty can only come from innate ideas, I think he obligates himself to holding the ultra-rationalist view that real knowledge is fundamentally innate knowledge -- therefore, not a position very different from Plato.
You're evading. I took your argument and using your own language asked you a question. Answer that question please, or modify / elaborate on your argument.
