Italian Navy the British Perspective with  

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For those of you wondering, the Italian maritime strike aircraft I'm referring to and the RA aircraft assigned to anti-shipping missions. :)

_"You worried about me, eh? _*_*Looks around the Mediteranian*_*_ Well there's no other navy around so you must be worried about me!"_ - Regia Marina to the Royal Navy, ca 1940

finally drachi in a adequate sound level

For what it's worth, I may be able to provide some context as to the behavior of some of the Italian warships, especially the major ones; For Italian battleships, the biggest issues were issues with Italian reconnaissance, and deficiency in night actions. The first clash of Italian battleships with the British, the Battle of Calabria (9 July 1940), is a bit of an exception - the Italians had a rough idea what they were facing, an Admiral Campioni knew he was outmatched, his pair of smaller battleships (29,000 tons full load, 10x 320mm guns, 27 knots) versus three larger British battleships (31-36,000 tons, 8x 381mm guns, 20-23 knots) - his only edge was his speed, and larger number of cruisers. Once Giulio Cesare was hit (at 16.00), the extend of the damage was not immediately clear, and with Cesare's speed rapidly falling (down from 25 knots to 18 knots in a span of about five minutes), Campioni assumed the worst. He had taken great risk engaging in the first place, so once he knew he couldn't control the range disengaging was the only rational choice. By the time Cesare worked up to speed again, the chance to re-engage was gone. Though, for what it's worth, a seldom acknowledged fact is that Warspite actually ceased fire first (at 16.03 and 30 seconds). The Italian battleships maintained fire even after Cesare was hit, not turning away until 16.06. In fact, they did not cease firing until 16.08. For whatever reason, Warspite had also decided to break off the engagement instead of capitalize on the damage she had dealt, and the Italians were able to disengage in this time. At 16.09 Warspite then engaged Italian heavy cruisers, which began to engage her in addition to the British cruisers to cover the retreat of the battleships and the destroyers laying smoke. Moving on from Calabria - from then on, aerial reconnaissance tended to be the bane of Italian admirals at sea, as it often became impossible for Italian admirals to get an accurate picture of where the British were, and what they had. Ex, at Cape Spartivento (27 November 1940), recon failures prevented Campioni from making contact with the British forces while they were separate, as planned, and instead had to contend with the combined force. Though the match up, on paper, was fairly even (one carrier, one old battleship, one modernized battlecruiser on the part of the British, and one modern battleship and one modernized battleship on the part of the Italians), Campioni was acutely aware of the fact that he was operating, once again, with the only two operational battleships available to the Regia Marina (an irony of his short career as wartime fleet admiral - this face was true at both Calabria and Cape Spartivento), and it didn't help that he believed the British actually had a carrier and three battleships available. Though in reality it was an excellent opportunity for the Italians to take on a major British force with the advantage on their side, as far as Campioni was aware he was actually once again outmatched and needlessly risking his irreplaceable battleships. This trend would continue. The failure of Italian and German reconnaissance during the British 'Operation Grog' (9 February 1941) allowed the British Force H to slip by a superior Italian force, despite the face the Italians had gotten within 30 miles of them. Had Iachino (the new fleet commander) not adjusted course at 13.07 (which could have been avoided), they would have placed themselves between Force H and their escape at 13.37 - probably the best chance the Regia Marina ever had to destroy a major British force. This trend repeats itself continuously, with either the RM's own inadequate recon force, the Regia Aeronautica, or Luftwaffe letting the fleet down, during Operational Halberd, the events leading up to the Second Battle of Sirte, or Operation Pedestal. The other half of the equation is the difficulty in pursuing action after night falls. Italian battleships were limited in their ability to confront the British at night. Prior to the war, and in the entry, only secondary batteries (100mm to 152mm) and main batteries of destroyers, torpedo boats, and light cruisers (100mm to 152mm once again) had arrangements and training for night action, as well as the flashless ammunition for it. It was only in early 1941 (ironically, just prior to Matapan) that efforts to include it for the 203mm guns of heavy cruisers came into effect, and in Spring 1941, in response to the events of Operation Guado and the night action at Cape Matapan, this also extended to the battleships. However, though by the summer of 1941 Italian warships of any kind had the means and training to engage the enemy at night, the Italians were acutely aware that the British were still far better at it. They were aware the British had radar available, and realized they were greatly disadvantaged by this - especially as the British began employing increasingly dangerous fire control radar technology against them. Thus, even when the opportunity to press an action into nightfall presented itself, the battleships were reluctant to do so, as they knew they were presenting themselves at great disadvantage to the British. Italian radar technology was simply too slow in coming, and German radar, though supposedly secured by agreement in 1939, simply failed to manifest until the spring of 1942, as the Kreigsmarine seemed to have little interest in actually providing the radar as promised (in an interesting contrast, the luftwaffe was considerably more open with sharing radar with the Regia Aeronautica). Thus, for the British, it isn't hard to imagine why they might be assume the Italians were simply unwilling to engage - very often it was the case that the Italian admirals at sea struggled to locate the British, and once they did, could often over-estimate what the British had, either prompting a recall by Supermarina, or leaving the chance for interception too late in the day before a more realistic appraisal became available. With the benefit of hindsight, the reasons for the Italian choices become clearer, and are certainly quite understandable - after all, there are likewise numerous examples of the British avoiding contact when faced with more resistance than they liked, such as during Operation Hats (31 August 1940), where Cunningham elected to steam away from an Italian force heading to engage him for a solid three hours to stave off conflict, or Operation White (17 November 1940). Light cruisers could usually afford to be more aggressive, on the other hand, as they were not so vital to the war effort. They weren't irreplaceable, but their loss would not change the course of the war in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, every time a Littorio sortied, the admiral leading the fleet was placed in the unenviable position of Jellicoe's 'only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon' - a major defeat at sea that cost Italy her modern battleships cost her the ability to contest the Mediterranean, as nothing else - submarines or airpower - could sufficiently counter the threat of the British battleships. When operating with the fleet, Italian light cruisers tended to operate as scouts - clash with screening elements, and then fall back for the battleships and heavy cruisers to take over. This was done to the letter at Calabria, though there were few other opportunities as Italian light cruisers simply never got much of a chance to clash with the the enemy, especially the 'true' cruisers'. The earlier cruisers - the Giussano and Cadorna-classes - were all 'large scouts' originally, re-rated to light cruisers later in life, and were perhaps best described as small, cardboard-armored cruisers with armament equivalent to many light cruisers... but that was about it, and they were considerably lighter (5,100-5,200 tons standard (Sydney, for example, was ~7,100 tons). They really weren't suited to action with cruisers, but they were considered expendable, so they saw the most action. The better light cruisers (Montecuccoli, Duca d'Aosta, and Duca degli Abruzzi-classes) were progressively better armored, and in general were far more robust combatants. The Abruzzi's only ever got a chance to engage their British counterparts at Calabria, where they had decent success - skirmishing with British cruisers and inflicting damage before withdrawing, preferring not to deal with 15" guns of the British battleships. The earlier examples of the 'true' light cruisers only ever got one true chance to shine, which was at the Battle of Pantelleria - which, given it was a victory, was a good showing. The British honestly didn't get enough chances to clash with them for a real 'pattern' of engagement to develop, but overall, the bulk of the light cruisers the British did clash with were the 'large scouts', which were largely serving in the role of fleet scouts and little else. The larger, 'true' light cruisers simply had too few chances to engage the British, though both chances saw them make the most of their situation. Hopefully this at least explains the 'why' behind the Italian actions that formed the British impressions - if you've any more questions about the RM's doctrines or actions, or want me to clarify any of the above, feel free to ask!

A tip for italian pronunciation: the g in "regia" is pronounced the g in "regicide", always when i or e follow g like generale (general), Giappone (Japan), Germania (Germany) it sounds like J

That title is so sexy you should bring back the "military history for adults" channel name ^^

I'd love a video about "fleet in being" theory and how arguably that was the best use of the Italian navy considering their logistical limitations.

Ironically the greatest issue the italian navy faced at sea was the alliance with germany. As soon as action was deciced (Quite slowly) by supermarina and the germans caught wind of it,hey would use enigma and the brits would know as well.

Really interesting vid, and right in time as i was just reading about the Italian fleet in WW2 haha. I think the engagements in the Med don't get nearly as much spotlight as they should, despite there being many major fleet actions and the amount of ships lost overall.

For my part, I viewed the Italy like a second rate power or even third rate power and the armed forces likewise. Then I played World In Flames over ten years ago and played Italy (you play the entire WWII - one of the largest board games in the world). Wow! This is a large fleet! I can do some serious damage to the Royal Navy! While the army was "meh". Then I got to read about Mussolini and the armed forces in Italy from 1900 and up to WWII. I have respect for the Regia Marina, the submarine arm and not least the frogmen.

Well i've seen some youtube collaborations but always good to see two of the creators I respect the most doing a job together - nice job both of you

Love seeing collaboration between you two. Always interesting and entertaining.

Drach and Bernard, my two favorite history channels, Dream Team!!!

Very interesting, looking forward to the next part.

Two of my favorites in one place. Great job!

This was wonderful guys, well done I really enjoyed listening 👏👏

Loved this, you guys should collaborate more, I listen to everything by both you they gets pumped out

great video. looking forward for the second one!

I can't stop laughing at the thumbnail. The binoculars are so huge.

Very interesting to learn about the Italian Navy in greater depth!

Two of my favourite peoples having a podcast. Awesome.

I really enjoy these conversational videos and what nations thought of others nations capabilities

Great episode! You two make a great pair.

Glad yall are doing buddy team up videos lol huge fan of both of yalls channels!!

Interesting stuff, as always.

Really interesting, I'm always excited when aspects are highlighted that I don't know much about. So now I am crazy about an elaboration on the Bulgarian Romanian Croatian Chinese Spanish Navy etc.

a new dynamic duo.

MHV and Drach on one presentation. Two of my fav 'casters. What a nice surprise.

Awesome!

I just finished watching Drach, 2 Drachs in one day. A very good day

Nice!

UK and Fascist Italy had a good report until 1935, there was no reason for either nation to be concerned with what the other was upto.

Terrific breakdown without the normally present wild British bias. Well done sir. Enjoyable listen.

I think the most incredible thing about all of this, is that our Royal Navy carriers a Flag from Italy, Genova to be precise. Also we copied technology from the Italians, like the Charriot, which was actually used by the first SBS, the Decima MAS! Called the PIG. Italy once ruled the waves, from the Roman Empire to the Renaissance period, hence the Flag from Genoa. St.GeorgesCross. History is amazing, both great nations, but I think if Italy spent as much as UK or France, it would have had amazing things. Their building frigates for the USA.

Love the video, you hear little about italy beside memes.

Basic German and Italian strategy = if we can beat it, we will attack it. Basic Royal Navy strategy = attack regardless of odds. This could be disconcerting when your Heavy warship plus support ships are getting close assaulted by a destroyer (i.e. HMS Glowworm vs Admiral Hipper) .

The Royal Navy underestimated the Regia Marina, especially after Cape Matapan. This was a mistake and they soon realized it, despite the Royal Navy victories to date over the Regia Marina. The Regia Marina continued to cause the Royal Navy much stress and loss for the duration of the conflict. From the raid on Alexandria which saw 2 Royal navy battleships knocked out of action to the mauling the Royal Navy took during Operation Pedastal, the Regia Marina's continued to cause significant loses to the Royal Navy. The Italian Cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli is a fine example Regia Marina's fleet prowess. She crippled the destroyer HMS Bedouin and damaged the cruiser HMS Cairo and the destroyer HMS Partridge. An interesting side note, Admiral Angelo Iachino wrote several books about his actions during the war, especially focusing on Matapan and trying to justify his actions in that battle. In 1974 he donated money from his books to the construction of a Sailor's Monument in Taranto. See www.giovannicarrieri.com/photography/italy/taranto/sailors-monument-taranto.jpg

Just a pronounciation heads-up, since you'll keep talking about the Regia Marina (although you probably already recorded the next video): "c" and "g" in Italian are hard consonants, when followed by a vowel, except for two cases, vowels "e" and "i". In "ge", "gi", "ce" and "ci" the consonants are soft: in that case "g" becomes something very similar to "j" (in english, like "just"), "c" is pronounced as "ch" (in english, again). For those sounds to be hard, you need an "h" (which in Italian is otherwise a mute letter) before the the vowel. So "Iachino" is pronounced "Iakino", while "Regia" is pronounced as "Reja". Sorry for writing this, it can sound a bit pedantic, but Drachinifel showed interest in this, with his videos on correct pronounces, and I'm still mentally scarred by Ian McCollum's pronounciation of "Moschetto", so I felt compelled to chime in.

Two point to add: speaking about "Italian Light Cruisers" you'd better split them in two categories: the Capitani Romani and first batch of the Condottieri class were rather small and fast ships, often armed with Destroyer like armaments in the CR class (named Explored before the war and not Cruisers) and were the most numerous in the eastern Mediterranean performing convoy escort or resupply for the Army in the greek islands. The British intelligence knew quite accurately their strength, when they left the Greek ports and approximately where they were headed so most of the battles where conducted by the British with superior forces of DD intercepting and ambushing these light cruisers. In case of the sinking of Da Giussano and Da Barbiano, they were ambushed at short range from behind an island and the amount of fuel supplies on the two light cruiser where so heavy that tanks on the stern made unable the rear turrets of the retreating cruisers to fire back. In the end when you are shot by a torpedo at point blanc range there is little armour that can save you, but these were not straight front-line battles between 2 cruisers and a single torpedo boat and 4 DD British DDs, where the cruisers could have deployed their full fire-power potential to deter the DDs from closing in. Speaking of other light cruisers, partially from the second Condottieri batch and fully from the third batch they became larger and more armoured, which relegate them to first line combat in the fleet until later in the war when convoy protection became the only priority for Italy. These larger ship were quite aggressive in skirmishes with the British escorts in the convoy war and often at the front of the Italian fleet. The chaotic fights in open water did not provided great results on both sides in the fire fight because of heavy smoke curtain an very long range shooting, but unless the British had full information of the enemy forces and trusted their superiority in number or strength (due to radar, air detection, enemy communication encryption breaking or straight leaking form double agents in the Italian line of command) they certainly were not "aggressive" or looking for troubles when facing Italian CL. Punta Stilo is another matter that should debated: the British had by far the largest guns with 3 15" large battleships vs the 320mm on the only two Cavour: Campioni had strict orders to avoid contact with superior enemy forces unless strictly necessary. With the Cesare hit and the rest of the fleet out gunned, Campioni did the only reasonable thing since the convoy in the area had already reached safety. Despite the boasting from Cunnigham about "Italian having enough", he knew far too well that he had gained no strategic advantage except a single hit on the enemy (with minor damages) and several cruisers and DD hit by splinters from the enemy fire.The whole scruff had been just a showing down without any effective benefit. He knew perfectly well that Campioni had done the logical thing and I guess he would not acted differently in his shoes. About the opinion of the Italian fleet on the British I think Capo Matapan had a much more substantial effect because they knew of the Italian operation much more then was actually disclosed by mean of leaking form inside Supermarina: the power struggle that brought Iachino to command actually sacking his superior for "not being aggressive enough" with pressures from the Germans, Iachino was now being forced to "Show Up" to justify his accusations end even the renewed pressure by the Germans for a more active "battling the Briitish". After Matapan, Cunnigham must have suspected the crushed self confidence of Iachino after his "less then spectacular" performance in it's first sortie at Matapan, and had leankings of how Iachino survived the inquiry due to political protection in the monarchic side of the parlament, while he should have been removed from command. From Matapan on Cuningham knew its counterpart was not up to the task and this gave him great confidence in its own strengths. Iachino spent most of his life in and after the war trying to blame his own inadequacies on navy Equipments, Training, Regia Aeronautica, Intelligence, and while he may have had some point here and then, he never blamed himself for the damages he had brought on the Italian Fleet. Had he met the fate of Admiral Persano (Which was much less culprit for the debacle at Lissa then he was at Matapan), a different Chief Admiral (may be even Campioni himself) could had brought some more self esteem in the possibilities of the Italian navy in the war.

a treat especial everyday.....like Ave

There must have also been a certain level of intimidation caused by the Royal Navy's reputation. I would have thought that any opposing navy confronting them would have been well aware of how difficult a task it was going to be. That fear affected both Italian and German navies on the strategic and tactical level during WW2 often meaning they had lost even before the fighting started.

Please guys, do another video about the British on the Imperial Japanese Navy!! Love your work!

Nice

There is general debate in the Royal Navy whether the Italian Navy is up to the standards of the last war, or if they have fallen off at all.

Warspite is never outnumbered, she is merely temporarily inconvenienced

I'd love to see an episode about "commercial raiders", light cruisers masked as merchant ship, or merchant ships covertly armed to raid. AFAIK they were initially successful, at small scale, during the early parts of both world wars. A somewhat "piracy romantic" and anachronistic part of the warfare, it seems to me.

Could you please make a video on the development of field fortifications and fortresses in response to cannons? I'm particularly interested what happened from Star fortresses on to early modern times.

As for the UK "boldness" compared to a supposed Italian cowardness: - The Calabria/Punta stilo example is not really good: UK had a lot of extra battleships in other bases like Gibraltar or Scapa Flow (and others) They had a total of about 20 Battleships in 1940. Regia Marina at that point only had The 2 Comte di Cavour class as active Battleships, since both Doria class were finishing their refits and Littorio was under final stages of sea trials. UK could have lost Warspite without any modification on the strategic picture, something Italy couldn't say about their 2 Cavour. That's why Italy's plan was to lure RN into a aerial bombardment trap... something that didn't work so well - It is also fair to mention that Cavour/Dorias were reffited thinking on France as main contender (they were kind of "on pair" with bretagne" but after refit they could also engage Dunkerkes) and couldn't really take a british capital ship, since the entire Royal navy battlefleet units were fitted with 15' or larger guns and were protected against that caliber. Uk AP 15' shells could overwhelm Cavour/Dorias protection. So at the end, even if they were still usefull as fire multipliers, to be honest Italy counted for the entire 1940 1941 and 1942 years with just 1 or 2 Littorios to face a 3 Battleship squadron in Alexandria + 2/3 more in Gibraltar, which also had CVs on their side. With that massive advantage UK could afford to pretty much risk all Alexandria squadron in a "mano a mano" engagement against a kind of paired (in papers) Italy squadron, while Italy couldn't afford to lose any battleship (or at least any Littorio) because they needed to retain their "fleet in being" condition to force massive UK deployments for as long as they could. Despite this strategic need, and the much weaker force, Regia Marina did sail in rage a lot of times, and even managed to pull 1st Sirte Battle + Alexandria Raid, in a row, which gave them a short 6 month period of naval superiority in east Mediterranean.

As a base without very serious defenses, Malta has one hell of a moat.

Italy conquered 5 countries, was awarded the territory they won in France, and won the Spanish civil war vs. the Communist. Aside from Russia and Germany no other European country performed better, or stated another way, Italy was the 3rd best performing European country of the war. An Empire larger than Germany's. Won the Spanish Civil War which greatly hampered the Greek campaign and the remainder of Italy’s war effort of an already unprepared Italy back-stabbed by Germany when they broke the Pact of Steel just 4 months after signing in Sept. ‘39, stipulating Italy would receive 3 more years to prepare.

did you already made a video about how impactfull the italian Air Force was ?

"Not only should Tunisia have exploded the myth of Hitler's military acumen, it should have discredited the idea that Germans fought better than the Italians, since Messe's 1st Italian Army held out longer than Arnim's 5th German Army and the DAK, even both groups had about six divisions and faced roughly equal Anglo-American forces. Indeed, Hermann Goring division was the first to be scattered on 7 May, DAK the next to break and surrender on 9 May, with the Italian Spezia division closing the gap created by the German collapse and watching still combat-efficient German units march off into captivity on 11 May. Whether it is significant that the German 90th Light division was the first to collapse in Messe's 'Italian' Army, there is no doubt that the Italians fought well and held out longest in Tunisia." (The Second World War: The German War 1939-1942, Jeremy Black, Page 265, Ashgate, 2007)”

Bernhard and Drach together, cool.

All hail HMS Splendid!

The sunking of Novorossijsk battleship the 28 october 1955?

so Italians tried to rely on Frances and Britains rivalry in the hopes they could conqour the med but when that fails and rn in creases their pressence rega marina do what they can till Italy falls in 43?

One comment on developing Armies and Navies ... I would be more inclined to say that it takes decades to build an Army and Generations to build a Navy. With Armies you have to have all those 2nd Lt.'s become Generals and that takes a while. Then - you have to have those Generals get experience at actually commanding large forces in combat and wars don't come along that often. Then - all that knowledge has to become doctrine so that it isn't lost. Here - Nations such as the Americans and British (who are Naval Powers) tend to develop these massive armies during a war but then largely dismantle them once it's over. Thus each of them, with the exception of the Cold War which lasted so long, starting every war with a fairly large level of incompetence until the dead wood has gotten enough people killed and then been cast aside. With Navies ... it's not just building the ships and training their senior officers to command them ... it's the development of traditions and attitudes that govern their automatic responses. When everything turns to shit and you don't know what to do - it's the things you automatically fall back on that count. With the RN it has always been "It's OK if you lose your ship - we'll build another one. Just get in there and HURT them!" With your smaller, younger Navies ... one of the driving criteria is ... that if they lose their ship ... they don't know if the Mother Country CAN just build another one. The Fleet In Being is a strategy some of these Navies adopt and - if you've lost your Fleet - that doesn't work any more. With the Germans that's about all they could ever do. Even the Hight Seas Fleet didn't amount to much more and the Kriegs Marine ... except for the subs ... couldn't think of anything better than Commerce Raiding. The Italians - had a good fleet - but they did NOT have the industrial capacity of the US or UK and so ... they were much more reluctant to lose ships it took a long time to build. Thus, if they got hurt - their reaction was to try and preserve their ships - rather than to strike back and hurt the enemy. Even the Japanese - who were easily the best Axis Navy - still had a Fleet In Being attitude. If you look at Savo Island and The Battle Off Samar - each time - they had gotten in on the Americans and could get at those transports ... and in the end - they turned away. At Savo ... there is some justification for considering the preservation of their ships against the losses they could inflict on the enemy (and basically doing more never even occurred to them) - but Off Samar ... Kurita was preserving his fleet ... for what? To be sunk at anchor? His first flag ship had been sunk out from under him, he had all these Angry American Aircraft doing things like dropping depth charges on him (because that was what they had when he showed up), strafing his bridges and then - making dummy runs when they ran out of ammo. Those little escorts just threw themselves at him snarling and firing torpedoes. He didn't know where the American Battleships were or their Fleet Carriers. He didn't know what to do. So - he fell back on his automatic response - to preserve his ships ... even if that didn't matter any more. If you look at the RN - you have all these stories and traditions about what has happened before and the way these earlier Captains are regarded. It isn't just the heroes of Trafalgar that are remembered - it's what happened to those who acted with prudence as in the case of Admiral Sir Ernest Charles Thomas Troubridge during the flight of the Goeben ... this in contrast to the attitude of the RN towards Sir Christopher Cradock when he lost most of his squadron at Coronel. Better to be a Dead Hero then to live and be labeled a coward. Those stories ... those Traditions ... take Generations to accumulate. .

One question asked how did the axis fuel shortages play into actions by the Italian navy

Most Italian Naval personnel were university graduates. whom graduated from the prestigious WhatsamatterU.

"Well, it never left port."

Rommel was a “genius” thanks only to the Italians: “At that point, of course, the situation changed considerably and Rommel has gone down in history as one of the greatest military leaders of all time for his stunning victories over the British in north Africa.. What many fail to realize though is that the forces effectively under his command, which he used to win these masterful successes, were 2/3 Italian and the large majority of his armored forces were Italian tanks.” “The German soldier has impressed the world, however the Italian Bersagliere soldier has impressed the German soldier.” _Rommel And Italian intelligence and bravery: NOTE: This video has since been removed due to copyright infringement. It showed how Italian Intelligence Services penetrated British Intelligence and relayed British fighting positions to Rommel, hence why he seemed to know their every move.

Surely the fleet in being concept comes into play for the Italians?

HMS PRINCE TAMPAX....

Battleships (Italian) lacked over the horizon surface radar.

where did the Italian fleet get there burn oil?

now I am curious about why(as in the battle) the Italians decided not to risk there capital ships.

Hadn't properly appreciated the extent to which WWII was the worst case scenario for RN.

Your point of view is objective and neutral, there are many untold italian victories over the sea. Italy isn't ready for ww2 and instead ww1, nobody expect Mussolini wants it. Italians haven't a strong industrial complex, no radar, no aircraft, a weak and disorganised air force and a huge problem of supply (in particular the gas) for their battleship. Anyway I think the Regia Marina was victim of British propaganda unfairly, even Wiston Churchill recognize italians courage in Alexandria.

I think that part of the bad press the Regia Marina gets comes from the fact that superficially, they do not compare well to the German Fleet, which had more spectacular successes - even if it had more spectacular failures. The sortie of the Bismarck will live on for many decades to come in naval lore, as will the Channel Dash, and the seaborne invasion of Norway has its place in naval annals. But each of these was accompanied by heavy loss or damage: Bismarck for Hood; Gniesenau permenantly out of the war, Scharnhorst damaged, Prinz Eugen later torpedoed; Norway captured and the Royal Navy Glorious and her escort sunk, in exchange for 15 German warships, including 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers sunk - out of 22 committed. Superficially, the Regia Marina does not have a success record in major ship-to-ship actions to compare: the glories go to the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, and Supermarina is faulted for excess caution. Phoenix jz points out some of the valid reasons for Italian caution below. It must be pointed out also that the German Fleet and the Regia Marina had different missions: the German High Seas Fleet was really intended for commerce raiding, while the Italian Fleet's mission was to defend Italian sea lanes and protect convoys going to Libya. So though the Germans could content themselves with control of the Baltic Sea and the waters around Scandinavia, with the help of the Luftwaffe, while commerce-raiding, Supermarina had to support Italian colonies, and so had little choice but to be cautious and pursue a "fleet-in-being" strategy. So its battleships were often used for convoy escort, to ensure that supplies made it to North Africa. Those missions were not as dramatic as commerce-raiding, but they ensured that German and Italian troops in Libya and Egypt had food and ammunition. And the Italian Navy did have its failures, yes, but if I am correct, they did not lose virtually their entire navy in a single afternoon, or even a week, as the Germans did.

Dragonwaffle!

It is not true that their submarine were equipped with screened windows!!

Love how Bernard pronounces Drachinifel. Charming like how the brits pronounce battleship as "Bah'O'ship".

I had never heard of the concern about a war between U.S. and U.K. in the 1930's. WTF?

Meddl Leude, wo sind die Drachis

Very interesting video! Based on a rough research, England lost in the Mediterranean Sea by Italian forces - 33 submarines - 19 D. escorts and DD - 6/7 cruisers - 1 battleship if you count HMS Queen Elizabeth that was grounded Naturally some of these numbers are debatable

Why was there *military* concern between the US and UK after WW1? That's always confused me.

Is that the Mighty Jingles in the Thumbnail?

6:42 Pause to have a bunch of Azur Lane fanboys (me included) gazing...

If the Italian Navy had carried out an all out attack on Malta in the summer of 1940, the entire war could have been different but it is clear that the Regia Marina was not really committed to the war.

I mean the Italians had the fourth largest navy in the world at the start of WW2. It was smaller than the Japanese navy at number three, but larger than the French/German navies at four and five. The only problem for the Italians “and this goes for their army and Air Force as well” is that they were lead by incompetent leaders and had a severe shortage of oil to fuel their war machine. Italy in general had great potential to be a great power, but poor leadership and poor logistics made it nearly impossible to be a great power.

“A popular impression in the United States of the Regia Marina, the Italian Navy, during World War II is that because its powerful surface fleet spent so much time in port, it was more effective as a fleet in being - in other words, for what it could do - than for what it actually did. As with all generalities, there are exceptions, and in this case that exception was its Decima Flottiglia MAS (10th Light Flotilla), one of the most effective units in the history of special operations.” None of the major participants of World War II have suffered as much unjust and unfounded criticism as the military forces of the Kingdom of Italy. It really is just amazing how this false narrative has taken hold and grown ever stronger and more prevalent over time. The nonsense of the Italian Navy being completely inept: “This revisionist history convincingly argues that the Regia Marina Italiana (the Royal Italian Navy) has been neglected and maligned in assessments of its contributions to the Axis effort in World War II. After all, Italy was the major Axis player in the Mediterranean, and it was the Italian navy and air force, with only sporadic help from their German ally, that stymied the British navy and air force for most of the thirty-nine months that Italy was a belligerent. It was the Royal Italian Navy that provided the many convoys that kept the Axis war effort in Africa alive by repeatedly braving attack by aircraft, submarine, and surface vessels. If doomed by its own technical weaknesses and Ultra (the top-secret British decoding device), the Italian navy still fought a tenacious and gallant war; and if it did not win that war, it avoided defeat for thirty-nine, long, frustrating months.”

Ah 5 min ship review more or less

Italian navy didnt have enough fuel to leave port en masse. This made Mussolinis' boast of "Mare Nostra " very weak. And since there was no Austro - Hungarian Navy landlocked powers added to the axis factored in nothing. The Battle of Taranto further reduced its power by its pre Pearl Harbor destruction in port by those swordfish aircraft much maligned. Unfortunately for America the Japanese took note. What victories the Italians had in Mare Nostra were limited to midget subs manned torpedoes and frogmen.

Check out a map: Malta & Gozo fit into a circle of less than a 10-mile radius! That's smaller than Catalina Island (California).

Someone put it better "Bed time stories for adults"

Drach 👍😊 So what he is saying is; "The RN saw the Italians, except the torp riders, as not as dangerous as the Germans". Guess that fits with the evaluation of land and air forces too 😉 Furore Germanium...

There's a generally negative view on Italy for both world wars, they just happened to be on the winning side for the first one.

Italian navy hasn’t hopes since first days of war: no aircraft carriers, no radar, bad torpedo training, lackness of night combat training, bad team work with air force, and lackness of corvettes and frigates to escort the convoys to Lybia, and so the cargo ships were escorted by old torpedo boats of WW1.

Only one Enemy formation Italy and whole of Europe must be prepared to fight alliance Of (Turkey-China-Pakistan supported by some Arab nations) Russia and Iran play neutral...

Italy? You mean *YEET-aly?* - Some British Admiral, probably.

Australian inflection...it’s like Jeremy Corbyn giving a lecture 😖

italian military history tl:dr= spaghetti regretti

whatever. the brits were humiliated by the japanese in ww2 so.....

Interesting that the British never really seemed to realize that none of the Italian capital ships-even the new, legitimately threatening Littorios-were actually capable of dealing with the British due to the British carrier supremacy.

Lose England 2020,finish empire....top it s NAVY Italia

The problem ITALY in ww2 is Mussolini...Mussolini = lose war

The US perspective is why the Italian Navy never really came out to fight.

"Good ships, but they're crewed by a bunch of bloody Eye-ties!"

"Nobody counts in or on the Italians" - Erwin Rommel