T-Shirts and other Merchandise: teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized »» ERRORS / CORRECTIONS «« 08:33 - I said 1939 although it should be 1931. (Thanks to my Patreon Galtur) 15:57 - I said "new year plan" it should be "new war plan". »» TIMESTAMPS RELATED CONTENT «« 00:12 - Why Japan had no Chance - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-l9ag2x3CS9M.html 03:25 - Why France fell in 6 Weeks ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-CI29hh5qBug.html 04:01 - Appeasement in 1938 - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-iZ2-ypT6ewQ.html 04:44 - Why German Victories Weakened the Japanese - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-2oUEHHhuEoc.html 05:17 - Operation Weserübung - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-gHJqtI3AzkQ.html 09:35 - Why the Japanese Military wanted to fighter after the 2nd Nuke - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-U0kII5dUXKg.html 14:12 - Wikipedia not a source!? - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-6Tz720XU2Mw.html 14:40 - Attack on Pearl Harbor - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-oTZmW3qz3Js.html 19:41 - What did the Japanese think of the Germans in WW2? - ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-ZCmNpToDBHA.html
Did you know...in 1931 Japanese MISSED Liao-He huge oil field by only 100 meters? That field could produce 18 million tons of oil per year! 10 times of Japanese need! A shallow, low-sulfur one, close to the coast! If Japanese didn't missed it, they wouldn't attack or join the Axis!
US and japan war was inevitable. US had plan to bomb Japanese cities before Pearl Harbor. watch these two video. FDR plans sneak attack before Pearl Harbor (1st half) FDR plans sneak attack before Pearl Harbor (2nd Half)
You mean how every government operated during the war......Japan just didn't have the luxury of it actually functioning well enough to do it for lengthy time, always competing over a resources within it's branches.
This has been my experience and seems to be the same for many others I have talked to who are knowledgeable about the subject. Though it is also one of the reasons I find studying them so interesting. Just as studying why the allied powers were so successful in the long run - not just in how they made war- is interesting, I find learning why the axis powers failed just as interesting if not more so.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized might not be a joke in the future considering how more and more devs use neural network to train AI to oppose and eventually beat players. In strategy, tactics, firefights, racing and so on. So far it'll all fun and games, but we'd be filtering millions of people in billions of engagements through those. Who said that we're not accidentally helping to create Skynet ourselves? Or that gamedevs and military research programms aren't aware of this possibility in the first place?:D
@@TheArklyte Oh then there is nothing to worry about: If Skynet is gonna learn how to warmongering out of the noobs that are playing TW on Multiplayer, then we are safe. Also Skynet is gonna be rather puzzled when it figures out it doesn't have any raise skeletons ability on his robot army and it's processing capacity is consumed on it trying to find where to recruit Triarii.
@Computer Whisperer 1)if you mention Elon and his views on AI, then use full context. He did also warn about people misunderstanding what an AI is and mixing up real aIs and ones in sci-fi. Modern AI(aka Artificial Idiots) are just a data sheets and algorithms very far from any form of actual self learning and sentience despite what marketing departments of companies developing them might tell you:)) 2)and humanity is a static point in history, banned from evolving and reinventing itself?
About the Netherlands' threat, I think it is more of a cultural and historical factor, rather than a tangible one, since the Dutch were the only westerners who could trade with Japan for two centuries, so for a long time they were the archetypical westerners in the minds of many japanese. Probably those in the Navy who wrote about the "dutch menace" were trying to strumentalize history and do a bit of cultural fear-mongering.
Are you sure they didn't simply make the list by default since they had resource rich holdings in the area? I don't recall the Netherlands being mentioned by itself... or than that they could stop selling the oil from their holdings to Japan...
@@cavscout888 They are directly mentioned in the citation in the video, and they did stop selling oil to the Japanese, at first stalling the talks, and then joining the US in the embargo. The WW2 channel talked about this in last saturday video, I think. Of course the Dutch were a target because of the resources, but I think the "resource" reason goes hand in hand with the "cultural" reason, in a mutual reinforcing pattern, something along the lines of "they have resource we need, and they stopped selling them to us. For too long they meddled with our affairs, and now that we're finally stronger than them, and we could take their riches with force, if necessary, they hide behind the gowns of other, more powerful westerners (who also meddled heavily in our affairs in the past, especially the US)". Also, the "cultural" reason is very useful when justifying a war to your people.
@@jacopomangini3036 'We should get these resources being denied to us so we can lop off heads and catch babies on bayonets, that way our master race will rule all of Asia.'
Another factor was the secret Japanese defeat in Mongolia by the Soviets -- it's my understanding that not only were the people not told about this, but the Army didn't even tell the Navy. The most obvious way for Japan to assist Germany in 1941 would have been by attacking the Soviet Union, but as the Army didn't think they could win that fight, they passed the buck to the Navy who couldn't say no.
I mean Nanshin-ron was bad, but Hokushin-ron was just batshit insane. Supplying an army advancing in Siberia while you are already stuck in a war in China without enough capacity to supply even that is just walking into the knife.
@@MajinOthinus True. But it would have required a lot less oil. And the Japanese didn't have to march to Moscow, they would only have needed to keep up a second front as the Soviets were fully involved with the Germans in the West.
As far as I'm awere the army wanted war with Russia but the navy got the bulk of resorces the island campaign the Japanese took on would have bean better spent in Siberia that's were they would have got more men and resources to spend in Siberia. The Soviet lost 2x what the Japanese did in pretty much everything or more for a win at Khalkin Gol so idk were people get this idear the Japanese got smashed.
@@MajinOthinus without the campaign in South Pacific they had the men and resorces to push into Siberia but they only had limited oil production only some 3 to 4 million barrels a year or with South Pacific 7 to 8million barrels. The Pacific tried down over 1million Japanese troops and America took the way of lest resistance the Japanese lost some 100,000+ casualties to America and the American's lost bout the same.
"Between 1930 to 1935, there were twenty domestic terrorists incidents, four political assassinations, five planned assassinations, and four attempted coups...." So do you expect any civilian oversight?
My understanding was that the Japanese Army needed the resources from the Dutch and English colonial possessions to wrap up their war in China. The decision makers concluded that taking those territories by force would end all chances of a diplomatic solution with the USA. Not only that, but since the USA moved the Pacific Fleet from the US Pacific coast to Pearl Harbor already in response to the fighting already going on, an armed takeover of the Dutch and British possesions would cause the USA to respond by moving the Pacific fleet to Subic Bay in the Philippines, which would be untenable and lead to an inevitable outbreak of war. Now, we know that in 1941 the US leadership had NO internal plans to move the Pacific fleet to Subic Bay, BUT the Japanese did not know that!
You have a good point about the possibility the USN would send ships to the Philippines, but the Japanese carrier force was 3 times larger than the US force and so they could have still successfully bombed Subic Bay and attacked with submarines if the US did that to threaten Japan.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was the organization more focused on the need for oil from the Dutch East Indies and the "Southern Strategy" - and that "Southern Strategy" was getting kicked around since the mid-1930s (like when Britain was identified as a possible opponent in 1936). The US was trying to practice deterrence in 1941, with the move of the fleet to Pearl, and the build up of various assets in the Philippines. But with isolationism in the US, still would not have been a given if the Japanese Navy just went around and seized the Dutch East Indies. As for the Imperial Japanese Army, they were up to some odd things at the onset of the 1940s, like provoking fights with the Soviets, which they essentially lost. The IJA afterwards became more partial to the "Southern Strategy" but still had their focus on the continent and the Soviet Union (hence the massive Ichi Go offensive in 1944 against the Chinese Nationalists). If Japan had left Indochina alone, they probably would have been able to access most resources they needed for the war against China on the open market.
@@michaeldunne338 Yes, there were many islands and they could not be defended. Even mighty Truk, Japan's version of Pearl Harbor, was just cut off and forced to be abandoned by the IJN.
@@fazole But one reason for the plan Rainbow 5. Othewrise, to your point about reversing situations, understand that Truk provides very unusual scuba diving, due to that base becoming isolated, a Pearl Harbor/Cavite/Darwin in reverse ...
Yeah, the Japanese were on to the threat possed by the Dutch. We were THIS close to poldering in the entire Pacific, leaving Japan as a land-locked hill surrounded by the great planes of New Netherlands.
If you think about it, This was similar to when the Nazi "suddenly" attacked the Soviet Union, both Japan and Germany at the time needed OIL to fuel (pun intended) their conquests
@@bingobongo1615 No they only suplied Germany with under 7million barrels or 900,000 tons. Germany domestic product was over 3million or just over 400,000 tons. Germany consumed 44million barrels before ww2 or 6million tons in 1938/39.
How many eyebrows do you have? Raised a dozen eyebrows at the presumed threat of the Netherlands... Well, I get it. But five or six eyebrows seem more reasonable.
4 года назад
Totally agree. The Netherlands is no threat at all. Pay no attention. Now... about those spices you supposedly own....
Great video. The hardest part for me to understand is the failure to recognise the shift from short wars to the type of war that world war one was. The idea that after world war one a country like Japan could expect to capture territory and then negotiate the retention of that territory seems like an idea from another time. All the more so given they knew US industrial power would grow giving the US a military advantage within a few years. I accept this but it is difficult to understand.
@@timonsolus I agree. We, New Zealand, gained Western Samoa. I think the change I see which I don't think the Japanese saw is the change to a much larger scale of warfare across multiple dimensions with World War One. There is probably a term for this that I don't know. To over simplify the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian was that some provinces were exchanged by treaty and life went on. In World War One it was going to be a fight to the destruction of either France or Germany. From my point of view expecting a new war to follow the old model rather than the new one is hard to understand. Having said that if you were a Japanese leader and you saw Germany occupying Austria and Poland maybe you would think you could do something similar in the Pacific. Once Germany invaded France I think it became a big enough threat to Britian and by extension the United States that it was going to be a war to the destruction of either. Ok, now I have thought this through, here is what I am trying to say: Japan saw the US as their primary adversary. They knew the industrial strength of the US and the willingness to get involved in foreign wars, shown in World War One. They knew wars were now fought for longer on much greater scale. However, rather than pursuing a strategy which tried to keep the United States out of the war by doing things the US didn't care about they sought direct confrontation. They did this knowing they could not win a long war. I not being critical because they were there and I'm not but it takes some effort to get my head around this idea.
Jack Prichard : Well, technically Germany wasn’t ‘destroyed’. The Armistice in 1918 wasn’t an unconditional surrender. The German Army didn’t surrender - it marched home. And it wasn’t the Entente who forced the Kaiser to abdicate - it was the Germans themselves. Back to Japan, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 ended in a treaty, and so did the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895 before that. In 1941, 1895 was still relatively recent history, less distant in time than the Vietnam War is for us. And WW1 wasn’t the shattering experience for Japan as it was for France or even Italy.
G'day, Have you niver heard o' George W Bush..., and the time he bogged Unkle Spam in BOTH Iraqagain & Absurdistandstill ? Short War = Endlessly Indefensible Quagmire upon Attempted Occupation. Ask Prissydunce Johnson & Nixon. Just(ifiably ?) sayin'. Take it easy. ;-p Ciao !
The fact that the army may have gotten the upperhand, and Japan initiating the northern strategy was the reason the Soviets kept over a million troops at the Manchurian border at all times, even at the hight of Barbarossa
Thank you for examining the importance and nuance of the situation in China! It is sadly overlooked. The Japanese knew they were receiving increasing criticism the world over for their actions in China. The US took action in several ways to protest and to punish Japan economically, but it's not very well known that it was well before Pearl Harbor that President Roosevelt gave permission to create an air force for China, made up of US servicemen who had to resign from their US military branches of service. This permission created the First American Volunteer Group which became known as the 'Flying Tigers'. As a side note, the original Flying Tigers ceased to exist on 4 July 1942; the nickname passed on to the US 14th Air Force. There is legend associated with the Flying Tigers that is sometimes not understood. It is commonly held that the AVG was "just" a group of mercenaries that was in response to Pearl Harbor. While they did consider themselves mercenaries, their service to China was not only sanctioned by the Executive Branch of the US government, the entire enterprise was orchestrated in large part by agreements between the Chinese and US governments, and even payments from the US to China to pay the so-called "bounties" the AVG pilots earned for shooting down Japanese aircraft. US industry and the US war department procured combat aircraft from an RAF order, and US business provided the Front company, called CAMCO. The AVG were hardly just men who traveled to China with an idea of adventure and money. AVG personnel were later recognized as US war veterans. Furthermore, if the AVG had been in _response_ to Pearl Harbor, they never would have left the US or their branches of service; there was supposed to be a Second American Volunteer Group, but Pearl Harbor's attack dissolved the idea. The Japanese knew, months before Pearl Harbor, that these Americans were going to China to aid China in opposing the Japanese Empire. This undoubtedly contributed to Japan's resolve to attack the US and remove this thorn in their side before things got more out of control in an area they had invested in heavily.
The first American ace of the war was Arthur Chin who was a Chinese American flying for the Chinese airforce from 1937 to 1939 flying a Gloster gladiator. There were several other Chinese Americans who flew for the Chinese before the AVG got involved.
@@porksterbob absolutely! And before the AVG there was a multi-national group. But the AVG was an American conscious effort from the President down, and this plays into the topic of Japan attacking the US.
That's a good theory, but the AVG was not in combat until after Pearl Harbor. Plus they were really rag-tag with few aircraft and operating in poor conditions. I just don't think the Japanese saw them ad much of a threat prior to PH. The Soviets were providing aircraft and training to the Nationalist Chinese Air Force and the Germans were providing equipment and training for the Nationalist Army until the signing of the Tripartite Pact.
I enjoyed this episode. I live in the region of the topic being Australia and have read many Japanese biographical accounts that touch on this period. It is very complex due to the many military factions within Japan at the time. It was as if they were striving to reintroduce the Samurai class with a Warlord structure after the late 18 hundreds Boshin wars that introduced a civil government.
Oil. The IJN calculated they had enough oil for 1 year of War and I believe two to two-and-a-half years of normal peacetime operations before they ran out of oil. Use them or lose them was essentially their choice when it came to their Navy. their culture would not allow them to back down from their position that got them painted into the corner to begin with.
The conditions that Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the US were requiring for any settlement would result in a _massive_ loss of face for everyone involved in planning, ordering, and overseeing the China campaign. This created the cultural imperative that, as you describe, made it impossible for there to be any outcome that _didn't_ result in a full-blown war.
Easy. US had imposed oil embargo against Imperial Japan and they attacked Pearl Harbour to try to knock the US navy out of the war. Japan was resource poor and didn’t have enough oil to sustain it’s large war machine for too long.
No, isolationist sentiment is still running high at this point. Only an actual attack would galvanize the American public to war. FDR's hands were tied until war is declared on him or an attack happens first
@@yoseipilot The US had been increasing military strength in the area since Japan invaded China, and Japan's goals were in direct conflict with US interests such as the Phillipines. Conflict with the US was inevitable.
But Japan did it merely so the Japanese master race could emulate European empires and conquer oriental Asia and the Pacific. I would hope ANY country, then or today, would stop selling the resources to accomplish that... Especially since the Japanese enjoyed slaughtering while they did it.
Probably first time I've heard settling for NOT conquering everyone around you for their resources as 'concessions.' But it's accurate. Thanks! Love your WW2 Pacific Campaign stuff! Not just because I find it very interesting, but you look at it more critically than most, and don't just repeat stereotypes like most.
I recommend anyone interested in this topic find a copy of the Japanese film ‘Isoroku’. It does turn Yamamoto into basically Jesus, and perhaps portrays its characters and events with more interest towards narrative purpose than historical accuracy, but nevertheless it’s a very honest examination of how Japan went down the path to war and why they could never have won the war they sought to fight. It’s also an extremely philosophical movie that talks a lot about war in general. Additionally, the battle of Midway sequence is a must-see for every movie lover and is one of my favorite scenes in all of film. I do feel the need to mention that the film does not recognize the millions of Chinese civilians slaughtered during the 2nd sino-Japanese war, however considering Japan’s current political climate, the creator’s of this movie probably made the best anti-war film they could without being censored or attacked by the strong right wing historical revisionists controlling Japanese media.
What's interesting is that belief does definitely come right from Japanese myth and legend, considering the Shinto myth that the Emperor supposedly descended directly from Omikami Amaterasu, and because of that those he chose to aid him had divine providence. Incredibly fascinating how such a belief can be used as propaganda later.
You fail to discuss another major fallacy of Japanese thinking-that the US would go to war to prevent Japan from taking over British and Dutch oil fields and rubber plantations. If the Japanese had been more informed , they would have realized that the US had a strongly isolationist majority and would never have gone to war to protect colonial possessions, just as the US did nothing when Germany tried to bomb and strangle Britain into submission. Big mistake.
Max Schultz I don’t understand. Even if everything you say is correct, how does that mean that the U.S. would have gone to war to protect British and Dutch colonial possessions?
Max Schultz Even if all you write is true, that does not explain why the Japanese attacked. It does not explain why they took what you consider to have been Roosevelt’s bait. The Japanese seem not to have understood that Roosevelt had neither the legal right nor the political power to take the United States into war. They appear not to have understood that, no matter what you believe Roosevelt wanted, the United States would not have defended colonial possessions. That is why a respected historian of the war (Victor Davis Hanson) has written that had Japan seized them, the U.S. would done nothing; thus, he wrote, the Pearl Harbor attack was unnecessary and a colossal mistake.
How can anyone claim US would do nothing? The US has ALREADY embargoed Japan, to a point where Japan cannot continue any millitary operations. More aggression will 100% likely to attract more punishment.
Mr Alpaca I agree with you that the United States would have done something but whatever that would have been, it would not have been an act of war against Japan. True, the intact Pacific Fleet would be in a position to, from the Philippines, cut off any southern supply but it would not have been given orders to do so. Recall how isolationist the U.S. was at that time; it did not intervene when Britain was being blitzed or when Russia was invaded. It provided supplies and convoy escort, but that was all. The America First crowd had much too much public support to have permitted more.
@@asd6557 Yes it may not be a straight up declaration of war, but it will be something more severe than the embargo, which, has already crippled Japan. So whatever it is, it's not good for Japan. Anyway there is a popular notion if Germany and Japan ignores the US they would do better which I don't think is the case.
US embargo wasn't just a matter of scarcity, it was intended to cripple Japan. US was already directly supporting Chinese resistance groups long before Pearl Harbor. Who gets to own SE Asia's resources? Japan or Europe/USA? That was the question.
Bo Zo Yep. Exactly. Japan did unspeakable things in China making them without a doubt the bad guys there but in the war with the US? What was the alternative?
@steve gale Even the Nazis were appalled by Japanese war crimes in China. Or ask the uncontroversially non- communist South Koreans. Imperial Japan was terrible.
"[Tojo] attempted to rebut the conclusion by arguing it omitted intangibles like unpredictability." Tojo my guy, that breaks both ways, and if getting lucky in a war you can't win could get you a favourable peace deal, then getting unlucky in a war you can't win could get you destroyed.
I really love the thumbnail artwork! It reminded me of the Russo-Japanese War painting involving a big bear representing Russia about to maul a small Japanese samurai about half as tall.
Before watching the video, I would assume because they expected to go to the war at some point in the near future so better to start the war on their own terms and doing as much damage as possible before the US can retaliate.
You’re blinded & also deafened by an extremely common, nigh on universal Japanese trait. ‘Nihonjinron’ obsessions with the quite mad notion that what we used to refer to as ‘Jap crap’ was in fact ‘superior’. Sadly for Japan, that was always a preposterous notion. Ten million rubbish sticks called ‘rifles’ are still just that. Rubbish sticks. What good did building lumbering targets such as ‘Yamato’ do you? None.
Excelent analyses snd condensation of very well researched facts. Your hinge on China ties the whole slippery mess of Japanese politics to the key points.
I'm curious why the Japanese couldn't arrange a similar deal to that of the Molotov Ribbentrop pact in terms of resource acquisition from the Soviets? Yes they did not like communism but neither did Hittler. Perhaps the infrastructure in the far east was bad. But then again it's not spread out over a bunch of islands that require excess shipping capacity and under threat of Submarine attack. Considering how badly they mauled the Nationalist Army in 1944. I think it's possible that they could have completed their original objective of defeating China by 1942 if they focused solely on it.
Simple answer - bad infrastructure. There was a single rail line across Siberia to Vladivostok, the Soviet eastern port. Not a big port, and it freezes in winter.
@@variszuzans299 Not that simple. The soviets built a dual line during Stalin's 5 year plans and there was several connections to the Manchurian rail network. So any material could be offloaded in ice free ports.
Partly because the Soviet Army defeated the Japanese Army at Lake Khasan in 1938 and Khalkin Gol in 1939. The Soviets weren’t as scared of the Japanese Army as they were of the German Army. However, if the Japanese had approached Stalin and offered a Japanese-Soviet Pact as an alternative to Japan joining the Axis in the September 1940 Tripartite Pact, then Stalin probably would have agreed, as it would be in his interests to prevent a Nazi-Japanese alliance. But offering such a deal to an enemy which had recently humiliated the Japanese Army twice would be politically very difficult for the Japanese government - the Japanese Army would have been strongly opposed to it.
@Audio Sugar When ww2 started for Russia it had over 500,000 truck's it produced about 100,000 to 200,000 more in the war and America suply them with 250,000 to 300,000 more they also captured about 30,000 to 40,000 German trucks but Germany captured about 80,000 to 100,000 Soviet trucks most of that in barbarossa. Russia had a standing army of 5million at the start of oparation barbarossa and 11million reserves 20,000 to 25,000 tanks more then the rest of the world but 15,000 to 20,000 of them were light tanks or tankettes. There airforce was the same size as Germany or France.
Japan has repeatedly proposed peace talks to withdraw from China once the restrictions on oil and other supplies are lifted.It held the Potsdam Conference, but conditional aviation was not allowed and only unconditional surrender was proposed.The United States knew that the Japanese government wanted peace negotiations and the Army was against it.The Army was killing two Priministars at the time, and the Army had more power than the government.However, when Roosevelt secretly struck Hull Note against Japan to his aides, Japan unanimously agreed to fight.Hull Note was the ultimatum for Japan, which had been engaged in peace negotiations until then, and was the haze of the blue sky.President Roosevelt also knew that if he sent Hull Note, Japan would definitely launch an attack.President Roosevelt said he was relieved to his aides when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Hull note ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-cs5NRJW-xLE.html ru-vid.com/video/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-FsMNQrzu1oU.html
Japan simply self destructed. Japan projected an oil shortage and tried to secure oil ressources but they could acquire only limited ressources. Problem #1 in order to defend/secure these ressources they had to exact control over a large area thus creating new ressouce requirements and overcompesating the initial gain. Problem #2 by attacking the US they antagonized the by biggest oil producer in the world again overcompensating the initial gain. There was no way for Japan winning this war.
I think there are a lot of different opinions. But the cause started when Commodore Perry came to Japan. Some Japanese think that Truman did something decisive. I am introducing Japanese culture and history, and I hope to address this issue someday.
@Prussian Union Seriously? There's a whole video on Pearl Harbor's defenses... go watch it. A giant surprise attack on a country not at war... is probably going to a lot of damage. Although maybe not so much on this case, since most ships were refloated anyway...
Terrific summary of a very complex topic. I'd add two other elements - one is that there is plenty of evidence that the Japanese public were getting increasingly war weary over China - Manchuria/China was increasingly becoming Japan's Vietnam - the army was struggling to control a narrative of victory when so many broken, disabled soldiers were returning home. The military seemed to have feared its public simply demanding an end to it. There are some very interesting 1950's Japanese films dealing with this (most famously, the trilogy 'The Human Condition'). Another issue was the widespread knowledge of US racist policy against Asian-Americans (such as bans on Asian American kids from public schools in California) - this convinced the Japanese public that the US would never accept Japan as an 'equal' in the region. The historian Kenneth Pyle in his book 'Japan Rising' says that the State Department was aware that these policies were having a very negative impact on the perceptions of the US in Japan, and were worrying that this was strengthening hard liners, but pleas to clamp down on racist State laws were ignored by Congress. The most important overall factor though is that the Japanese had convinced themselves (with some justification), that they were cornered geopolitically, and in their eyes a rapid strike was a rational defensive tactical measure, not the act of random aggression perceived by the US.
Japan should never have signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in September 1940. It benefited only Germany and Italy while giving no benefits to Japan beyond a newspaper headline - indeed, the response of the United States was to become much more hostile to Japan. Japan’s Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941 was far more beneficial to Japan than the Tripartite Pact. Japan’s political system gave far too much power and influence to the Army. This could only be changed if the Army was completely discredited - and that could only happen if the Army was catastrophically defeated. The only thing Japan could have done differently, politically, was to attack the Soviet Union in late 1941 instead of the Western Powers. But the Western Powers were very worried about the prospect of a Soviet defeat, which would make an Allied invasion of Western Europe exponentially more dangerous, and so they might have declared war on Japan by mid 1942 even if Japan hadn’t attacked them first. Militarily, an all-out Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union in late 1941 probably would have ended in disaster, as the Soviets were far better equipped than the Japanese Army, particularly in artillery and tanks. Although it would have saved the exhausted German Army from the Soviet winter counteroffensive of 1941/42, as the Soviets used forces transferred from Siberia for that.
An all out japanese assault into eastern siberia in early 1942 would have resulted in the fall of the soviet union within the year, and axis victory through negotiated peace within another.
@@fulcrum2951 Indeed. And it is doubtful it would prevent US intervention. Though the handover of the peacful east indies and its oil to Japan would be a likely part of the peace deal.
I need no channel youtube! : Consider the outcome of the fighting between the Soviet Army and the Japanese Army at the battles of Lake Khasan in 1938 and Khalkin Gol in 1939. The outcome was not favourable to the Japanese. In 1941, the Japanese Army had no anti tank gun that could penetrate the front of a T-34 tank. They would have to resort to Molotov cocktails (petrol bombs) and suicide bombers.
@@timonsolus On the other hand, the Soviets could ill afford significant armoured forces in the far east, and the Japanese wouldnt have to win, mearly tie down the forces that were shifted west irl for operation Uranus. If the Don and Stalingrad hold, the road to the Baku fields is open for the Nazis, and the forces that were used fruitlessly at Kursk could well provide the final push that breaks the soviet defense, and cuts off Moscow, Pwtrograd and Stalingrad. The Japanese would only have to 0ose a credible threat for about half a year. Still, it is nota gamble that they could realistically take, I will agree on that.
Very, very well done. I was in fact unaware of the appeasement of the Japanese by the British in shutting down the Burma Road. The one thing I'll add, is further back ground on Japanese thinking. After initially allowing some contact with early western explorers - missionaries in Japan created Christian Political Factions that caused a political disruption. These factions were destroyed - and Japan cut it's contacts with the West - not allowing any westerners in. This went on for about 200 years. Before the American Civil War - Commodore Perry - went to Japan and demanded that it open up. After the Civil War he went back with a fleet to force the issue. Japan, looking about saw that almost all of Asia had been colonized. China - to big for any colonial power to be allowed to have it all by the others - was divided into Spheres of Influence over which it had no control and had been defeated in the Opium Wars by Britain and not allowed to restrict the use of Opium by it's own citizens. At this point Japan's main aim was - to avoid becoming a colony. The Meiji Reformation in 1870, among other things, sought to reform Japans military along western lines. Japans basic idea toward Colonialism was "if you can't beat them - join them". Ironically - it was Japans very lack of anything that any of the Colonial Powers wanted - that had saved it from Colonization so far but - in order to protect itself with something other than just not being wanted - Japan had to expand to increase it's resources. The first areas taken were Korea and Manchuria (which the Chinese could do nothing about as when that happened the nation was still divided up into the fiefdom's of War Lords). The thing here about Japan's becoming a colonial power itself - was that it believed that if it ever backed down to a colonial power - it was on a Slippery Slope to becoming a colony itself. Thus - when it's continuing policies in China led to a confrontation with the United States it felt that it could not back down to a colonial power. It felt it's choices were limited to - Become a Colony - or - Be Destroyed. In Japanese Culture - when forced into an untenable position - one honorable way out - was to commit suicide. When faced with a war with the United States which they KNEW they could not win - they essentially chose to commit suicide by going to war with it. When reading John Toland's "The Rising Sun" I came to the impression that a series of Japanese governments wrestled with being between a rock and a hard place - all while being pressured by more radical people - until they each threw their hands up and effectively said to the radicals "OK! YOU do it!" The radicals got into power and found themselves in the same position, each giving in to those radicals still pressuring THEM now by saying in effect "OK! YOU do it!" This went on until they reached Tojo - and he did it. Then ... there is this transition in Japanese thinking ... Before - they had simply known that they would be destroyed if they went to war with the US. After they had made that decision though - they began to bull shit themselves that maybe they wouldn't be destroyed ... that maybe they could win ... Of course - bull shitting themselves WAS what they were doing - and they were destroyed. Some might also argue - that they did in fact become a US Colony ... but this would be more complicated than that. .
Great video! Fun fact from my country which maybe is not so well known to you, Mr. History not Visualized - Poland declare war on Japan after Pearl Harbour. This is only case declaring a war by PL in XX century. But fun fact does not stop there! Japanese goverment replied they do not accept declaration of war, becauss JPN had not any interest to fight against PL.
The Japanese were very dependent on the Poles for intelligence on the Russians and later in the war on the Germans who they distrusted, neither they or the Italians supported the invasion of Poland. The Japanese rejected the declaration of war so their intelligence services could keep working together in secret. Japan had a history of helping Poland against Russia before the war the Japanese ran a rescue operation to help Polish children who had been deported to Siberia under the Bolsheviks. These children were taken to Japan and then later returned to Poland. It is important to note the Polish spies never divulged any information about the allies only Russia and Germany.
I always wondered why the Japanese didn’t join with the Germans and attack the USSR rather than (or before) attacking the US. The USSR was saved by allocating troops that were positioned to defend against Japan. If the Japanese had attacked the USSR the Soviets would have been doomed and FDR probably couldn’t have convinced the public to join the war.
In hindsight, I guess it would have been possible for Japan to just invade SE Asia for oil and ignore the US. No attack on the US, but no compliance with US demands either. Without Pearl Harbour, the Roosevelt administration would have had it far harder to get the necessary public and political support to go to war with Japan. Did this at all figure into Japanese calculations, or did they assume out of sheer paranoia that the US would come for them at a time of its choosing unless they struck first?
Objectively, I think you're right that FDR would have had a much harder time getting the support for war with Japan if Japan only attacked the British and Dutch. However, from the perspective of the Japanese military, I can see why it was inconceivable for them to attack the East Indies while leaving such a strong U.S. military presence (which could be reinforced at will) directly astride their supply lines to those new conquests. In that scenario, the U.S. could have potentially cut off Japan's deployed forces and the resources they desperately needed any time they wished. While it would have been far harder for FDR to get the necessary support, it wouldn't have been impossible, and I certainly have a hard time seeing 1941 Japan trusting merely to the political situation in the U.S. to keep their vital supply routes safe.
No, it wouldnt have been possible. Every Japanese task force would have an American tail, reporting home as to the position of the Japanese fleet. In the clear. On frequencies the British were monitoring.
The adjustment to economic and production factors as the primary lens through which we view the Second World War (as opposed to the 'great man' focus on generals and leaders' individual qualities, much more common in my youth and the more immediate post-war years) has really shown the Axis in a different light. Both major powers (Germany and Japan) knew they were incapable of defeating the combined economic and demographic strength of the status-quo powers, thus both sought to isolate their enemies into digestible chunks with a very distinct view of obtaining the economic resources needed to fuel their war machines from their enemies. Both powers also focused on their totality of commitment (politically, socially, militarily) to the fight from the very initiation by a cycle of ever-increasing centralization of all power. Both powers also should have realized that fighting a war to gain the resources needed to win the war you're going to fight is a fundamentally flawed strategy - in the event, neither power could secure the resources they sought (neither would be able to hold their economic targets long enough to exploit those resources in any meaningful way). In such a scenario, both would likely go down in defeat - one after another.
On the attack of pearl harbor we missed 2 stations if i’m right it was the naval repairs and the “submarine station(?)” also i’m pretty sure they attacked pearl harbor in an attempt of neutralizing the U.S’ battleships but since they didnt attack the naval repairs the U.S had their ships back up pretty quick Thats what i thought
What if Japan caved on China but still joined the Axis and focused on the expansion they had in Malaysia but focused on India and the Middle East? I doubt they would ever tangle with the Soviets but tying down Soviet forces may have made the Germans life easier.
There are people who think a novel published in 1925 about a war between Japan and the USA might have given Yamamoto and the Japanese navy on how to fight the USA. The novel was called The Great Pacific War and Yamamoto could have red the book, when he was a Naval Attache in Washington. www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-09-24-mn-1046-story.html
After attacking the most populous country (China) and largest country (Russia)the genius Japanese strategy added the largest empire (Britain) and largest economy ( USA ) to their list of adversaries along with Holland, France, Australia and New Zealand. Japan had the economy of Ohio.
I know I'm 3 month late but maybe someone (a native English speaker) knows an answer. At 10:54 I saw the sentence "Their vocabulary featured incantations that this path was manded for Japan's 'self-existence' and 'self-defense' against Japan's 'encirclement'..." and I cannot find the meaning of "manded". Also the original source uses this word but could it be that this should be "mandated"?
IT is worth considering that shipping is needed in Japan just for domestic commerce. One of the problems with the plans to invade Japan was the assumption that there would be trade interdiction against Japanese shipping, which would lead to mass starvation as the various islands rely on eachother (as well as foreign imports) for food. Also, the Hagakure thing can be taken out of context, and kinda is. This "book of the samurai" (which is not at all what it is known by in Japan, just a western tag) was written by a samurai who lived at a time of peace, never served in a battle himself, as the wars in Japan were over by that time. They largely deal with maxims from his clan leadership. Moreover, they often deal with how their clan specifically did things different from other clans. Other clans practice they arts, poetry, flower arranging, calligraphy, etc. The samurai of our clan practice only war. I paraphrase because I'm too lazy to look it up. So hardly the norm of samurai society. Also, Japanese society and Japanese samurai society were never the same things, samurai made up like 1% of the population of Japan. The rest of the culture was made up of various levels of peasants, farmers, merchants, and priests, most of whom suffered at the hands of the samurai throughout most of Japanese history, and occasionally raised rebellions against them in one form or another. All that said, the political propganda machine of the time very much did feed this to Japanese citizens, descendants of peasants or samurai regardless, so it does have some weight, but not as much as to paint the entire culture with the same brush. Presumably more weight with the people in position to make decisions, although many were descendants of the other castes (merchants specifically did well in the 19th century), not samurai. That has just been a traditional oversight of western academia.
5:54 60% of American caloric intake at a time when a *lot* of Americans were underweight. (This is why post-war Japanese are so much taller than their ancestors: a lot more calories, including protein.)
A most superlative explanation on the question. Surely the decision was incredibly stupid in hindsight and even to them, but they had their reasons and they leapt at the window of opportunity that existed. Only to met a Wall of Steel and Fire as you so aptly summed up.
I read an article that stated even today in Japan there is a huge reluctance to stop the actions of an obvious bad decision from continuing. This might be due to "sunk cost" bias.
@@timonsolus Yes, that is a powerful element too and no one talks about how this trait unquestionably affects China's and N. Korea's policies. However, during WW2 I read that Japan was going through a kind of military "cultural revolution" in that if a superior's decisions were seen as too timid by his junior officers, they could strongly challenge him and it may account for some of the rash decisions made by Japanese military leadership. Also, during the war as pilot losses were occuring, the Japanese Navy aviation training acceptance became even stricter! It was already the hardest course in the world with a 90% fail rate! If we look at the Guadalcanal campaign, that was a disastrous sunk cost effort. Why didn't they build airbases closer to Guadalcanal, but out of US fighter range? The generals conducting the campaign were not aviators. Carrier Bomber commanders were not aviators. Carrier captains were not aviators. Yamamoto was an aviator, but had no combat experience in the air. Are these conditions due to face, tradition, sunk costs? All of the above I think.
fazole : Regarding your comments about Guadalcanal, the newly constructed airfield there was well within FERRY range of Rabaul (a one-way trip for a single-engined aircraft). And the Japanese thought that would be all they needed, for 2 reasons: 1) they weren’t expecting the US to be capable of taking the offensive so soon after the Battle of Midway (the Japanese believed they had sunk 3 US carriers in that battle, not just one). 2) they didn’t believe that the US would be capable of carrying out a successful amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (once it had been properly fortified and fully garrisoned, see point 1). They expected to drive any US force back into the sea. In Japanese planning, the airfield on Guadalcanal was never expected to fall into US hands. So the issue of building proper airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal (other than crude airstrips for emergency landings by damaged aircraft) never came up, until it was too late to do anything about it.
@@timonsolus The Guadalcanal campaign lasted 6 months AND the Japanese sank several ships at Savo Island, and the carrier Wasp later. They were still a formidable threat to the USN early on in the campaign. They had the airfields at Rabaul and a small one at Buka, which was far from Guadalcanal. The Zeroes were forced to keep their drop tanks on while dogfighting due to a shortage of them and this reduced their performance substantially. Direct r/t from Rabaul to Guadalcanal was about 1200 nm which was in patrol range of the Zero, but a dangerous distance when you add the unknown high fuel consumption required in combat. The Japanese had at least 3 months to build airbases closer to Guadalcanal with which they could also threaten USN shipping, use as a staging area and as an emergency field but they didn't. To me, this is an unfathomably bad decision.
Interesting video. One aspect that is often not considered is that while the US, UK and USSR did try to coordinate their strategies (broadly) and there was clear economic aid (Lend Lease to UK, shipments to Murmansk and to Vladivostok) there was little coordination between Germany and Japan. I know that you are familiar with the many wargames and simulations - and nearly all of these games from simple ones like Axis to Allies to more complex ones, suggest knocking out the USSR by combining the efforts of Germany and Japan is often the only pathway to victory for the axis. A question that perhaps you could follow up on is what if the Japanese only attacked the Dutch holdings and seized the East Indies and oil holdings but left the Philippines alone - would the US still have entered the war?
The Japanese Navy player doesn't get any victory points from this, so he's got no incentive to agree with the Japanese Army player, and the Japanese Army player doesn't have enough transports or fuel points to make it work. US Entry can still occur as well.
You should listen to the podcast - Hardcore History, and it's talk on Japan before the war and on the Japaneses decent into WWII the series is called "Supernova in the East", currently 3 parts have been completed and I presume more are to come. Or a more lighter take on it is the comic Showa by Shigeru Mizuki which again talks about Japan before, during and after the war.
Great background at the complexity of the considerations. It is easy to forget that "losing" would not have seemed that bad to japan at the time - if england could not be invaded, they were not contemplating occupation either. They also naturally had the mindset of the technology and attitudes of the time - by that time germany with its army support airforce dropped 1% as many bombs as the allied total war year zero annihilation air force were prepared to drop on germany.
> the second sino Japanese war started in 1931 with the invasion of manchuria but > was not declared as a war untill 1937 the first statement is still debated by current scholars, the second is just wrong since Japan never declared war on China and China only declared war on Japan in 1945.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized thanks for, correcting me on the second statement I did a university essay on the this topic and came down on the side of the school of thought that believed it started in 1931
@@tobydawes6007 yeah, it makes a lot of sense. I remember I wanted to include it in a previous video, yet, it would open up a complete new can of worms and just over-complicate matters. So for now, I settled on the "orthodox" interpretation.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized the nationalist tried to slow down the Japanese through political and diplomatic means from 1931 up to 1937 whilst engaging in actions close to war but wasn't war
What also needs to be considered was Japan's assessments of other powers' intentions in its neighbourhood. That they would use their possessions for resource extraction that would not be available to Japan even at reasonable trade terms and that the USA was bent on a Pacific lake policy that would dictate terms for everyone in its way, especially Japan. The influential assessments ranged from the two militaries' relatively sober judgements, that Japan must either submit to the US or opt for war at the time of its own choosing, to the far more extreme from ultranationalist societies such as the kokuryūkai, that war was not only inevitable but desirable. To be fair resource extraction was exactly what America, Britain, France, and the Netherlands were up to and the US had sought to expand its influence and dominate the Pacific quite successfully with the rapid expansion of naval facilities at Pearl Harbor, the Naval Treaties, and military build-up in the Philippines.
The Japanese would have had no problem getting the oil they needed if they hadn't messed around with Indochina, starting at the end of the summer of 1940. They let opportunism in certain circles get the better of them. And that happened in a progression of events before the US commenced a serious buildup in the Philippines. Otherwise, in terms of resource extraction, a look at production figures of the United States' 48 states, and its apparent that across many categories, the US was quite busy with just its continental territories (and in trying to finally get out of the Great Depression). Japan backed itself in a corner in the summer of 1941 basically, after moving troops into Southern Indochina.
@@michaeldunne338 I didn't say they were right. The scale of resource extraction by US corporations is what lead to the imposition, both successful and attempted, of tariff regimes on Philippines. The military buildup that the Japanese found threatening began with the military provisions of Tydings-McDuffie which led them to believe it would never be free from US control
@@Matt_The_Hugenot Philippines didn't matter a bit when you compare to indices on natural resources of the continental economy of the United States. The military buildup began in the late summer of 1941, with assurances given to MacArthur of resources on August 16, 1941, for shipping of reinforcements no later than September 5. So well after all the fun and games the Imperial Japanese military was having say in Indochina. Pretty much the same with the air buildup, which was proposed by Hap Arnold in July 1941, with the first units heading out in September. The speculation there about Tydings-McDuffie is just that, speculation, and one that is actually belied by real events going on in 1941, like lend lease for Britain, supporting other military requirements, naval coverage of the the Atlantic, even pre-lend lease to the Soviets, etc. (not to mention that up until summer there were questions about investing in the defense of the archipelago, especially since plan Rainbow 5 wrote it off).
@@michaeldunne338 With the establishment of the Commonwealth the US got control of the Philippines armed forces for the next ten years plus agreement to negotiate further basing afterwards. The investment in upgrading started straight away and further investment was made in the Philippines forces themselves. As far as Japan was concerned this took military control beyond the time frame during which the US would either provoke war or find a pretext to start it. The e investment may seem small compared to the post 41 build-up however it was sufficient to seem threatening. In interwar US eyes war with Japan and also seemed inevitable as US interests and Japanese were in such conflict. The difference being that the US assumed that Japan would avoid war as long as possible as it was bound to lose and that war would come later rather than sooner, another factor was the underestimate of Japan's ability to conduct offensive war in the Pacific. Japan's fears of encirclement and economic oppression by other powers have direct parallels with Soviet and Russian fears post WW2, overblown but not entirely wrong.
@@Matt_The_Hugenot don't think so. Philippine army was established in December of 1935, and things went pretty slow, for an unproven, largely infantry force; and with investment very small in absolute terms for other branches (like only about 40 airplanes for the Philippine Air Corp by1940, not much of a navy). Interesting to focus on and play up a force that proved unready at the end of 1941, that was part of a policy of receiving independence that would have politically benefited the Empire of Japan. As for the force, talking 100,000 men "within a week after the outbreak of war" that were described as "poorly equipped and trained " Then there is what the Japanese thought, as conveyed by the US Army study (or two) on the subject: "The strength of the Philippine Army and the Constabulary, the Japanese estimated, was 110,000 men. This strength, they thought would be increased to 125,000 by December. The bulk of the Philippine Army, organized into ten divisions, was known to consist mostly of infantry with only a few engineer and artillery units. This army was considered very much inferior to the U.S. Regular Army in equipment, training, and fighting qualities."
In 1896 the US gov. Stole Hawaii so Js couldn’t have it; spent 40 years constructing the most concentrated defense system in the world to prep for attack by Japan. All FDR had to do was provoke Japan w his economic war.
Japan was expanding its empire and its influence while European powers were pulling out of Asia to fight Germany. But The US had a military presence in the Philippines. And other islands in the pacific. As long as we were there, we were a threat! Japan’s failure was they didn’t finish us off. And they paid for that with Hiroshima and Nagasaki 🤔
The American Government at the time told the Japanese that if they attacked any South Pacific nation (cough) Europeans then America would declare war on them then later on America put on the oil embargo cutting off 90% of it's oil it's a no brainer. America wanted the Japanese to stop the Japanese took this as indacater war with the USA was only a matter of time so take as much as you can and hold it make America pay a huge price in men to take it back and they will grow tiyerd of war and come to the bargaining table preferably lifting the oil embargo and the more territory they had the more they had to bargain with simple really. But the problem was the island defensive ring thing didn't hold up that well no were near as good as they thought it would and the American's only took on about 12% of the Japanese in the Pacific they basically took the way of lest resistance for the most gain and none on the mainland of Asia or Japan.
It is becoming more clear to me that Japan should have consolidated their holdings in Manchuria and Korea. They should not have attacked China but support Chang against Mao. They should have invested their resources instead on white elephants like the Musashi and Yamato and put all that wasted steel and fuel into better and more numerous tanks and infantry weapons.Then when they were ready push into siberia. Which had all the resourses they needed.This would have put them in a better relationship with the US instead of going to war with them.
Japan got stuck in trap of president Roosevelt. For Japan it was extreme fail. Japan and Japanese media made USA as underestimation. In the first place the reason of attack to USA was only for oil which banned to export to Japan by USA. But USA provided a compromised way to support Japan what if Japan attack Soviet Union. This was USA's complete ambition. These sentences was written on Hull-Note's last sentence. Japan could not understand USA's mind. The correct way of diplomacy for USA was what Japan only shows fleet drill included carrier ships near the west coast of USA. Japan only wished to threaten USA. Because Japan did not occupy Hawaii. While Japan did not attack Soviet Union of far east. It was completely opposite action. Even in the era Japan and USA were same capitalism countries. While Soviet Union was communism country. Japan failed the choice completely.
The Japanese were incapable of backing off when told to by the international community, vis a vis China. The egos of the military leaders and the rank and file of the IJA wouldn't countenance it.
Great episode, love your channels. Danke schon 👍🍺. Maybe im missing something here, but to me Japan's options in 1941 are easy. Dont attack the USA at all, bypass the Philippines, and go straight for all French, British, and Dutch holdings in the Pacific. Dont bother with India or Australia, not much strategic resources there anyway.
The US war against Japan started in 1937 when the Japanese launched their campaign out of Manchuria and down the coast of China and against the northern warlords. Japan established a colony in Manchuria in 1931 as part of a solution to the impacts of the Great Depression. Japan had an excessive external trade dependency and when the Great Depression came and the prices of Japan's export commodities collapsed this hit Japan harder than most other countries. The Japanese thus reoriented their economic policy and decided that creating an exclusive, Japanese controlled colony in Manchuria would help solve the economic problems. The Japanese sought raw materials from there and settled people from Japan there to create an offshore market for Japan's exports. The used their other colonies in Korea and Taiwan in a similar way as part of an integrated Imperial economic system with a division of labour. This rankled with the west who thought Japan was taking more than its fair share of the Chinese cake which had been previously carved up by all the western powers. However it particularly brought Japan into conflict with the US doctrine of the 'Open Door' which was the idea that all major industrial powers should have equal opportunity of access to Chinese economic resources. The Japanese policy was firmly closing the doors while the other powers were gradually opening them. From 1936 the northern warlords who had lost out to Japan in Manchuria were determined to go to war with the Japanese despite the fact that Chiang Kai Shek , the ostensible leader of China did not want to be distracted from his war with the Communists who he regarded as the real enemy. Chiang had lived in Japan, and had received his military training in Japan. However following the Xian incident in which the northern warlords basically held Chiang hostage, he agreed in principle to starting a fight with Japan. The Japanese response was to attack and drive these forces back, while seizing economically valuable coastal territories and ports. This essentially kicked the British and others out of their Chinese colonies and closed the Chinese door firmly behind Japan. The USA never accepted this and was determined to force the Japanese out of China. They had no intention of direct military intervention but instead used economic warfare to do this. The situation is very similar to Trump's economic warfare against Iran now. Japan was highly vulnerable because its industrial economy was heavily dependent on imported energy and raw materials. Eventually the Japanese decided to strike out and seize all the colonies they would need to establish a self-sufficient empire in the western Pacific. Oil from Burma, rubber and tin from Malaya, etc. etc. This precipitated the Pacific War. Incidentally the US during WW2 also explored the possibility of establishing an autarkic empire. This was part of the activity of the 'War & Peace Studies Group' of the Council on Foreign Relations. They called this minimum area the US must control to be independent of foreign economic pressure the "Grand Area".
'What if Japan attacked Russia instead of America?' is a fascinating proposition for speculative history. Had the 'Strike North' faction (Army) won over the Strike South (Navy) faction prior to WW2, all of the surplus industrial capacity that went into the Yamoto class ships, air carriers and giant submarines could have been turned into tanks, artillery and aircraft. Russia wouldn't have been able to send the bulk of its eastern forces to the 'Eastern Front' ( actually the Western Front, from Russia's point of view) to fight the Germans. Furthermore, the US' direct involvement in the war would have been delayed, if not avoided. Remember American public opinion was largely against US involvement before Pearl Harbour. Considering how 'touch and go' the Eastern European theatre was, it could have made all the diffence
What happens is the Navy Minister resigns, the Navy refuses to appoint anyone else and the government collapses. At the same time, the Army runs out of oil, because it doesn't have any and can't get any from anything it conquers in Siberia. Late 41 still sees the Central Asian units sent to Moscow, because Moscow is more important than Vladivostok, and Soviet local forces counter-attack via the Trans Siberian Railway. US Lend-Lease goes to China via the USSR, and IJA is decisively defeated in 1942. IJN fires on IJA cowards trying to retreat from China and Soviet Union.
In hindsight, they'd have had been much better off to withdraw from the Tripartite pact with Germany and Italy which provided them with nothing of real value at all, make nice in China for a while to get sanctions dropped or at least be able to buy from the Dutch, stock up and wait for the US to get involved in a war in Europe with Germany which Roosevelt was really pushing for. Would only have taken a Lusitania type incident and some in the German Navy were saying they could starve Britain into surrender if allowed to go after shipping off the US coast. What became Operation Drumbeat. With the US & UK distracted Japan could've taken a peaceful trade approach to create soft power and influence in the surrounding region while building up their own industrial & economic capacity. Of course from the Japanese point of view it was very obvious the US & UK at the time were not willing to accept them as equals so I understand their fear and anxiety at not being self sufficient. Especially given what history had showed them was done to even huge China. Lived there for a few years and it was odd to stop and think that without food imports we could all be starving in 3 months. Then of course when post-war Japan did take the economic path they got an awful lot of hate for that as well. Bit of a pickle to be in anyway you look at it really. Then of course their screw up so that Pearl was hit BEFORE the official declaration of war. Couldn't think of a better way to rile up a bunch of infighting struggling people to redirect all their anger at you if they'd tried on that one. Hitler followed suit with the kick a man while he's down declaration and U-boat campaign on the coasts. Those actions got everyone onboard with nothing but unconditional surrender at all costs. Which completely sank the entire Japanese war plan and later the crazy hope Hitler had of a separate peace with the western allies to allow him to continue the war with the USSR.
related to timing and the fact that the US appeared already rather hostile to the Japanese. Their strategy was to beat the US while they could and then dig in. If they only attacked the British, they could not dig in (taking various islands / areas: Wake, Philippines) and not weaken the US forces neither. If they would have only attacked the British, the US would have strengthened all their Pacific positions rather easily, so the Philippines etc. would have been much harder to crack or even impossible.
