Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway by Jonathan Parshall (2011) 

Exactly. They panicked and made a fatal mistake trying to adjust for it.

Several years ago, out of curiosity, I researched the issue as to why the Zero’s didn’t climb to altitude after the torpedo runs. They had ample time to do so. Why did they leave the Carriers, their ultimate responsibility, exposed and unprotected? Your conclusion is accurate. The fact is that, for the first time, Zero pilots lost the advantage and were shocked to be receiving a beating from US pilots employing the Thach Weave. Instead of climbing to 20,000 feet altitude to stop the dive bombing, they were on the deck attempting to help their colleagues. Huge tactical failure by the IJN fighters that ultimately decided the battle. This fact is (almost) never acknowledged but is the most imp take-away from the Battle of Midway.

@@livingadreamlife1428 A thought I had from another video (A6M) was that the Zeros may not have had radio receivers to tell them not to swarm the Wildcats.

@@livingadreamlife1428 To be fair, they had just witnessed a train load of torpedo bombers, for which the CAP was the greatest defense. AA can see off divebombers, they would have hoped. CAP had just done in a lot of torpedo attacks. AA had got onto some airplanes that were harrassing from up higher. CAP down low, AA up high. Anyway they were in a blitzkrieg mode.. they had the idea of "Defeat in detail" for both attack and defense. Especially preserving the CAP as a strong force was essential, they knew AA couldn't do a good enough job, right , so what else is there to do ? fly off and hide ?

Sounds reasonable. Overall, the Americans succeeded by throwing a lot of swings , many wild but some were landing and left them off-balance for the haymakers than came. The element of surprise was crucial. The Japanese knew that the island was there but not until late that the carriers were. Something aside: if I were a B-17 could iI not turn to come upon the ships from head-on or tail-on?

I couldn't agree more. It was awesome and definitely modified my view of the battle.

@michael boultinghouse Breathe bro, just breath. It is a word, not a cliche. It's an actual word. Have a look in a dictionary. He just meant that they took pains to get it right. It's a terrific book. Be well in the new year.

@michael boultinghouse No, they invaded China which was NOT communist dominated, in fact they fought both Nationalists and Communists In addition they demanded territory of other countries as well, if you want to call it western imperialists fine, but Japans GOAL was dominating as much territory as possible and they had the same attitude towards China and Korea and the west that the Nazis had of non Aryans If you don’t understand the big picture at the time you’re the dumb one

Six hundred pages? Hey it's nice that all these authors want to show their manhood by writing big books that provide every detail with a thousand footnotes, but hey we are not all historians. To me, a good writer distills the essense into three hundred pages MAX. We don't need to know all the detail. Make it an enjoyable easy read, and put all the extra details online. Stop making books with hundreds of pages of footnotes etc. Why do we mistake volume for good writing. A good writer gives you the important stuff in fewer words.

@michael boultinghouse I agree with your observations. Too often we get a one sided biased historical view point. Ideally we would see both sides. As far as evidence of Japan putting an end to western colonialism there are direct quotes and just factual evidence that Japanese military stayed in countries like Malaysia to drive out western influence. There are even vids out there quoting those other Asian country leaders that they can indeed stand up against western counties occupying Asian. Amazing how Japan “invaded” into Asian countries where either British or US or France or Spain or Dutch, etc already previously “invaded”. Parshall is a douche anyhow. He constantly talks about Midway and focuses on every minute detail of what went wrong but he’s unable to take a step back to explain why the entire battle plan was flawed to begin with. Parshall presents a style or scenario where he insinuates there was no way the IJN could have won anyhow. He is actually full of crap.

I was wondering the same thing. He can be contacted at his website. I would love to get a translated copy of all the carriers's flight records for those days.

Ships, especially aircraft carriers, rarely sink before their commanders realize the inevitability of the event. The Japanese had plenty of time to gather their important papers for safekeeping before abandoning ship and being rescued by other ships in the fleet.

Yes. Saving the Ships Logs is a high priority during an evacuation ... they just aren't always able to do it ... So - good job here on the part of some Japanese Naval Personnel. .

@@BobSmith-dk8nw Japanese; Duty before anything else.

@@PalleRasmussen Yes. .

I know this comment is old, but I will respond anyway. While I don't disagree that the skill and courage of the USN helped play a key role in this battle; I would like to point out that USN doctrine on carrier flight operations was nascent and the mess of the attack had little to do with commander incompetence and more to do with the fact that these commanders and the Navy as a whole were still writing the book on how to perform combined strikes from a carrier. As it has been commonly recited it wouldn't be until 1944 that the USN would perform carrier strikes with the same level of coordination as what the IJN was capable of at the beginning of the Pacific War. Well that's my two cents.

@@solus48 Tom Tonkyro is correct, it was the initiative of individuals that won, or saved, the conflict. The top men were detached from reality, or inept, which was common in US forces in WW2. Look at Bradley on Omaha beach by not employing the "funnies". The US troops were set to be evacuated from Omaha and put down on an adjacent British beach, which should have been done to save lives, however individuals saved the day for Bradley.

@@solus48 Good point. Jon Parshall makes this same point on video Dec 1, 2016 for WW2 Museum when discussing the Pearl Harbor attack. I just watched it a few minutes ago.

Tom Tonkyro let’s get some things straight once and for all. The only “miracle” at Midway was how “miraculously” STUPID the IJN was with their battle plan. In reality the IJN didn’t “outnumber” the US in the actual battle of Midway. Total plane count was 248 for IJN and 360 for the US. It’s kind of no wonder the IJN lost. Everything else being discussed is secondary. I don’t want to take credit away from the Us naval aviators but let’s be transparent here. Had the IJN did some things differently then the outcome would have been different. The Us Navy still would have fought bravely but everybody is asking and expecting too much. The Us had a lot going against them. Their torpedo bombers were very slow and the torpedos were mainly duds! Had the IJN mobilized their battleships and other vessels there was very little the US could do. 5 battleships including Yamato shelling Midway would have made things very difficult for the US to handle. Nagumo should have never been put in his dilemma position. A first wave of aerial bombers attack while the battleships are moving into position to shell Midway. Even before this the IJN sends a non carrier lead force positioned 100 miles north of Midway and moves this body due east heading for a potential collision with any US ships positioned here. The IJN had to figure that US vessels were going to be somewhere east of Midway. So sending 2 Kongo class battleships along with 6 cruisers and 12 destroyers is enough for the US to have to address. So there would have been many dilemmas for the Us commanders to think about. 1. How do they address the approaching IJN non carrier vessel force. If they are positioned north east of Midway then this IJN force will reach striking distance for vessel vs vessel combat. So how many Us planes if any attack this force. Do the planes from Midway attack or do the Us carrier planes attack. How many? 2. It’s reported by US scout planes that a large body of vessels are approaching west of Midway. It’s 5 battleships including Yamato along with escort vessels destroyers and cruisers. Holy fuck. Both these non carrier vessels have CAP. The IJN fighter planes took off from further back carriers and have caught up to the leading battleship group. No carriers spotted yet. These additional threats for the US would have diluted any one attack on any IJN force. All of the Us planes can’t concentrate on the IJN carriers. They have to address the battleships. “Coordinated” US attacks would have been irrelevant. The deficiencies in what the Us had would have been more highlighted. Junk torpedos. We have not yet even touched upon how the IJN should not have gone to the Aleutians at this time. That could have waited until after Midway was secured. Now you’re adding in 2 smaller carriers with an additional 90 planes plus 5 cruisers and 13 destroyers. These vessels could have been re-positioned in a variety of different ways. Wasn’t the Us lucky that the IJN did this? Wasn’t the US lucky that the IJN decided not to bring Carrier Zuikaku?

@@f430ferrari5 Here he goes again, on every single Midway video, spouting his "the Japanese should have won B.S." It does not matter if the IJN battleships were hitting Midway or not. it is stated historical fact, the priority of Nimitz was to sink the carriers, then secure Midway. Nimitz knew, as did everyone else, without the carriers, the invasion could not continue. It does not matter if more battleships and cruisers were with the carriers, they would have been ignored, just like the ones that were with the carriers, and the carriers would still be attacked. The Mogami and Mikuma were not attacked by carrier aircraft until the 6th, 2 days after the IJN carriers were sunk. Only one cruiser, was attacked during the carrier battle, and by only a very small force. Ferrari refuses to understand that sinking the IJN carriers were the sole goal of the U.S. fleet. Any additional IJN battleships or cruisers would have been ignored just like the ones present. These ships did NOT have an effective cap as he states. The additional small carriers with that fleet were seaplane carriers, they could not conduct air operations nor handle Zero's, only float planes used mostly for scouting and recon. These float planes were slower and had much less armaments than the ineffective Buffalo's. They definitely were not cap fighters. A ship to ship battle with IJN battleships was never going to happen. For a ship to ship battle to take place, BOTH sides must want to engage. Did the jeep carriers with TAFFEY 3 engage with the Yamato? No, they did not, they retired at speed, the Yamato pursued them, the destroyers engaged, the rest is history. To even perceive that carriers would engage with battleships is totally inane from the concept. That is like saying a couple of jeeps are going to do battle with a Tiger tank, ridiculous. I am not saying the IJN plan was perfect, nor the U.S. plan, but they were doctrinal at the time, perhaps not today, 80 years later, but at the time they were. The only way an IJN battleship would get close to a U.S. carrier is if it were already severely damaged and could not escape. Otherwise a carrier commander would not allow a battleship to get anywhere near, regardless of the IJN plan.

the zeros's range without the drop tank was not as great as you think. internal fuel capacity was 103 gal in two wing tanks & 38 gal in a fuselage tank. buzzing around the carrier fleet even at cruise speed (207 mph) and especially pursuing american attakers would burn up a lot more fuel per hour

_The two 7.7mm machine guns had 500 rounds each, but they were too light to do much damage to sturdier, well-protected U.S. planes._ That's a good comment. If I understand this correctly, the 7.7mm round (7.7×56mmR) was one used by rifles and light machine guns. The Japanese bullet was a copy of the .303 British. _That meant the 20mm cannon was its decisive weapon, but it had a tiny magazine._ I read the 20mm (Type 99) cannon's magazine would empty in less than 9 seconds of continuous fire. Since its rate of fire was 520 rpm, 60 rounds is 8.6 seconds of continuous fire. Presumably the pilots were disciplined to fire short bursts, but still that adds up. I reckon when it comes to defending the critical carriers, pilots would have been more motivated to knock the enemy out of the sky quickly rather than conserve ammunition by lining up the perfect shot, and of course having the carriers nearby to land and reload probably also assured pilots that they'd wouldn't be without ammo for long.

I have to agree with your analysis & conclusion. Lots of air attacks and only 60 rounds per cannon. The Zero's 7.7mm are fairly useless against sturdy aircraft.

The Japanese 7.7mm is about the same size and power as the American 30-06 30-caliber rifle bullet.

@@alanstevens1296 I did a comparison of Kinetic Energy calculations measured in Joules for a five second burst for these: Japanese Navy 7.7mm Type 97-synchronized=203,380; US (7.62mm) Browning M2 AP ammo synchronized=342,939; and the US (12.5mm) Browning M2 AP ammo un-synchronized=1,286,518.

@Timothy Verrinder Those are good points. Especially about the photo's from the bombers. It would be interesting to see what the Japanese historians had to say about Fuchida in detail. And - just which "Japanese Historians" were these - and did all the others agree with them? Other questions would be - what did the flight deck logs for all the carriers show - or were they all recovered? But - if all the Japanese Carriers were ready to launch - why did it take the Hiryu so long to get off it's strike - and a partial one at that? .

@Bill. Zuikaku was not damaged. The IJN simply decided to not bring her. Some US historians say that the Zuikaku air group was wiped out. That’s not correct either. Shokaku had surviving pilots and planes and with the remainder of what Zuikaku had left plus plenty of pilots fresh from their training program could have had a full crew. Even if both carriers or one more was there, it really doesn’t change history because by losing 2 plus carriers the IJN pretty much could not stay on the offensive for anything afterwards. The mistake the IJN made was not learning from the Battle of Coral Sea What really should be discussed more is why on earth did Yamamoto and the IJN follow this carrier vs carrier battle concept all through 1942. They wasted their prize assets without making use of their surface ships which is where they had the true advantage over the Us. Even more stupid the IJN brought their Main Force just 300 - 400 miles out of Midway. Why take 11 oil guzzling battleships including Yamato just to do nothing. What a total blunder. They also had 17 cruisers and 49 destroyers as part of the combined Occupation Force. All the IJN had to do was re-arrange their vessels and they probably could have gotten by with just 4 main carriers. It would have helped having the Northern Force which went to the Aleutians.

@@f430ferrari5 It takes some time to rebuild an air group; and the Japanese were very methodical about it. Yes they could and should have pushed it; but they were suffering from Victory Disease and all its symptoms. The USN was on the ropes and only needed one more punch to put it down; that was the sentiment that ran things at that moment. Zuikaku's presences was not thought to be necessary, simple as that.

@@gruntforever7437 there was no rebuilding necessary. You need to do better research. The IJN had over 1,500 pilots at the start of the war and we are only talking less than 6 months end. Even with 6 main carriers that’s way less than 500 planes and Zuikaku carried a max total of 84. It’s ridiculous to even for folks like yoh to comprehend that the IJN couldn’t field enough pilots. 😂🤣 And as far as Zuikaku thought to be unnecessary…yeah…and that’s where the IJN blew it. At least you seem to be partially admitting it.

Midway was first

@J Calhoun I think phtevlin is talking about his father's frame of mind Pre-Midway & Post-Midway.

@@thomasjr8360 I think phtevlin is talking about his father's frame of mind Pre-Midway & Post-Midway.

The trouble is that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter Short didn't heed the warnings from Washington.

navyreviewer wow, you here.

Good point about Hiryu.

I believe that Fuchida said that they needed "...just another five minutes", which is an exaggeration by perhaps 15-20 minutes (the dive bomber attack was over at approximately 1030).

At least one crew member is assigned specifically to save the ship's logs. Another to destroy the code books. That is on the Watch/Quarter/Station Bill

@@derrith1877 I imagine the Japanese had some similar protocol.... thanks for that answer.

For what I recall, the high level bombers did no damage at all.

Aside from an occasional splash, no.

What they did is take time off the clock.

@@artmoss6889 Near misses that explode, when very close to the ship's hull, cause similar damage as torpedoes. This is how Billy Mitchell sank the German WW1 Battleship Ostfreisland in Chesapeake Bay and kept within the Navy's guidelines for that exercise.

Nope but they managed not to get shot down. Lol

I'm not so sure Robert. If Tone #4 had not been delayed, the sighting could be expected 30 minutes earlier, precisely at the time the rearmament was ordered - on paper. Now a strike would have been more viable at this time with all or nearly all reserve planes correctly armed and another 30 minutes available before Tomonaga's air group returned. Would it have been ordered? We'll never know. It would almost certainly have saved the Akagi with only one hit put on it. Would it have saved more than that? We'll never know for sure. I guess it is possible that the landed planes from Tomonaga's group could have caused similar problems on all 3 carriers.

Occupying Midway wasn't the IJN primary objective. It was to draw the two (2) US carriers from Pearl Harbor so they could be destroyed. The IJN believed the USN had 2 carriers in the Pacific not 3. They believed 5 carriers was enough for the plan to work, 4 at Midway and 1 at Alaska. Four carriers at Midway they thought was a 2 to one advantage. More than adequate. The had a lot more carriers they could and should have used. But their resources were scattered all over the Pacific protecting their supply lines of oil, rubber, rice, coal, iron ore of which the Japanese Islands only had rice. Everything else had to come from conquered territory.

And why were the SBDs unmolested ? There was NO CAP up there with them !

@@oceanhome2023 VT-6 lost ten TBD-1and VB-6 lost eleven SBD-3 and I don't yet know the particulars. VT-8 lost it's fifteen TBD-1 and VB-8 never found the target. Hornet's fighter escort mostly ran out of fuel and ditched despite what Hornet's report says. It's F4F group leader was the only F4F return to land on her and that's who wrote the report. It was learning on the job for Hornet which had heretofore been preoccupied launching the Doolittle mission while the other two had been at practice. That's probably why they only launched a deck full while Hornet's F4Fs wasted fuel waiting for the final few aircraft to be brought up, fueled and armed. Adjustments to that were made within this battle the next day. The Air Strike Group's navigational miss as initially planned might've been operating on the assumption of two separate Japanese Carrier Groups as PBY recon only reported two carriers as sighted before having to hide in cloud cover. Learning on the job the hard way you might say.

There was a 40 minute time frame for CAP to climb to altitude as Parshall pointed out in the video. Target fixation in CAP chasing down the remnants of VT-6 seems the likely reason or so I've heard elsewhere. Japanese aircraft radios weren't usually functional . . . I have yet to read Parshall and Tully's book.

Nik D'Agostino Couldn’t they have given him a clicker? God.

This was apparent to everyone in the US Pacific Command the second Midway was decided.Japan had no offensive capability left and was on the defensive for the rest of the war. The US knew exactly how many carriers the Japanese possessed and knew the industrial output of Japan could not replace those losses.For every carrier lost by the US, they could build ten to replace, the Japanese could build maybe one. None of this was a secret anyone in either command structure.

@@miltthomas7057 wrote: _"knew the industrial output of Japan could not replace those losses."_ The US never knew.

@@miltthomas7057 wrote: _"knew the industrial output of Japan could not replace those losses."_ The US never knew.

"this was only apparent after WW2." Must be kidding. Until 4 June 1942, the Allies had sunk only the IJN Shoho, among all Japanese light and fleet carriers. At the end of the day, the American forces had sunk two-thirds of the Pearl Harbor strike force fleet carriers. There's a reason the City of Chicago soon renamed an airport "Midway." When visiting Midway Airport, be sure to visit the display about the Battle of Midway, complete with full-sized aircraft hanging from the ceiling. My huge question for the Japanese admirals who planned and executed the planned invasion of Midway was "Why did you take so many risks with your irreplaceable aircraft carriers?" The Japanese carrier-based aircraft had a flight range advantage over their American counterparts. Japanese antiaircraft artillery capabilities were far below those of the US Navy. Midway could not be fortified as heavily as other Pacific islands like Tarawa (Betio) or Iwo Jima. The Japanese had an enormous superiority in surface ships near Midway. Given all these factors, I would have kept my fleet carriers at the edge of their range from Midway until its air power was subdued. I would have concentrated my forces, keeping the light carriers Junyo and Ryujo with Kido Butai instead of running the pointless feint at the Aleutian Islands. I would have concentrated far more surface ships with AAA around my aircraft carriers to minimize their chances of being damaged or destroyed. I would have sought to at least get some heavy cruisers to shell Midway at night to cripple air operations so that my carriers would only need to fear submarines (with nearly useless torpedoes) and possible American aircraft carriers. I would NOT have closed the range on the American carriers after they were spotted by the Tone's floatplane, but instead moved away to the northwest as time was on my side, not the Americans'. I would NOT have sacrificed the Hiryu on the afternoon of June 4th in an attempt to extract "revenge" for the loss of Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. Japanese ineptitude that had nearly cost them heavily during the Indian Ocean raid against the British finally did cost them very heavily at Midway. I wonder what might have happened if it was the British who were reading Japanese signals traffic well before Midway.

I think there are many turning points, and they depend on your point of view. From the Japanese point of view, was it Midway, Guadalcanal, or New Guinea? We Americans (as well as British) look at production, logistics, attrition, replacement, etc. The Japanese & Germans in this war looked at the "Will" of the enemy to resist them. The Germans point to Stalingrad, maybe we should point to the failure of the 1941 invasion. The Japanese maybe point to those campaigns where the Allies toughed it out vs. got lucky as a signal for a turning point. My point: The turning point is not always obvious to everyone at the time, especially if you are on different sides.

I watched an interview with him and basically, from the points he makes, memories are not perfect. The pilots still have had 3 more years of the war and then Fuchida's book didn't come out for another 10 years after that. According to the Japanese CV's records, they had just landed several CAP fighters and they were possibly still in the process of being cycled below or another set of CAP fighters were being moved into position for takeoff. So, hypothetically, the dive bomber pilots saw some planes (likely only a handful of fighters) at the beginning of their attack run. Attacks seem to start out in the 15-20,000 ft. range and the plane is going several hundred mph towards the ground at near vertical angle for a couple of minutes. While this is going on, there's a ton of flak and tracer fire from the AA guns flying past him and he's trying to avoid all this. After this the pilots are most concerned with not dying on the way out and and hopefully not run out of fuel on the way home. In short, unimaginable amounts of stress. Then 13 years after the fact, someone who was from the other side says something about a bunch of planes being on the flight deck and that's similar to what the dive bomber pilots actually (hypothetically) saw. So to them, they might think they've slightly misremembered events. Or they don't remember everything and Fuchida's account sounds good and they accept it or their brain incorporates the information and forms a false memory. The brain is a powerful thing.

"What about the American dive bombers, why didn't they dispute Fuchida's claim there were planes ready to go on the Japanese carriers?" Not many if any American dive bombers cared about the history of WWII after the war. Not many lived thru that battle and any that did didn't want to revisit it.

@@JLWestaz Good point. Combat veterans rarely talk about their horrific experiences for good reason,

I was wondering that, too. My guess is that it must have been a priority to save that stuff when the ships sank (?)

Good point . From what I had read was that was all of the other films and pictures taken on the attack on Pearl Harbor were lost on the Akagi when she went down

The carriers were rendered combat ineffective by the strikes, but were not sinking until the Japanese decided to sink them with torpedoes after the battle. While the fires raging aboard them were massive issues, once it became clear the ships couldn't be recovered, there would be plenty of time to take the records off the ships. They would definitely want to know what the hell happened to destroy their carrier force and the records were a part of that. That said, the situations on the carriers weren't the same in terms of just how bad the situation was. But it's worth pointing out that they sunk all of them with their own torpedoes for fear of the Americans capturing the still floating ships after abandoning them. That indicates the hulls were quite intact at the time.

Should hear his personal feelings with MacArthur if you wanted a whole lotta fun.

Yes and no. The CAP was pulled down by the torpedo bombers that came during the 1025 attack. He was specifically referencing the mythos around VT 6 and VT 8. The common claim that theyir attacks allowed the dive bombers during the 1025 attack to go in unmolested by fighters. In reality, their attacks didn't help but they forced the carriers to take extensive evasive action that prevented the Japanese from launching their anti-shipping strike package. This is assuming that the strike was ready and just needed to be spotted on the deck. I would imagine that with all the evasive maneuvers going on, the ordinance crew was having a fun time trying to load torpedoes onto planes while the ship is violently pitching and rolling, lol.

Dive bomb the airstrip! That's all that's needed! Once that is accomplished, you have freedom of action. Game over!The battle would have been won. Of course, they would have ultimately lost the war.

idk they sell their reasoning rather succinctly and I think rather convincingly. If you're Nagumo you have a very vague and inflexible order that doesn't allow for rapidly changing facts of the facts on the ground (ie keep half your attack aircraft kept on standby) Nagumo has a known factual: Midway in continuing sending aircraft with the internet to harm his greatest naval assets (keep in mind as well that one of the last B-26 marauders sent by Midway just tried to give him a haircut with a shave much closer than you'd expect from local barber). All the intel fed to kidobutai fervently said to expect US Carrier presence after 2-3 days. Knowing these two things he knows/thinks to be true, its absolutely asinine to hold off your attack possibly for multiple hours to feed, refuel, rearm and re-spot Muratas attack force while likely suffering continuing air attack from Midway land based attack aircraft. Nagmumo made the right call given the operational data he had at the time. Japans downfall was preordained even before 0600 honestly given the absolute sloppy state of their naval patrols starting at the vast American recon aircraft count compared to the IJN search patterns not spotting American naval groups that they all rights should have if they followed their patrol routes and dropped beneath cloud cover more often.

"At NO point were the Germans EVER close to defeating the RAF. If the Germans HAD tried Sea Lion - the RN would have sunk it - so". WRONG They were actually very close.The UK had planes and was producing what they were loosing plus or minus. The US could have shipped fighter in a box to them that could be assembled in 1 day. They were running out of trained pilots. When you shoot down a plane it takes 8 weeks to train a pilot. And what you get after 8 weeks is a raw pilot with about 150 to 200 hours of flight time with no combat experience whose life expectancy is 2 weeks. Furthermore, if the Germans had won the Battle of Britain Sea Lion could have worked. The RN was scattered all over the world. It wasn't all sitting at channel ports waiting on Sea Lion. Had the Germans executed Sea Lion the RN would have had to contend with the German air superiority plus the Kregsmarine and Germany's submarine fleet. Airplanes were very effective at sinking ships in WWII. Germany would have been flying from the coast of France clearing the channel of RN ships backed by submarines. And all with no opposition.

@@JLWestaz Bull shit. The Luftwaffe were losing air crew a lot faster than the RAF. Some of the RAF pilots that got shot down - were back in cockpits in hours. Almost none of the Luftwaffe air crew that were shot down and didn't make it to the channel - ever got home. The Luftwaffe was wrecking itself trying to do something they could not do. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain#Attrition_statistics You forget that the RAF potentially had all of Bomber and Coastal Command to draw on and did drawn on the Fleet Air Arm. The point being - that the RAF was *_NEVER_* as close to running out of pilots as the movie would make you think they were. That was always bull shit. The reason this mistaken belief exists - is that the British always assumed that the Germans were a lot stronger than they really were - and the Germans always believed that the British were much weaker than they really were. So - because of these two intelligence inaccuracies - each side believed that the Germans were closer to winning than they ever really were. The Germans switched to night bombing because they couldn't do it during the day any more. They just couldn't take the losses. As to the RN - the RN had plans on just what it was going to do if the Germans tried it. In addition to that - the Luftwaffe was NOT trained in attacking ships. If they and the Italians couldn't stop the British from re-supplying Malta - they'd never have been able to stop the RN from destroying their landing force. And - of course - the RN would NOT have to do it alone as the RAF was NOT going to be destroyed. I don't know how much you know about amphibious warfare but I can tell you - the Germans would have drown a lot of their people whether the RAF & RN interfered at all. Using River Barges in the channel, many of which had no propulsion at all - would have been a disaster. The other thing is - the British Army had not ceased to exist. It had a lot more men and equipment than the dramatists would have you believe - and the longer things took - the stronger they got. Finally - for operation Sea Lion to take effect they needed to have good weather and with the Fall - the weather would turn worse. So the amount of time the Luftwaffe had to defeat the RAF in time for Sea Lion to take effect was limited. Remember - that Sea Lion couldn't just dump a bunch of men ashore - it had to supply them as well. Here are a few facts: 1) The Luftwaffe was trained to support the German Army. It was NOT a strategic Air Force. It had only medium bombers and none of the long range, heavy bombers that Americans and British had. 2) The speed at which the Germans defeated the French surprised them as much as anyone. They had NO plans to invade England when they started the war and were slow to begin getting ready to do so after France fell. If you look at the amount of time the Germans had to prepare for Sea Lion and compare that to what the Allies did for Over Lord - it's no comparison at all. Neither the Luftwaffe nor the Kriegs Marine had adequate forces or the time to prepare for a cross channel invasion. 3) The Germans were mostly fighting 11 Group. This meant that the damage done to the Luftwaffe - was done by a fraction of the RAF's strength. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Battle_of_Britain_airfields 4) Bomber and Costal Command - besides being a potential source of pilots for conversion to fighters - were bombing Germany and destroyed a lot of the barges the Germans had planned to use to cross the channel. .

Wrong. Don’t get mad at others for taking initiative and having balls to do something you can’t even dream of. Haters alway hate always

@@misterbaker9728 Ah ... it's a Sunday ... that's why all the twits are out ... Fuck off Troll. .

Twenty years before - they didn't have the internet - so it wasn't that easy to do. First thing you'd have to do - was figure out who the Japanese Historians were - which - if you didn't speak Japanese ... was not that easy to do before the internet ... .

@@BobSmith-dk8nw The Japanese during and after the war were notorious for not reporting bad news.

@@JLWestaz Yes. You're are absolutely right about that. .

They had time to evacuate. The 4 carriers were scuttled, in fact.

AF was the designated Center force target .. MI was the OP name.

南雲, not 長芋.

Hiryu didn't take half an hour to launch her retaliatory strike. The dive bomber attack ended at 1030. Hiryu began to launch her retaliatory strike at 1050 (they were all in the air by 1058). On one page of their work, the authors state that it typically took a minimum of 45 minutes to spot a strike- while on another page, they state that it took half an hour (the latter is historically accurate). Since the authors also state that it took approximately 15 minutes to warm up aircraft engines, it's clear enough that Hiryu's strike was on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began. In fact, both Hiryu and Soryu had the available time to spot their strikes, while Kaga had the available time to bring approximately 20 aircraft to her flight deck and spot a very few. Soryu's executive officer stated postwar that her strike was on flight deck awaiting the order to launch, while Kaga's air officer stated postwar that she had what amounted to approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck. In the case of these three carriers, the time frame between their last landing time of aircraft and the time that they were attacked supports the above.

I doubt that Uncle Joe would have a lot to say about it. Midway is June 4th, Guadalcanal is November 12-15. As you point out, Germans were getting ever closer to Moscow, then in July the Rzhev Meatgrinder started (went on into 1943) and in August the battle of Stalingrad began. Both of those needed steel for tanks and naval construction of BBs was stopped. To add to that, Soviet Navy at the time didn't have a lot of ships bigger than a destroyer, that were not blockaded in Leningrad or Kronshtadt, and those ships were either used for convoy protection, locked in the Black Sea or were on general patrol and harbor defence since USSR wasn't at war with Japan untill 1945. After WW2 USSR wasn't in position to match USA or Britain in surface combat vessels, althoug they got a lot of submarine tech from Germany and after Stalin's death and Khruschev's rise to power, anti-ship missiles were thought to be the weapon for sinking BBs and CVs. Great example of this thinking is P-15 Termit missile and fast attack craft it was to be launched from.

No it impressed him. He thought after Midway the US should invade Europe ASAP to take the pressure off of the Russian front.

The issue with your scenario is that, in order to allow enough room for the CAP fighters to land at 10:10, the entire rear half of the flight deck would have had to be clear. While a couple of fighters preparing to launch could have been accommodated forward during that time (they didn't need much more than half the deck to take off anyway), there's no way that an entire strike package of 30 or so planes could have been parked in that way on the front third or half of the deck.

You have no earthly idea what you're talking about. Airplanes don't magically "appear" on the deck in the right spots. Each plane would have be to pushed, one at a time, from their places in the hangars on to the elevators, and then from the elevators to their spots on the deck. Japanese carriers had three elevators, each of which could carry one plane at a time. This alone would have taken more than 15 minutes to do.

@@Wolfeson28 Why Japanese needed to park all their strike group on flight deck? They could have half of planes on flight deck then let the CAP fighter down, then they lifted rest of strike planes. Parshall's whole theory is based on that Japanese always follow their rules. But the fact is that Japanese used to not following their rules. Before being attacked by US dive bombers, Japanese had broken many safety rules, include piled bombs on hangar decks of their carriers. Why shouldn't they break one more safety rule to arm the bombs of their strike group inside hangar instead of on flight deck to get their strike group fly ASAP? Hiryu launched an attack on Yorktown at 11:00. If Japanese wasn't near ready to launch attack on American fleet when being attacked by US diver bombers, how could Hiryu launch the counterattack just within 30 minutes after the event?

@@jeko32 Nagumo had 4 carriers, which means if the strike group had 96 planes, each carrier would only needed to launch 24 planes, which was the number Hiryu launched to attack Yorktown. Besides, the taking-off fighter which Fuchida saw was probably the CAP fighter which was launched at 10:25 according to Parshall's book. The strike group was behind the CAP fighter and might be planned to launch later, like at 10:30 or 10:40? So Japanese may have more than 15 minutes to life 24 planes by 3 elevator. And if Wolfeson28's theory is true, some planes might have already been lifted and parked on front half of flight deck before 10:10, Japanese only needed to lift rest planes within 15-25 minutes by 3 elevator, it won't be too difficult. I think Fuchida's account is accurate in general. He saw a fighter taking off just before American dive bomber attacked. And his account was backed by Parshall's book----there was a CAP fighter taking off at 10:25. Fuchida probably saw the strike group was parked behind the fighter, so he thought the fighter belonged to the group. Though he was mistaken about the fighter, but it doesn't mean the strike group or at least a part of the the strike group didn't exist on the flight deck at 10:25.

That may possibly be able to be done, but, every aerial photo taken during the attack show only a couple of Cap fighters on the deck of all the Japanese carriers. None had a strike force on deck. The photos do not lie.

Boy does this post take me back to my college days when little nerds who only knew a fraction of what they thought they did would, their brains working feverishly, come up with these convoluted ideas about how everything from Superman to Frodo might have been done differently. The chief flaw in the idea above is that the carriers were faster and so would have just run away - as they did when the Japanese did send surface strike forces to try and catch them. Next - carrying only fighter planes - the Americans could damage the Japanese ships with their bombers but the Japanese could not have damaged any with theirs - because they wouldn't have any. So - it's not a realistic scenario and there is no consideration of it because it's silly. Or ... are you a troll? .

Bob Smith nerds? That would be you? For your info. The Kongo class battleships the IJN has could do 30 knots. The Kaga Carrier 28.5 knots. Do some research first before making a nerd of yourself. And I didn’t say the IJN should only have fighters. I said the majority would have been fighters. Meaning 350 out of the total over 500 planes. So still at least 150 bombers. Try again.

Bob Smith oh and before you come back with another one of your dumb responses let’s put it this way. You are in charge of a force which has the following at your disposal: 11 battleships vs your enemy maybe 0 to 2. 9 available carriers with over 500 planes. Your opponent 2 or 3 carriers at most plus the planes on Midway. And don’t go talking about how the IJN only predicted 2. That’s false. Despite the IJN thinking the sunk the Yorktown at BCS they still predicted they may be facing 3 carriers because the Saratoga was still out there. Cruisers 21 vs 8. Destroyers 63 vs 30 at most. So now. You are in charge of coming up with a battle plan to wipe out the enemy force. Where and how would you align your vessels. Or are you and others too stupid to devise your own battle plan. So it works this way. There have already been others who understand my battle plan and praise it and it’s obviously more solid than what the IJN actually did. On the other side there are bozos like yourself who can’t think outside the box and can’t even imagine or comprehend the force which has the superior number of vessels winning at Midway.

​@@f430ferrari5 Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! Did I say I wasn't one of those nerds? Hornet could do 32.5 knots - all the cruisers and destroyers were faster. Remember - if the Kaga can only do 28.5 knots - your fleet can't go any faster than your slowest ship. And - all those other battleships were not as fast at the Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima and Hiei - because these four were converted Battle Cruisers - and that was why they were escorting the carriers - because they were fast enough to do that. The problem was - that took away from them a lot of their AA protection but most of those other battleships were way to slow - annnnnnnd ... you can't go any faster than your slowest ship. You're doing exactly what I said you were doing. You've stripped the air cover from all the other formations and combined it all together - which the Japanese could have done - but then they'd not be making an amphibious invasion of Midway Island - which is why they were there. They weren't there to over whelm the US Fleet - because - they didn't know it would be there. We had broken THEIR codes - but they hadn't broken ours. That's the reason there was a diversionary attack on Dutch Harbor - to draw the US Fleet away - so they could take Midway - and THEN destroy the US Fleet when it showed up. Of course - you're also assuming you could just swap those attack aircraft for fighters - which would require that the Japanese had all those planes and pilots available and that they had all trained to fly off those carriers with THOSE air groups. The air groups they had had been together for YEARS - just how easy do you think it would be to train all those guys in YOUR new tactics? Japan had the best aviators in the world back then - do you really think they would bust up those teams - just to try some new, unproven tactic? Ever play the board game Midway? As the Japanese player - your ships came in in small groups - but only included the combat ships - so you didn't have to protect any slow transports. The best strategy for the Japanese was to hang back on the edge of the board until all their ships had come in - and then move forward in one big fleet. As such you were unbeatable. But of course - this was playing the game - not real life. Your posts are so amusing to me as they were what we were doing back in 1967 when I played that game. And - for the record - I still am a nerd. I just try not to be as silly a nerd as I was over 50 years ago. If you want - you can get a copy of that game from Amazon for $50-$60. It was a lot of fun. Of course - you've left out a few things ... did you know the Americans had a lot of P-40's on Hawaii and P-38's in Alaska they could have based on Midway? They also could have flown the B-17's out of Hawaii. I've forgotten which other aircraft we drug in but we played a compass and protractor game - where we had two teams and a judge. Each team would plot their moves on velum - then give it to the judge who would then lay the sheets of velum over each other and make the changes on HIS map - then he'd report back to each team what it could see. We used to do that a lot. Ha! Ha! Ha! You should have heard the Japanese team squeal when the P-38's showed up! We were in a different room and we could hear them, "**P-38'S!!!!!!**" Friday nights - after most of us got out of the military and were in college we'd meet at this bar, drink beer and solve all the worlds problems - then when the bar closed we'd go by Denny's and eat breakfast until dawn. We'd sleep all day - then play war Games all Saturday night - then sleep Sunday so we could go back to classes or work on Monday. .

@@f430ferrari5 Oh ... in case you or anyone else is wondering, this is the source we used for finding out about those P-38's permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps48350/aaf_wwii-v1-2.pdf not having the internet back in the '70's when we were playing those compass and protractor games - we actually had to go to our college library but they had the book on the shelf. This is from Volume 1 of the Army Air Force History of WWII libguides.rowan.edu/c.php?g=305296&p=2036186 Which is not to be confused with the United States Strategic Bombing Survey en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Bombing_Survey Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! All just a google away! Boy what I wouldn't have given for that in the mid-'70's!!!!!! Yeah ... I sound like these old people ... "Young Whipper Snappers! When I was a boy I had to walk TEN MILES to school each day - through snow drifts TEN FEET DEEP!! And UP HILL!! BOTH WAYS!!!!!!" Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha! .

because people talk about that all the time.

The Japanese could not have destroyed the fuel reserves, as much of it was stored underground and hidden, like the tanks under some baseball diamonds, or the Red Hill facility, which was operational if not complete, buried under 100 feet of volcanic rock. Also, as shown in Alan Zimm's "Attack on Pearl Harbor", oil tanks are remarkably hard to set ablaze. Yes, bombs could open holes in them, but they were built with leaks in mind, surrounded by berms designed to keep floods of oil from spreading very far. That way, oil lost could actually be reclaimed. Make no mistake: even if the tank farms were destroyed, they would be repaired and operational again in a fairly short amount of time. It's not like fuel tanks are all that complex, after all, and the US Navy would send a continuous flood of tankers to Hawaii to resupply. Sorry, the "Mistake" really pretty much wasn't.

With their warrior attitude, the Japanese were obsessed with attacking the kind of military targets that could "fight back". Their submarines prioritized attacks on warships (with some success) but were not used to attack merchant shipping. So at Pearl Harbor the Japanese were after the warships and the military aircraft. The goal was to destroy U.S. offensive capabilities for six months so the Japanese could accomplish their goals. In this they seem to have been successful. Only Fuchida (in hindsight?) seems to even think about the "failure" to attack the tank farms and the naval facilities.

WashuHakubi4 warrior attitude to not attack non-military targets did not prevent them from sinking hospital ships

"... did not prevent them from sinking hospital ships." The Japanese sank one hospital ship in WW2, the Australian CENTAUR, on May 14, 1943. I wouldn't go so far as to say the Japanese were avoiding them, but it's incorrect to say that they sank multiple hospital vessels.

I think you are talking from the 30,000 ft view. This is very specific to one battle .

@@stanw909 Not casting shade on this author's account of this battle. Just wishing more attention was paid to how the Japanese conducted themselves from 1939 to 1945.

Cherry picking much John Burns. To claim Montgomery, the genius behind Operation Market Garden, halted the germans is demeaning to the truly valiant efforts of the US 99th Infantry Division. They were the difference makers, and no manner of revisionist history will change that story. Their kill ratio was by far the best of all units deployed or engaged. This was primarily an American engagement with minor British personnel involved. 30 to 40 american soldiers for every 1 british combatant. Montgomery's dithering allowed large numbers of Germans to escape the vise between his and Patton's forces..Now Montgomery did take the credit, was his wont to do, but it created a chasm in the command structure that probably has not healed to this day.

@@miltthomas7057 Market Garden was a _concept_ by Montgomery, which Eisenhower agreed with but under-resourced. The planning was by mainly Americans, Brereton and Williams. Despite their incompetence in planning, the operation failed by a whisker. *The failure point was the US 82nd failing to seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately.* Total incompetence. If they had, the operation would have been a success. Montgomery did not _plan_ Market Garden or was involved in its _execution._ As it was under resourced he stood back from it. At the German Bulge attack the US high command was shambolic for sure. Bradley ran away from his HQ while Eisenhower locked himself up in Paris. Monty had to take control of *two* out of control US armies. These armies were depleted due to the German armies attrition. Monty filled their depleted ranks with British troops under US command with the armies under British command. Very wise. Monty's armies stopped the German advance pushing them back to their start line. The US suffered nearly *100,000* casualties in the Bulge. Appalling figures. Monty never allowed the Germans to move across the vital Meus river. The US command was amateurish. Only a few years previously most had only been colonels, including Eisenhower. Monty had more experience as a general than all of them combined - literally. He performed the fasted and longer advance in one single move in WW2 from El Alemien to Tunisia, where he took more Axis prisoners than at Stalingrad. He not once suffered a reverse. Not once. *Genral Hasso von Manteuffel on the Bulge:* _‘The operations of the American First Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’._

@@miltthomas7057 Patton was an average US general, like Simpson, Patch, Hodges, etc. No more. _"The Allied armies closing the pocket now needed to liaise, those held back giving way to any Allied force that could get ahead, regardless of boundaries - provided the situation was clear. On August 16, realising that his forces were not able to get forward quickly, General Crerar attempted to do this, writing a personal letter to Patton in an attempt to establish some effective contact between their two headquarters and sort out the question of Army boundaries, only to get a very dusty and unhelpful answer. Crerar sent an officer, Major A. M. Irving, and some signal equipment to Patton’s HQ, asking for details of Patton’s intentions intentions and inviting Patton to send an American liaison officer to the Canadian First Army HQ for the same purpose._ _Irving located but could not find Patton; he did, however, reach the First Army HQ and delivered Crerar’s letter which was duly relayed to Third Army HQ. Patton’s response is encapsulated in the message sent back by Irving to Canadian First Army; ‘Direct liaison not permitted. Liaison on Army Group level only except corps artillery. Awaiting arrival signal equipment before returning.’ Irving returned to Crerar’s HQ on August 20, with nothing achieved and while such uncooperative attitudes prevailed at the front line, it is hardly surprising that the moves of the Allied armies on Trun and Chambois remained hesitant."_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944 Patton refused to liaise with other allied armies, exasperating a critical situation. _"This advance duly began at 0630hrs on August 18 which, as the Canadian Official History remarks,16 ‘was a day and a half after Montgomery had issued the order for the Canadians to close the gap at Trun, and four and a half days after Patton had been stopped at the Third Army boundary’. During that time, says the Canadian History, the Canadians had been ‘fighting down from the north with painful slowness’ and the Germans had been making their way east through the Falaise gap. They were not, however, unimpeded; the tactical air forces and Allied artillery were already taking a fearful toll of the German columns on the roads heading east past Falaise._ _Patton’s corps duly surged away to the east, heading for Dreux, Chartres and Orléans respectively. None of these places lay in the path of the German retreat from Normandy: only Dreux is close to the Seine, Chartres is on the Beauce plain, south-east of Paris, and Orléans is on the river Loire. It appears that Patton had given up any attempt to head off the German retreat to the Seine and gone off across territory empty of enemy, gaining ground rapidly and capturing a quantity of newspaper headlines. This would be another whirlwind Patton advance - against negligible opposition - but while Patton disappeared towards the east the Canadians were still heavily engaged in the new battle for Falaise - Operation Tractable - which had begun on August 14 and was making good progress."_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944 Instead of moving east to cut retreating Germans at the Seine, Patton ran off to Paris. John Ellis in _Brute Force_ described Patton's dash across northern France as well as his earlier _“much overrated”_ pursuit through Sicily as more of _“a triumphal procession than an actual military offensive.”_ *Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months.* The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed there with green German troops. The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept attempting to plug the gaps while the proper panzer divisions were re-fitting and rebuilt after the summer 1944 battles. The Panzer Brigades had green crews with little time to train, did not know their tanks properly, had no recon elements and didn't even meet their unit commander until his arrival at the front. These were not elite forces. 17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. It was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, equipped only with assault guns not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy and not up to strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine. Patton's Third Army was almost always where the best German divisions in the west were *NOT.* ♦ Who did the 3rd Army engage? ♦ Who did the 3rd Army defeat? ♦ Patton never once faced a full strength Waffen SS panzer division nor a Tiger battalion. In The Lorraine, the 3rd Army faced a rabble. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took command in September 1944 said: _"I have never been in command of_ _such irregularly assembled and_ _ill-equipped troops. The fact that_ _we have been able to straighten_ _out the situation again…can only_ _be attributed to_ *_the bad and_* *_hesitating command of the_* *_Americans."_* Patton was mostly facing a second rate rabble in The Lorraine. Patton was neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes. The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne saw few German forces, with Bastogne being on the very southern German flank, their focus was west. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage _some_ German armour but not a great deal at all. Patton's ride to Bastogne was mainly through US held territory. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was not one of the best German armoured units with about 80 tanks, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had about 12 Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1. Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back. On the night of the 22 December 1944, Patton ordered Combat Command B of 4th Armored Division to advance through the village of Chaumont in the night. A small number of German troops with anti tank weapons opened up with the American attack stopping and pulling back. The next day fighter bombers strafed the village of Chaumont weakening the defenders enabling the attack to resume the next afternoon. However, a German counter attack north of Chaumont knocked out 12 Shermans with Combat Command B retreating once again. It took Patton almost *THREE DAYS* just to get through the village of Chaumont. Patton's forces arrived at Chaumont late on the 22nd December. They didn't get through Chaumont village until Christmas Day, the 25th! Hardly racing at breakneck speed. Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual _'attack'_ towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. His start line for the attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, just 15km southwest of Bastogne and yet he still took him five days to get through to Bastogne. In Normandy in 1944, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. *Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British.* Once again, Patton faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact. This eastern dash devoid of German forces was the ride the US media claimed Patton was some sort master of fast moving armour. Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates. ♦ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics Bradley's II Corps were employing ♦ He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division, Truscott of being _"afraid to fight"._ ♦ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps. ♦ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize stalled he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being _"very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect"._ ♦ He called the 17th Airborne Division _"hysterical"_ in reporting their losses. After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive ground attack plane support and he still *stalled.* Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his *stall.* Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated. Oh, and wore cowboy guns. Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his orders, and Eisenhowers orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself. Read: _Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory_ by Michael Reynolds and _Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies_ by Harry Yeide

@@miltthomas7057 Only for Monty pulling back the US 99th Infantry Division, then regrouping them, they would have been no more.

@John Burns: We do tend to identify with our nations' generals, but your reverence for Monty seems a bit over the top to me. I agree that Patton was no demi-god of war, but he did have his strengths. His aggressive personality suited him well in many battles. Monty, on the other hand, I regard as a mediocre general who consistently had difficulty getting along with other nations' generals, as well as their staff officers.

Are you one of those 50 cent Trolls the CCP employ?

More 50 cent CCP trolls?; just asking

WHY NOT ???????The audience you apparently wish to engage in this discussion, is N O T interested,

+multitoolish You think a historian presenting a lecture on a topic within his field of expertise is a poor use of time?

+Nicholas Nystrom Only a fool would think that...some clown who spends their life texting some other clown...

Those who ignore history are doomed to waste their lives playing "Angry Birds" on their smartphones.

Oh ... I thought he was talking about all of us in the comments section ... .

I am an idiot? what about you? you blindly believe anything our gov. tells you. The u.s. navy REFUSES to credit the Japanese with anything.How did the u.s. navy "find" the plane, bomb, take off data for these carriers at Midway?The sinking of the IJN Kirishima is a great example- the senior battle damage control officer of the Kirishima WROTE a book. The U.S. navy IGNORES it. Who knows more? He was on the ship when it got shot to pieces by the uss washington.. You mr genius will believe the u.s. navy- if I am an idiot u r an a fucking idiot.

here is the battle damage report for the Kirishima www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

+skysky7250 stewart Answer to above posed question: Victors over an inhumane, brutal and jingoistic Japanese Empire

+Mark Link you miss my point. I am not defending Japan's conduct in ww 2. We the people are only to know what the u.s gov. historians want us to know. 75? yrs. later we still refuse to use any evidence from our former enemies today we discredit ijn officer Fuccida's account. where did we get the carrier records from? why did Fuccida not have these in 1953? why do we refuse to invite Japanese historians to present their comments?the u.s.s grunion is another blatant example of u.s gov. officials/ historians ignoring other evidence. the captain of the ship the grunion was trying to sink survived the war and wrote a book detailing the attack- we ignore it.

American Dive Bombers did not sink any of those Japanese Fleet Carriers at Midway. The sinking of those ships were carried out by Japanese Naval Warships, by torpedo, as they were determined to be beyond salvage. That is well known fact and beyond any dispute. The Ship's logs were transferred to escort ships. Fuchida was suffering from appendicitis and was restricted below decks. He saw nothing but a way of making money from his name. More truth will be exposed. Yes your Government lies to you. I am not disagreeing with that...at all. But at times they haven't a clue so they just create a narrative to give the illusion of omniscience. It is not always nefarious.