Tackling the 5 Most Common Counter-Arguments to my Dunkirk Halt Order Hypothesis 

On point 4, the reason I seem a bit reluctant to commit to the idea that Stalin thought that Hitler wouldn’t risk a war on two fronts is because this was one of the things I was challenged on in the previous video. Some viewers didn’t think Stalin thought this, even though I presented a direct quote about it in the previous video... So it looks like I’m going to have to do a video on what Stalin’s pre-Barbarossa thoughts were and how he was shocked by the invasion, just to solidify what actually happened, because if Stalin wasn’t shocked by Barbarossa (as some claim) or if Stalin didn’t fall for the two front war thing (as some claim) then this entire theory can be thrown out, as can most of the current history books that talk about Barbarossa or Stalin. If anyone has any source recommendations specific to Stalin being shocked or not, or about the two front war idea, let me know below so I can compare and contrast the various theories. Thanks! Also, I didn’t include the Patreon list in this video because it would have been longer than the video (I’m only half joking...) but it will be back in on Monday’s Stalingrad video.

I sincerely don't think that Hitler would want the war with the British Empire to continue merely as a ruse to fool Stalin: A) Did Germany not consider Soviet forces to be woefully incompetent, ready to fold as soon as they were confronted by any real challenge? The Winter War had already occurred by Dunkirk, so why would Hitler believe it was worth it to devote the massive industrial resources and manpower needed to fight Britain, all just so he could catch the USSR by surprise? B) Adam Tooze in The Wages of Destruction (I've seen it on your bookshelf) puts forth the idea that Germany invaded the USSR in 1941 because they believed they could win in a short amount of time and they believed that the resources and security provided by an occupied USSR would be necessary to defeat Britain (and their inevitable allies in America) in the oncoming air war. To combat the British blockade which had so crippled them in the last war they needed a supply of food, and to wage an air war they needed fuel, both of which Stalin demonstrated the USSR could provide by sending significant supplies to Germany. I feel this entire theory is based on a modern outlook of World War 2, and in particular the power of the USSR vs Britain, rather than looking at the actual perceptions of the time. Fear of massively destructive bomber raids were one of the primary concerns in the 1930's. The Soviet Union was not considered militarily the equal of Germany (Winter War aside, the Russian capitulation in the Great War had imprinted on Germans the notion that Russia was a paper tiger) and fear of another blockade by the Royal Navy, followed by another period of mass starvation, was not something the average German (let alone the general staff & political leadership, who knew of Germany's shortages in the many resources needed to wage and sustain a war) would brush aside merely as a mild inconvenience necessary to distract a nation that by all accounts was moribund. I appreciate the time and thought you put into your videos, and in particular your refusal to be constrained by established narratives. I look forward to your next video.

Interesting that Hitler said that after taking Soviet lands, Germany would need to import only coffee. In the late 70s, East Germany found itself in a "coffee crisis" after the Brazilian coffee crop failed, raising world prices. East Germany spent huge portions of its scarce hard currency on coffee, and eventually made a gigantic deal with (fellow Communist state and Soviet client) Vietnam to start huge coffee plantations - with East German funded equipment, even a power plant, homes and hospitals for the workers. But coffee takes many years to grow and bear fruit, so by the time it was ready, the East German regime collapsed. Still, Germany is still the top market for Vietnamese coffee to this day.

I agree with your analysis of Stalin and his thoughtprocess. However, while your Dunkirk theory is worth considering and has merit, I don't think your evidence proves the theory conclusively. Simply, we don't have enough sources for this. For me, the military concerns are still more likely, since the explanation is simpler and less complicated. Let's not forget Hitler is directing a war and Dunkirk is an unforseen circumstance, so has to be inprovised. So I would use Orkhams razor to point to military matters, but your theory definitely has good points and deserves attention and research.

I've always thought that Hitlers halt order made perfectly sound military sense. At that point his forces have only conquered the northern-most portion of France and still hadn't properly secured it. He spent 4 years slogging away in France and Belgium in WW1 and he would have been aware of the similarities between the astounding achievements of this new Plan Yellow and the initial deep penetrations of the Schleiffen plan of 1914 which rapidly became mired down in fruitless static warfare when the invading German forces lost their forward momentum. He simply must have looked at the map of France and surveyed the distances involved with extreme trepidation. One of his absolute prime concerns MUST have been the conservation and rebuilding of his mechanised forces that had seen intensive operations since March 38 and he must have been extremely loathe to butt his tanks up against a built up area surrounded by low lying fen land against an enemy with very effective anti tank weapons and whose air force is safely amassed in strength only a few minutes flying time away across the channel. I think that in actuality the question is rather moot, the facts are that he did indeed halt his tanks and did indeed go on to defeat France in a very short space of time after Dunkirk and other evacuations. The point is though that he could not possibly have known that when he issued the halt order.

This must be true because even in the great documentary "Hearts of Iron 3" the Soviets were hardcoded to attack Germany if they set foot in the UK.

I'm glad that two of my counterarguments ended up in the Top 5, but since there will be a follow up, let me reiterate those you didn't address yet. 1. Military argument. Encircled army is still dangerous, possibly more so, since they can't fall back, but only as long as they didn't run out of supplies. You reduce the pockets of resistance with patience, that's the cheapest way. 2. Gambling argument. You don't make risky moves if you are obviously winning already. An all out assault was risky. The Germans could be pushed back and suffer unnecessary losses. It just was not necessary in order to win. And overall, I remain unconvinced, obviously. While your theory may not be too complicated to work, it's still more complicated than the alternative. The alternative is, that the Germans tried to avoid unnecessary losses and simply made a mistake. Not a huge one! It wasn't a big mistake. British army was soundly defeated, whether they evacuated some soldiers or not. As long as the Germans followed up with an invasion *quickly* , they could still occupy Britain. So that's what they tried to do with the Battle of Britain. And yet again they overestimated the capabilities of Luftwaffe. This approach is demonstrably simpler than what you propose. Does it mean that Hitler never considered your line of reasoning? Of course not, so your theory is still valid and potentially useful in explaining some aspects of WW2.

Last time I was this early, Rommel was still racing for the coast.

You’re a king Tik, so knowledgeable and also such a genuine bloke. You seem like the dude you could just sit around with, drinking a few beers and talking this sort of stuff for hours. Cheers from Australia 🇦🇺

The man is at it again, he's gonna destroy his enemies one by one, true badass

There's a bit of a contradiction at the heart of your argument is there not? On one hand you argue that Hilter was so worried about Soviet preparedness ruining Barbarosa that he turned down a war ending blow on his one still standing enemy and settled instead for two fronts. On the other he could spare resources as felt Barbarosa was a pushover which would be over in a matter of months. So your conjecture would have it that Hitler deliberately turned down a fatal blow to an enemy he couldn't realistically mount a successful naval invasion against in order to assist with a battle he was supremely confident about. He didn't finish the pinned eagle in order to surprise the cornered cockerel. Not exactly the cunning of a fox. What say you sir?

"In April '41, Hitler assembled all the commanders in France. And during two hours, he talked to us about the part two of the Battle of Britain. And ... he told us later - two of us, namely my friend Molders and myself - that it has only been in order to camouflage the offensive against Russia. This has been in April, '41. And the raid on 10 May can only be considered as a camouflage of the ... beginning of the Russian campaign." This theory reminded me of a statement made in episode 4, "Alone", of the old BBC series "The World at War" by Adolf Galland, who was a wing commander in the Luftwaffe in 1941, and who fought during the Battle of Britain. I found a video copy of this, and about two minutes before the end of this episode, Galland describes a conversation with Hitler. I have transcribed the closed-captioning of this part of this episode above.

I like your theory. There were still trains coming from the USSR into Germany carrying crude oil the day before Barbarossa. I initially viewed the Halt Order as a power move and sowed the seeds of the rift between Hitler and his generals.

Off-topic: TIK, have you ever been diagnosed with Myasthenia gravis? I have a mild case of it myself and it causes my right eyelid to droop similar to yours. I am not trying to make you self-conscious, but to help you in case it has not yet been diagnosed. It's worth discussing with your doctor, if you have not already.

For argument 1, 2 and 5 (and to some extent 3), I find you can answer it just by saying "Hitler only wanted to delay the British's defeat, but still wanted to defeat them". So all the efforts gone that way aren't actually wasted

I mean if Hitler really thought the Soviet Union was weak enough to be beaten in 8-12 weeks then it wouldn’t make much sense that he would want to continue the war with Britain to aid such an easy campaign. Also it’s not too complicated a theory, it’s just far more complicated than the panzers stopping for genuine tactical reasons and this being a genuine mistake with the benefit of hindsight.

There's a lot of misuse everywhere, even among trained scientists, of the words 'theory' and 'hypothesis'. You have a great 'hypothesis' which you are defending vigorously. If it survives every attack and is adopted everywhere because it's bulletproof and predicts everything cleanly and effortlessly, it's become a 'theory'. The title ought to read, '..................to my Dunkirk Halt Order Hypothesis." I"m only saying this because I appreciate your content and thinking. In fact, I have a hypothesis that the political spectrum from Far Left to Far Right is an exact parallel to the development of emotional maturity. It feeds directly into your own 'Hitler was a Leftist' hypothesis from before. Let me know if you want to discuss.

Honestly, i doubt the german not pushing into dunkerque had anything to do with barbarossa and more to do with OKH not knowing what to do when their push to the sea was succesful, they had no means to know the extent to which the allies were on the verge of collapse, meaning that OKH would be expecting the allies to either have reserves (as they did in the previous war) or that an assault to entrap the mobile arm of the germany army was being planned (after all, the french 7th and 10th armies were launching counterattacks to push the bridgeheads the germans had made over the somme) That and it took some 160k men to keep the lille pocket contained, we speak of the dunkerque pocket as if the germans only needed to walk over the city and voilà but there were some 400k allied soldiers in the dunkerque pocket, planning the destructiin of said pocket would have taken troops away from the main frontline, leaving the germans open for a potential counterattack ( i say potential because we, with our insight , can conclude that it wouldn't be possible, but with the intel available to okh, it seemed possible) Ps : sorry for typos, was done on phone.

Your main counter-counter argument against #2 and #3 was that Hitler basically thought the USSR would be a pushover (Barbarossa will take 3 months tops) so saving his top pilots, fuel, and removing the blockade would not help in the campaign very much. My counter-counter-counter argument is: However, if Hitler believed Barbarossa was going to be a cakewalk, why then would he create such an elaborate scheme in order to catch the USSR off guard? If Hitler believed the USSR to be a weak state, surely he would prioritize knocking out the United Kingdom (a strong state) out of the war. Especially before it got its other allies in (like the USA). Your point about Hitler believing in Autarky (and shrinking markets) and therefore not wanting to trade is a good point about why he does not care much about the blockade. Great video. I am glad you are debating this issue.

Glad my argument about the French Army didn't make the list! :D

Anything that provokes debate is great history. We get better answers when we address the tough questions.

Remember that the germans dropped leaflets to the encircled divisions in Dunkirk telling them to surrender

Great work.Now you HAVE to make a video about rudolf hess and his flight. History tells us that he tried to land the plane, but didn't find any airstrip. So before the gas run out, he parachuted himself from an almost mortal situation and whithout proper expirience or equipment , to land safely on the ground and being camptured by a scotish farmer. Now what if he actually landed on an airstrip as planed and was met by MI6 agents and his mission was sanctioned by Big H himself as some sort of sleeper Agent/Ambassador to negotiate not with britain but instead with the royals? He had friends among English Nobles, made during the Weimarer years as the party was small and in need of finantiation...

Kickass analysis for 5 most brought up arguements

My main problem with this theory is in this contradiction: if Hitler believed that Soviet Union is a pushover, why bother with this "we're still fighting Britain" thing?

Now I can't help but imagine a young diplomat rushing into an office to tell Hitler, "Mein Fuhrer, the English are threatening us with peace!"

I really love this channel. It really makes you think and analyze what you thought you knew. Also the comment section is an eye opener too. I sometimes wonder if some commenters actually watched the video.

On Point 5, I believe that's also where the tactical considerations come back into play: Strategically, it makes sense for the British Army to be crippled, but doing so with ground forces in an urban area would be more resource intensive than trying to bombard the British from the air and the sea. The Battle of Britain seems to me to be a further point where this line of thinking becomes clear. After the first few days, the successful raids and bombing runs against British airfields are stopped, and instead London is made a priority target, for the supposed effect this would have on the populations "morale". Viewed from the perspective of trying to cripple Britian but just about keeping them teetering on the edge of surrender, that decision becomes clearer too. What shouldn't be forgotten, is that the British evacuation was far more successful than even the British command calculated, and the Army that was defeated in France took several years to be ready to be deployed again. With hindsight, it might not seem like a good idea to keep from destroying the Army completely, but if the original prognoses of Operation Dynamo were correct, then the damage to the Army would have been far greater than it turned out to be. Secondly, even with the Army escaping, it took years for them to be effective in the field again. The EIghth Army in Northern Africa was not part of the fighting in France, and would have been at their strength as before.

This theory is fascinating. I'm not fully convinced, but I love the originality of it and how it fits so well into the broader scope of the war and the strategic outlooks of the leaders involved. I think it's far more logical than any other reasoning for the halt order I've heard besides the purely operational considerations of an unexpectedly rapid advance and the fog of war.

Funny thing is Germany peaceing out with the allies and being able to trade (even though he's against trade, autarky etc) would have put Germany in a better position to fight Russia then having the element of surprise in my opinion because it would have certainly helped with the huge resource promblem the Nazis were facing and would have allowed them to first mechanize more of the armed forces and also be able to divert troops and resources from other campaigns they were fighting e.g. atlantic convoy sinking, africa, Atlantic wall

As I see it your argument was Hitler was feigning a distraction for Stallin. But he still had the French for that and even though Britans army was smashed in France I doubt Britan would sue for peace. Considering personal family experience the German soldiers where given methamphetamine.American soldiers would constantly find the empty boxes on the battlefield. This would give the soldier bottom less energy for 72 hrs.but they would crash. They would restrict dosage as not to get psychosis. Your Videos are Great THANK YOU!

TIK, You should make a Battlestorm series on the British campaign in South East Asia. Your videos are blessing to my historical knowledge.

You need an urgent visit to Ikea...

THIS FEEDBACK VIDEO IS AN AWESOME IDEA. I SUSPECTED (CORRECTLY) WHAT YOUR COUNTERARGUMENTS WOULD BE; THEY ALL SEEM VALID TO ME, YET NOT NECESSARILY MOST PROBABLE. YOUR THEORY CERTAINLY MAKES SENSE AND EVEN THOUGH MAYBE NOT THE MOST RATIONAL FROM STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD GO WELL ALONG WITH OTHER IRRATIONAL DECISIONS GERMANS HAVE MADE.

As with most decisions, there are numerous factors that go into the thought process. I believe that several of the discussed reasons, and the constraints of time, at the moment, contributed to what actually happened.

Your theory is interesting. The counter arguments are excellent individually but if they are taken together they are devastating to your theory.

I just have one problem with your Dunkirk theory. Hitler during the whole war had a thought process based on what had gone wrong in Ww1. Based on that fact I have some difficulty in believing that he would leave the British army escape and risk a two-front war when it had gone badly against Germany in WW1

On the too complicated argument: It only becomes too complicated when you try to apply it to Dunkirk. The elaborate balancing act between letting the Brits escape while destroying enough... It just seems more plausible that the Germans just overestimated the Luftwaffe capabilities in the region and underestimated the RAF and the weather, without any grand theories behind it (though those theories are certainly more fun!).

On the point that Hitler believed the Soviets would collapse in week: 1. The Wehrmacht just defeated one of its major enemies from WW1, France, in a matter of weeks. 2. The Soviets couldn't even defeat the Finnish. Hitler had everything pointing towards an easy win in Operation Barbarossa and all he would then have to do is destroy the British Isles. I think your arguement for Dunkirk is spot on.

The "halt order", which only concerned Von Rundsteht's armored spearhead, is used to lie by omission. Like the attacks on the perimeter had stopped. THEY NEVER DID ! The Heer's Chief of Staff war Diary states that Von Rundsteht reported 50% of his tanks had been put out of action. Also, the french had entirely flooded the area around Dunkirk. The city, is ruins, was stubbornly defended. Despite being hammered day and night by artillery and aircraft, the defenders, at 80% french ( 100% during the last 3 days ) held fast. The germans couldn't break through: "Despite our overwhelming superiority in men and hardware numbers, the french troops are counter-attacking in several places. I can't understand how those soldiers, sometimes fighting at one versus ten (or even one versus thirty in some areas), can find enough strength to assault us: this is simply amazing ! " "For several days now, hundreds of bombers and guns are pounding the french defence. But, it's always the same thing: our infantry and panzers can't break through, despite some local and ephemeral successes. Dunkirk brings the proof that the french soldier is one of the best in the world. " "The French artillery, so dreaded already in 14-18, once again demonstrates its formidable effectiveness. Our losses are terrifying: many battalions have lost 60% of their strength, sometimes even more! " "By resisting ten days or more to our much bigger forces, the french army has accomplished, in Dunkirk, a superb achievement that you must pay tribute to. They have certainly saved Great-Britain from the defeat, by allowing the british professional army to reach the british coast." General Georg von Küchler, commander of the XVIIIth army "The french troops never stops counter-attacking. May 21st 1940: that day starts in an extremely tense atmosphere: reports indicates a serious pressure on the northern flank of the IVth army. The VIth army faces a solid front. May 22nd 1940: our tanks, that are currently fighting in the south, have met a powerful enemy. Our panzerdivisionen suffer too many losses and attack without being required to. Stress is growing. May 23rd 1940: the losses for the tanks of our ten panzerdivisionen reach 50% ! The french resistance is fierce." General Franz Halder's diary

i don't know if you have read it but i highly recommend the well researched and based on soviet archival material biography of stalin by stephen kotkin, it's a work of three tomes (third tome not out yet but the second one ends on 22 june of 1941, so it's exactly what you need)

Your theory makes more sense than any other that's been put forward keep up the good work.

Why did Hitler on 19.07.1940 offered peace to Great Britain publicly in the Reichstag if he wanted to mainain Britain in the war?

On the “why waste resources attacking the British in the Battle of Britain and the Atlantic” the other obvious counter argument is: They are still at war with Britain and they have to win that war at some point, ideally (under this theory) soon after Barbarossa. You can’t just ignore the large empire you are at war with.

TIK, you were quite right IMHO in creating a new perspective / discussion on this matter and your explanation held water, it had me riveted as many of your presentations do. It's the best explanation I think we have, either that or an out and out miracle. If the British Army had been crushed to a man, eminently possible at that time . . . . and all, that such an onerous outcome would have entailed, it becomes doubtful we could have withstood a full invasion; morale may well have been the determining factor in all of that. As it was the absolute belief in the mythological, but nonetheless ubiquitous acceptance of the "Dunkirk Spirit" and the possible hand of God. The "miracle" of Dunkirk re-energised the populace and all the Armed Services. "We lived to fight another day.".

Well done ..... details need work but as a overall idea it fits the historical record and cleans up many inconsistencies

Another great video and thanks for addressing my view regarding resources. It is my understanding that, at one time, Hitler promised to "give back France" in exchange for peace with Britain as Germany never intended to invade the West in the first place. I read this sometime in the past and cannot quote the source unfortunately. Can you verify?

Found this while I was looking for Nigel’s article. Reddit poster didn’t even give time to have his argument destroyed. Keep going, you’ve got myself and nearly 150k people listening to you. Here is what I found: “I was casually browsing through RU-vid this morning when I noticed a new video from TIK. Only occasionally do I watch his videos. This latest addition grabbed my attention, though: It was a response to Nigel Askey. As most of you might remember, TIK was the subject of an article that Nigel wrote 2 years ago. TIK had made numerous claims about the war on the Eastern front that were refuted by Nigel. I was not expecting the RU-vidr to make a response so long after the fact, especially after he had been soundly beaten. I clicked on TIKs latest video, and watched for about 10 minutes before shutting it off. I was disappointed at the low quality of TIKs work, and the dishonest tactics he used. He made heavy use of mockery and ridicule to undermine Askeys points, an approach that is common on SWS (ShitWehraboosSay). I have neither the time or the inclination to watch the video in its entirety, especially after such a weak introduction. However, I did send an E-mail to Nigel Askey to alert him about this development. I don't think he will be impressed by TIKs video, or his arguments. This episode could end up going in a interesting direction if Nigel decides to respond again.”

8:38 this is how Stalin actually behaves when becoming suspicious.

To my mind, everybody keeps missing the elephant in the room... Yes, there were political considerations involved in the decision for the "Halt" order. But I believe the main reason is this: After 2 weeks of high-intensity/rapid-mobility warfare, the panzertruppen were utterly dead on their feet -- EXHAUSTED, both physically and materially. Tanks were breaking down, ammunition supply & other logistical needs were inadequate (the logistics system was strained to the max -- something the OKW & OKH should have remembered before hurling the Wehrmacht into the less-developed USSR) -- but most importantly, the panzer crews were at the end of their physical endurance. They desperately -- urgently -- needed some rest. Most of them had been on the move, in combat, for a fortnight with no more than an hour of sleep per day. Imagine fighting & advancing virtually non-stop for 2 weeks, hopped up on Pervatin (uppers) with only an hour of sleep a day. Also: TIK should check out Robert Forczyk's "We March Against England: Operation Sea Lion 1940-41" (Osprey Books, 2018). Forczyk lays out highly persuasive evidence that Sea Lion was no bluff -- Hitler was serious. Way too much planning (military & political, at all levels) and treasure expended (in the construction of special ferries, boats, etc.), for the operation to have been a bluff.

It is a brilliant theory and it makes tons of sense.

One thing I've always been intrigued by was Operation Sealion , how badly planned and resourced it seemed to be . Your theory also helps to explain this.

I think your argument makes more sense than any other. If that is the case it worked. Stalin actually thought Hitler wouldn't start a 2 front war and was shocked when Hitler invaded.

Brilliant responses👍

Great hypothesis and great follow-up debate. My main counter points that would need dealing with: 1. If Hitler believes the Soviet Union will be such as pushover (he states this in 1941 before Barbarossa. Does he also believe this in 1940?) then why go to all the trouble of achieving surprise? It's of course quite possible they will only be a pushover if strategic surprise is achieved, but this point needs to be hammered home more. 2. Is Hitler and his ilk even capable of this type of long-term planning? They might be - they did do some political maneuvering to outfox other right-wing politicians back in his early days. But a lot of his command seem to be very based on spur-of-the-moment thinking and acting, rather than long-term planning. Since this would need more than just Hitlers spurious temperament to fulfill, I would expect a 1-year+ long ruse like this to leave more of a paper trail in diaries, minutes from meetings, orders given to OKW etc. Perhaps Military History Visualized can help you look in the primary sources for hints pro/con this hypothesis?

Milton Schulman interviewed Rundsteadt in 45/46 while he was an allied prisoner. The highlights in his classic book "Defeat in the West" talk about the tank loss figures that were being monitored by Berlin (Hitler). These figures report operational tanks - non-operational might be under repair OR total losses. Hitler misread the data and assumed total losses - this led to the HALT order - as Hitler was concerned about the tank losses. This makes sense - and comes from the Army Group Commander immediately post war.

I’m under the impression a lot of people who tries to counter-argue or criticise TIK either don’t watch his content or watches his content but not fully because certain things they say are already covered in the videos.

@tik Other than Hess's flight to Scotland. Was there any other diplomatic contact between the uk and Germany during the war? I assume their must have been some. Perhaps through a neutral government. However I've never found anything on it.

I am not sure this holds up under an extended analysis. It makes the supposition that everything between June 40 and June 41 was part of an extended ruse to catch the Soviets (which you said Hitler thinks would be an easy target) unawares. Not only would Hitler have to put on the Battle of Britain show, but run all around Europe collecting barges for Operation Sea Lion. It also requires Hitler to believe that a simple loss of a larger portion of the BEF would trigger a win condition. It's a plausible belief, but it is not like such a loss would drop the Germany into Kent. The Royal Navy was always the UK's ace in the hole with the army being almost an afterthought. I believe there are plenty of simpler and equally convincing facts about the tactical situation. His army was strung out after a rapid advance and 300k British soldiers with their backs against the sea may have proven a tough nut to crack, wasting resources and causing longer delays down the line that might give France time to stabilize its own situation. Second, against the sea the BEF could have been able to call upon the support of the Royal Navy with naval gunfire, again, damaging the depleted mobile elements of the German army. Third, its entirely reasonable to believe that Hitler could have simply under estimated the British ability to evacuate that many people in such a short amount of time. Hitler wasn't really a navy guy and not been aware what the British were capable of. Between a cornered enemy, a strung out army and a belief that he had time, it would be entirely logical to pause, consolidate and send in a coordinated attack, possibly with the support of heavy artillery and aircraft that could keep the Royal Navy away.

This BLONDEST program has added so much VALUE to my life... it cannot be understated... I have been watching EVERYTHING you have been showing me. And that is a PROJECTION of your values and goals. So. I know you BLONDEST. I have a CLUE what you are about after many years. I HAVE TO SAY THAT THIS PROGRAM - YOUR PROGRAM - HAS INTEGRITY AND LOTS OF VALUES TO MY LIFE AS AN ORPHAN WHO DOESN'T KNOW SHIT AND SHIT IN THIS WORLD... DONT EVEN KNOW WHETHER I AM BEING ABUSED OR TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF ... MY MAMA BEAR ALPHA KNOWS THE BEST IN AMERICA AND IN THE FUTURE WITH OUR FRIENDS IN OUR CURRENT RELATIONSHIP TOGETHER WITH EACH OTHER IN AMERICA.

Would you ever consider releasing just the audio of your video.. Podcast sort of thing.. Love the in depth content. All the best

There’s a further fact to number 3 which is that the Germans were restricted in trade anyway. The US was restricting their trade with Latin America already and the British would probably be reluctant to trade with their recently victorious enemy. So for example to purchase oil he would need to do so from either the USSR, the USA, Venezuela (which was under significant pressure from the US not to trade with Germany or the British Empire. Furthermore the Reichsmark was heavily inflated making it a poor currency further complicating trade

Hey TIK love your work and how extensive it is. Wondering what your thoughts and opinions on The King of England advocated the throne and this is related to him having a close companionship with the Nazis and Hilter himself, then becoming the General of the British Army in France when she fell to Germany. 🤔🤔🤔

On point one- The question is why advanced U-boat designs were being worked on early in the war. Someone with support from the top was working on improving the U-boat threat, and not just going thru the motions. Need to look closer at if these initiatives were actually supported and approved by Hitler to see if it supports your scenario.

I couldn't even think of such deep and consistent explanations. Why again aren't you a professor with tenure? Thx for your vids!

I think that here there are 2 different points that are very connected: 1) Hitler wanted to stay at war with britain 2) he let the troops flee dunkirk because of that The first point is very supported by everything tik exposes in the video, the second one is an interesting possibility, but I have a few questions about it. 1) Was the british army in dunkirk such a significant portion of the total british army, that its destruction would precipitate a british surrender? as far as I know, hitler publically never wanted war with Britain and France, so, it would have been fishy that hitler wouldn't accept a peace offer where britain just let him keep all his gains 2) was this army significant enough, that its destruction would put britain at immediate risk of being invaded? again, britain would likely have offered good peace terms if its ass was on the line on the other hand, a weakened british army would have meant that just preparing an invasion force and bombing now and then would have been a credible enough war action, with less resources being spent. In fact, the best possible outcome would have been to simultaneously sign peace with britain and invade russia. that would have required to bring britain to the brink of collapse on the eve of barbarossa. What makes this whole thing so difficult, is that its a theory of what hitler thought churchill would do if the british army was destroyed. I'm looking forward to more research on this, it sounds really interesting!

Honestly, the only issue I have with the theory is that it isn't really needed. At the time of the Dunkirk Halt, the German thrust was deep into French territory and the German Panzers had outrun the infantry divisions that they would need to complete the encirclement and destruction of the BEF as well their supply lines. While seen as a blunder by many, it does also make a good deal of sense. Even in more modern wars, like the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, armored forces have been forced to halt in order resupply and allow slower forces to catch up. This same issue would be encountered by the Allies in the 1944 during their liberation of France and the Low Countries.

I still think the theory is solid. It would be interesting to see what other historical evidence can be found or reviewed to bolster or counter the theory.

An observation on hte question of Hitler risking heavy losses during the Battle of Britain - One thing that the Germans had missed in the lead-up to the war was the RAF's Integrated Air Defense System, which vastly increased the effectiveness of the RAF's Fighter Command. The integration of sensors (Chain Home Radar, (Looking outward from the coasts), Ground Observer Corps (Inland, the CH radars weren't much use over land), and HF/DF (tracking own aircraft), the Filter Centers, and the Command and Control network meant that instead of the conditions that prevailed during the Battles of Poland, Norway, and France, where the offensive side held all the advantages, able to attack whenever and wherever they wanted, with the defenders scattered out in small standing patrols or trying to scramble with the enemy overhead, the defenders held the initiative. Note that Chennault set up a similar system for the Flying Tigers, using agents on the ground communicating via radio instead of radar.

I would like to think he was worried about the Royal navy sending battleships to bombard,it would be risky but you can never be sure with the Navy they do some crazy things

TIK, love your videos and this is a very intriguing theory and not one I have ever heard before! It makes a lot of sense. My own gut feeling at the moment is that the halt order was more likely a cock-up rather than a planned strategy. I think that there are some things which are generally not sufficiently appreciated, in my view, about the German advance to the coast in May 1940. The Halt Order of 24 May 1940 was not the only time that the panzers were strangely immobile. I recall that they stopped on the 17th May and the 21st May, losing two whole days of advance (see Chapter 18 of "To Lose a Battle" by Alistair Horne) . Had those two earlier delays not happened, the panzers would probably have reached Dunkirk on 23 May and the BEF would have been lost. Why did these two earlier halts occur? Firstly because elements of the German high command, including Hitler, were consistently nervous about the scale and speed of their success. The dash to the coast was a highly unorthodox, risky thing to do. It could easily have turned into a total disaster. The German high command seems almost unable to believe its own luck and success. Anything that pointed to a credible threat to the long, thin corridor of the German advance, for example the Arras counter-attack, creates a great deal of nerves in the German high command (Rommel bears some responsibility for this as I believe he wildly over exaggerated the strength of British forces in the Arras attack, adding to the nervousness of the German High Command). The second reason for the halts is that, incredibly, the German had not planned what was to happen after the advance reached the coast. Were they to drive south or north? It hadn't been decided and it took a day or two to decide. There may also have been an element of concern at the extreme exhaustion of the troops, many of whom would have been mostly awake for 10 days or more. Once the coast had been reached, and the corridor appeared secure, I suspect that a wave of extreme euphoria and arrogance swept the German High Command and especially Hitler. In two weeks the Germans had accomplished more than in 4 years in WW1. The cream of the French army and the BEF would trapped and the defeat of France assured. It probably never even occurred to the Germans that the British could evacuate over 330,000 soldiers from the pocket. Had such a massive evacuation ever been carried out before in history at such short notice? It probably seemed impossible for the Germans to forecast any other outcome than the total destruction of all trapped Allied forces in the pocket. A couple of days of delay may have seemed entirely unimportant. Other considerations, such as Hitler demonstrating to the High Command that he, Hitler, was in complete control of what the armed forces did, may have seemed much more important.

Great response video! For me, it still hinges somewhat on The Battle of Britain in terms of my erring on your theory. The sticking point for me is the sudden shift by Hitler and Goring from focusing on targeting the RAF and gaining allied air superiority to then deciding to change tactics to bombing British cities and towns instead. It seems to me that the first stages of The Battle of Britain were more than just something of a war to suggest to Stalin that Hitler was at war with Britain. The nature of the combat seems to indicate that the Luftwaffe were indeed trying to gain aerial superiority over Britain either 1) for the intention of invasion or 2) to eliminate the possible threat to German cities from British bombing raids. As mentioned in my comment on your other video, however, it had got me to thinking over Dunkirk and, indeed, the nature of The Battle of Britain. It has made me consider these questions, relating to the Battle of Britain aspect, which may hopefully create some discussion over this theory of Dunkirk. 1a) Is it possible the reason for this tactical shift (Battle of Britain) was because Hitler and Goring believed that the RAF was beaten? Is it possible because the tide of the battle turned, and the Luftwaffe were losing too many fighters to the RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes, which prompted Hitler from daylight dogfights to nighttime Blitz's of British cities? OR, 1b) Could it be that at some point, with regards to your theory with Dunkirk, that Hitler decided to change his tack here, during the Battle of Britain? 2) If the theory of Dunkirk is correct, and Hitler wanted to create an illusion of a war on 2 fronts for Stalin, could the whole of The Battle of Britain simply a war for propaganda purposes? In which case, which side won for propaganda purposes? Germany in convincing Stalin and, indeed, his own citizens e.g. Hess of his war with Britain, or Britain and its willingness to keep fighting? 3) What of the planning for Operation Sea Lion? Was the possibility of invading Britain taken with any seriousness by Hitler and the German Army? What preparations were made for such an invasion? Can a comparison be made between the preparations for Sea Lion to that of Barbarossa, in terms of detail, practicalities, interest, possibilities and intent? If Dunkirk was in aide of making Stalin believe that Hitler was solely focused on Britain, why did the German High Command place so much effort into planning for an invasion? 4) What of the invasion of Norway? Was this to bolster the illusion? Was it tactical? 5) What of Goring's role during The Battle of Britain? When was it he started to lose favour with Hitler? Something I have thought about with regards to your theory, in favour of it, is what would the benefit be of invading Britain in the first place? At the time, Nazi Germany had domination over Europe. They controlled all of the coasts. Did they believe it feasible that an invasion FROM Britain could be possible? Was there more of a threat from Africa, hence Rommel and his campaign? At this stage, the USA was not at war, and nothing seemed to indicate, at that point (1940), that they would join the war anytime soon. Would a D-Day style invasion have been possible from America to Britain/France? Thinking in the same mindset, did the Germans, in 1940 with domination of Europe and the skies, believe that a D-Day style invasion in 1944 would have been possible? This is the first time in a LONG TIME I have thought of something critically like this with regards to history. We never even went this far into critical thinking when I was at school. Thanks for such a great topic for debate!

To No 5: that s right, Stalin would have been too shredded to take it at face value. The not-entire-loss at Dunkirk on the other side actually saved Churchill to have to surrender. People and Parliament would have turned totally pacifist in such a case, i believe. A turn of the table foe Hitler. He may have requested a Mosley government tosupport his Eastern campaign. Could support Franco in exchange for some divisions. Stalin would have nothing arrining in Murmansk, no Spitfires, nor Studebakers, Iran could turn into a point to kick at from Hitler, et cetera.

As far as I know, the decision was a purely tactical one. The chiefs of staff were nervous. Very nervous. Things were going too well, and the panzers were overextended and needing maintenance. They believed that the french army was still a fighting force, they couldn't have imagined how lost they already were. The counter-attack in Arras scared them immensely by showing how overextended the panzers were. Besides, they would never imagine that the campaign was already won and they were expecting a pincer movement from the french army in coordination with the BEF, which was exactly what the allies were trying to do. Things were going well. Let's not ruin it all by being overconfident (the headquarters were full of generals that considered what was being done was a foolish dangerous gamble). And it was a sound military decision. Your theory fails Occam's Razor test.

A little late here, my personal life has been absorbing... I've just now watched your last two videos. You may have something in your hands with this notion. It would make sense if Hitler somehow underestimated Britain and the Soviet Union. Or maybe not, maybe it was not such the case? It depends, I suppose, how a close run thing WWII was, but I cannot, from where I stand judge. At any rate, your idea makes more sense to me than most I've heard so far. Cheers.

i prefer the goering argument. generals had ignored hitler halt orders and continued advancing in northern france. they pinned the brittish down at dunkirk. georging argued that you can't let the generals just win the war their own way. if they do the generals will become too powerful and continue to ignore hitler in the future, maybe even over throw him. let the air force finish off the brits and put the generals in their place.

Hi TIK: I'm getting to this comment absurdly late in the discussion, and I haven't worked thru all 788 comments so I don't know if this has been addressed. But while I watched this vid and the previous Dunkirk-halt vid in real time, it was only recently that I went back and watched your 2018 vid on OIL as the root cause of Axis defeat overall. This gave me quite a whiplash, because of course in that vid you support the exact opposite 'political' theory for the Dunkirk halt, which was that Hitler DID very much want and hope for Britain to peace out, specifically so that the navy blockade would be lifted and the Reich could import oil from the western hemisphere. I know you say here that Hitler didn't believe in trade (except for coffee!), but I would simply refer you to the argument you actually made in 2018. So then I watched these two newer vids again and was a little surprised that you didn't directly address your pivot -- obviously that was 2+ years ago and one's thinking is allowed to evolve, it's just such a clear 180 on the specific interpretation of the Dunkirk halt. I did see that the first (or second?) counterargument you address here is basically a form of your own earlier theory, and I think you wave it away far too readily. Maybe you were just too convincing in your OIL vid. The biggest challenge for the newer (i.e. keep Britain fighting solely to fool Stalin) theory, and I do see lots of people saying this in the comments, is that the further Hitler goes in prosecuting his war with Britain, the harder it gets to see it all as simply a ruse, and NOT a genuine attempt to knock Britain out of the war--in fact, part of a master strategy to keep Britain IN the war at least until summer of '41. Dunkirk halt, ok. But the whole Battle of Britain, and then the Blitz? The Battle of the Atlantic? You're arguing that those were all basically show-pieces, intended solely to preserve the deception for Stalin. But the British certainly took them seriously, and why wouldn't they? The Luftwaffe's July - October attacks on the RAF aircraft and infrastructure looked, acted and smelled exactly like a real campaign to destroy the RAF, and thus guarantee Channel air superiority. Was Hitler's idea to destroy all but, say, one squadron of Spitfires and then find an excuse to leave that one intact? And then the Blitz (whether it was begun intentionally or not) was prosecuted just like a real Strategic Bombing campaign, as these had been theorized by all the major powers since the early 30s. We can disagree about whether these air campaigns cost Germany just "a few" crews and planes, as you say in this video--it was more like a few thousand of each, and certainly a non-trivial proportion of the total Luftwaffe strength. But the more important point is: what if they had succeeded? If the Luftwaffe had in fact destroyed the RAF, and then at least demonstrated their ability to bomb British industrial and population targets with impunity --- and all while the British at least were fully convinced of the reality of Operation Sea Lion, whether Hitler really intended it or not--then how could Hitler be confident that the British would NOT sue for peace, on terms that he would have to accept? Meanwhile it's the 'Happy Time' for U-boats in the Atlantic, and again, this certainly looks, feels and smells like a genuine (and in that period scarily successful) effort to starve Britain of shipped materiel. As others have noted in the comments, to frame all of this as play-fighting is to assume that Hitler was able to precisely calculate how much damage he could do to Britain while still keeping her in the war--which makes him a strategic/tactical /logistical genius--but simultaneously to accept that he was utterly deluded about the combat resources and will of the Soviets, which makes him an idiot. But ok, let's grant that Hitler was a complex combination of strategic clarity in some realms and ideological blindness in others. Then we're back to the other counter-argument raised often in the comments here: if Hitler is so convinced that the USSR is a paper tiger, which will collapse within two months of invasion, why is it even worth the effort (and, yes, the costs to his own war machine) of the war on the British, just to ensure the element of surprise? In your OIL video, you argued (I thought fairly convincingly) that by Dec 1940, Hitler felt that the timelines for Barbarossa--attack in May or June and total victory by October at the latest--was absolutely dictated by the Reich's oil situation as of end-1940. You also argue that Barbarossa planning, from start to finish, never took seriously the prospect that the USSR would have significant (in fact massive) reserve forces well behind their in-position frontier forces. Maybe this was delusion born of desperation by Dec '40, but as you note in this video, there was no such sense of oil-clock-ticking desperation as of Dunkirk, in May, or the start of the air war on Britain. This leaves only the delusion -- ideological certainty of Slavic fighters' inferiority, mistaken assessments of the fragility/stability of the Soviet regime, its popular support, the effects of the Purges, sheer undercounting of Soviet military resources, etc. Whether or not there was a rational basis for any of these assessments is beside the point; the point is there WAS this massive mis-assessment of Soviet capacity. And given this, what difference would it make whether Stalin had a few months' warning of German intentions (beyond what he had anyway, and chose to ignore)? What could the Soviets have actually accomplished, per this assessment, by way of reinforcement and other preparation? As you've argued repeatedly, the whole premise of Barbarossa was that the Germans could essentially annihilate the bulk of the Soviet army near the frontier, triggering a de facto collapse of their fighting ability, if not a formal collapse of the regime as a whole, and thus make it possible for the Wehrmacht to drive 1200 km to the Caucasus oil fields in the next 2 to 3 months, AND secure the oil fields once there, indefinitely, against any counterattack, as well as securing the whole supply chain back to the Reich. This whole scenario absolutely depended on Soviet fragility and strategic collapse. If a few months' extra warning would have been enough for them to significantly reinforce their frontier forces--significantly enough to have a real strategic impact--then Barbarossa would have been doomed even WITH total surprise because of Soviet defense-in-depth, as indeed it proved to be. For a useful contrast, consider Yamamoto's plan for the Pacific war on the US. He was absolutely clear-eyed about present American force size as well as American industrial capacity. He felt he had one chance to destroy the bulk of the US Pacific fleet, at Pearl, and that chance relied on total surprise. Even half a day's warning--a few hours' warning--would have seen the whole US fleet maneuvering in open water, and defended by massive Army Air Force cover, if not also carrier cover. Rather than a one-way slaughter it becomes a pitched battle, with no certainty that the Japanese would prevail at all and certainly not without massive losses to their own aircraft and crews (or even their fleet carriers if the surprise is blown early enough). And even with total surprise, Yamamoto also badly needed our fleet carriers to be anchored at Pearl alongside the battleships, so there would be no chance of a Coral Sea or Midway. And even assuming all that, he STILL famously gave the Japanese Pacific forces just six months to "run wild", and hopefully cause the US to sue for peace; otherwise he felt they were probably screwed. That's what it looks like to have a strategic war plan reliant on surprise. The Barbarossa premise was different in every possible respect. The kind of total surprise that Hitler in fact achieved was a nice-to-have, not a strategic necessity. Had it been a necessity--had German victory been, in his view, so contingent on fortune and deception--then his entire ideology of master race/slave race would have been disproven. As in fact it was...

I think that bookshelf is going to give way soon. Books crammed in, with the shelves bowing under the weight. The biggest concern though is that the sides of the bookshelf appear to be falling in, due to the shelves giving way under the weight. TIK could do a video on it next week. Slow motion video please, for dramatic effect! :)

I don’t know… as an American, we tend to think of Britain as the island. In fact a shipment of tanks sent under lend lease Churchill sent to Egypt and Roosevelt was upset because to Churchill Britain was the Empire. If London fell there were plans to move the government to Canada.

The Battle of Britain was fairly determined though they weren't just token bombing it a little bit to make it look like they were trying. Also Herman Goering fell out of favour with Hitler due to the failure of the Battle of Britain to achieve it's objectives. Operation Sea Lion was a serious proposition at one point as well, they wouldn't have bothered with that had they been trying to keep the UK in the war. Going into Russia was really more a solution to knock Britain out of the war by isolating it from any potential support and so to lift the naval blockade. At the time it was thought Russia would be be easier to take than Britain particularly as there was no naval component involved just a straightforward land war with superior trained men, commanders and better quality materiel. Once the Soviet Union was defeated in around 3 months Britain would then capitulate without the need to invade.

I agree the utmost importance was to keep Stalin thinking Barbarossa will not come that soon but it is also important to keep British pinned down in their island. The B of B was aiming to dry out the British resources so that they have no chance to get back into the continent within say 2 years time so essentially there was still only the Eastern front to face. At that point Hitler might be thinking even if the Soviet was not collapsing in 3 months time, surely there was more than enough time for the Axis to conquer and acquire the resources from Caucasus.

Also I do agree in general about Hitler (at that moment) wanting to keep Britain in the war but I dont think it can be linked entirely to Dunkirk...

So as a lot of people have already pointed out. It seems like somewhat of a contradiction, that HItler was so determined to catch the Soviets off guard that he was willing to spare the British army. But at the same time he thought the Soviets were such a pushover that it didn't matter that he was fighting a two front war. So if he thought the Soviets were a complete pushover, then surely it wouldn't matter if he didn't succeed in catching them off guard? Aftercall, he didn't invade France until 9 months after they declared war on him, but he still handily defeated the French. You'd think surely the benefits of being at peace with Britain during Operation Barbarossa would be far worth the cost of not catching the Soviets' by surprise. These benefits would be: -Not having to waste pilots, aircraft, and fuel during the Battle of Britain. -Not having to spare fighter aircraft to defend Germany from British air raids. -The Kriegsmarine would not be busy with the Battle of the Atlantic so they could dedicate their full strength to Barbarossa. This would mean they could achieve full naval dominance of the Baltic Sea, and during the Siege of Leningrad could call in Naval bombardments. But most of all it would mean they would not have fuel shortages because they would be free to import oil from the Middle East or Venezuela. So their number one concern during Barbarossa, wouldn't be a problem. The Wehrmacht would have all the motor transport they could possibly need, so they would have no problems sealing the rings when they encircled Red Army formations. Their would also be no time limit to defeat the Soviet Union. They could have concentrated on taking Moscow and Leningrad first, then take the Caucasus the following year as this was logistically a lot easier. Of course I'm willing to admit I could be wrong about some things so if you disagree with me feel free to comment.

On point #5, once Britain even starts to think about or offer a peace deal with Germany, that will cause Stalin to understand that the western front is going to die out soon and that he is next in line so we don't need Germany to even reject the great offer for Stalin to understand what is about to happen.

I made my point in a post under Monday's video on this topic. I must say that the idea I expressed (and will briefly express again here) was actually put forth in a much more recent WWII documentary (the name of which I can not remember) about secret British recordings of German POWs made during their captivity during the war. Also as a part of that documentary, there was an active German military officer that was also a historian, and it was he that put forth this reason for what happened at Dunkirk. Paraphrasing, he said, the reason the tanks were stopped before Dunkirk was because of a final showdown between the Wehrmacht leadership and Adolf Hitler. When Hitler chose Erich von Manstein's plan to attack France through the Ardennes, he wanted the tanks to stop at certain points, but the tanks did not stop even once, thus showing Hitler that his military was disobeying his orders. The tanks continued to the coast. At this point Adolf Hitler was livid that his generals were not obeying his ordered and it came down to a final showdown. After Hitler won the showdown, the Wehrmacht never again challenged Hitler by openly disobeying his orders. This whole issue cropped up because of how the Prussian generals in the Wehrmacht thought of themselves. They were the people to plan and wage war. The leader (like in WWI) simply said, there will be war, then the generals decided the best way to proceed. Hitler was against this completely. He wanted to by the one to plan and decide where his armies would deploy. That is why Dunkirk happened. And I believe this completely because it fits even with what the generals said after the war about being ORDERED to stop before Dunkirk. The generals would NEVER say openly or willingly that they were too weak to stand up to Adolf Hitler. Instead, they now had carte blanche to blame Hitler for everything that went wrong. And this is why we have that narrative today that the Wehrmacht were supermen and it was Hitler who is to blame for the loss of the war.

I had a RM Grandfather who was on HMS Hermes when sunk in the Battle of Ceylon. My other Grandfather was a Radio Operator on RAF Liberators and was involved all over. I’m still in the RAF after 30 years mainly due to their influence as a child. That said I wish I'd listened to them more with regards to their war stories now they are gone. It's funny but the older I get the more I find the whole subject fascinating. Last year I went to Berchtesgaden followed by a trip to Auschwitz a few weeks later. I couldn't make any sense of it. Still so much to learn why they did what they did and why so many supposedly normal people turned so bad and evil. ie: SS Schutzstaffel and other Germans. Great videos BTW. My real passion is the US Civil war. If you ever decide to change subjects then you could do no worse than that subject. Quite incredible what happened in the US between 1861-65. Your detailed approach like with WW2 would be a great contribution I'm sure. 👍

I am not sure if this has already been mentioned. While this may be a bit of a reach, i wonder if the original operational limits to the German deployment to North Africa would support TIK's theory? My understanding is that the deployment of the Afrika Corps was originally intended to stop an Italian collapse, not to conquer Egypt. As the deployment took place in the first few months of 1941, before Barbarossa, maintaining a defensive stance in North Africa, would, at least in theory, fit in with TIK's theory, as it would keep the British busy well away from the European mainland, and show Stalin that Germany was actively engaging in the war with Britain And this would also fit in with the idea that as Hitler thought the Soviet Union would collapse quickly, expending a relatively small amount of resources - oil, tanks and troops - would not overly effect the outcome of the future Russian campaign. Moreover, by early 1941, it was clear that air power alone would not defeat Britain, and as Operation Sea Lion had been cancelled by this time, the deployment in North Africa would be the main on land example to the soviets that Germany was determined to keep fighting Britain. And finally, as the North African deployment took place in the 6 months before the invasion of Russia, and the land fighting started about 2 months before the Russian invasion, it would help to keep Stalin's attention away from the German buildup on the Russian border.

I was attached to the 14th German army in 1962 they told me that when they got to Smolensk their supplies were in real bad shape and their tanks were in bad shape and would need repair or replacement, food was a big concern and this could have why they went for Kiev instead of Moscow to secure the food before moving forward again. The German supply system was at best only good for 250 miles at a time then they had to wait for the supplies to catch up. In Russia

My theory is why continue the land attack on army that is trapped and probably will surrender after luftwaffe destroys most of them and their supplies? ie. evacuation was not considered realistic at the time

I think you've nailed it TIK. I forgot about Hitler's views on free trade/autarky (which is crazy, because I've read Mein Kampf more than once!). And of course you're right - Hitler really did believe Barbarossa would be a pushover and that he would get all those resources very quickly. And as you know, he wasn't the only one. Even the accursed Halder thought it would be relatively straightforward. I was wrong, and you were right...TIK wins by a technical knockout!!!

Hey, not sure you have seen off the counters emphatically and though its a quick response I look forward to see where this is leading. Does make me nervous as with no faux socratic piety even to ne you appear to have left your flanks open set your camp on a dry River bed a day away from the monsoon. Which I don't think you'd do unless you wanted to dance. Look forward to see what else you bring in. All the best.

I really like your theory, it shows your deep knowledge and way of working with information. But for me it boils down to a lack of decisiveness. Annihilating the forces at dunkirk would have been very costly and required sacrifices. Due to the amount of deliberation and lack of decisiveness at the top led to a lack of action on the ground. Im not claiming the germans just stood around, but for the guys on the ground to go the extra mile requires the top to do the same.

If Hitler is so confident about beating the Soviet Union easily, then he doesn’t really need to trick Stalin. So this argument cuts both ways.

I like the theory, personally, I think it was primarily due to the French Army kept fighting after the pocket of Dunkirk, so the Germans had to chase the rest of the French Army to avoid they could consolidate a defensive line and force them to surrender, and meanwhile the British escaped. But it makes sense why sent Rommel (Wasn't him Hitler's favorite General? ) and the Afrika Korps to North Africa in 1941, yes to save the Italians but keep a "second front" to fool Stalin too.

Hi, TIK! I enjoy your channel, though I can't say I agree with everything you have published. I have a lot of general thoughts on where I think you "hit better" and when you tend to loose a little precision and why, so shoot me a message if you want more generalised feedback. No hard feelings if you don't have the time, I really enjoy how your videos cause me to rethink what I think I know. Whether you're stricktly "correct" or not in any given instance is less important to me. Especially your videos on the resource situations of the various parties during different stages of the war have been really great, and helped me plug a lot of gaps in my understanding of several situations. Now, onto your "theory". I think this is easily as thought provoking as your best of stuff, but I also think these two videos tend to stumble a little bit in terminology. I think you might get more resistance to your ideas than they deserve due to this, so I thought some concrete feedback could be worthwhile. I put "theory" in quotation marks, and there is a reason for that. I don't want to come across as pedantic, but in my opinion this is not a "proper" theory, but rather a hypothesis, or even a speculation. This might seem like semantics, but there is an important distinction. What you put forth in your video is pure speculation, and is not supported by, or likely to ever be supported by, concrete, solid evidence. I get the impression that you acknowledge as much, when you keep mentioning that you're not married to the idea. I think it is a really thought-provoking bit of speculation, and I think it makes a lot of sense. But even if you are spot on, the likelyhood of anyone ever uncovering any kind of supporting evidence of this is slim at the very least. I think this hypothesis fits the evidence we have pretty well, and you makes your case very well. But you have constructed a story to fit the subset of information available, and thus it is really hard to test the hypothesis. We cannot know what motivated Hitler, and we're not really likely to find any sort of real evidence either way. I think the furthest you can go is to say it's a possibility, and i fascinating one at that. It's hard to prove, and hard to disprove, but the mere speculation raises some possiblities, and thus can still be enrichening and valuable. This is distinct from a less open-ended question, like "did Germany have the resources neccessary to win the war". That's a question with only three possible answers, namely yes, no or maybe. That's hard enough to prove either way, and there is plenty of room for debate and arguing. But the scope of the question is limited as it's a close-ended question. When we ask the question "did Hitler give the Halt order to trick Stalin?" we cannot reasonably consider it without also considering every other possibility. The answers are not "yes, no, maybe" but rather "yes", "maybe" and a whole range of different "no"s, with every other more or less plausible explanation that have or have not been put forth. If this was a claim put forth by any primary sources, then we could assess the crediblity of that claim, and deem it more or less likely. But as an idea put forth almost 80 years after the event it's hard to to buy into it in any way as more than speculation. Of course, if enough people over the years find this idea presuasive, future generations of historians may discuss this as the famous TIK Theory Of The Halt Order, but we are too far removed from the event itself, and to close to the "birth" of the idea, to properly assess it as a theory. In my opinion this is similar to a common fallacy with many conspiracy theories. They don't neccessarily lack credibility because the very fact of conspiracies existing is not credible. Quite on the contrary, I am sure there are a lot of "secret conspiracies" around the world, mainly because a lot of classified stuff would probably be classified as conspiracies if leaked. Heck, a lot fo stuff that HAS indeed been made public would qualify (Watergate anyone?). Where conspiracy theories lack credibility is that someone assumes they are able to guess these secrets with any degree of precision. They are too specific! Somewhat similarly, Hitler might very well have sent the Halt order due to the specific motivation of tricking Stalin. But he might just as likely have some other reasons that we'll never guess, or, as you say, there might be tactical, logistical, or internal political reasons. Heck, there could even be a seemingly random event that caused the order, ie a misunderstanding, or something else. In other words, I think the best your idea can reasonably be expected to be supported by evidence is that it might be deemed "plausible" or "possible", but I think it's going to be really hard to assess whether it's is likely to be true. Thus I think it'd be more prudent to call it a speculation or a hypothesis than a theory, as theory is a term which in my opinion implies something more supportable/opposable by evidence. I hope you don't take any offence at this, I don't really mean it as criticism, and I find these two videos really interesting and thought-provoking, and I look forward to whatever you publish next! :-) Regards, T.

2 arguments against the idea. 1. If Hitler thinks so little of Soviet military abilities then why would he be so worried about tricking them and getting a surprise attack? They are a total walk over if taken by surprise but terrifying if taken awares? Seems like a very unsound way of thinking. 2. There were multiple halt orders prior to the Dunkirk halt order, Hitler and other German generals were skittish on many occassions the Dunkirk one wasn't the only order to halt, in the channel dash there were also halt orders. This incicates a more general nervousness which indeed you later see in the soviet union, the opposition to letting the panzers get too far ahead of the infantry.

*@TIK* The answer is to be found on the economic relations between the Nazis and Communists (1939-1941). Nazi Germany, in this whole ordeal prior to Operation Barbarossa, was the _gold digger_ of this relationship. Stalin knew that Hitler didn't had the raw materials to maintain a prolonged war (this is also to be mentioned that Hitler didn't thought France and Britain would declare war over Poland, and when they did, he was caught with his pants down). Hitler lost the war in that September of 1939, without realising it; the countdown into falling started. Stalin, besides securing new borders and commercial deals with Hitler, started to push what the pact included. Originally, Lithuania wasn't meant to be under Soviet occupation & Bukovina wasn't meant to be under Soviet occupation. Furthermore, Stalin attacked Finland, trying to conquer or weaken it. Whatever he attained, he severely destroyed the static defenses of the Finns. The Finnish-Soviet war occured between _Novermber/December 1939 and ended in March 1940_ and the Nazis couldn't do anything because they were tied to the pact. Just as a hypothetical (even if in studying history isn't savvy), what would've happened if the Soviets attacked Finland at the end of Spring in 1940? I don't have a meteorological table. Nevertheless, the Finns were weakened. Meanwhile, Hitler started over Western Europe to conquer it, furthering neccesitating resources from the Soviet Union. Stalin knew, Hitler knew, they both knew that war could end in Europe if the Soviets turn off the resource dumping in Nazi Germany. My apologies for using Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi%E2%80%93Soviet_economic_relations_(1934%E2%80%9341)#German_raw_materials_crisis_and_Soviet_needs_after_Poland en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Soviet_Border_and_Commercial_Agreement en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Soviet_Border_and_Commercial_Agreement#The_Agreement en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi%E2%80%93Soviet_economic_relations_(1934%E2%80%9341)#1941_border_and_commercial_agreement de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golddiskontbank#Die_T%C3%A4tigkeit_der_Golddiskontbank_1933%E2%80%931945 I don't have a link to prove it, however, I remember somewhere (I think in documentaries) that Nazi Germany's resources and materiel reserves were ”booming” in 1941 because of the imports (the USSR speeded up its exports) and army planners concluded they have a _momentum_ in their advantage to start Operation Barbarossa, taking into consideration the shortfalls in, not only oil, but raw materials for war production. If they wouldn't take it, they'd lose the momentum. Then, couple it with Stalin's initiatives of mobilization and how, at a proverbial switch, turn off the resource faucet, forcing Nazi Germany to really then be in a crisis: autarky and nothing short of ”war communism” conditions.

Hey @TIK I broadly agree with your hypothesis here, certainly an interesting angle to look at - who knows if we'll ever know for sure? Hopefully some more sources come to light! A question I have though is this: If Hitler thought that forcing the capitulation of the USSR would be so easy to the point that the looming oil-crisis would be a non-factor in Barbarossa (and therefore could "afford" the battle of britain etc.), then why would he go to such great lengths to try to fool Stalin with the whole no war on two fronts thought? You provided evidence that Hitler wrote to Stalin clearly with the intention of misdirecting Stalin pre-Barbarossa, which gives your hypothesis credence, but I do find it odd that he would go to such lengths with the Halt Order just to further try to catch a "weak" USSR off-guard. Perhaps it was a calculated move in terms of thinking that the oil used against Britain would massively reduce the oil needed in a war against the USSR (by shortening the war), thus averting the oil crisis? But, given the paper-tiger look opinion of the USSR in 1940-41, it may be hard to believe that Hitler would effectively be playing 5D-chess in this manner...Some food for thought, at least! Cheers.

Regarding the response to #4 and how the theory relates to Dunkirk, I think it ignores this fact: by May 22, the situation on the front was chaotic and it was very difficult to tell what was happening. With hindsight and with well-researched maps, we can see that the Wehrmacht had just delivered a stunning blow to the Allies and the French would not respond. However, to OKW which was far away from the front and was suffering from the "fog of war", the Battle of Arras seemed to indicate that a massive counter-encirclement was about to take place which would ruin Germany's ability to maneuver and could derail the whole campaign. I think Hitler shared OKW's attitude and was not assured that Germany had won yet. While most of Germany's leadership began Operation Barbarossa with a feeling of supreme confidence that victory was certain, this confidence simply was not there in France, at least not until June 1940 when France began to collapse. Therefore, I don't think Hitler had any grand strategic motivations in issuing the halt order.

Dunkirk was a re-creation of the Battle of the Dunes in 1658 and the Battle of Denain in 1712 as described in my #46 and #44 and #21 and #15. I promise that you've never heard this version before -- but I think it makes the most sense. The blow-by-blow of Dunkirk starts halfway through #43 "Submarines and What Really Happened to the Titanic." Enjoy! Britain had wanted to use Hitler to squash the Russians, and Hitler had great success right up until Dunkirk when he was given an ultimatum, that he could either take Britain by force and face the unpleasant wrath of a resentful population, or he could agree to the British request for regime change in Russia, after which the king of England would make Hitler a Knight of the Realm and become his best friend, and the assassination attempts against Hitler did not commence until the Germans began to fail against the Russian army. France had a treaty with Poland that had been brokered by the British, so if Britain declared war over Poland, they would be able to invade Belgium, abandon France in a dramatic defeat at Dunkirk, give France to Hitler so the Americans would come over to save the French, and when the Americans lost the Battle of Normandy, Britain’s debts to the U.S. from the Great War would be expunged.