Regarding "creative accidents": Put the ship in drydock, pause repairs for a few days (say, the yard is closed for holidays) then mount a false flag operation where a small group of "enemies" (either internal, external, or a combination of both conspiring together) gets past the light security (after all, you're not at war) and sabotages her to the point where repair is not economically possible. If you're really, sneaky, you actually manipulate some real enemy or enemies into doing the job for you. Sadly, once they're completed their mission, they're corned by troops responding the explosions and are all killed before they can be interrogated.
Further comment on the Yamamoto at Midway segment. Not only does a partial strike launch get all that risk off the decks and hangars of the IJN carriers, it also sends it towards the USn carriers. Given how effective the limited numbers the IJN actually launched were in the return strikes, one has to think you could have seen considerable damage done to the US fleet, even if the US strike also did a bunch of damage close to the historic levels; a "mutual annihilation" outcome could have been on the cards, even.
I'm from Maine, and we have the old New England accent here, similar to the west coast of Britain. Mt. Katahdin is Maine's highest peak at 5,269 feet above sea level, which really isn't that far away. It is also the northern end of the famous Appalachian Trail. So here we pronounce Katahdin this way: Kaah TAH Din The emphasis is on the second syllable. Anyway, for what it's worth
Hello from the USA! Wanted to ask about the planned, but never started, refit to USS Ranger (CV-4) , intended to make her more survivable and able to stay with the fleet. Apparently the plan got to the point where it was being backed by FADM King, but at the last minute he was talked out of it when it was pointed out that the time and resources could bring another Essex on line. Have you ever run across any specifics on what RANGER would have been like had the work been done?
At the battles around Leyte Gulf, one thing is often over-looked. Not only did the US commanders (other than Halsey) lose track of where the fast battleships of TF34 were, the Japanese didn’t know where they were either. The first air strikes didn’t hit Northern Force until about 8 am. By then, Kurita and Center Force were locked up with Taffy 3. Kurita’s people could hear the Americans directing (Pleading? Begging?) the fast battleships to come to the rescue of the US ships Center Force was engaging. It is reasonable contention that, at any moment, Center Force could have seen a series of flashes on the horizon, followed by some very large splashes or explosions around their ships. When you factor in the lack of information concerning TF 34’s location, Kurita’s decision to break off pursuit to regroup and reform makes some sense.
As to Isoroku Yamamoto taking command at Midway, it is important to realize the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, while he had undergone pilot training when he changed his speciality to naval aviation in the 1920s, did not have the depth of modern knowledge to develop Japanese naval aviation tactics and doctrine. Rather it was younger officers that were flying current IJNAS aircraft that turned the Kido Butai into such a deadly instrument--no more so than Minoru Genda: "Reporting as air operations officer to Commander, First Carrier Squadron, later that month and in the rank of commander, Genda began developing carrier tactics for the fleet while on board the flagship Kaga. Early in 1941 Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the shore-based Eleventh Air Fleet, asked his advice about a proposal by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, for a surprise carrier raid on Pearl Harbor to initiate war with the United States. Genda studied the idea for ten days before endorsing it. In April he became air operations officer of the new fast carrier striking force, First Air Fleet, and the next month initiated the study and testing of aerial torpedoes to make short, shallow runs in the 30- to 45- foot-deep Hawaiian anchorage. He was Admiral Nagumo’s key adviser on the flagship Akagi during the attack." www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1990/april/remembering-genda Genda quite literally made the Pearl Harbor attack work, developing not only shallow-running torpedo procedures but effective level bombing tactics using modified Nagato-class shells and, most importantly, Japanese carrier cruising formations: "Returning from attache duty in London during the Battle of Britain in 1940, he chanced to watch an American news film in a Tokyo movie house in which four U.S. carriers were seen steaming in column. This suggested to him that they had been operating together in one tactical formation. Mulling over the possibilities, he was struck with the probable answer as he stepped off a trolley car one day: a circular cruising disposition for efficient air operations, defensive combat air patrols, and concentrated antiaircraft fire. After experimenting with Japan’s four front-line carriers early in 1941, Genda decided upon two separate tactical formations. Tight concentric circles of carriers and their escorts would be employed against land bases-like Pearl Harbor and Midway Island-while in a fleet action each two-carrier division would disperse up to 200 miles apart in order to split the targets for the enemy’s planes. The latter tactic was what Genda and Nagumo were unable to implement at the crucial point in the Battle of Midway, leading to the loss of all four of their carriers." If Yamamoto had taken command of the Kido Butai at Midway, he nevertheless would have been at a severe disadvantage as his four carriers were in land-attack formation, not sea battle formation with significant distance between CarDiv 1 & 2...and Genda's health was a wreck on 4 June 1942: "Genda’s carrier tactics worked equally well in the conquest of Southeast Asia, including airstrikes on Ceylon and Port Darwin, Australia. He drew up the air plan for the Midway operation but was confined to sickbay with pneumonia at the outset. On strike day, 4 June 1942, he nevertheless managed to climb to the flag bridge, where, beset with fever and clothed in Pajamas, he was embraced by Admiral Nagumo, who followed bis advice. Later in the day, however, he was evacuated from the stricken Akagi." Fever-ridden Genda had less than an hour on the morning of 4 June 1942 to come up with a brand-new strategy to address the pickle Nagumo found himself in. He was there on Akagi's bridge that morning...and he couldn't come up with anything new. It is fascinating that Parshall rarely mentions Nagumo's Dilemma when he gives presentations, despite it being a key insight in Shattered Sword. The chief problem was deciding to launch an all-out attack meant consigning the Midway strike to ditching with no foreknowledge of how ineffective the Kido Butai's AAA was against Dauntlesses in 70 degree dives. Moreover, the A6M's effectiveness against Dauntlesses in 70 degree dives is also highly questionable, as Hiryu's augmented CAP hit Enterprise’s incoming strike of 24 SBDs that afternoon, but the Zeros AND the AAA only took down three Dauntlesses before Richard Halsey Best and the rest planted four 1000-lb bombs into Yamaguchi's flagship. Hiryu got off two strikes at TF17, and was totally wrecked despite having almost no attack aircraft remaining when Lt. Best blasted her. All things considered, had Nagumo or Yamamoto authorized an immediate strike only Yamaguchi's Vals would have got off before VB-3, VB-6, VF-3, VS-6 and VT-3 arrived--the 800-kg land-attack munitions on CarDiv 1's Kates were not only questionable against armor, horizontal bombing against American ships maneuvering at speed was borderline pointless--leading to the only other play being a decision to land the Midway strike on CarDiv 1 while CarDiv 2 launches their D3As. No matter how one cuts it if a strike is launched before 1025L, three Japanese carriers are going to buy the farm from VB-3, VB-6 and VS-6 munitions--but in this scenario all of Hiryu and Soryu's B5Ns blow up aboard Akagi and Kaga. Rather than dealing a death blow to the Americans by Yamaguchi launching early, the imcreased loss of torpedo planes in the Enterprise strikes likely mean Yorktown never is torpedoed...unless I-168 can pull off an early I-19 vs. Wasp attack...
2:49 Drachinifel, just a minor correction. Kaga was burned down by McClusky and Scouting 6 plus most of Bombing 6 when he dived first instead of Best and Bombing 6 going first after assigning targets as was SOP. Best and his flight went after Akagi. They didn't get many hits on Kaga for 30 or so Dauntlesses, did they? Best and his flight managed 50% (1 mortal hit plus a hull popping, rudder jamming near miss out of 3)
13:00- would Yamamoto sailing with the carriers at Midway be like Nimitz sailing with Spruance or Fletcher at Midway? Seems like Yamamoto and Nimitz were the 'grand strategists' rather than the 'battle executors'.
Nimitz was able to exert more control if he wanted to at Midway because he was at Pearl Harbor not at sea. Yamamoto couldn't exert the same control because he was at sea.
44:50 Part of the design concept of the cage mast was an attempt to reducethe transmission of vibration -but it didn't work -vibration was still transmitted through the cage -and the cage was less rigid than a pole or especialy tripod, but it is significant that lattice masts re-appeared on destroyers and Crusiers (HMS Belfast) when they needed support for Radar and heavy coms etc. As for ship losing mast in age of steel -SMS Emden 1906 lost its fore mast when run aground in the Comoros and it lost it's stacks.
I would also consider that Admiral Marschall in Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, also threw out the orders he was given as stupid, to the misfortune of HMS Glorious
In the US Navy, and going back a number of years. Ship’s birthdays, and the Navy’s birthday were also celebrated with a special meal…And, if we were on deployment, steak & lobster with no reason was usually ominous. Typically, this meant your deployment was being extended, tasking change ( port visit cancelled )🙄
Ben-my-Chree was a taken up Isle of Man Steam Packet ferry. The IOM Steam Packet boats were noted for their high speed, sea keeping and their handling. The Viking became HMS Vindex if memory serves. The Steam Packet Boats played their part in both World Wars with Mona's Isle being the first vessel to complete a round trip to Dunkirk bringing back around 2,500 troops on her first run. There is also a vague memory of one of the Manx boats ramming and sinking a U-boat in World War One.
27:30 Vanguard (first 1586, at least 9th of name) Lion (first 1511, at least 10 iterations), & Tiger (first 1511, 13 iterations to date) all pre-date the Amarda, surprisingly Glorious of 1915 was first of it's name.
Re the 1919 air attack on the High Seas Fleet, would it be more appropriate to take Taranto as a model? The Swordfish is a lot closer to a Cockoee than any of the Japanese Aircraft. According to reports from Taranto, a fabric-covered aircraft does have some advantages when hit by light calibre AA.
On the U-Boats and Hilfskreuzer question, there actually was one instance of a U-Boat sinking one. On the 31st of January U-333 under command of Erich Cremer spotted the Spreewald near the Azores under the name of Britanny. U-333 sank it with a torpedo and afterwards several boats joined in rescue operations after the true identiry was revealead. Cremer returned to Germany and was court martialled but got acquitted as he couldn't have known it was the Spreewald.
01:13:03 for what it's worth I agree with Drach here. I guess we can think of the Fulmar as a Scout/Fighter. In 1942 the USN split it's flight decks between 4 aircraft groups , Scout Bombers' and Dive Bombers had different doctrine even though they flew the same airplane and the USN quickly realized any experienced Dive Bomber crew could perform the scout role. Also, Dauntless was used in air defense to counter enemy strike aircraft (hence the 2 forward firing .50's, considerable gun power in the early war).
Drach, have you considered doing a video on Armored Trains and Railway Guns since they are like "Land Battleships"? I've never foind a decent video about these oddities of land warfare.
Regarding U-boats and Surfare raiders, that's exactly when raider Atlantis was caught and sunk, while refueling U-boats, when the original supply ship meant for that was caught and destroyed by the British. The U-boat was able to dive, meanwhile the Atlantis was helplessly sunk by HMS Devonshire. Prior to that, Atlantis had met with various kinds of U-boats, exchanging information, sometimes bringing new personel, resupplying the U-boats. In the end, the survivors of Atlantis ended up making their journey back with German and Italian submarines.
At Surigao Straits, to my reading, not one PT boat landed a torpedo hit. ETA: Graf Zeppelin getting out into the Atlantic unscathed is not likely. Big, flat top with RAF bombers prowling -- and then get 'er home again without some punching, not likely. ETA2: The Fulmar failed for weak climb. That fault was shared by the Grumman F4F. This meant loitering patrols. The Fulmar also had issues with catching fast Ju-88s doing both recon and strike. This is why armored decks in the Med made a lot of sense.
22:17 I would think the idea is a bit broader than just the Kantai Kessen doctrine. Perhaps more, the Kantai Kessen is a symptom of the same factors that created a reluctance in many Japanese commanders to risk their fleet. Back to your point that any British or American commander knew that any ship they lost could be replaced, a Japanese commander knew that they deperately needed every ship they had to fight the war regardless of the Kantai Kessen doctrine and any significant losses could never be replaced. I think you tend to see this in many cases for the weaker side of a conflict tends to be more cautious. Which makes logical sense, aggression involves a lot of risk. If you destroy a small American fleet it delays their current campaign, if you get your fleet destroyed your side has effectively lost that entire campaign and possibly the war.
Can you compare the German Battlecruisers (Battleships) Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the Alaska? I love to read the battle of the Scharnhorst and King George but was wondering if the Alaska(s) would have done as well?
You're correct but Drach was also correct in using the Kaga/Akagi or Akagi/Kaga as a good example of the situation he was asked to answer. Sometimes people are so focused on being "correct" that they overlook the purpose of the exercise. Such people make poor military officers in my opinion. In the Alexandria example proposed by Drach the "correct" thing to do would be to follow the order to the best of one's ability even if such an effort was meaningless and wasteful.
It is striking that the Battle of Midway example comes up, and the scene of Ed Skrein portraying Lieutenant Richard Halsey Best pulling himself and his two wingmen off of Kaga to attack Akagi doesn't come to mind. Roland Emmerich's depiction of Dick Best blasting Akagi in the morning of 4 June 1942 and hitting Hiryu later that afternoon was letter-perfect, right out of Shattered Sword and the USN and IJN after-action reports, but because Emmerich didn't get the other nitty-gritty details right in 2019... Less strange than reversing the Kaga-to-Akagi attack by one Richard Halsey Best and his two wingmen is the bizarre belief that Best was disobeying orders. Either Clarence Wade McClusky ordered VB-6 to attack Akagi as Parshall argues, which means Best followed his CAG's orders to the letter, or McClusky ordered VS-6 to attack Akagi but got target-fixated on the nearer carrier and Lt. Gallager's pilots followed their CAG down to kill Kaga...in which case McClusky disobeyed HIS OWN ORDERS. But McClusky's overall order was for VB-6 and VS-6 to separately attack each carrier in Carrier Division 1 (Akagi and Kaga, as opposed to Hiryu and Soryu forming Carrier Division 2), which was in keeping with Admiral Nimitz and Admiral King ordering Fletcher and Spruance to inflict "maximum damage against the enemy," principally against the Japanese carriers. In context, Richard Halsey Best was always following orders off Midway. Not so much for Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, CO of VT-8. Waldron directly told Hornet’s CAG Stanhope Ring to shove it, and had CV-8's SBDs been similarly insubordinate and followed Waldron on a heading of 240 over the ocean instead of Ring's 265-270, the effects would have been devastating. If McClusky hadn't ignored scout doctrine to spread out and search with three-aircraft formations over a wide area, his own flight to nowhere would have been as ignoble as Ring's...save for blundering into Arashi. It was dumb luck that ANY TF-16 dive bombers appeared over the Kido Butai the morning of 4 June 1942, and this was largely due to extremely poor performance by Enterprise’s and Hornet’s CAGs and (moreso) the bizarre antics of Spruance's inherited chief of staff Miles Browning...but strangely the real issue was overall command. Who was in overall command of Yorktown's strike? Massey of VT-3, Leslie of VB-3, or Thach of VF-3? Hard to tell, until one reads Flying into a Beehive: Fighting Three at Midway in Volume 21, Number 3 June 2007 edition of Naval History Magazine by Jimmie Thach himself. He wrote that Leslie, Massey and himself came up with a strategy the night before launching, agreeing not to split formation (go "lone wolf") and put the fighters right behind the "fire trap" TBDs. Yorktown's CAG, Oscar Pederson and Air Officer, Murr Arnold stayed on the carrier. Even without an overall commander, Yorktown's strike was a seamless unit. Too bad this wasn't a lesson learned by TF16 prior to 4 June 1942...
After mentioning the Indiana class BB's in the answering 'The USN Expansion of the late 1800's that never was?' you could have said in fact the ship that provides the background for this video Q&A series is USS Oregon the third and final Indiana class battleship.
Ben-my-Chree (pronounced Ben M’Kree, though I think we’d let you off with a warning!) was indeed a converted ferry, of the Isle of Man Steam Packet Company. I’d love if you could find the time to do a video on the Steam Packet’s contributions to both World Wars as they perfectly demonstrate what requisitioned ships did throughout (boarding vessels, seaplane carriers, fast transports, especially the latter at Dunkirk, and even one strange conversion of the Tynwald to an “Merchant Anti Aircraft Cruiser”), though I understand sources would be pretty difficult outside of actually coming over to the island to look at the logbooks and records firsthand (trust me, I did that at uni, and fortunately I was studying from home when I was researching!). Not to mention, Ben-my-Chree, Viking and Snaefell’s most notable service helping lay the groundwork for combat aviation in the RN!
@ROBERTN-ut2il moonshiners. Can't have them rum runners and fireball NASCAR types taking over the rivers and coasts. Think of all those sweet sweet tax dollars the government would miss out on!
Dry dock is like a lesson from the teacher with ADHD . Its learning but just better Btw dude awesome content, between sleep and background noise youve given me so much random naval knowledge 😁
As for (purported) _”accidents”_ as the cause for the loss of a ship, that might depend upon the *definition* of an accident. For example, what about a ship catching fire while in port? You could have a skeleton crew on board, and the fire spread so rapidly that it couldn’t safely be fought, and everyone safely evacuate. For example, the carrier *_USS Bonhomme Richard_* …
Drach: le quatorze zhool-ē-ā is how I remember it from my secondary school French... ...my Alexa says Julie-ā... ...since I am a Drachinifel Patreon, of course Alexa is wrong, just because!
I have a question... Leyte Gulf battle. If America had cracked the Japanese code, why did Admiral Halsey continue north, after the decoy carriers? OR, did Admiral Halsey know about the Japanese centre force entering the Leyte Gulf and to preserve the secret that America had crack the Japanese code, Taffy 3 was sacrificed. Is this possible?
1:40:06 because the US armed forces in ww2 were Orks. our great grandpas are straight up 40k Orks. if you have enough screamin, howling lads behind you, anything is possible!
39:11 permament dry docking as in that shown in the photo and in the likes of IJN Miksa and to a lesser extent Cutty Sark and Victory -are vulnerable to hull distortion when forever out of the water as the hulls were never designed to support the weight in free air.
1:39:55 I imagine this is because they are American so hear more about American commanders. That will be almost all of it just not knowing the exploits of other nations. For example, the MAS boats taking on a battleship and winning. From Greek Fireships, to French Privateers and Buccaneers, to HMS Speedy vs El Gamo, HMS Cambeltown raming a Dock gate, Vikings sailing to America Etc. Etc. For almost any country you can think of. There definitely a lot of luck with all the examples I talk of including the US, you can also point to often coming into wars late which allows the US to build up forces. There is a lot of Propaganda and what is focused on after a win and even draw and losses. I.e. do you focus on errors
36:11 The most basic ergonomics on ships is the floor covering especially around open gun mountings, in the RN wood finishing on decks over steel plate, with various forms of lino internally -although I would have thought it became a serious fire hazard.
The USN had a wholesale stripping of fire hazards program after the bitter lessons of Guadalcanal sank in. Oddly the most common fire hazard was excess paint - apparently given the choice the average enlisted sailor would repaint the ship every week - and other than new vessels had many layers to strip. Paint is surprisingly heavy, so in battlewagons and cruisers it sometimes amounted to several hundred tons being removed.
In keeping with your answer about why Americans seemed to be so aggressive. Do you think that in modern terms the USN is approaching that ossification as it has been the dominant Naval power for so long without a truly destructive war which causes it to build massive numbers of new ships and rapidly promote very young captains wh haven't been entrenched by "The Book"
Great answer at 22:17 'Why did so many IJN commanders snatch defeat from the jaws of victory?'. I have been studying WW II for over 35 years (Own many books and documentary videos), and I agree with your personal opinion completely as to why The IJN often turned and left when they should have pushed on. But I think that there was another factor that led to this over and over. They were not use to fighting anyone that continued to fight back, and with ferocity. So, I think it was a real shock to the IJN that the Americans continued to fight, even after fairly substantial losses. They just weren't use top this, especially with the false attitude towards the American fighting force. On the land, the Japanese attitude was almost the opposite, where they carried on so many times, foolishly, with not husbanding their military resources - the troops in this case! In this arena, they probably thought that they could always get more troops, but never stopped to consider the population difference between the US and Japan, and hadn't concluded they would run out in just about all cases. Also, they thought that they were much better fighters, and did not respect the Marines enough. Of course, once the IJN lost control of the seas, they were not able to get reinforcements, so throwing mass numbers of troops as a frontal attack died out. On another point - the coffer dam for relieving dry dock repairs. What about simply building a complete base that surrounds the hull, supporting it completely and never putting it back in the water? Of course, the ship would have to be fully repaired prior to this permanent station. So, that would imply the cost of the support structure AND the dry dock repair work. And if the ship had to be moved, which it shouldn't, then you could fill up the supported area with enough water to get the ship to float again. This means that this 'permanent' dry dock, with full hull support, would have to be deep enough into the ground to be able to flood enough water to get it floating again. It seems to me that getting the water away from the ship is the long term answer.
IJN had more respect for the USN than the IJA had for the US in general. IJN doctrine was focused on one grand slug fest the USN while the USN doctrine was more flexible. USN would commit forces to something the Solomons without regard to whether there was going to be on grand slug fest or series of slug fests if the IJN attempted to intervene. Yamamoto was reputed to comment that 'only way for Japan to defeat the US was sign the peace treaty on the steps of the US Capital' which was not a slur against the US but sarcastic comment on the competence of the IJA. He didn't Japan could realistically defeat the US if the US decided fight.
@@washingtonradio 1) hate to point it out to you but the US Army had a greater strength in the Pacific and made more and bigger landings than than the USMC 2) By 1944, the IJA had learned its lesson - Peleliu, Manila, Iwo and Okinawa's Shuri Line were bloodbaths because banzai charges were forbidden and the Japanese were dug in in depth in bunkers with interlocking fields of fire
Some did (sent prior to the invasion), a few made it out of the Baltic after Poland fell (Stalin's stab in the back just increased Poland's hatred of the Russians - if Hitler had been blin, the Poles would have gladly joined an anti-Russian alliance and perhaps given him the extra troops he needed to capture Moscow. Same deal if he had armed the Ukrainians). The escape of the Orzel was an epic en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ORP_Orze%C5%82_(1938)
@Drachinifel could you please look into getting a shock mount for your microphone? Every time you thump your desk the vibration travels to your microphone and comes across in your videos. I love your videos but this vibration is extremely distracting/annoying.
"juillet" in french pronounces 'ju-yeah' with 'ju' as in "justice" ("ill" pronounces same as english "y" in words when following a vowel, and "et" is just one of 4 or 5 spellings for what would be an english "ea" sound.)
@@tokinsloff312 yeah, I could suggest any word with 'ju' in english but it'd always be wrong because english doesn't have that sound, of all european languages I believe only french and german have /y/, in french it's 'u', in german it's 'ü' (I use tréma instead of umlaut because there's no umlaut on french keyboards but it's close enough)
I'm suffering from the clappies 2:11:57 2:11:57 tertiary sphs; leprosy, anthrax - cutaneous and sub-cataneios -. Plus Bubonicand Pneumonic Plagegue. Plus a few Lotta odds things ! But I'm COVID-free !
Regarding one of the answered questions... Someone has been watching too many James Bond movies, where the Villain Of The Day can conceal an immense, complicated plan. 🙂
question re ships sailing to UK during the War. Where there any puntive actions against the families of the sailors who presumely still remained in the occupied county, or did the Germans take the line, the individual sailor had no say it in, just the higher Brass are responsible
My SafurdY Night bed--time story here in Vancouvver, Canada. Coupland Brandy Alexander's. + baguette garlic butter and some brie makes for the most beautiful nightmares.. sleep well .
From what gathered there was a debate at Tulagi whether to give Kennedy a medal or court martial him. Since the PT men were almost all reservists, they said "To heck with it, lets concentrate on winning the war and not get distracted"
On the picture of HMS victory there is a whitish lower section on the black lower hull. Is the cutoff from darker to the lighter paint where the waterline would be when the ship is in full load with tons of food, water, gunpowder cannonballs, crew etc on board?
I’d argue that a lot of the IJN’s “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory” scenarios weren’t actually such. Obviously there were cases like Komandorski Islands or First Savo Island (though the latter is a bit arguable), but as a whole I have to question how much of a difference would it have made if the IJN had been more aggressive. Pearl Harbor; launching a third wave would have had little effect against a lot of the shore facilities (especially the fuel tanks), which were far more durable than often assumed, and even more importantly would have severely overstretched logistics (as in to the point of literally running out of fuel on the way back). Midway: The point of the battle for the USN was to destroy the Japanese carriers present. They did that, and it really didn’t matter that the US carrier force had to head east to evade afterwards (especially since staying out of range of enemy surface ships is kind of the point behind a fast carrier task force). And if the Japanese had captured Midway all that does is force them to commit to another useless island outpost that drains their logistics even faster, meaning they’d actually do WORSE overall. Friday 13th: Adm. Abe had been seriously wounded and was in no shape to command, his charts (rather important in confined and often shallow waters like the Slot) had been ruined, and the ships had used up much of the ordnance intended to be used for bombarding Henderson Field. Samar-I’ve made my thoughts on this clear over the years, but to recap: the most Kurita is realistically doing by not running away at Samar is damaging the main body of Seventh Fleet, at the expense of the bulk of Centre Force. Between poor operational timing, the failure to account for the USN sending two and not one major fleet to Leyte Gulf, and continued resistance from Taffy 1 and 2, I can’t see him getting to the landing beaches before Third Fleet returns, and even if he did he’s going to have to split his focus between going after the significant numbers of already-landed and entrenched troops and supplies (not helped by the fact the IJN and IJA are basically incapable of coordinating) or hunting down the tail end of the landing forces that would have had ample warning and time to vacate the area-again, stalling him for too long for him to do his job before he gets annihilated. And of course, there’s the big underlying factor mentioned in the video-the IJN physically couldn’t afford to take that many risks with its ships (especially capital ships) because it couldn’t replace them fast enough. They were in a war where sacrificing ships to win a battle would most likely just result in the enemy replacing and regaining their losses while the IJN fails to do so. That’s why the Kantai Kessen doctrine even became a thing in the first place, and why the Japanese resorted to things like carrier strike doctrines, Long Lances, and at least two classes of capital ships (Yamatos and Shokakus) intended as secret superweapons. They were always going to be fighting on the back foot, and that inevitably pushed them into trying to get as many advantages as possible and trying to minimize their losses.
in fairness those are (understandable, in isolation) tactical decisions. what seemed to be lacking (for me at least) is an appreciation of the deteriorating japanese strategic situation and/or perhaps an unwillingness to abandon the original strategic doctrine 🤷♂️
Prewar, the Japanese had observed that after 15 to 20 minute night engagement their plot of their ship positions would become wildly inaccurate. Once the plot had “fallen apart”, withdrawing to reorganize was seen as a reasonable solution to maintaining a coherent formation
@@georgewallis7802 The issue is that there really weren’t any viable strategic alternatives-all their options boiled down to “lose”, “lose anyways” or “lose even worse”. Really they shouldn’t have started expanding in the first place.
@@Drachinifel Japan's industrial base smaller the the UK's. They were engaged in a major land war at a sustained intensity not matched in the European theater until Barbarossa and yet they were able to develop modern aircraft. Using the outbreak of the European war as excuse for not developing capable aircraft does not cut it. The development of aircraft for the FAA was handicapped by doctrine and lack of control of aircraft development until the eve of the war.
@@johnshepherd9676 the number of advanced FAA aircraft curtailed in 1939 by wartime production ramping up in the UK is extensive, conversely, the Japanese aircraft industry was nowhere near capacity nor on a war footing and was free to develop new aircraft designs pretty much at will. After Pearl Harbor and early 42 made it clear they were in a long total war you see a similar ramping up and development of existing models and curtailing/delaying of new aircraft as happened in the UK and to a lesser extent the USA after their respective entries into WW2
@@Drachinifel Your argument is about development not production. Development takes a lot fewer resources. Your argument is valid for the US but I don't think it applies to Japan given their rather weak industrial base.. Japan's ramp up in production in 1942 was of existing types, not new aircraft types, and they were continuing to develop new aircraft as well. I also note the RAF managed to develop land based aircraft during the war. Arguably if the Air Ministry gave Rolls Royce the jet engine contract from the start the UK probably would have beaten the Germans in introducing the jets by several months. The War is not an explanation for the state of the RN's aircraft development. There are good reasons why the FAA lagged in aircraft development that were beyond their control. Update: I checked start of the development for both the A6M and Fulmar. They both began their development in 1937, with the Fulmar starting first. The Fulmar was still under development in 1939-40 after the war started. The Fulmar was result of doctrine not the start of the War.
I will stipulate that you know vastly about naval affairs during the channel's time period than I but this subject is not one those areas. After double checking sources I verified that you are incorrect about the relative position of the FAA versus both the IJN and USN in 1939. Both the IJN and USN had two monoplane carrier based aircraft at the start off WWII in Europe. The IJN had the Claude and Kate. The USN had the Devestator and Vindicator. Yes, the FAA had the monoplane Blackburn Skua but it was grossly inferior to the last US Navy biplane fighter, the F3F and the IJN's monoplane Claude. The FAA went with the Fulmar because that is what they thought would meet their fleet air defense requirements. The reason that the start of the war killed FAA aircraft development was because they had no serious aircraft development program in place in the fall of 1939. Every major combatant continued aircraft development throughout war, including the RAF, and introduced new types during the war. You are being a bit a homer on this topic. The RN fell behind both aircraft development and doctrine because they had little control over aircraft development until 1939. The FAA had insufficient time to develop a detailed development and procurement strategy before the UK went to war and it was easy for the air ministry to shutdown whatever plans they did have. It is not like FAA caught up after the war either. The FAA aircraft lagged way behind the US Navy. The last FAA fighter, the Sea Vixen, was introduced three year after equivalent US Navy fleet air defense fighters and two year after the Mach 1.8 F8U Crusader.
I’m unsubscribing because you shifted too much from several years ago when you made excellent naval videos to now making dry dock videos which to me is uninteresting and lazy. If you shift back to making excellent naval videos such as the ones like salvaging and repairing sunken ships in Pearl Harbor after the Japanese attack then I will resubscribe.
I make exactly the same number of drydocks as I used to (1 per Sunday, end of the month in two sections) and more naval videos than I used to (Saturday and Wednesday, but now also alternate Fridays)
Oh boo hoo. He has been doing this for 274 weeks straight. He just interviewed Robert Lundgen and chatted with Parshall about Midway wrecks. Finally he made another USN submarine campaign video. Along with 5 minute guides. And somehow, you think he shifted his content? These Drydocks are questions from us viewers. The greatest thing a RU-vidr can do is interact with their viewers.
How did anyone sneak up on PT 109 a destroyer is much bigger and can be heard that's kind of like saying you didn't see or hear the elephant come up on you before it stepped on your head
I suspect that on a PT boat all you hear is the engine on a PT Boat, the night was cloudy and moonless, and no ships had lights on. I find it disappointing that some one sitting in there mothers basement finds the courage to find fault with the Captain on the spot during the war.
@@benwilson6145 They were asleep. The PT boat was hove to with engines on idle and the mufflers cut in. In a calm night at sea sound travels for miles and the howl of as tin can's forced draft blowers is LOUD. Go back to mom's basement.
00:36:08 -- With your comment about crew performing poorly when exposed to the blast of the larger weapons, this raises the question of what the -- admittedly already severely limited -- utility of the open triple 2.5cm mounts on ships like the Yamato would be, given their placement around -- and in the case of two mounts on turrets B and Y (see upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/Yamato1945.png), _on_ the 18" main turrets would be. Were these gun mounts intended to be unused during the firing of the main armament, on the assumption that the blast from the guns would be more than the crew could be expected to handle, with crew kept under cover in proximity to their guns so they could rush out and man them when needed?
I think Kennedy was out there hot dogging he was a bit of a show-off do you realize he had a 3-inch gun on his boat which couldn't be fired because it would rip the deck off if they did
