Back in the day we all went to the boat. Every Naval Aviator knew that anyone with wings had proved they could do it manually, even us rotor heads. I see the reasons, I agree it makes sense but I can still feel the loss.
Yes, emotionally it seems they are taking away a crucial part of the experience. In my case, we carqualed at the end of basic in the T-2B and at the end of advanced in the F-9. I just hope that those auto landing systems are really reliable. I also hope that all wing commanders and Squadron COs require all aviators to do enough manual landings to remain somewhat proficient, just in case.
I Checked in to NASC on Feb 23rd 2024. Started academics on July 8th 2024. I've got about a week and some change left before I'm NIFE complete. Shout out to CNATRA for stepping to the plate and getting us through in record time. My peers and I greatly appreciate it!
Dec 1969 my Dad left NAS Miramar VF-121 as Ops Officer and helping LCDR Pedersen to stand up Topgun. He reported to NAS Meridian for a 2 year stint as XO/CO of VT-9. It was 5 years into Vietnam. At that time, VT-9 had 600 total students / instructors, 400 total support personnel, 300 aircraft (T-2 Buckeyes). The U.S. Navy needs to dramatically increase the CNATRA budget to ramp the production of highly qualified aviators. As a highly experienced pilot, LSO, CAG LSO, Air Boss, and Squadron CO my Dad believes that Aviator training and time on the stick are only way to prepare pilots for the few minutes they might spend in actual air combat or hours above enemy territory (his was over North Vietnam 1965 and 66).
Would your Dad's name be Vern by chance? If so I served with him at Brown Field, CA from late 1956 - 1959. In fact I introduced him to his beautiful wife Becky!
@@lewgray1196- Mr. Gray - my Dad is Vern Jumper and my Mom is Becky Jumper. They were married in December 1957 while Dad served at VU-7. Dad is alive and well, residing in the San Diego area. He is retired, but serving as a Docent at the USS Midway Museum.
Good to hear…[hopefully the wait between OCS and actual flight training is short ] my son is headed to OCS next week then slated to Pensacola afterwards…
In 1970, the CNATRA staff was reformed into CNET. As part of that, the CNATRA of today was formed from CNABATRA (Basic Air Training) that was in Corpus.
I have met several Vietnam era Marine Phantom drivers who did their upt with the Air Force. They then did initial CQ in the F-4 FRS, so the concept is not new.
They should have kept two of the last non Nuc carriers , one in mothballs the other in reserve as a testing training carrier and back up. Instead the scrapped them both ! Unless you think the us will never need another carrier on short notice it was a terrible idea . In other words no more peer wars .
Sooo, going to the boat in the FRS having not gone in the VTs gets you a slightly higher though “within statistical norms” rate of DQ… but they’re doing the FRS CQ with the “easiest thing ever” PLM aided carrier landing systems? Hmmm… I’d suggest a search of Medium for both F-35C Crash into the South China Sea - A Case Study and for Cautionary Thoughts Regarding Improving Training for Naval Aviation. Props for at least running a control group in tandem to the test group. Will you continue tracking these groups through their first full JO tour? Understandable in the environment of limited Carrier availability for training but don’t think it is a miracle system. Consider series of normal distributions yield pareto distributions. Automation and precision systems tighten norms yet create more severe gross misses.
Good questions and points. The Marine F-35C crash was a case of pilot error, from what we understand. Not so much a lack of CQ experience and training as a JO hot-shotting the approach.
@@USNavalInstitute Marine? F-35C into the SCS was Navy. And I would challenge it being “pilot error.” Search Medium for the James McClaran Allen story F-35C Crash into the South China Sea - A Case Study. Note, had he truly “hot shot” the approach, he would have been significantly more over-energy than he was at the start and Paddles would have waved him off much sooner so as the wave-off would actually have helped. There is a lot more to this if you actually read into it and take the time to be curious about it. But there is also a narrative to push which unfortunately precludes any lessons that could be applicable to other situations from being learned. What this crash also saw was certain “LSO Rules to Live By” not being adhered for which neither Paddles nor the pilot seemed to care meaning there is much more afoot. And there are ‘whys’ to this yet concerns from this unaddressed.
