At one time I taught an overview of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) as part of a two-week intro to nuclear power course for engineers. The marine version has many similarities. A few of the differences: 1) the nuclear version, as expected, has more loads and therefore is larger, generally locomotive size diesels. 2) Due to the heavier loads, we had a sequencer to incrementally load the generator over a period of about 30 seconds. 3) To facilitate faster starting and loading, our EDGs were kept preheated using the jacket water cooling system. 4) If there was a sag in offsite power, the EDGs would start automatically but not load in anticipation of a potential loss of power. They would only load on a loss of power to the Essential buses. Note that we also had Vital buses, which were UPS backed. These were for loads that had to stay running regardless. As with your marine EDGs, the vital buses didn't power everything, only loads such as instrumentation, controls, and safety systems.
Very similar setup I worked with on the Offshore drilling rigs, the self propelled ones anyway. UPS for critical ballast and controls, E-Gen for all essential functions. Same as what you describe. Always heated water and oil, ready to go instantly. Normally we (me) would get a warning if we were approaching a brownout and the E-gen would not come on until buss volts dropped below a set point. Then it started the E-Gen, once up to speed it would switch over from main buss to E-buss. Tested it monthly and ran the E-gen under load every month.
@@jackflash6377 - Yes, very similar! Out of curiosity, what are the typical electrical loads on your normal generators. That is, total electrical output needed to run the offshore drilling rig?
@@michaelj3971The last rig I worked on was a Dynamic Positioned rig that was 10,000 ft water depth capable. We had 6 V-16s rated at 8000kw each. That's 48 megawatts of available power. The thrusters took most of the power since they were rated at 5,000kw each and there were 6 of them.
Appreciate your videos shedding so much light on ship mechanics. Could you do a follow-up on the main propulsion system with regards to intake & exhaust systems? From my very limited understanding of these big low-speed diesel engines they are started with compressed air, to reverse them you change the firing order of the cylinders, and their intake air is fed by large blowers. Reading through YT comments it seems that opinions vary as to the cause of the heavy black exhaust smoke with some suggesting it could have been them operating the engine under heavy load in reverse and others suggesting it might have been the engine starving for air if the intake fans were offline resulting in poor combustion. Others speculate the heavy smoke could have been caused by the engine restarting. Would love to see/hear your explanation for how these systems work and what might have been occurring at the time of the heavy exhaust emissions.
I also have seen this many times, but most new ships have auto synchronization. Also, during maneuvering, 2 ships service generators should have been on-line with buss split--no reason for synchronizing gens in this situation. Emergency gen should have come on once bus tie to em board tripped- again, no synch. Have not yet found all ship particulars of DALI to determine what they had for equipment.
Thing people seem to forget is white this small generator can restore power to the rudder it would not necessarily mean you could steer the ship out of danger as any rudder be his ship or plane needs something moving over it for it to have any steering authority, if you are going fast enough then you can have some steering authority but if you are large and slow then there will not be enough movement over the rudder to do anything and you have to apply power to the propellers to force water over the rudder for it to actually do anything, look at the video the ship was going pretty slow and probably not much faster than the rivers current meaning that when they lost power and main propulsion even if they have resorted power to the rudder they would have been going to slow for it to have any correcting effect.
Agreed, plus we don't know whether the current was flowing strongly or weakly with reference to the tide and the track of the vessel at that moment. Seems like once the blackouts began, they were pretty much throwing hail mary passes one after another as they began to realize where the ship was heading.
They were making eight knots when the power went out. If they had rudder, I don't think they would have drifted more to starboard and hit the bridge pylon.
The Dali was doing about 8 knots when the load dropped so the rudder still had plenty of authority. What made recovery impossible was backing the propellor effectively losing way and rudder authority.
What about the steering effect of the single prop screw turn assuming some of the propeller was out of the water. Or even just the turbulent from the prop?
Your video is superb. I would like to add that the emergency circuit breaker needs to function properly. If the breaker trips nothing on the emergency circuit will work. Also, the bridge needs to know which pump for steering is on the emergency circuit and be utilizing that pump during maneuvering. All personnel need to know what is on the emergency panel and verify that the items are working.
@@DR_1_1Or poor maintenance and or operator / engineer training. You can't believe what I've seen in my years on ships. Jury rigged, never tested crap that I would not trust my life with. Stupid designs that looked good on paper but in real world did not work or were actually worse than bad. Many hire low IQ people to put in critical positions because they are low cost and can get by until something bad happens.
Seeing it always helps me understand much better than just hearing or reading about it - thank you for taking the time to put this together for those of us out here wondering how it all works!
Greetings Chief. I've just dropped by on a recommendation from Sal! And it was such a strong endoresment that I already subscribed, turned on notifications, liked and hit 'play all'. Sounds like you've got a lot to share Chief so I'm here for a tour / lessons!
My money is on Over current Under frequency protection. In short, they shed a generator from the bus to early, exceeding the remaining gen capacity causing over current protection at the generator and under frequency at the bus. To electrical protections it would have looked like an instant dead short, and it would have been at this moment, they knew, they fucked up
@@MessyPointedBlob: They definitely don't want to power up anything on Dali until it's free to move, watertight and on deeper water. In worst case a disturbance can make it slide closer to the center of the channel and sink there. Which would then be a lot bigger problem than just random bridge parts being there.
You should do a video of synchronizing the alternators, and show how to blackout a ship hitting the wrong button....do a blackout drill at dock or something
You can bend a generator quill shaft and reduction gears doing that. 90 degrees out of phase paralleling can throw a terrible transient torque on a steam generator's gear train. Ask me how I know. I suspect it would not do a diesel much good either.
Appreciate the informative video. Could you possibly do a video talking about the shaft driven generator, this seems to be another issue people are confused about. Subscribed and hope to learn more.
I never got to sail steam outside of school, but I really enjoyed it when I did it. You’ve done a great job trying to make this as simple as possible for people who don’t have a clue about what this is really all about. Try explaining the emergency bus tie and normally sources of power and they only want to spin conspiracy theories about how everything was planned for X Y Z reason. For those of us who understand, we know what went wrong, how the responses were right and some days the numbers are just going to run out and we’ve all seeing the results of that.
They can have 2 , 3 or 4 layers of redundancy on some systems but there can often be 3 , 4 or 5 small mistakes that occur at the same time and cumulatively they spell disaster :/
Cheers... I dont quite understand how all redundancies failed 🤷♂️ like always with these things its never just one thing, there will be a series of mistakes that lead to this👍 keep safe my friend thanks for the insight
Well, if you consider it was a ship recently brought into heavier use after houthi trouble meant Maersk needed additional capacity and needed it fast.. And marine operators have been cutting down on everything to save money, including crew size. It's a recurring theme that when you suddenly need all the reserve capacity available, not all of it will be as well tested than your normal units. And volume of container traffic is just so high even if something only happens every million miles, it will still happen relatively often.
@@JariJuslin I've seen it with my own eyes. In 2009 we went in for some "refurbishments". Was supposed to be 3 months and turned into 9 months. The French were in charge and it was a big corrupt fiasco. I can't even list all the crap but one that stands out is, they installed the ballast water vent check valve backwards. We left port without any sea trials and as we rounded the Cape and headed north we started listing, they could not vent the ballast tanks and to top it off they had switched the "IN" and "OUT" hydraulic actuator lines for two ballast tanks. One was stuck open, the other stuck closed. We only had a skeleton crew and we were in a panic. Rough weather and we're listing bad. I'm very familiar with the ballast system so I'm down there trying to figure it out, finally found the backwards check valve (a check valve for a 14" line is not a small valve) and fixed that then later found the switched hydraulic lines. Allowing the lowest bid company to do the work nearly lost the entire vessel.
Ships often have twin banks of filters with a 3 way ball valve on them so you can flick the valve over and replace filters without shutting down the equipment , they will also have blockage indicators that pop a visual indicator and can also activate a relay that posts an alarm condition on a panel somewhere.
@@budsatawny they are expensive , the only one i worked with was about $28,000 worth , 1100 mm tall fitted with 3" SAE ports for the common inlet and 2 outlets , even the handle for the changeover ball valve had a safety lock button so it couldnt be accidentally knocked out of position , both circuits had manual indicators and electrical blockage sensors . i have no idea if they make smaller ones but you could do it yourself with single pressure filter bodies and a high pressure 3 way ball valve , even for a 1" system thats still $ 3500 in parts alone.
I appreciate you taking the time to do a video, but I was under the impression that, along with providing emergency rudder control power and essential electrical loads, the EDG was also used to facilitate re-starting the main propulsion engine, alongside the air and hydraulic systems? As in providing emergency electrical power for critical motors & pumps that the main propulsion system would also need to facilitate the start-up.
No, the emergency diesel is set up to provide the essentials to restart a main generator. It’s too small to run everything needed for the propulsion engine
My time in the engineering space was very minimal and it has been 30 years since I spent any time at sea, but don't you still need propulsion to effectively have steering.
A big container ship like the Dali, needs about 6-7 knots of water speed passed the rudder to steer. Which is about the speed it had when it collided with the bridge, so it should have been able to steer without any propulsion.
@@tjampmanThe ship's Velocity Made Good was not the same as the flow rate over the rudder because there was as fairly strong river current in the channel pushing her stern along and the ship's passage under the bridge had been timed to ride the peak running of the ebb tide. If there was any flow across the rudder with the engine stopped, it was very slight, and possibly in reverse.
Thanks again. The Ships arrangements is much like some of the Ships I've sailed on. And it brings me back around to seems like operator error. Like why couldn't they get they get steering up?? I can see the main fault taking out a main generator then dumping the load. All bus ties should open and the emergency sequence should have had the emergency generator feed its own essential Bus and they should have been able to get control of the rudder. The bridge must have been chaos, so much communication and personality along with training failures breaking down. Someone's gonna hang for this one and i'm sure its going to be low hanging fruit.
Nicely done! the Million Dollar question is what would cause the Main Switchboard to trip off,( the loss of the Main Engine auxiliaries (would cause a Main engine safety Trip shut off)) and Electrical Generator Shut down instantaneously. Engine stall from going stop to Full ahead ? Engine control management system malfunction? Emergency stop button activation? Generator Switching on and not being phased onto the board correctly? Electrical Board hot spot limit temp trip? Electrical system component failure? Electrical short/ earthing (such as an external Electrical draw - Ie lightning strike ( not in Dailies' case) or high powered electrical line earthing in sea water?) - I would not expect a ship to put the shaft generator on till it was fullaway.
Great content. Watched the video after this one about the 2 generators/pumps(?) that run the rudder. I'm actually far more interested in the steering situation on the Dali as I believe the momentum of the Dali would have carried it safely under the bridge while coasting. Afterall it was on course and heading to go under it. It is the turn that the ship made while the power went up and down that I have an issue with. How could that have happened if there was no steering control? The rudder isn't loosey-goosey when it looses power is it? I wouldn't imagine it is but you can explain if I'm wrong. And in the video you made after this one, I'm led to believe that what you call "an extremely unlikely scenario" is exactly what happened on the Dali? ALL redundant systems failed, barring the hand-turn action you pointed out at the very end. And even that tho would require that at least one of the two generators in that shot working? Thanks again for your time and effort in sharing.
Are there sensor that get the open/close posito for the gate valves on fuel line of the emergency generator? How is checked the filters and/or water separators of the fuel line? How is checked if fuel line flow is free after maintenance?
When you do your monthly Genset tests do you use a loadbank or simply run it unloaded ? Do they run any fuel tests each time the tanks are filled ? Do the Gensets each have their own fuel tank ? Does every fuel tank have a WIF water In fuel sensor and audible alarm ? If the Genset has a low frequency / Low RPM alarm , what is the trigger frequency that trips out supply and sets off a condition alarm ?
I always did mine using the fire pumps. Get those lines blown out and test all the valves while you're at it. Granted, it would not get you full load but 2 or 3 100hp pumps is a decent load.
@@heartobefelt prop walk is even more exaggerated in reverse, with the wind and tidal current coming out of Curtis Bay channel. It's called crash astern when you put the engine in reverse while its moving forward.
If possible could you explain the condition the ships propulsion is in when entering or leaving port, in my time as an engineer in the Navy when in transit thru a port how we operated equipment was highly controlled. Is the main engine providing all of the propulsion? Is there another means to provide propulsion if the main engine has a failure? Does the rudder provide all steering or does a bow thruster provide steering to assist the rudder while transiting thru a port at lower speeds?
Any idea why the ship in Baltimore appeared to steer directly into the bridge support after the power outage? Why didn't it continue on a straight path that it was on?
The emergency Genset in his video would have been 400 - 500 kVA , he did point out it will power rudders which may be powered with redundant electric / hydraulic power packs. The genset engine is a Cummins but i cant tell from the photo if its a 6 cyl inline or a V12 , a 6 cylinder might be 400 - 600 kVA while a V12 could be 900 - 1500 kVA depending on cubic inch displacement and turbo spec.
Im guessing the genset is liquid cooled. But then its radiator is air cooled. Still has a water pump to recurculate its coolant. But not cooled by outside non recirculating water. Awesome to learn about these things. Im guessing a 4 cycle diesel perhaps turbo?
Yes my mind thinks differently it has a water jacket and radiator but is not seawater cooled. My world usually revolves around seawater cooling and if that fails my emergency generator is what gets me through the repairs to that
Thank you for the video. I'm wondering about how the bow and stern side thrusters operate during emergency. Also, you don't have to run the awful bio-diesel fuel that grew a fungus in my skid-steer loader's fuel tank, making it inoperable, do you?
Thrusters are not effective unless the ship is near stopped. Just not enough power to the thruster blades via electric motors to maneuver laterally. 🇺🇸⚓️
Sal sent me as well and its fantastic to see real information getting presented, its the background details that allow understanding, or at least for the tech decisions that AHJs make. I would like to know if the steering gear off the Backup Gen is a separate hydraulic system (motor) than the main Gens? It does no good if a common electrical fault takes down both Gen Systems (Mains and Standby). A huge concern is what Chief Makao said about they could not recover from a power loss during maneuvering. That gets into how many mains are running during those critial times, the Standby Gen is not as well as if you can't recover, then why would you have a bridge in that precarious condition of getting rammed when there is a failure? I know that is past your job duties, but it needs to be rammed down the AHJ throat you have no tugs atached to a ship that can ram a bridge that is not protected. My background included backup power for facilities. We test 30 minutes a week loaded. In 35 years I had one failure to providfe support when a non backed up Standby Generator was being worked on. We had scheduled it for what we thought was the best time (summer, daylight no weather) and we got hit with an outage mid work. I did catch many developing failures with the 30 minute weekly loaded tests. Again I know its not your area of deciding, but I believe the 30 minute weekly tests are the only way to increase odds for when you need it. Equally tests before crucial maneuvering points wherever those are as well as having the Standby Gen at least running and able to switch into the load during those times. If (and he knows his stuff from what I have seen) you can't recover then you need to have other threat reducing mechanisms in place to deal with those failure issues.
So the emergency steering gear pump is normally always available it’s connected to the emergency switchboard seen here which is normally powered from the main switchboard and generator/s. In the event of a blackout this emergency generator will start and provide power directly to that steering motor in less than 30 seconds. As far as weekly test I think it’s a bit much we do a 2 hour monthly loaded test and weekly starts more than that you start to do more harm than good
@@steamman9193 Thank you for the response. Recommended for facility backup power was weekly. I never saw any issues developed from that. Not all were setup to load, those that were not we did yearly load banks of 4 hours on. By then they were crudded up but ran and cleaned up in 30 minutes. NFPA which deals in Fire Systems (sprinklers, fire pumps and fire panels) required 30 minute run weekly regardless if they were diesel driven or electric motors driving the Fie Pumps. There were no issues with wear and tear (all mine were multi use and used in equipment of some kind as well as hooked up to Generators). The largest were 1200 KW electrical sets (1800 hp engines) . Smallest was 30 KW. Most diesel but a few Natural Gas sets as well. I had pre lube pumps on some but not most. Longest under my work were 35 years old and were ageing out rather than any mechanical issues (seals and such). The ones without pre lube did fine. Injectors on the cats got so old the seals failed in those (and some issue with using Jet Fuel which changed as the main tank also served other equipment that had newer diesels that had no tolerance for Jet Fuel and need of the Low Sulfur fuel) 30 minutes if loaded was enough to cook the crud out and I never had one fail if it had to run more than 30 minutes. I had some Cats that did have fuel pump seals go every few years but caught those all on the weekly tests. I know you have small crews but the AHJ should require full manning of all critical positions during maneuvering and if they need to mandate larger crews, then it adds a bit to the costs but as long as all pay the same cost, its not a competitive issue. We sure are paying the costs for failure. Again not casting any blame, but voices like yours and Chief Makao have more weight than mine does.
Hey, steamman, thanks for the response. ' appreciate it. That said, so if the emergency generator failed to fire, then they'd still basically be simply a drift? As you mention in one of your other clips, the navigation systems for these vessel are, in fact, actually designed, with repeated layers of redundancy, "to not hit Francis Scott key bridge " or any other bridge. Just seems all options as to why this happened ought to be on the table, to include nefarious action by someone (group or nation, etc.) wishing and willing us harm.
Preference load EDG will power main propulsion after all is of line so you can run steering and main engine ,nothing else till you restore SSDG power supply.
Could you comment on how much pressure captains are under to keep moving and delay maintenance until later? Could that have been an issue here? Have seen some reports the ship had electrical issues while in port. Are those issues fairly common and not requiring immediate attention?
Does the stby gen have a circ pump for keeping the engine warm when off? The one I had at a 4 story apartment building had all the bells and whistles and could take load within just a few seconds because of the heater.
As he said, it's air-cooled - so there is no coolant to circulate or warm up. It's designed to start from cold, so that's not something to worry about. Being fuelled by ordinary diesel fuel, rather than heavy oil, is all part of that; heavy oil would need to be heated just to make its viscosity low enough to fit through the injectors, but diesel will just work as-is. This is not a particularly big engine. It's often useful to compare marine diesels with those in railway locomotives. This emergency standby engine looks like it would go into a small shunting locomotive, as you might find on an old-fashioned dockside railway. The auxiliary generators would be comparable to full-size mainline locomotives (engines of this size are enough to serve as the main engines of smaller ships). The main engine of a Panamax ship is absolutely massive, producing as much power as about a dozen mainline locomotives tied together.
When I worked on a bulk carrier there was a point when we were down a main engine so we used the backup generator to power the unloading gear. That's why there is a team of engineers onboard to distribute power and control the systems , there's many ways of doing the same job
@@Kromaatikse that is definitely not a air cooled engine, I think what he meant by that was the radiator is a water to air cooler. The main engines will have a water to water heat exchanger to keep the sea water out of the engine.
@@KromaatikseIt's not air cooled, it's water cooled. What he meant was that it's not depending on a circulation pump/cooling loop for cooling, it has a radiator which is ducted. It's a regular stand by generator with a Cummins V12 like the ones you'd find on land, unlike the main generators which have more in common with the main engine. So yes, it most definitely kept warm by a coolant circulator and/or a block heater.
Backup this accident, main ships engine relies on a generator to presumably pump the fuel to the injectors, had that engine its own mechanical fuel pumps what difference would have been the outcome. Allso main engine provides hydraulic pressure to the steering gear, the control gear is battery backuped. Then you hang all the electric auto luxury stuff off the generators. That is full redundancy is it not ? Just a tiny thought 😊
As a PowerStation Tech my thoughts exactly, why does the ships diesel engine need a generator to make it run? What is wrong with compressed air storage and batteries for the pumps, controls. and auxiliary equipment. Then when the diesel is running it drives a shaft driven generator and compressor to charge the pre mentioned items.
@@wonton8983 My background is standby power so guessing this is a standby set to power everything else that normally gets power from the main engines WHEN THEY ARE RUNNING. If the main engines quit then you need backup power for controls, lighting, HVAC in those confined areas where people work, etc. IOW, this doesn't provide crank / start power, but may provide power for all the controls necessary to make a start happen.
So what fouled the emergeny generator along with the engine. Where some filters changed to get the generator up. It did take about 44- to 52-seconds to get electricity back.
Solas regulations require the emergency generator to start running and be on the board supplying power within 45s maximum. Typically the generator will start as soon as a blackout occurs but will not go on the board straight away. This is to allow the engine time to settle down.
The entirety of the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) are considered an emissions control area. This means all U.S. ports require fuel with a sulfur content below 0.1% mass (or equivalent means) to be burned while within 200 miles of shore. This is a regulation in MARPOL Annex VI. Once more than 200 miles from shore you can switch to fuel with 0.5% sulfur content. There is some speculation that the original blackout had something to do with them doing fuel changeover early. That would not explain why the emergency generator did not take the load within 45 seconds though. The issue could be related to the electrical distribution system, could be a compound of the EDG not working while botching an illegal fuel changeover, or any number of possibilities.
Let people know the main engine has all sorts of support electric motors. Cooling, fuel pumps and list goes on. Plus fact the main engine is not like a car just turn the key it starts.
My understanding is that even if you have steering, it is generally of minimal use unless the propellers are producing wash over the rudders. Is that not correct?
All the redundancy in the rudder and emergency power system begs the question as to why the Dali apparently lost rudder control. Of course, backing down didn't help as it reduced whatever rudder authority was still left.
It’s water flow past the rudder that dictates its effectiveness. The propeller wash, when at ahead, pushes massive amounts of water past the rudder. Conversely, when the propeller is operating astern, it can rob the rudder of all flow, rendering t useless. With the propeller stationary, water flow is directly related to hull speed.
As long as the ship has momentum and there is water flow pass the rudder, the rudder can have an effect on the ship. Keep in mind ship in the Baltimore ship channel was going 8 knots and MV Dali weighted 100,000 DWT. Ship would glide for several ship lengths as long as it doesn’t hit anything. NTSB will do the calculation but once the ship dropped the plant the bridge was doomed.
@@williamlloyd3769This is my point. The rudder can have some effect, yes, but if Steam man is saying that on E-power you don't have main engines, it's game over in a tight channel maneuvering outside of divine intervention. So I don't understand the focus on rudder power
@@NorthPolePenguin1 The ship was doing 7-8 knots which should be enough to steer the ship. You might have to go hard on the rudder (like 20-30-40 degrees) but it should be able to steer the ship effectively. I would have imagined as soon as they had emergency power they would have put the rudder hard to port, maybe there was not enough time to change the turn. But we will have to wait and see what the NTSB finds.
Exactly as I would expect. However one question. How is your Emergency Generator shutdown? Is it an automatic shutdown then subject to another 20 second restart or is it online till manually shutdown? How does the reset occur?
But aren't the rudders minimally effective in a narrow channel without the ability to run the main engine to push water across them? Sure, you might be making 8 knots over ground, but 4-5 knots could be the current pushing you along, leaving 3-4 knots of relative water movement for steering, which isn't much, IMO.
Would have been nice for you to list all systems that are on that emergency bus ad thus powwered from emergency generator. (for instance, how much lighting is powered that is visible from outside). Would there be another generator at bridge level or higher as a last resort generator for when ship is sinking and engine room already flooded? Are there strict rules on what must be powered by emergency generator?
I didn’t do that because what my ship has and is labeled is very likely different from the Dali. Some things are required like steering pump and fire pump, many others are optional
Thanks. I guess we have to wait a year or two for final NTSB report that will go through exactly what that ships generators did and did not do. @@steamman9193
From the time I first heard a report of the Baltimore incident on 03/26/2024, I have been trying to gather accurate data about ALL of the of the factors that played a part in creating the disaster. Keep in mind that even this is something of an oversimplification of what occurred, but it covers the most essential facts. My OPINION is that the principal cause was bureaucrats who played at cost-cutting gambles over the years that seemed like small risks individually, but when they lost multiple bets on a single pass that morning, the cumulative cost was catastrophic, and those who placed the bets were no longer at the table to make good the payment. That's the nature of bureaucracy. There had been generous amounts of rainfall this spring on the Chesapeake Bay watershed, so the volume of water in the river and the current in the channel were quite lively for the M. V. Dali's departure. Also high tide was about 90 minutes before the collision, so it's probable that the departure from port was timed to have the ship pass under the bridge during the peak flowing of the ebb tide. According to GPS tracking records, M.V. Dali was heading southeast at about 8.7 kts. in the navigation channel with a river current running about 8 kts., so nearly all of the rudder’s control authority was being created by the engine's thrust, or prop wash, flowing over it. When they lost the thrust from the engine, being able to change the angle of the rudder didn't matter anymore, because there was no meaningful flow of water over the rudder's surface; the rudder was stalled. Reports today, April 1, 2024, are saying the wind was just 6 kts., but the night of the incident, local sources were saying the wind was straight down from the north at 20 mph. If that was the case, the Pilot was having to steer somewhat east-southeast to keep the southeast heading of the channel. Loosing engine power meant they were being pushed forward at the stern by the river current, which tried to keep them moving at about 8 kts, while being slowed and pushed to starboard by the wind against the port bow, causing it to veer southward because the ship no longer had any steerage to prevent or overcome it. When power came back briefly, GPS readings registered the ship's headway at just 7.4 kts. on its southeast heading along the channel. By the moment when the M. V. Dali struck the bridge piling and pier, the Pilot and the Captain, (who followed all the rules), were just helpless members of the same audience who have virally viewed the video of the event. But they are also victims of the constant fog of decades of authoritarian regulations issued by a dozen generations of appointed petty bureaucrats, each of whom is ego driven to leave some written mark to prove to posterity that their existence within the system was justified, even if the system itself was and is not.
I recently watched a bridge engineer's perspective on this. He believed better protection around the piers would have been effective even for a ship of this size. I was convinced
So you are stating they would have had steering power but no engine propelling power, is that correct? That being so, then, one would think, if all they had available to them at that time that gave them any "power" to navigate the vessel, they would have turned hard to Port, away from their then pointed point of contact with the supporting structure. Would that not seem so?
Considering the size (space available) the risks involved, and the costs associated with the loss of steering in port, I cannot see any good reason for not having an instantaneous battery back-up system for providing steering hydraulic power until generator power is established.
As near to my knowledge and understanding what you stated seems to be accurate. But what I can ascertain from video and other data leads me to believe that neither steering nor main engine power went out when the alleged "first complete outage" occurred. Although, I do not know the HP of the main engine, tracking data and video observation shows a rapid slowing of 1/8 at a time when it could not have happened without two main aspects being present. One being engine power of course in order to go astern, but the speed at which this decrease occurred would seem to suggest that once desired speed and course were achieved at just above slow ahead going toward bridge that the engine had to have then set below and quite possibly at dead slow ahead. Also, once port exit course and desired speed were achieved the rudder would not have been too far port to compensate for current (drift). Wind speed and even current was not far above what is often considered ideal. But this had to be not long prior to observable turning to starboard. Only very shortly after do I see lights out and more turning to starboard this brings me back to the percentage above. As near as I can get it as tracking data rounds at the tenth, the speed forward decreased (in seconds) by 0.1264367816 (12.6% or not far off the average mark of 10% for transverse thrust). The above can be justified as slowing and pushing by the current going mostly west and hitting side of ship at an angle. It is as near to 1/8 of travel speed (12.5%) that one can get. But even if I ignored video and other data and went with full power outage and sudden lack of steering or loss of steering I cannot find support for how much to starboard the ship started suddenly turning without either or both transverse astern and rudder movement. I tried to just give basics and it is not in disagreement with what you highlighted about main and emergency. Should you read the above and give due consideration you will understand why I rapidly dispensed with "freak accident" narrative being pushed immediately or "full outages" and then still later a ton of additions as if they were "getting new information" as they investigated. The sheer number of failures necessary to even come close to justifying what the video and tracking data show would have been nearly all highly evident upon a cursory walk-through the very next day.
Every marine propulsion engine of this type will instantly shut down on safety devices during a blackout. Now can you restart is to be determined. There is a way to cancel the shutdown but with no electricity for fuel supply and air will the engine be able to actually make any power? Probably not
@@steamman9193 This I understand. But what I also know is that for a full outage to main switchboard it would require at minimum two phases with a ground fault. With just one voltage drop of a phase, then detection of that would initiate the auto-emergency switchover. That the emergency generator seems (I say that with a grain of salt because I can emulate all of that from the bridge via just the appearance of actual emergency whether it goes awry later or not) to have started 59s later seems to indicate adequate starting air pressure for it needs it at well. As for the alleged thick black smoke? No firm evidence as the video was shot in dark from a relatively small cam over 4500 feet away with a different audio overlay later in a video without date/time stamp or angle information. For reference, the cam was located at the Brewerton Channel Front Light which is barely discernible on a general map and so 99% of the public will not even make note of it much less find it and even on navigational maps would be difficult if not specifically looking for it. This is thus far the ONLY video with a date-time stamp and a little other angle information and either has more on it or was specifically activated at this time for this event. They could clear that up quickly but if they do not then the presumption is a planned and known attack. But back to the alleged smoke? At night with a small distant cam zoomed in and soaking whatever light possible for the image pure steam belching out could appear the same way. It does mean much to me without an internal video or close up which they neither release or allow despite no real justification for not doing so. I do know that it would be a separate issue and can be bad fuel or a bad fuel to air ratio. My problem arises in the fact that the time sequence, data and additions to the narrative as they went along make it far less likely to me (within first few minutes of the first video release) that it was accidental or even an out of control ship owing to full main outage and then another outage of the emergency. The only other consideration (highly unlikely but I still have to consider it) is that the interlock did also fail or somehow whether intentional or not, they tried to run one or more generators in parallel without being synced but if so then they had to be already trying to do that prior to getting to that point. I just have to consider it because somebody asked me some of the things that could go wrong after a little time of doing that.
@@rickhanson3293 I think you are being too detailed in your assumptions. There’s too much unknown information. And far too many possibilities to have initiated the sequence of events that took place
@@steamman9193 I'm not making hardly any assumptions that have not panned out. I am well ahead of the videos and information released thus far alleged from "official sources". Like I said, I don't disagree with your vid about the steering. My information is in regard to the clear inside job that it was. I don't run on "possibilities". I run on stated info., observable info., contradictory info. (often very revealing despite), knowns, knowledge, the detailed symbolic nature and probability. Possibilities are for those in the media who want to introduce a midnight rainbow causing a color-blind pilot to get confused in calm waters.
Is it possible for the system to fail completely. I mean like everything? Like the Bridge Destroyer? Or Is it completely Human Error on a large scale.?
No way to know for sure, but we had the largest Geo magnetic storm in decades at the time of this failure. The strongest part of this storm ran north to south along the east cost. So my question, is there a way to know if a power surge knocked out the power?
@@rupe53 thats what everyone thinks. however goe storms are selective. the charge builds in one area not everywhere. same reason lighting does not hit every where
@@andrewhallin doesn't have to affect everything, but one might consider a thunderstorm might have several strikes within say a 20 mile radius. Maybe the NTSB will give us a hint in a few months?
Steering at slow speed without propulsion is very very limited. You need the propulsive power of the main engine to provide strong flow over the rudders to have any real effect at low speeds.
The emergency switchboard supplies power to both the port and starboard steering gear pumps, but you have to steer from the emergency steering station in the steering gear room. What happened in the steering gear room after the emergency generator came online is what everyone wants to know (in addition to what caused the blackout).
The emergency switchboard does not supply to both the port and starboard steering pumps. It typically only supplies the #2 (stbd) pump. You do not have to manually steer from the steering gear room after power restoration. That is a backup in case bridge control of the rudder is lost and cannot be restored. I would not be surprised to hear that next to nothing happened in the steering gear room. The issue is with the power loss. Fix that and the vessel should be able to steer normally from the bridge.
Hey again Chief. I'm starting to lose all of the finer details since I retired. I'm looking for some clarification from what I remember and you're just the guy to talk with, again. When the ship lost power the first time, that would have tripped all of the secondary pumps (fuel pump, cooling pump, etc.), correct? And, if all of those pumps shutdown, that would shut down the main engine, correct? How quickly (guestimate) do you think you can get your main engine back online after a blackout? It looks like it took 58 seconds from the initial blackout to the light turning back on (even the navigation lights). The navigation lights should be on the emergency switchboard. So, since they didn't come back on until the rest of the lights came on, there was no power, meaning no steering and no propulsion for the 58 seconds. Then the lights came back on, including the navigation lights. The black smoke started billowing out of the stack 10 seconds after power was restored. Could that be them trying to restart the main engine already? Doesn't it take longer than 10 seconds to get all of the pumps running before you start the main? When the power tripped the second time, the navigation lights stayed on. So, we know at that time, the EDG was operating and powering the emergency switchboard. Since the nav. lights stayed on during the second blackout, that means they had emergency power so they should have retained steering during the time. But, still no propulsion. I know I'm making guesses, but at least they're educated guesses compared to some of the theories out there. Thanks for you opinion. JMac
So lights go out engine shuts down. You can restart by canceling limits/shutdowns but I doubt it’s going to do much because you have no power for fuel pumps or blowers for combustion air as the turbos would have probably spun down. It looked like they got a regular generator on for a brief bit I can’t tell if the emergency ever did anything. Time to wait for the accident investigation report now
@@steamman9193 Thanks man, I appreciate the info. Pretty much what I thought. I heard about canceling the limits but then you risk damaging the engine. It does look to me that the EDG came on at some point after the first black out, and before the second blackout, because the nav. lights stayed on while the rest of the ship went dark (during the second black out). But yeah, it'll be a fun year waiting for the official NTSB report. The lead investigator is a classmate of mine. Good dude back in the day. Very knowledgable.
Oh you coppertops take the cake stfu and listen to the real men who "drive" these huge ships. 65 ton propeller. 7 ton pistons. Ship weighs 200,000,000+ pounds. Ain't a Tesla
The odd deal of the clip showing the Baltimore Bridge takedown is the only thing that seems, to the layman's eyes, to be functioning is steering. Thus, I find it note worthy, you state, you have that with the emergency generator alone. No propelling power, but indeed, steering power.
Greets and love from Hamburg in Germany. I am a facility manager 30 years in the buisn. The information you gave make clear that there is something wrong on that ship- If generators are not in use (after law all 4 weeks or other times) then it will not function in time of need. MEARKS the ship company has no good reputation in "the maintanance the technic of there ships" and also thereatening the workers if they compain because of "the lack of safty first stuff on board. I wonder if the US Gov will make the ship company responseble for the damage or if they look away and cover the criminal activitys (not functional generator and the PROOF in the maintanance books) It can be because how is the onwer of Mearks the shiping comp? A.P. Moeller - Maersk A-S (A) Aktionärsstruktur Größte Anteilseigner in % Freefloat 27,54 Den A.P. Møllerske Støttefond 6,23 Government Pension Fund - Global (The) 1,75 Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP (Global Equity Portfolio)
Which means after the emergency generator came on in a minutes time after the ist black out , they started a main generator thus powering the man engine in turn giving the astern movement , to stop the moentum।, for the reason of the black smoke , thus Canting the head to the St Bd (right) straight to the bridge pillar, & causing the 2nd blackout , futher complicating it with dropping the anchor, It seems the Pilots concentation moved to protecting the bridge than to navigate the ship safely under the Bridge using the momentum of 8 knots, leading to the crash ,
No, you missed the timing there getting a main generator going and getting the main engine running takes longer, how long? How fast were the Indians doing it? Answer not fast enough
@@steamman9193 Could the black smoke seen in the funnel just be the Engineers trying to start the Main Engine? It is started by air pressure, right, so could it just be sod blowing out the funnel, even if the engine didn't start?
There was no need to start the main engines , just the momentum was enough after emergency steering was restored , to guide the ship under the Bridge ,
The pilot did a great job. He helped get the bridge shut down to traffic. The main engine never started back up. The black smoke was probably from the emergency generator or the main generator. Diesels can smoke a lot when 1st starting.
It's called blowing through rhe engines, a standard practice for testing the engines,, before departure usually an hr before, In this case there was no time to be testing the engines , other than direct action using the fuel ,
@@kkinva68starting at the top And deck department captain, Chief mate, 2nd mate, 3rd mate, bosun then the able bodied seamen. Engine department is chief, 1st asst, 2nd, 3rd. Electrician, reefer, junior and wiper. Then 3 men in the galley steward, cook and assistant
@@steamman9193 thanks... that helped, i was trying to understand the onboard maintenance capabilities, i have an idea what union wage rates are and what enlisted wage rates are, i wonder how much these guys wages are..., what training... certification... now i want to watch the Sand Pebbles ...
I would think the emergency generator should be up and running the moment the ship leaves the dock under tug power. What possible downside could result? Certainly, the fuel burn is meaningless by comparison to half a minute without steering while negotiating the close confines of the in-port channel.
Emergency generators are for emergencies imagine 10-20 years of unnecessary wear and tear on your emergency generator then having an actual emergency? They should have had an extra main generator online in restricted waters that should have been the first backup. Should may end up being a very important word in the Dali report
So in other words without a main engine running, and backup steering control, a hypothetical stricken ship should be able to coast a considerable distance UNDER CONTROL and just float under a hypothetical bridge without incident. UNLESS the crew was fighting a malware attack that took control of the SCADA/CAN BUS....
Generator goes out no electric for lube oil or fuel pumps it initiates a safety shutdown. It can be bypassed but it’s highly unlikely the engine would have any power under those conditions.
One minute may be acceptable but does seem like a while. I worked at a large industrial plant. When we lost utility power, our backup generator would be up, running, and loaded in about 15 seconds. We were running quite a few very large motors. I've never worked on a ship so maybe it's a bit different.
@@michaelsuede I have seen that clip several times but never put a stopwatch on it. Seems like a long delay, but certainly well under a minute. The whole event of lost power to collision was less than 2 minutes, and that included power loss twice and the emergency gen set starting / quitting.
