I've only a passing interest I railways but find these videos fascinating. I don't think the public really appreciate just how much concentration is involved in driving a train.
Sadly that was the case in 1988 with the Clapham Junction train crash which involved three trains and all three drivers and many passengers were killed on that day :(.
I think that if you stop whilst the AWS Sundial is on some sort of flashing light warning should automatically activate and potentially also you should be interlocked out of taking power until you press the AWS acknowledge button. I know this isn't quite a great method (would drive you nuts in yards), but I can see starting against danger spads averted in many cases by some sort of automatic, positive alert. Removes the classic human risk of forgetfulness/laziness in setting the DRA.
Yeah Paul Tyreman. i love how he is so formal and professional and in First uniform in those FGW videos, and here he is in relatively casual dress and surrounded by an Apple sticker, a pair of Wharfedale passive speakers powered by a Technics amplifier, and two Sony video monitors of different vintage, what a lej haha :)
ALWAYS, set the DRA at stations where the signal is at danger, there is no platform signal, or the last signal was showing a cautionary aspect and make CLEAR messages towards signallers and drivers!
I wonder how their unions let those companies get away with making the drivers do piddly customer service tasks at every station? If you ask me most of those first few spads were greatly contributed to by company policy that essentially requires the drivers to break their concentration from driving.
There’s a passenger who wants to know what train (s)he needs to catch, and just arrived at the platform. The first member of staff they see is the driver looking out of their window, so they ask about where they’re going. Are you expecting that drivers shouldn’t answer any questions asked even if they know the answer and it’d make the passenger’s journey that bit more pleasant?
The communications example @10:30 and @12:30 seem very longwinded when compared to, for example, air track control - ground operations. Two different situations but the read back aspect seems much more efficient on the aircraft side.
Exactly. Such longwinded protocols are exactly what leads to shorthands and slangs. In this connection, simplifying comms protocols actually would improve safety.
An ATC-style transmission might go something like this: Signaler: Signaling Center. Driver: Signaling Center, this is train 4404 from A to B standing at signal AD0799 in advance of the signal. Requesting permission to pass the signal at danger. Signaler: 4404, [understand you're standing in advance of signal AD0799;] hold position. Conflicting move signaled. Driver: Hold position, 4404. There is no need to repeat the signal number multiple times in one message; the point is to ensure the other side got it, which can be confirmed when it is read back. The bracketed language is optional, because there's no risk of danger when you give a "hold position" instruction. It's usually dangerous to use the word "not" to reverse the meaning of a message, no matter how many times you repeat it. Better to use an alternative phrasing, like "hold position", so there's no chance of the other side inferring the opposite of what you mean if a part of the message is lost. Also "hold position" is much shorter than "you don't have authority to pass the signal at danger; don't move the train until told otherwise". Finally, the "stand by" instruction can be omitted: what else is the train gonna do sitting there but wait for you to get back to it? As to the second transmission, I would shorten "driver of train 4404" to "4404", but not much else.
It's just occurred to me that it would be safer if the AWS were to repeat the ping if you take power with the sunflower showing. That way you'd not forget it.
The problem with the freight driver's spad (radio discipline) is that the "by the book" procedure is far too unwieldy. It is true that neither of the staff were using it properly, but it appears to be so long (notice the driver is actually reading a script (like that would happen!)) that it has failed to take into account the human predisposition to laziness and is simply a rule asking to be broken. It also fails one of the golden rules of radio communication: it is not concise. In my opinion the procedure requires urgent modification to allow for radio exchanges that are short, easily adhered to, easily understood and thus the safest possible.
Jerram89 It must be said though that form-based safe-working (shown later in the example) is a good way to communicate complex, important or lengthy instructions.
Things have improved a bit since this video. Full read-back and lengthy wording can leave people tongue-tied, as well as feeling stupid in the case of conversations for routine working procedures. Radio token block scripts are a example of a fair compromise and all staff know where they stand without over-lengthy chit-chat.
You're plain wrong. They're not reading off the script. They are both reading off a pre-printed form, so there's no memorization. Further, remember that all radio communication is recorded, they go back and audit the recordings. It's only the British that are lazy, go see how the US does it with track warrants.
Many Words I could normally think about, as well as learning about, especially at school Here are the contents to SPAD Risk 1 00:00 Intro 02:14 Risk 1 Platform starting signal at caution, next signal not visible 03:10 SPAD TRAP 03:35 Explanation 04:10 The Right Way 04:26 Risk 2 No platform starting signal and the next signal not visible 05:19 SPAD TRAP 05:37 Explanation 06:04 Failure to use the DRA Device, in SPAD situations Mandatory 06:35 Risk 3 Train or movement reversed, starting ahead of a signal 07:38 SPAD TRAP 08:10 Explanation, Very Serious Collision! 09:27 Verbal Authority, no authority to move the train 10:28 Explanation 11:10 The Right Way to pass a signal at danger 12:41 Conclusion 13:04 Risk 4 Starting against a signal at danger 13:42 SPAD TRAP The Signal Is Still On! 13:51 Explanation 14:38 Looking Back 15:04 Final Explanation and Outro
+phillyslasher Either way the freight train has to call the signaller for authority to pass the signal at danger as his wheels are occupying the track circuit meaning that the signal will be at danger either way.
@phillyslasher I agree also that what they said didn't make sense. But on your point of signal blocks, here in the UK we have a small area after the signals called a signal overlap, so that if a driver overshoots a danger signal there is a safe area where they won't collide with trains on converging lines. In this situation the front of the train is only occupying the overlap and not the track of the block after it, so trains can still be signaled over the points on the converging line.
@phillyslasher The loco is only ahead of the signal either due to a loco runround/change or due to shunting. In these scenarios the route/points could have been automatically released further down line line allowing the signaller to set other/conflicting routes...this is why drivers must gain the signallers permission to start ahead of signals. The block can only be considered belonging to the train if the train had entered the block on a proceed aspect.
The words are "I'll get you THE shut back when the other bloke's got the road", that is once the other train has departed, he will allow this train to continue with shunting operations.
How amusing, when you realise we used to hack up and down a four track mainline with steam hauled express trains at up to a 100mph, without even AWS. (Waterloo - Bournemouth until 1967) Indeed even with 90mph EMU'S the London-Brighton line (& others) didn't get fitted with AWS until the late 1970's. And these were some of the busiest lines in Britain !!!
At 10:01, even when they're trying to do it correctly, it's not very good. In my view what the signaller should have said is: "Negative. Remain where you are, I will call you back after a conflicting move has taken place."
I had wondered by the tone of this video was played to those drivers who had a spad and had to be “further trained” before they were allowed back driving again
The radiotelephony makes me cringe, verbose and clunky, and still not poignant enough to prevent misunderstandings - they should really look for inspiration in the aviation world... (Driver of... who cares, say the train number as your callsign - 'you do not have authority to proceed' can be shortened to hold position - leave out unnecessary information to the driver (line is in use by goods service, again, who cares, he is holding position)
They're on a duplex radio, identifying apart from the first contact is completely useless because there's nobody else on the line besides the driver and control.
Network Rail tries to use mental discipline to resolve issues with poor signal positions and various other design weaknesses. Relying on memory rather than optimal positioning of signals should be addressed. The DRA could be improved to include an At Danger dash indicator. As soon as the At Danger is observed, the DRA would be set to At Danger. Allowing a moment of time between seeing the At Danger signal and activating the DRA creates a risk. The sunflower also appears to be poorly positioned. An aircraft would never have so many procedures that require accurate memory.
I always wonder how is it possible in 2013 you don't have a simple Signal Repeater in the cabin of trains in England! Take example from the SCMT we have in Italy!
13:15 This isn't a SPAD trap, this is a SPAD risk created by incompetent staff driving and dispatching the train. Both of these men should have done their jobs properly instead of the dispatcher dispatching the train against a red signal and the driver moving his train without checking the signal.
I'm never going on a train again. I thought all this stuff would have been automated by now, but as it turns out the equipment is the same as it was in the 1960's.
+Calum MacLeod Right on, Calum. Glad there are some people out there who can see through the bullshit screen. Nowadays, its all about working out fail-safe ways to blame the driver(or other running staff) if something goes wrong, as distinct from doing the utmost to eliminate the hazard in the first place.
I made a short YTP on December 2016, on location at the Verkehrshaus in Lucerne, the same place with so many road signs in green, blue and white, from all over Switzerland. A DRA is shown in the video.
Is it just me?.. but where was that message misunderstood? I know the signaller should of used the term propel back instead of shove back bwtf? Driver error !
7:20 Is this driver even from the UK? How did he not understand what the signaller had told him? That said the signaller wasn't clear enough and should not have used the words he did.
