The Battle of Midway in Perspective with special guest Jon Parshall-Episode 110 

Jon Parshall Jonp@combinedfleet.com responds: “One question which I have always had was why the Japanese CAPs fighters failed to position themselves above the carriers before McClusky’s squadron arrived. It is my understating that the Zeros had both the capability and time to gain attitude to make the interception.” This is a great question, and he’s exactly correct-the Zero had plenty of performance to get back up there. We don’t know exactly, but here’s my sense of things. Some or all of the CAP may have indeed resumed altitude after they finally saw VT-6’s attack off by about 1000 or so. But the very visible arrival of VT-3 at about 1010 required a response (obviously). VT-3 was unique, though, in that it was the only strike of the morning of any flavor that had a fighter escort (Thach). A *lot* of the Japanese CAP got sucked into this vortex of trying to come to grips with the Thach Weave, which Jimmy was desperately debuting for the first time as he was trying to keep himself and his other two pilots alive. So, a lot of people tend to think about the 10-15 minutes prior to the dive-bomber attack as a question of the CAP not being at altitude. I don’t see altitude as the issue. I think it’s a red herring. What I see is a lateral distortion of the CAP into the southeast threat vector (which is where VT-3 was coming from), that pulled the bulk of the CAP away from the carriers, and into Thach’s furball. We know that as many as two dozen Zeros were involved in that circus-that’s the bulk of the CAP right there. The bulk of the rest were shooting up VT-3. “Another point that has been a puzzle is the absence of any literature regarding the action plan that was sent out from the flagship Akagi to the fleet. Transmitted at 5:20 am on June 4, it stated that “no enemy action was expected for the day”. Truly, it was a bad way to start the day.” Another *very* perceptive question by your listener! As it turns out, my co-author Tony Tully and his friend Lu Yu wrote an article on this very topic for the Naval War College Review back in 2015. You can find it here: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/6/. (And I’m also attaching it.) Intriguingly, this is driven by something that Lu Yu picked up on in Mori’s 2012 book! J In a nutshell, a staff officer named Yoshioka Tadakazu, who was the guy who prepared the Nagumo Report, “admitted to Mori that there had been an omission in the reproduction of the message log that he compiled. In a radio message of 0220, or 0520 local time (2:20 and 5:20 am), a significant first sentence originally stated, ‘It is calculated [projected] that enemy Kidō Butai will not sortie [be encountered] today.’ This sentence was dropped from Nagumo’s report as actually submitted. Indeed, this omission was not even disclosed by Yoshioka to the writers of the official Japanese war history series, Senshi Sōsho.” That’s a bombshell. Because what Tony and Lu demonstrate is that the scouting arrangements of Kidō Butai all through the first part of the war *were driven by their intel estimates!* If the pre-battle intel said “no carriers expected,” you’d get a pretty sparse scout plane pattern. But if the intel estimate said “there might be enemy carriers”, lo and behold, you get a much beefier search pattern. So the fact that Nagumo’s intel said “no carriers,” well, that explains why you only have seven scout planes up in the air. Ooops. Finally, regarding “You will always face defeat once you start lying.” Yeah, and of course Midway is the beginning of a Japanese pattern of deceit, and *self*-deceit regarding their losses in battle. That pattern continues all the way to the end of the war, and allows the Japanese to deceive themselves that they were inflicting much greater losses on the Americans than they were receiving in return, when in fact just the opposite was true. That alternate reality made it a hell of a lot more difficult to end the war, because the Japanese leadership literally wasn’t operating with the same set of facts… until the Bomb got dropped. Thanks for these great questions, and the listener should congratulate themselves for being a very astute student of the battle. Cheers, Jon

​ It was pleasant surprise to receive a prompt and illuminating response. Many thanks. The review written by Messrs. Tully and Lu regarding Nagumo’s early morning message to his fleet confirmed much of my suspicions regarding the IJN’s pre-battle conduct. I have moved on to Guadalcanal, reading a book by Toshikazu Hando (eminent Japanese historian, published 2004). The prologue referred to Midway. I was amazed to learn that the Emperor and Tojo received the doctored reports on the battle results. Osami Nagano, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, obtained the Emperor’s approval on the formation of a new carrier group on July 4. The reorganization was begun on July 14. A list of the composition of the new fleet clearly identified the Akagi and Hiryu as being out of commission, implying they would eventually be back on line. Both ships had been in Davy Jones locker for more than a month! Clearly this was what had been reported to the Emperor. Although there was no substantiation relating to Tojo, given the author’s reputation for scholarly work, the statement that he too had been beguiled was credible. Too bad no one listened to Isoruku Yamamoto’s admonition about being truthful in reporting battle results. As this is being written on the 81st anniversary of Pearl Harbor, I thought an anecdote on Yamamoto, the mastermind of the attack, would be appropriate. Before the attack, he strongly demanded that a declaration of war be delivered without fail. “Even if a samurai has to kills an enemy in his sleep, he should have the courtesy of kicking him awake with a boot to the pillow before delivering the blow.” Fate was unkind. Based on what I’ve read about Nimitz, the two probably would have been good friends with if they had met under more favorable circumstances. By the way reading Parshall-san's bio in the Imperial Japanese Navy Page site, it was amusing to learn he had lived in Hiroshima. I was working at an automaker headquartered in the city while he was there. Our paths might have crossed at the Hondori shopping arcade!

I also, would suggest that with the large number of "casual historians" who tend to, (and I include myself in this as younger WW2 enthusiast) mix excellent historical work and pop culture and then carry that mixture into discussions on and offline, you can have myths like the CAP not being at altitude, become accepted fact. In the 1976 Midway movie, I am specifically thinking of a line spoken by Commander Genda when asked about the CAP after the torpedo squadrons had attacked. Roughly paraphrased, the character Genda, says that the fighters of the CAP are off chasing the torpedo bombers left at eave top height, and the character of Admiral Nagumo, asks "so we have no fighter umbrella protecting us?" My point being that as a young kid seeing that movie, combined with actually reading historical accounts before Shattered Sword debunked many falsehoods about the battle, pop culture and history combined to create a myth in my understanding. I guess the point I'm trying to convey is that providing a forum for the casual history buff to learn from historians such as Seth and Jon and someone who has the l9ve of history and practical experience of Bill, is going a long, long way towards not only correcting the record, but opening up a whole new segment of the population of casual history enthusiasts, to the scholarship and insights that most people would never know how to find. Thank you for adding your voices to this work and for making your podcast as accessible to as many people as possible.

My thinking on this question is that while the zero could stay aloft for a very long time, it could not keep from running out of ammunition for a similar long period of time. Also, US planes were tough to shoot down and the zeros, if I am correct, only carried 60 rounds per gun. Hence, it should not be a surprise that after bringing down a number of US planes, zero's starting going back to their ships to reload ammunition. This obviously would keep them from being at high altitude for some time given that the carrier deck needed to be clear enough for them to land and take off again after loading.

​@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Jon I bought Shattered Sword when it first came out, a million thank yous. Have always loved the WW2 naval ships and battles especially the IJN carriers. Lol also my cats are all named after IJN ships❤

That was El Alamein not Battle of Britian! :)

This did not age well. Cadet Bone Spurs doing Putolini's bidding and withholding aid for Ukraine.

Both Seth and Bill make sure those stories are told as a main part of the mission. Human beings do all of the suffering and dying, on both sides. I think Japanese officers had such low regard for life that they wasted the best of their male population, as well as ruining their brains.

Thanks!

Kudos on the the channel and the Midway series in particular. I’m interested to see a series on how much Mcarther exaggerated. On a side note. I’m a huge believer in Midway being the turning point for tree reasons first and foremost it took 4 Japanese frontline carriers off the board as well as Thierry respective flight groups. It slowed the Americans to stop playing defense and reactive warfare. And lastly it was a huge moral booster none of which can be overlooked.

Your discussion on the Japanese’s military’s state of mind was very interesting. Do you think they would had surrendered without the US dropping the atomic bomb? As much as I find the Japanese culture admirable it bothers me that they never have acknowledged the Rape of Nanking and their treatment of civilian and military POWs. The Japanese always reference the Atomic Bomb as victims. I remember the protest and debate over a Smithsonian exhibition , the mention of the Atomic bomb was eliminated.

Agree, just watched the old 1979 Midway movie on Netflix, and I could just see every event coming after this podcast taught it all to me. It's pretty good for that time period of Hollywood, if anybody else wants a night off from their usual streaming fare. Thanks

​​@@mariellouise1 I agree with you. The Japanese have much to atone for. They could take a lesson from the Germans post World War II where they, the Germans paid reparations, issued worldwide apologies, and took ownership of the Holocaust and their own form of brutality during the war. They went to extreme lengths to rehabilitate a brainwashed and indoctrinated population. I have friends that live in Japan and they have told me that the Japanese are rewriting their history books even as I'm writing this. There's never any mention of Pearl Harbor, the rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, the treatment of Allied pows as well as civilians and the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians. All of this while they still claim to be "victims" of the atomic bomb. Who attacked America by the way? My father was a veteran of World War II, US Navy South Pacific. And I can tell you that growing up there was never anything, ever, that was made in Japan or had anything to do with Japan. He had seen enough action aboard the USS Montpelier which was a light Cruiser including a Kamikaze strike. He had seen enough, heard enough and it shaped his post-war attitude towards the Japanese for the rest of his life. My dad told me there was a saying that went around during the war that went, "wherever the Japanese go rape, torture, and murder follow." It seems like no truer words were spoken.

Are these photos part of the public record yet? Please post what you can. Let's not loose our history. From a 1970s navy vet.

They don't tell the enlisted men what is going on.

@@Canadian_Skeptical Yep, but as the battle was discussed later, the confusion was evident. Even if everyone was doing their level best, communications were patchy and slow, unable to keep up with the pace of events.

@@petesheppard1709aka the fog of war

@@daverobinson6110 Yep!

Anything by Richard Frank, James Hornfischer, John Bruning, and others mentioned along the wakes. There are also episodes on recommended books and movies.

😊😊😊😊😊pppppp

More to come!

Guadalcanal is so huge when you think about it, it's difficult to get everything. Right now we are focusing on the actions on and around the island. We fully intend to have an episode (or two) just on the air campaign so that we may highlight some individuals and their actions.

Thank you very much for the compliment. Spread the word!

They are awesome! I started watching after I was laid up by an accident. Now, I eagerly await Tuesday's for the next episode.

You're welcome!

Thanks very much.

FUN FACT: The Japanese sank _Enterprise_ six times!

I totally agree!

Potter: my old prof. Rochefort-- you are correct.

Many thanks

The US had several Essex-class carriers on the building ways in June 1942. The USN was way behind the IJN on the coordination of multiple carrier air groups in '42 and didn't really match Japan until the attacks on Truk in early '44.

I agree strongly. Treatment of both POWs and civilians was horrible. And, just like the Germans, no winning of hearts and minds. Ridiculous master race nonsense.

I agree with your views on the differences between the "aggressive mindset" of the Japanese vs the Germans combatants. My view is based on friends & family members fathers, uncles, etc reflections & statements of their personal experiences on both fronts. My best friend's father, had been deployed first to North Africa, then fought his way up through Italy, then sent to England for a little R&R & retraining, before his final deployment was a few days after the initial Normandy beachhead had been secured. They landed on Normandy & fought through France & into Germany. His unit took part in the liberation a concentration camp. The haunting look of abject horror on his face, over 60 yrs later, still gives me chills today. Having said that, I distinctly remember this statement he made. "As bad as it was for us in the ETO, the boys fighting those Japanese had it worse." He based his statement on the shared experiences of friends, who had fought & made it home from the Pacific theater.

They have episodes on a book list and recommended movies. You will be truly hooked then.

@@Jakal-pw8yq ALA " The Rape of Nanking." This brutality had no tactical benefit to Japan and enraged all who learned about it.

From Bill: Did an article in World Magazine that included a lot of exposition on LeMay. He was the inspiration for the George C. Scott character in "Dr Strangelove."

@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar I like bill and I'll look for that article. Love the channel ty for replying and keep doing what you do. We have got to get one of those doomsday devices lol

@@chadrowe8452 We cannot allow a mineshaft gap either.

Midway was just the start of the attritional war that would see the elite cadre of Japanese airmen all but wiped out by the end of the Battle of Santa Cruz. They lost 121 at Midway, a similar number at Eastern Solomons and 148 at Santa Cruz. Add in their losses in the day-to-day actions during the Guadalcanal Campaign and the fact they didn't (or couldn't) rotate their experienced aviators back home to train the new guys, by '43 there was a marked drop-off the the caliber of Japanese aviators.

Also, Japan took 2 years to train navy aviators, and resisted changing policy(adapting). As a Russian admiral once said, "Better is the enemy of good enough".

😂😂😂

Glad you found us.

Well said.

@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWarthank you. I just found this channel and am thoroughly enjoying it.

@Jet Driver this is an excellent concise description. Thank you. I am glad I came across your comment.

Hey there! Lemme see if I can answer these: 1) Maybe, possibly... but if so, there's no mention of that purpose that I've seen anywhere in the Japanese accounts of the battle. Also, my sense is that the Japanese viewed Hiryu as an offensive asset, not an asset designed to provide cover for a surface force. So far as I know, all of Hiryu's CAP assets were over *her*, not Nagumo's surface force. I personally think that Yamaguchi tagged along behind Nagumo simply because he was more aggressive than he was imaginative as a tactician. Your question is interesting, though--hadn't thought of that. 2) Sorry, don't have that information, and I don't remember if it was even specified--my sense is it wasn't. Understand that those dispositions between the AL and MI forces were laid out in one of the Japanese monographs, and I feel like they were highly conjectural--more like sketches rather than a formal plan. I note that Senshi Sosho, pp. 99-114, has a number of tables laying out what look to be similar tables of dispositions... but I haven't translated them. 3) Sorry, again, don't have that, and I don't *think* it was actually specified in the Japanese sources (however, bear in mind, it's been 20+ years since I was deep in the weeds on all this.) My sense is that Kondo stays in the neighborhood of Midway to provide support to the landing forces. Depending on the timing, the heavy forces from the Aleutians *should* have been able to come south. From what I recall, though, it didn't seem like the two carrier forces or the two battleship forces were necessarily operating together--but that may just have been a result of the fact that the diagrams in the source materials weren't all that specific. All we really have to go on is the map on p. 117 of Senshi Sosho, which shows the map exercise on May 25 that Combined Fleet staff did. That shows 2nd KDB operating separately from 1st KDB (and *southwest of Midway*, oddly enough), and also shows 2nd Fleet moving as an advance force towards the oncoming blue fleet. I aimed Google Translate on my phone at that section of the manuscript just this morning, and there was no talk of specific dispositions to fight the battle. There may be more in the text, but I haven't tried translating it. Hope this is helpful. Jon

Haha

@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar I forgot the other part not in the papers. For his effrontery to the power's that be: "Roquefort exiled to Shipbuilding and denied Award"!

Well, define "ready". The US wasn't "ready" for Operation Watchtower either, but they went ahead with it anyway because they understood that you can still succeed without being fully ready, especially if your enemy is also in dire straits.

I think your comment is fair; operation Torch when it came was tricky enough and in no way comparable to a landing in Normandy. The Americans themselves would probably have suffered seriously with an early cross channel attack.

Guadalcanal. Everyday, from August 7 until November. And the IJN most certainly did not lose all their senior pilots at Midway. The beatings of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, especially Santa Cruz, proved that.

I think we do talk about Miles during one of our MW episodes.

Dead on. We can never know what we do not know. The criticisms of the flight to nowhere os over done. Ring may have(probably) stuck to his decision too long. This is all 20/20 hindsight. Also, as an ex Naval officer, I have seen, many times, senior officers step on their subordinates to promote themselves. THAT IS HOW (often) ADMIRALS ARE MADE.😮

Translation: I'm sure the people who fought at the time were desperate, but from today's perspective, the Battle of Midway feels like a duel in the blue seas on the huge field of the Pacific Ocean. It was so dramatic that I wonder how historians hundreds of years from now will view this battle, but some may perhaps portray it as a legendary, mythical battle that took place on the Pacific Ocean long ago. That's how dramatic and fateful a battle it was

A lot of them died on Guadalcanal. Col Ichiki's troops were all but annihilated by the Marines at Alligator Creek, for instance.

Hell no.